

## Polity IV Country Report 2010: Indonesia

<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">Score:</td> <td style="width: 15%;">2009</td> <td style="width: 15%;">2010</td> <td style="width: 15%;">Change</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Polity:</b></td> <td>8</td> <td>8</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Democ:</b></td> <td>8</td> <td>8</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Autoc:</b></td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Durable:</b></td> <td></td> <td>11</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Tentative:</b></td> <td></td> <td>No</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Score:	2009	2010	Change	<b>Polity:</b>	8	8	0	<b>Democ:</b>	8	8	0	<b>Autoc:</b>	0	0	0	<b>Durable:</b>		11		<b>Tentative:</b>		No		
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SCODE	<b>INS</b>	CCODE	<b>850</b>	Date of Report	<b>1 June 2011</b>																				
<b>Polity IV Component Variables</b>																									
XRREG	XRCOMP	XROPEN	XCONST	PARREG	PARCOMP																				
3	3	4	6	2	4																				
<b>Date of Most Recent Polity Transition (3 or more point change)</b>																									
End Date	21 May 1998		Begin Date	21 October 1999																					
<b>Polity Fragmentation: No</b>																									
<b>Constitution</b>	1945																								
<b>Executive(s)</b>	President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (PD); directly elected 5 July and 20 September 2004, reelected 8 July 2009, 60.8%																								
<b>Legislature</b>	Unicameral: House of Representatives (560 seats; proportionally elected; most recent elections, 9 April 2009) Democratic Party (PD): 148 Party of the Functional Groups (Golkar): 108 Indonesian Democracy Party – Struggle (PDI-P): 93 Prosperous Justice Party (PKS): 59 National Mandate Party (PAN): 42 United Development Party (PPP): 39 Great Indonesia Movement Party (PGIR): 30 National Awakening Party (PKB): 26 People’s Conscience Party (PHNR): 15																								
<b>Judiciary</b>	Supreme Court of Justice																								

### Narrative Description:<sup>1</sup>

#### **Executive Recruitment: Competitive Elections (8)**

In the midst of the devastating Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, the long-ruling authoritarian regime of President Suharto collapsed in May of 1998. Suharto had been the de facto leader of Indonesia since 1965 when the military curtailed the powers of President Sukarno. Since 1998 Indonesia has embarked on a

<sup>1</sup> The research described in this report was sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed herein are the authors' alone and do not represent the views of the US Government.

gradual, albeit rocky and uncertain, transition to democratic governance. Suharto's handpicked successor, President Habibie, opted not to seek reelection following the outcome of the country's first democratic parliamentary elections in forty-four years. These elections, held in June 1999, provided a majority of seats in the House of Representatives to opposition (i.e., non-Glokar) candidates and fundamentally altered the balance of power in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

The MPR consisted of all members of the 500-seat parliament, 130 elected regional representatives and 65 appointed representatives of societal groups (including the military). Under the guidelines of the ambiguous 1945 constitution, the MPR was charged with the task of selecting the chief executive. Under this system political power brokers inside the MPR were provided with excessive influence over the executive recruitment process. In the October 1999 presidential election, Abdurrahman Wahid, whose National Awakening Party (PBK) controlled only ten percent of the seats in the House of Representatives, narrowly defeated the leader of the majority PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri (who was then elected vice president). President Wahid's tenure proved to be full of political intrigue and instability as he turned his back on the political power brokers inside the MPR that had installed him in office. Power brokers inside the MPR originally viewed Wahid as being an acceptable compromise candidate and elected him president despite the fact that he had only a limited national base and that his party, the PBK, came in a distant third in national balloting for the House of Representatives. However, by 2001 many of these same power brokers in the MPR actively sought to reverse their October 1999 choice and replace him with Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of the country's first president). After the Parliament censured President Wahid twice in early 2001 on grounds of corruption (charges that were later dropped), in May 2001 the National Assembly voted to impeach him for incompetence. In July of that year the MPR met to convene an "Extraordinary Session" to require the President to account for his performance in office. Efforts by President Wahid to maintain his hold on power by calling for a state of emergency failed and on 23 July 2001 the MPR cancelled Wahid's mandate and Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri was subsequently sworn into office.

This indirect executive recruitment process, which was subject to extensive manipulation by institutional and elite interests, had the effect of weakening Indonesia's democratic transition. However, under President Megawati, significant efforts aimed at reforming the executive recruitment process were initiated. Meeting in November 2001, the MPR made significant changes to the 1945 constitution. In addition to providing for direct presidential elections, the MPR proposed the creation of a bicameral legislature with a regional representative chamber and the establishment of a constitutional court with the power of judicial review. Under this new constitutional order, political parties were required to win 3% of the seats in the national legislature to nominate a candidate for president. Moreover, in order to win the presidential poll, a candidate was required to take at least fifty percent of the total votes and twenty percent of the votes in at least half of the provinces. Failure to achieve these electoral thresholds would trigger a run-off election between the top two candidates.

Indonesia's first direct presidential elections were held in July 2004. Given the results of the April 2004 legislative elections, seven parties were eligible to field candidates. In addition to President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the first round election was contested by two ex-generals: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and General Wiranto (former head of the armed forces who has recently been indicted for crimes against humanity in East Timor). Yudhoyono (or "SBY," as he is usually known in Indonesia) garnered thirty-four percent in first round balloting while President Megawati came in second with twenty-seven of the electoral tally. Failure by any of the candidates to exceed the majority electoral threshold triggered a second round of balloting in September 2004 between SBY and President Megawati.

In second round balloting held on 20 September, Yudhoyono soundly defeated President Megawati with sixty-one percent of the vote. Yudhoyono, whose newly formed Democratic Party garnered only eight percent of the seats in the April 2004 legislative elections, was able to play on his credentials as a former military leader to take advantage of the widespread disillusionment with the new political parties and politics that have dominated the post-Suharto period. President Megawati's Indonesian Democracy Party had become the target of public cynicism in the wake of rising political unrest throughout the country and widespread allegations of political corruption. While Yudhoyono has held cabinet posts in all the post-Suharto governments, including a post in President Megawati's cabinet, nevertheless, he was able to portray himself as standing outside of the party machines and institutionalized corruption that have come to define Indonesian politics. Yudhoyono was inaugurated as president on 20 October 2004.

While President Yudhoyono has assumed leadership of the executive branch, many political observers, however, believe that Vice President Jusuf Kalla was, and may continue to be, the real power in

the new government. A wealthy businessman with strong political ties to the Golkar party, Kalla provided Yudhoyono with a political base from which to govern. Kalla ascended to the post of chairman of the Golkar in December 2004. President Yudhoyono won reelection in the presidential election held on 8 July 2009, gaining over 60% of the vote. On 17 October 2009, President Yudhoyono announced that the Golkar had joined his ruling coalition, which now included Democratic Party, Golkar, Justice and Prosperity Party, National Mandate Party, United Development Party, and National Awakening Party; the coalition controlled a total of 421 seats in the 560-member House of Representatives. Demonstrations held on 28 January 2010 in the capital and other major cities, marking the 100<sup>th</sup> day of his second term, called for Yudhoyono's resignation, claiming that he had done little to make good on his campaign promises to reform the political order and eliminate government corruption.

#### **Executive Constraints: Near Parity (6)**

Political power was highly concentrated under President Suharto. Suharto, along with members of the military apparatus, representatives of Golkar and individuals associated with the Suharto family's vast patronage network, constituted the nucleus of Indonesia's "New Order." Under this system, the legislative and judicial branches of government did not constitute a real check on executive authority. While horizontal accountability increased under the short reign of President Habibie, it wasn't until the installation of the opposition-dominated parliament (the DPR) and People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) on October 1, 1999, that the legislature began to flex its political muscle. One of the first political acts by the democratically elected parliament was to limit the power of the executive branch by imposing a two-term limit on the offices of President and Vice President.

Under this new democratic system, the legislative branch quickly sought to assert its political dominance over President Wahid (whom it elected on 20 October 1999). While Wahid was first viewed as an adroit political puppet-master, he came to be viewed as a weak and ineffectual political leader -- unable to address the social ills confronting Indonesia or counter the rising power of the legislative branch. While the legislature does not initiate many bills, nevertheless, it aggressively pursued its government oversight function and had significant influence on the final content of virtually every government-sponsored bill. Moreover, the legislative branch actively sought to weaken the powers of the president established under the 1945 constitution and to remove Wahid from office. In August 2000, in an effort to thwart a concerted parliamentary effort to oust him from power, President Wahid agreed to cede more authority over daily government management to Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. However, less than a year later, Wahid was removed from office by the MPR and replaced with Megawati.

Under Megawati's leadership, the government of Indonesia pushed through constitutional reforms that weakened and reformed the legislative branch into a bicameral system, provided for direct elections to the presidency, and established a constitutional court with the power of judicial review. These reforms have created a more independent executive branch, while maintaining institutional constraints on executive power. The first president elected under these new rules, President Yudhoyono, faces a much different, and more constrained, political landscape than his predecessors.

#### **Political Participation: Political Liberalization: Limited and/or Decreasing Overt Coercion (9)**

While the early history of Indonesia was plagued by widespread acts of factional violence (including the killing of hundreds of thousands of suspected communists in the mid-1960s), the repressive nature of Suharto's New Order established a false sense of peace and order in this poor and ethnically diverse archipelago. In the wake of the New Order, political competition remains in flux as the chief executive, the parliament, students, political parties, labor, regional power brokers and ethnic communities are all scrambling to establish a foothold in the country's new democratic power structure. This scramble has produced a democratic order rife with factional political interests. While the military continues to be an influential player in both the political and economic realms of Indonesian society, they have largely removed themselves from the day-to-day tasks of governance, at least for the present. Their presence, however, can still be felt in their unflinching commitment to the unity of the Indonesian nation-state.

For more than thirty years Suharto and the military tried to fuse the country's hundreds of different ethnic groups, which are spread across an archipelago of 17,000 islands, into a secular, multiethnic state. The political and economic dominance of Jakarta in Suharto's "New Order," however, fueled resentment by the outlying regions of the Indonesian state. Long-standing calls for secession/autonomy in East Timor (now independent), Aceh, and Irian Jaya (Papua) have flared up into open conflict in the post-Suharto period. While Presidents Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono have sought

to control the repressive actions of the military in these conflicts, their ability to limit the autonomy of the military in these breakaway regions has been incomplete. In an effort to bring a peaceful end to these conflicts, the National Assembly approved the Aceh Special Autonomy law in July 2001 and the Papua Special Autonomy Bill in October of that year. While these laws provide for greater political and economic decentralization with regard to these two regions, nevertheless, secessionist violence continued. It was only after the devastation in Aceh caused by the December 2004 tsunami and the intense international humanitarian engagement that followed the crisis that the government and the Aceh separatists were able to forge and implement a regional autonomy agreement that has been effective in calming the violence there and reintegrating the region into Indonesian politics.

In addition to these core conflicts, sectarian conflict between Indonesia's multitudes of ethnic groups has also been on the rise in recent years. Conflict between Christians and Muslims (in the Moluccas Islands and on Sulawesi) and between the indigenous Dayak ethnic group and Madurese settlers in West Kalimantan (on the island of Borneo) are representative of the continuing factionalization of Indonesian politics. Historical tensions among Indonesia's numerous ethnic communities have been exploited by opportunistic political leaders in their effort to consolidate their power within the new democratic order. While these violent clashes are often blamed on long-standing ethnic and religious hatreds, more often than not economic woes and political jockeying are their root causes. There does seem to be some dampening of political violence and repression since the consolidation of democratic changes in Indonesian politics.

Secular political parties continue to dominate the political realm in Indonesia. In the 2009 legislative elections 38 national parties and six local (Aceh only) participated but only nine parties won seats in the National Assembly. Of these, the top three parties were secular nationalist parties: President Yudhoyono's Partai Demokrat (21%), Vice President Kalla's Golkar party (14%) and former president Megawati's opposition PDI-P party (14%). The next four parties were all Islamic-oriented parties and, with the exception of the PKS, all saw a decline in popular support from the 2004 elections. The dominance of the secular nationalist parties in legislative elections has allowed them to limit the ability of Islamist parties from effectively competing in presidential elections. In 2009 the threshold for nominating candidates for presidential elections was revised so that only parties or coalitions that gained 20% of the House of Representatives seats or 25% of the popular vote in legislative elections were permitted to do so. This meant that in 2009, none of the Islamic-oriented parties were eligible to nominate candidates for the presidential and vice presidential ballots.

In April 2010 the Indonesian Constitutional Court upheld a controversial law banning religious blasphemy in the country. The Court declared that the 45 year-old law was in keeping with Indonesia's secular national ideology. However, many religious activists have argued that this law simply seeks to protect the hegemonic position of the mainstream Sunni culture as it usually only is applied to perceived offenses against Islam. While the Indonesian state officially recognizes five religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Confucianism and Islam), 87% of the population is Muslim. The upholding of this law comes at a time when conflicts between Islamic and Christian populations, and within the Muslim population itself, have been on the rise. In 2010 the country witnessed a significant expansion of mob violence targeted at members of unauthorized Islamic sects and Christian groups.