


Polity IV Country Report 2010: Chad					
Score:	2009	2010	Change		
<b>Polity:</b>	-2	-2	0		
<b>Democ:</b>	1	1	0		
<b>Autoc:</b>	3	3	0		
<b>Durable:</b>		18			
<b>Tentative:</b>		No			
SCORE	CHA	CCODE	483	Date of Report	1 June 2011
<b>Polity IV Component Variables</b>					
XRREG	XRCOMP	XROPEN	XCONST	PARREG	PARCOMP
2	0	0	2	3	3
<b>Date of Most Recent Polity Transition (3 or more point change)</b>					
End Date		1 October 1991		Begin Date	
				16 March 1992	
<b>Polity Fragmentation: No</b>					
<b>Constitution</b>	1996				
<b>Executive(s)</b>	President Idriss Déby (MPS); seized power in 1990; initially directly elected in 1996; most recently reelected 25 April 2011, 88.6%				
<b>Legislature</b>	Unicameral: National Assembly (155 seats; directly elected; most recent elections, 13 February 2011) Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS): 133 Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP): 11 Others: 44				
<b>Judiciary</b>	Supreme Court				



**Narrative Description:**<sup>1</sup>

**Executive Recruitment: Gradual Transition from Self-Selection (5)**

Idriss Déby, leader of the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), has ruled Chad since seizing control of the government from rival ethnic-based warlords in 1990. After many false starts and years of broken promises, multiparty presidential elections were held in 1996. While the elections of 1996 were not plagued by any major incidents of ethno-political violence, nevertheless, they were marred by widespread and credible reports of fraud and government intimidation of opposition forces. Déby's victory, while demonstrating a slight opening of the executive recruitment process in Chad, highlighted the continued weakness of democratic norms and institutions in this country. However, the May 2001 presidential election was the first step in the transition to a competitive executive recruitment process. While the six

<sup>1</sup> The research described in this report was sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed herein are the authors' alone and do not represent the views of the US Government.

losing candidates claimed that the vote was plagued by fraud, international observers have suggested that Déby's electoral victory was largely legitimate. To be sure, Déby used his position of power to tilt the electoral playing field in his favor. While incidents of voting irregularities were documented, the massive fraud and intimidation found in the 1996 election was largely absent.

Despite this positive step, however, members of the President's party continue to dominate the "Independent Elections Commission" and opposition observers are denied access to official vote tallies. Opposition efforts are limited by government intimidation and a general lack of public support. Although Déby was constitutionally prohibited from seeking a third term, in 2005 the National Assembly approved an amendment that allowed abolished presidential term limits. Déby won the May 3, 2006 election with 64.7% of the vote. In April 2011 presidential elections, Déby increased his share of the vote to nearly 90%.

#### **Executive Constraints: Slight Limitations (2)**

Horizontal accountability within Chad remains weak. The executive branch dominates policy formulation and implementation within this country as political power is centralized in the hands of President Déby and members of his Zaghawa ethnic group. While the controversial 1997 legislative elections (in which Déby's MPS won only sixty-five of 125 seats) marked a slight increase in executive oversight by the legislative branch, this increase in legislative power was only temporary. In the wake of the 2002 legislative elections, the MPS controlled 110 of 125 seats in the National Assembly and, not surprisingly, has posed little direct challenge to the President's authority and serves largely as a rubber-stamp body for executive initiatives. The judiciary continues to be subjected to significant influence by the executive branch and provides only a limited check on its authority.

#### **Political Participation: Factional/Restricted Competition (6)**

Chad has a long history of political factionalism, state repression and ethnic/clan violence. Like its neighbors to the east and west (the Sudan and Niger), Chad is racially and culturally divided between an Arab-dominated, Muslim north and a black African, Christian/animist south. In addition to this socio-geographical cleavage, there are numerous clan-based loyalties and political organizations within each region. There are over 200 ethnic groups in Chad that speak 128 primary languages. This unstable mix of social identities and political loyalties has produced an almost constant state of war in the post-colonial era and virtually all political parties continue to have readily identifiable regional and ethnic foundations.

In 1960 François Tombalbaye, leader of the Sara-dominated Chadian Progressive Party, was elected the country's first president. President Tombalbaye, whose political base was in the south, soon found his rule challenged by the nomadic Arabs of the north. In an effort to control the factional forces within Chad, President Tombalbaye suppressed all political opposition to his rule. By the mid-1970s opposition to Tombalbaye's rule was reaching the boiling point. Numerous loosely organized private armies, each with loyalty to a particular leader and clan, were active within Chad. The most powerful of the "revolutionary" groups active in the north was the Chadian National Liberation Front (Frolinat), led by Goukouni Oueddi and Hissene Habre. While Tombalbaye was killed in a 1975 coup led by General Félix Malloum, the new regime (led by Malloum) was unable to find either a political or military solution to the war in the north. By 1978 the Frolinat had fractured between supporters of Oueddi and Habre. The military success of Frolinat, now led by Oueddi, was briefly halted in 1978 with the introduction of French forces into the conflict. President Malloum, in an effort to create a political solution to the conflict, offered ex-Frolinat leader Hissene Habre the position of prime minister. However, the peace brokered by Malloum proved to be short-lived as Frolinat forces re-ignited their military campaign and forced the President to flee the country in 1979.

In the wake of Malloum's departure from power, rival opposition groups within Chad established a provisional Government of National Unity (GUNT) with Goukouni Oueddi as president. The GUNT was unable to hold the peace as civil war broke out between armed followers of Oueddi and Habre. By early 1981 Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN) controlled half of the country, forcing Oueddi to flee the country. However, Oueddi (with Libyan help) continued to wage war against Habre's forces throughout the 1980s. By the late 1980s the conflict had largely come to a standstill as Libya sought to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Habre regime. Despite the apparent return to "normal" politics in Chad in early 1990, by the end of the year the state was once again on the brink of collapse. With the support of Libya, the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), led by Iriss Déby (former army chief under Habre), defeated Habre's army and Déby was installed as president.

Throughout the 1990s factionalism continued to define politics in Chad. Déby's party and supporters, derived primarily from the Zaghawa and Bidiyat clans, have sought to enhance and consolidate their political power within Chad in recent years. Behind the cloak of democratic institutions and rhetoric, rival armed bands continue to operate inside the country and the government often relies on political intimidation to secure its rule. For example, starting in November 1999, insurgents under the command of President Déby's former defense minister, Youssouf Togoimi, fought government troops in the northern Tibesti region. In early 2002, however, a series of peace talks, beginning in January 2002, ultimately led to the cessation of these hostilities. Shortly after the death of Youssouf Togoimi in September 2002, an agreement was reached that offered Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) leaders high-ranking government positions. Peace between the MDJT and Déby's government has held since 2003. Déby has continued to face other challenges to his rule, however. In May 2004 forces loyal to President Déby quelled an army mutiny led by members of the President's own Zagawa ethnic group. Political observers claim the mutiny was the result of government efforts to weed out corruption within the military and the failure of Déby to back the rebellion in Sudan's Darfur region, in which many Zagawa live. Furthermore, the emergence of the Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy, a faction composed of former military leaders with a primary aim of Déby's ouster, led to several attacks on Chadian forces in late 2005 and throughout 2006. Failing to unseat the government, rebel forces took refuge in border regions with Sudan and Central African Republic. A peace agreement with the rebels was reached in December 2006 and fighting largely ended in January 2007. The rebel leader, Capt. Nour Abdelkerim, was appointed Minister of Homeland Defense in March 2007. A similar agreement with two smaller groups was brokered by Libya and Sudan in late 2007 in anticipation of the deployment of a joint UN and EU peacekeeping force in eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic but that pact appeared to fail when a major battle erupted in late November 2007. In early 2008 UFR rebel forces were poised to take over the capital city, N'djamena, but were subsequently pushed back and were forced to take refuge in Sudan.

By 2009 there were still many rebel groups active in Chad, mostly organized around ethnic lines and many with military ties to the Sudanese government. Adding to the strategic powder keg in Chad was the deteriorating relations between the central governments in Chad and in the Sudan. Since 2005, Chad has supported Darfuri rebels in Sudan, particularly the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which has its powerbase among the Zaghawa tribe, whose homeland sits either side of the international border dividing Sudan from Chad and who are the ethnic kin of President Déby. In turn, the various Chadian rebel groups that attempted to storm N'djamena in 2008 were armed and funded by Sudan, and have bases in Darfur, where they mixed freely with the Sudanese Army and its fearsome Janjaweed proxy. In February 2010 the Sudanese and Chadian authorities agreed to end their proxy wars, rebuild their war-affected border areas, and actively seek to repatriate the large refugee communities residing in each country. By 2010 over 270,000 Sudanese refugees were present in Chad and threatened to destabilize the entire region. After forging a peace between the two governments, the Sudanese authorities began to pressure the Chadian rebel groups taking refuge in their country to seek a negotiated peace with the central government in N'djamena. In January 2009, eight rebel groups formed the Union of Resistance Forces to coordinate their military efforts at destabilizing the government. Much of the recent conflict in Chad is related to the establishment of the Doba Basin oil project. Opposition warlords throughout the country fear that Déby and his clan will use the money from Doba to maintain their political dominance and exclude others from the distribution of its economic rewards. In October 2010 the once powerful UFR rebels decided to lay down their arms, vacate their bases in Sudan and make use of the amnesty issued by President Déby. A small group of dissident rebels that wanted to keep up the fight have moved their base of military operation to the Central African Republic.

Despite the persistence of factional conflict in the country, over the last ten years Chad has seen the gradual establishment of electoral politics. While the 1996 presidential elections were plagued by widespread voting violations and human rights abuses, the 2001 and 2006 campaigns saw dramatic, albeit far from complete, reductions in these restrictions on competitive participation. After six months of negotiations brokered by the EU, President Déby's ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) and the opposition Political Parties' Co-ordination to Defend the Constitution (CPDC) signed an agreement to create an independent elections commission and delay legislative elections, originally scheduled for December 2007, until 2009. The date of these elections has been rescheduled several times and is now slated to be held on 20 February 2011.