

Polity IV Country Report 2010: Bosnia							
Score:	2009	2010	Change				
Polity:	-66	-66	x				
Democ:	-66	-66	x				
Autoc:	-66	-66	x				
Durable:	0						
Tentative:	No						
SCODE	BOS	CCODE	346	Date of Report	1 June 2011		
Polity IV Component Variables							
XRREG	XRCOMP	XROPEN	XCONST	PARREG	PARCOMP		
-66	-66	-66	-66	-66	-66		
Date of Most Recent Polity Transition (3 or more point change)							
End Date	5 April 1992 (Ind.)		Begin Date				
Polity Fragmentation: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniac-Croat; 51% of territory); Republika Srpska (Serb; 49% of territory)							
Constitution	1995 (Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords)						
Executive(s)	High Representative Valentin Inzko, appointed 26 March 2009 by the Peace Implementation Council Collective presidency; direct ethnic election; most recent elections, 3 October 2010 Croat President Željko Komšić (SDP), 60.6%; Bosniac President Bakir Izetbegović (SDA), 34.9%; Serb President Nebojša Radmanović (SNSD), 48.9%						
Legislature	Bicameral: House of Representatives (42 seats; proportionally elected, 28 Bosniac-Croat and 14 Serb; most recent elections, 3 October 2010) Social Democratic Union (SNSD): 8 Social Democratic Party (SDP): 8 Party of Democratic Action (SDA): 7 Other parties: 19 House of Peoples (15 seats; 10 elected by Bosniac-Croat Federation's House of Representatives, 5 elected by Serb Republic's National Assembly; last constituted February 2007)						
Judiciary	State Court (all federation: created in June 2002) Bosniac-Croat Federation: Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Human Rights Court (non-operational) Serb Republic: Supreme Court, Constitutional Court						

Narrative Description:¹

Summary of Interruption: (-66)

Following the lead of the ethnic Slovenian and Croatian republics, the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a popular referendum to decide whether to secede from the Yugoslavia federation. Ethnic Croat and Muslim Bosniak populations voted overwhelmingly for secession while the ethnic Serb population refused to recognize the legality of the referendum. When the Muslim Bosniak-led government claimed independence for the republic in March 1992, warfare immediately broke out as ethnic Serb militias attempted to seize as much of the republic's territory as possible and, effectively, secede from the new republic. A substantial portion of the ethnic Croat population also leaned toward separation, leaving the republic government isolated in Sarajevo and the Muslim Bosniak population extremely vulnerable. The ensuing civil war and polarization of ethnic communities devastated the republic and radical policies of ethnic cleansing brutalized the population. Interventions by the international community, particularly military actions by NATO air forces, eventually persuaded the warring parties to accept a de facto partition of the country and international stewardship, as codified in the Dayton Accords and signed on 14 December 1995.

Executive power is vested, de jure, in a collective presidency comprised of one president directly elected from each of three ethnic constituencies: Bosniac (Muslim); Croat; and Serb. Executive authority rotates among the three Presidents every eight months. The All-Bosnia government is headed by Co-Prime Ministers who alternate in office every week, one elected by the Chamber of Deputies of the Federation and the other elected by the Chamber of Deputies of the Republika Srpska. While elections for presidents are relatively open and competitive (although heavily scrutinized and influenced by the international community), all appointments to the executive branch must be made in consultation with the international community's Office of the High Representative (OHR). Real power resides in the OHR who can, and does, remove elected leaders and impose decrees. De facto executive power resides in the fragmented constituent "entity" administrations (Bosniac-Croat Federation and Serb Republic) and in informal structures linked with ethnic-militias. The Bosniac-Croat Federation should also be considered fragmented as cooperation between Bosniac and Croat leaders remains tenuous, at best. The judiciary in both "entities" is subject to intimidation and influence by local leaders.

The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) continues to implement the military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Accords), create a secure environment for implementation of the accord's political aspects, and enforce a 4-kilometer separation between constituent "entities." The OHR oversees implementation of civilian provisions. The International Police Task Force (IPTF), established by the UN under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords, oversees police restructuring and training. Together, these international institutions provide the ultimate executive authority that governs the Bosnian state, therefore, an "interruption code" (-66) is assigned.

In 1998, Bosnia held its most peaceful and pluralistic elections since the 1995 Dayton Accords. Multiethnic parties committed to building on the foundation established at Dayton made some progress during the presidential and assembly elections. At the same time, the largest political parties continued to be ethnically-based and opposed to integration and the return of displaced persons from other ethnic groups to territories under their control. Continued party control of the media and security apparatus precluded full citizen participation without intimidation, especially in Croat areas and parts of the Serb Republic. To varying degrees, all major parties seek to exclude other parties in areas they control. Ethnic tensions continue to flare periodically. Many of the leaders during the civil war period, several of whom have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, remain at large and continue to influence local politics. Attempts to arrest these people invariably trigger demonstrations and other forms of resistance. Separatist sentiments continue to limit policy options and undermine the cohesion and authority of central governance. For example, in March 2001, a permanent boycott of the republic government was called by the Croatian National Congress (dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ). The Croat President, Ante Jelavic, was subsequently dismissed from office on 8 March by the UN Bosnian High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, for encouraging separatism. This was followed by a

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general crackdown on Croat separatist groups, including a high profile raid on a bank in Mostar accused of laundering separatist assets. The raid sparked serious and widespread rioting throughout April in ethnic Croat areas. In May 2001, attempts to begin rebuilding mosques in the Serb Republic destroyed during the war were prevented by Serbian mobs. A cornerstone for a new mosque in Banja Luka, capital of the Serb Republic, was laid on 18 June 2001, after police dispersed Serbian demonstrators with tear gas and water canons. On 21 June 2001, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate for the NATO (SFOR) and UN (UNMIBH) missions through June 2002.

On 4 April 2002, the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska approved constitutional amendments in response to a demand issued by UN Bosnian High Representative Petritsch that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims alike be made politically equal throughout Bosnia. However, Petritsch said that the constitutional amendments did not go far enough and he called upon both the Serb republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation to make acceptable changes by an 18 April deadline. Neither the Federation nor the Serb republic approved the changes by the deadline. Petritsch responded on 19 April by announcing new constitutions for both the Federation and the republic. Not surprisingly, the country's three main nationalist parties were critical of Petritsch's action.

In June 2002 a new State Court was created; it constituted the first state-level judiciary since the country was divided after the 1995 Dayton accords. The idea of a State Court had been proposed by Petritsch, who had left his post as High Representative in May. Lord Paddy Ashdown replaced Petritsch in late May 2002; since his appointment, Ashdown had made the fight against corruption and organized crime a priority. Continuing his anti-corruption campaign, Lord Ashdown on 29 March 2005 dismissed Dragan Covic from his post of President. (Covic had been elected as the ethnic Croat member of the tripartite presidency in October 2002.) Covic was dismissed one day prior to going on trial for customs evasion, corruption, and abuse of office. The House of Representatives in May 2005 elected Ivo Miro Jovic, a member of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ), as the new Croat member of the presidency.

Despite the weak central government apparatus in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in recent years there has been significant movement in the direction of reasserting central political authority in this country. Under EU and US pressure, on the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Accords the leaders of the country's main political parities agreed to work on establishing a new constitution. While still far from complete, the areas of agreement include stronger powers for the central government and parliament, a streamlined administration and less reliance on ethnic criteria in filling elected posts. Under this agreement, Bosnia's three-member presidency will ultimately be replaced by a single administrative entity. In addition, during 2005 an agreement was made to unify the country's military and policy forces by 2006. The High Representative, feeding off these promising events, suggested in 2006 that international support for Bosnia-Herzegovina would likely end in 2007.

In early 2007 the International Crisis Group warned that Bosnia remained unready for unguided ownership of its own future due to the continued presence of ethnic factionalism within the country. While over a half a million of this country's internally displaced citizens have returned to their homes in recent years, some 1.8 million remain internal refugees. Despite the continued movement toward reestablishing central political authority in recent years, which included the decision by the European Union cut its troop presence in the country from 6,000 to 2,500 in early 2007, nonetheless, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina announced in March 2007 that it would stay open until at least 2008. This decision was taken in Brussels by the 55-nation Peace Implementation Council which steers the Dayton Accord. The Office of the High Representative noted the continued failure of the country's 15 police forces to integrate into one apolitical and ethnically-mixed force as being a major stumbling block to their withdrawal. While Bosnian Serbs had been wary of giving up their separate force, fearing it may lead to the loss of their separate territory within Bosnia, Bosniak leaders have pressed for a completely merged police force, hoping it would lead to the complete unification of the country. In December 2007 an agreement was reached to merge the police forces in mid-2008. Also, in December 2007 Serb, Bosniak and Croat leaders agreed on new voting rules aimed at strengthening the central government. The reforms now make it harder for lawmakers to block legislation by simply boycotting votes in the National Assembly.