

Chapter 2

Political Violence and War

In their respective conclusions to examinations of the literature on possible linkages between internal and external conflict, both Stohl (1980) and Levy (1989) decry the apparent lack of theory development as the main impediment to progress in our understanding and the accumulation of knowledge on this subject. Stohl goes on to claim that,

The construction of an adequate theory of conflict linkages is dependent upon the reciprocal development of theories of political conflict and violence in general. As previously indicated, theorists of internal and external conflict have avoided consideration of conflict outside their particular focus when constructing their theories. The evidence we have reviewed...suggests that this has been an error and thus a hindrance to the development of conflict theory. (Stohl 1980, 326)

It is, however, unusual within the political science discipline for scholars to lend much credence to such linkage and other macro-theoretical arguments. The skeletal structure lent to our global security affairs by the construction of modern political states demarcated by spatial borders and exclusive juridical domains provides a strong rationale for closure, compartmentalization, and specialization in scholarship. Yet, the idea of a nexus between internal and external conflict, and especially warfare, gains in both saliency and immediacy as the political borders separating the internal from the external become more permeable. It seems almost facetious to suggest that the key to an understanding of any nexus between internal and external political conflict should focus on the agency and structure of that which defines the distinction, that is on political borders themselves.

The conventional approach to the subject of security studies is better represented by Midlarsky (1990). Instead of arguing for the development of macro-theory, he voices concern that such an enterprise may be little more than a “utopian expectation” and, by implication, a hindrance to progress in the development of “more specific mid-range theories of the causes of specific types of war. [For o]nly when we have mastered this more modest enterprise will we

then be in a position to develop a more general theory, if ever.” (Midlarsky 1990, 172)

Midlarsky’s encapsulation of conflict theory is an intuitively compelling argument. Political conflict, as a subject of inquiry, is perhaps too broad an issue, too complex a problem, and too far beyond our capacity to detail and comprehend. Yet, his claim that inquiry into “mid-range” phenomena has greater theoretical potential (given our current state of knowledge) hinges critically on our ability to demarcate discrete conceptual domains in order to identify and sort the “specific types of war.” This raises an important question: if we do not know how the pieces fit together, can we rely on our expertise, or rather our intuition, in taking them apart in meaningful ways? Without a macro-theory of conflict, such an enterprise can be neither systematic nor rigorous and, so, will be problematic at best. And so the argument goes, round and round.

The inquiry presented in this chapter centers on the problem of constructing typologies in the study of political conflict and war. It does not claim to be an exhaustive examination, only an initial visit for diagnostic purposes. As a corollary to the problems of classification, it will need to address the validity and sanctity of the “great divide” between internal and external conflict: that web of abstract political borders that we use to define and differentiate our social selves and according to which we construct our social institutions. It will necessarily engage in what Eckstein has termed *problematation*, that is an explication of “the most fundamental problem requiring solution if a progressive development of theory about a subject is to occur.” (Eckstein 1980, 135) An inclusive macro-classification scheme will be proposed for relating and re-aggregating the various micro-manifestations of the fundamental problem of political conflict: the institutional decision to initiate acts of political violence in the process of resolving a dispute.¹

The following analysis will examine the issues involved in these essential debates in the empirical study of war and political security. In this analysis the primary issue of security is narrowly defined as the social problem of recurrent, deadly warfare in political relations. The vehicle for the analysis will be the contrast drawn between the definitional scheme created by the author with one provided by John A. Vasquez in *The War Puzzle* (1993). The Vasquez scheme is innovative yet consistent with the conventional definition of war; that of the author is compatible with Richardson’s (1960) conceptualization of the deadly nature of warfare. By examining how the assumptions of our operational schemes affect the subsequent study and understanding of systemic security we may gain some theoretic insight in the ongoing debate over the security/insecurity dilemma.

State of the Art

Quantification in studies of war and security is a relatively recent addition to the social sciences. The pioneering works in this genre are Quincy Wright's *A Study of War* (1942/1965) and Lewis Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (1960). These two studies differ fundamentally as regards their basic conceptualization of what constitutes the essential problem under study. Wright classifies the population or universe of phenomena under study according to political, and especially *institutional*, criteria: "all hostilities involving members of the family of nations [i.e., independent political states]...which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense or which involved over 50,000 troops" and "some other incidents...not recognized as legal states of war [but which] led to important legal results..." (Wright 1942/1965, 636) Richardson eschews any such classification scheme as the introduction of a great subjective, structural bias which necessarily interferes with satisfactory statistical methods. (Richardson 1960, 5) Richardson prefers to examine the *psychology* of deadly political behavior and so employs only two criteria in detailing the population for his study: one, the event must involve a quarrel (i.e., a hostile interaction) and a human fatality (he then classifies quarrels according to magnitude, measured as the logarithm of the total number of people who died as a result). Thus, we inherit a legacy of interest in violent political behavior which is bifurcated into inquiry into the institutional performance of war and inquiry into the psychology of war initiation and experience.

Singer has since become the predominant influence in conceiving how quantitative methodology is applied to security studies and has remained that approach's staunchest advocate. His article "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight without Evidence" (Singer 1968) is the epitome of the quantitative empiricist's critique of the intuitive, inductive philosopher. Two works which have greatly influenced security studies have been the pivotal article "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" (Singer 1961) and the research designs which have culminated in the Correlates of War (COW) project data bases. These works have greatly influenced the division of security studies into separate "spheres of interest" focusing specially on inter-state (system), intra-state (unit), or individual orientations. It was not Singer, however, who carved the conceptual world of analysis into incompatible or non-comparable segments; he merely drew the lines of distinction. It was Waltz (1979) who took up Thor's hammer and most emphatically nailed the doors shut, claiming that "once structure is clearly defined...changes at the level of [system] structure can be kept separate from changes at the level of units [states]." (Waltz 1979, 67)

The COW research agenda, and especially its definitional scheme, has greatly influenced the ways we conceptualize the war phenomenon. For that project, as for the vast majority of the others, "international war remains [the] major concern."

(Small and Singer 1982, 16) Thus, COW data are classified as either inter-state, extra-systemic, or civil wars, and differentiated by unique data criteria sufficiently to preclude cross-classification comparisons. The COW criteria are particularly faithful to Wright's political-institutional approach, paying little attention to the psychology of initiation nor the interactive process that culminates in violent political behavior and institutional warfare. Both these conventional schemes, that is, adherence to the level of analysis "problem" and strict institutional bias, have had major impacts on the development of theory in international relations and security studies.

Richardson's approach, on the other hand, has been mostly abandoned and, perhaps, for good reason. As Small and Singer can attest, even the modest research effort of quantifying the most visible, invidious, and best recognized and recorded historical incidents is a Herculean task "of such magnitude that [they] have no expectation of ever completing it by [themselves]." (Small and Singer 1982, 21) The full Richardsonian research agenda is so broad as to defy accurate and reliable quantification on a global scale. Data collections of intra-state political behavior are extremely complex, costly, and time-consuming; the task is problematic both in terms of coordination and accuracy and reliability; and, due to the dearth of systematic record-keeping outside the Europeanized systemic core states, the results are non-comparable cross-nationally and often reflect little more than scholarly speculation. Even so, great strides have been made in this area over the past decade (e.g., Harff and Gurr 1988; Gurr and Scarritt 1989; Gurr 1993; also, data sets such as COPDAB, ICB, ITERATE 3, Polity II, Minorities at Risk, SIPRI, and WEIS).²

The pervasive supposition, however, has been that international war is of priority concern in that it is the most destructive form of political violence. There is an obvious Euro-centric bias inherent in this supposition. International war has surely been of major concern to the central system members in the present century, and the threat of nuclear annihilation, as the ultimate experience of international war, has been a predominant fear in that quarter. Outside the central core of advanced industrial states, however, international war has been the least invidious form of political violence (with some recent noted exceptions such as the Iran-Iraq war and the Persian Gulf war). During the course of the "long peace" (from 1945-present) the general condition of political relations within the global community has been anything but peaceful. Protracted social conflict, as a form of non-institutionalized warfare which appears "ignorant" of political borders and juridical considerations, has spread incrementally through the global system of states in the contemporary period. (Azar et al. 1978) These cultures of pervasive societal warfare have caused and continue to cause more deaths, more casualties, more dislocations, more systemic destruction and disruption than all institutional, inter-state wars combined. The present condition of pervasive, protracted social conflict throughout vast areas of the world may be described as the "great systemic war" of the late twentieth century: the "Third World War." (Nietschmann 1987)

The structure and nature of the world system and of political relations in general has changed dramatically since 1945. The unraveling of the Great Power colonial system in conjunction with unparalleled technological advancements, especially in information and communication capabilities, has led to fundamental changes in the rules of the world system, greatly increased the number of relevant political actors, widened the variance in state attributes, and set the stage for greater inter-penetration of formerly discreet, "closed" systems and greater interdependence among actors and levels of interaction. There has been a flurry of activity in recent years among scholars critically reexamining our concepts of security, posing alternative definitions, and otherwise working to reflect global changes and unique Third World conditions and incorporate them in our ways of thinking. (E.g., Azar and Moon 1984 1988; Rothstein 1986; Thomas 1987; Ayoob 1989 1991; Buzan 1991, 1994; Job 1992; Klare 1993) There has been concomitant activity among scholars representing the viewpoints of other marginalized groups in security studies; most notable are the feminist and gendered critiques. (E.g., Enloe 1989; Tickner 1992; Sylvester 1994)

Illustrative of the permeability of political borders as it applies to the issues of political conflict is the predilection of states, especially powerful states, and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to become involved in the internal affairs of the less developed states, especially those experiencing high levels of political conflict and civil warfare. One need simply cue the familiar names: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Bosnia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Somalia; the list goes on. This predilection for external interference and intervention is not necessarily a new phenomenon, though it has taken on new meaning with the independence of former colonial territories, nor is it necessarily overt. (Tillema 1989 1991) Covert "destabilization" campaigns defy public scrutiny. (Stohl and Lopez 1984; Chomsky 1991; George 1991; Forsythe 1992) Perhaps an even more invidious form of external interference in the internal affairs of states is the burgeoning international arms trade. (Laurance 1992)

The world system has been transformed in the last half of the twentieth century through the progressive opening of political systems and the concurrent decline in the salience of political borders. (E.g., Walker and Mendlovitz 1990) This change has become highly visible since the collapse of the Socialist unions, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Ongoing warfare between formerly constituent republics now independent states has demonstrated how civil wars can become international wars simply by an abrupt change in political status of the belligerents; new states find themselves fighting serious insurrections without benefit of professional armies. All these remonstrations illustrate the decreasing salience of legal-political borders in defining the problems of violence and warfare in contemporary society.

Critical Elements in the Study of Warfare

The intent of the previous discussion is not to deny the primacy of states in studies of security; it is rather to question the singular and unitary importance of states within the security system. The political state, constructed on the Weberian principle as the sole legitimate repository of (concentrated) coercive authority, must certainly remain the focal point in any analysis of a global security system. It is not only the main locus of coercive capability concentration; it is also the focal point of societies' conflict management capabilities. The Weberian model is flawed, however, in assuming both that the state enjoys a monopoly of force within its sovereign domain and that the use of force by the state, although legalistic by definition, is necessarily legitimate. (Zimmermann 1983, 11) In a preferred scheme, the state is viewed as the preeminent actor in the social milieu but not the only relevant political actor. It is a qualitatively distinct systemic unit as it acts in managing conflict in all societal arenas, but it is by no means a quantitatively "constant" actor. States vary widely as to their defining attributes; they are not equivalent units and, therefore, are not necessarily comparable units.

The point that states, in actuality, contribute a far different object to political analysis than the "state" as a theoretical concept is well taken and points to what may well be the incipient problem of modern Western theories of security: the problematic Weberian construction which focuses theoretic analysis through the use of *ideal types*. The principle ideal type around which security studies have been defined, as already mentioned, has been that of the "state." The concept of the state system is certainly the ordering principle and skeletal structure of the global societal system and, so, that construction must remain the focal point in security analysis. Yet, states as units are not physically or functionally equivalent as regards their particular attributes; they are not ideal types and so can not be treated uncritically as "like units."

This points to the crucial shortfall of using ideal types as a basis for analysis: the image of the ideal lends a false sense, or chimera, of precision to our inquiry while allowing us to selectively filter out that "noise" of the phenomenon under scrutiny which is inconsistent with *a priori* assumptions or purposes.³ Thus, much, or even most, of the violence and warfare in the world system today has been overlooked by security specialists because it does not meet rather arbitrary standards of what constitutes inclusion in the fraternal domain of inquiry. Especially problematic in this regard has been the convention of the state system to draw a political "curtain" around the fragile sovereignty of the state as a unit in the system. A systemic convention of systematic suppression of crucial information concerning security problems within the state's borders has effectively limited historical empirical security studies to intra-state actions of the grossest kind.

Similar arguments can be made in regard to the two other ideal types which inform security studies: "man" and "war." (See, especially, Waltz 1959, *Man, the*

State, and War) The concept of “man” as an ideal type of human who is a perfectly rational, profit-maximizing, power-seeking, and autonomous individual is neither an accurate portrayal of any generalizable human nature nor a reasonable depiction of any special type of man (the idealization of “man” and the “state” will be discussed further in chapter 3). Feminist critics of international security studies have generally deconstructed the problem of unwarranted behavioral assumptions (essentialism) down to its foundation in an idealized notion of masculinity and project that idealized concept onto its “natural” manifestation in the “state.” (Tickner 1992) While I would not deny that gender differences are important to a full understanding of security issues and I certainly applaud the contributions of the feminist scholars and activists in this field, I defer the essential argument of whether our reality is more a construction of masculinity or whether our concept of masculinity is more a construct of the conditions which have obtained in reality to some future discussion. The third idealized image, that of “war,” is the special subject of the present discussion.⁴ The intent of the present discussion is to detail an alternative framework for inquiry in the problem of political violence, beginning with a redefinition of the problem itself: an *actuality typology* of warfare. This reconceptualization of the “fundamental problem” will inform the theoretic construction of a relevant phenomenal universe for quantitative-analytic inquiry in the causes or conditions of instrumental, utilitarian violence.

Four principle issues inform the current examination of the conventional conceptualizations of war and security and lead to four critical elements in an alternative scheme: (1) social identity groups and open systems; (2) political violence and war; (3) determinacy, probabilism, and contingency; and (4) processual dynamics and the diffusion of insecurity.

Social Identity Groups and Open Systems

One intent of this discussion is to broaden the examination of political interaction and the potential for violent conflict. The limitations inherent in the conceptualization of the state and war as ideal types have been introduced and will be discussed in greater depth later in this text. A preferred concept of the state focuses on its primary interactive function: conflict management. It must be recognized that states vary in the capability to perform that function. (Migdal 1988) The ideal of the state as the concentration point of a society’s coercive capability is only meaningful within the context of that state’s conflict management function; that is, coercion is an auxiliary and subordinate instrument in the arsenal available to the state for conflict management purposes.⁵ The initiation of violence by the state against its citizens (i.e., arbitrary; outside of legal prescriptions) contradicts its primary function, as it then becomes the transgressor or violator of societal norms and conventions rather than their adjudicator. In such case, the state abnegates its legitimate authority, that is, its primary instrument of

conflict management (justice). Without the cloak or mantle of legitimacy, the state acts simply as another social identity group competing for preeminence or predominance in the social milieu.

Warfare is political violence conducted by social groups; it is the violation of the physical and psychological integrity of a social identity group. War, as an ideal type, is a highly institutionalized form of warfare and political violence that mainly involves major powers (i.e., highly institutionalized industrial states) and involves a penetration of political borders and, thereby, a violation of the sovereignty of a state. As argued in the previous paragraph, the abnegation of a state's legitimate relations with its citizens and constituent groups obfuscates the abstract political border between a "state" and a "social identity group." Similarly, the act of war obfuscates borders between the "state" unit and the local, regional, or global "system." The principle of self-determination further blurs conceptual distinctions between the state and its various conflict arenas, whether those involve social identity groups or the world system or the state itself. A globalization of security studies must be inclusive of all forms of warfare which seriously affect any of the social groupings operating within the world macro-system. Therefore, such globalization of inquiry must include all significant episodes of political violence involving not only the state, as a political unit, and the world system, as the context in which those units operate, but also any social identity group which can seriously challenge or evade the authority of a state.

There is no longer, if there ever was, a clear distinction between system and sub-system, unit and sub-unit levels of analysis. Even Waltz seems to have acknowledged "how difficult it is to keep the levels...distinct and separate." (In Buzan et al. 1993, 25). The progressive opening of all political systems through the media of technological, transportational, transactional, and informational advancements has obscured juridical borders and distinctions. There are few states left in the "new world order" still actively striving to maintain the prerogatives of authority based on systemic closure (e.g., Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China) and these states are coming under increasing pressure to open up. Thus, it can and should be acknowledged that there remain just two operative levels of political analysis relevant in the contemporary context: (social identity) group and individual.⁶ In a sense, the individual is variously reformulated and "cascades" in multiple and varied forms of group identification up to, and including, a global identity and, possibly, beyond. All social identity groups are both a discreet unit in larger systems and a distinct political system in their own right. All social systems are essentially open to external experience, influence, and activity, especially as regards the present subject of inquiry, political conflict and violence.

Political Violence and War

Another intent in writing this book is to broaden our understanding of the phenomenon under study: war and political violence. Political violence is defined as an episodic interaction between social identity groups engaged in an ongoing, iterative (i.e., processual) relationship in which instrumental force is used and results in death and/or injury to humans.⁷ Political violence is intrinsically political, in that it involves concerted, affective actions by individuals in a social context, but this broadened concept of the primary security issue (i.e., war victimization) relaxes the strict legal and institutional assumptions pervasive in previous studies of war and security. For this purpose, “war” is defined as the institutional/legal form of political violence; “warfare” is the general conduct of political violence.

Conflict is a contention between individuals in a social context; it carries no assumption of inherent hostility. Political conflict is simply conflict that has been politicized, or brought into the public domain for deliberation, usually through the agency of mobilized identity groups.⁸ Most political conflict is managed successfully by various political processes and procedures without resort to violence. There is, perhaps, no greater source of confusion, and conditional bias, in security studies than that arising from the indiscriminate use of the term “conflict” to connote, and thereby conflate, generic social conflict and armed conflict.

Conflict is not invidious, in and of itself. Political conflict within or between groups may be either dissociative or sociative, in either case it provides a stimulus for purposive social action. (Simmel 1908/1971b; see also Coser 1956 1973). This presents the basis for rational choice between alternative strategies and acts of enmity and amity in group responses to a conflict situation. (Buzan 1991, 168) This basic choice is crucial to a full understanding of the relative utility of cooperative and coercive actions and strategies in the management and resolution of political conflict. In political science there is a strong inference that conflict is synonymous with the use of militant force; this has been brought about by the conventional use of “conflict” to mean any military action. This equivocation of one possible (i.e., contingent) outcome with a general social process predisposes our inquiry to look for determinate causes; the broadened concept exhorts us to look for conditions which affect the probability that one conflict management strategy will be preferred over the other. Further elaboration of this element will be taken up below.

Determinism, Probabilism, and Contingency

The previous discussions lead to still a third intent, which is to question whether it is appropriate to conduct studies into the “causes” of war or of political

violence in general. War, as an institutional expression of political violence, surely has strongly determining operating procedures or behavioral expectations which might be confused with or construed as a form of causality. Vasquez (1987 1993) makes such an argument when he posits that adherence to the tenets of “power politics” leads countries into a structured process of diminishing options or “steps to war.” Wendt (1992) goes on to argue that even the context of such political action is in large part “socially constructed.” Bueno de Mesquita has possibly shut the book on the debate over causality with his compelling argument in *The War Trap* (1981). In that work he argues that the single “cause” of war initiation is the conscious decision by a group’s leadership to initiate force with the intent of unilaterally defining the resolution of a point of contention between groups in the pursuit of an “expected utility,” or preferred outcome, to be gained by such action. This argument is an elaboration of von Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means.”

The implication of von Clausewitz’s dictum is the seed of the idea of transformational politics brought to our attention through Hannah Arendt’s insightful separation of security studies’ “Siamese twins:” *power* and *violence*.

Power and violence are opposites; where one rules absolutely the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance....Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it. (Arendt 1969, 155)

This can be related to Buzan’s concepts of amity (power) and enmity (violence) already mentioned. This most basic “rational choice” is elaborated well in the social psychological work of Muzafer Sherif on group behavior. Sherif (1966) makes a critical distinction between integrative (pursuit of superordinate goals) and disintegrative (characterization of hostility; us vs. them) strategies in group conflict situations. These conceptualizations can be derived from Simmel’s (1908/1971a) earlier treatments of “individuation,” the will to be selfish and thereby dissociate, and “sociation,” the will to associate and thereby extend the social “self.”

More importantly, however, Arendt posits the idea that the decision to utilize violence in response to a conflict situation is symptomatic of an inherent loss of control over the dynamics of the interactive process and the devaluation of the exchange from a positive-sum to a constant-sum or even negative-sum game. This conceptualization departs dramatically from our conventional perspective on the deployment of military force: instead of initiating decisive instrumental means in order to positively establish social control (and gain a measure of expected utility or reward), we are signaling and accentuating our perception that we have lost rational control of the situation and, by initiating violence, are in real danger of losing physical control as well. This idea is crucial to an understanding of the processual dynamics of political violence, allowing for recognition and

explanation of both the escalation and the possible diffusion of violence. The essential question of inquiry then can be restated, why are political relations transformed from integrative to disintegrative or even to eliminative modes of operation? Or, put differently, what “causes” a group’s leadership to anticipate a greater utility from the use of violence than from the extension of its group’s power to cooperate and act in concert with its opponent in resolving the social conflict situation amicably (or even to opt out of the interaction entirely, the neutral solution)?

A corollary question arises as to the role of issues in conflict and the decision to engage in violence. Obviously, issues are the essential ingredients of disputes, but it is not clear whether they play any determining role in the decision to transform the mode of interaction to violence. Many scholars have argued for recognition of the importance of issues and grievances in conflict research. (E.g., Vasquez and Mansbach 1984; Diehl 1992; Gurr 1993; Vasquez 1993) Others have argued that issues are manipulated by group elites in pursuit of an already determined course of action. (Brass 1974) Issues distinguish particular conflicts, motivate interaction, and provide the substance of the preferred outcomes for those actively involved in the conflict interaction. Issues, however, remain constant across the modal transformation from non-violent to violent methods and so can not of themselves provide adequate explanation for the decision to engage in hostility. The question remains as to why a constant issue or grievance at different times lays dormant, gains interest, mobilizes political action, or justifies militant violence.

Issues do have emotive content, some much more than others, but problems can be defined, addressed, and dealt with in many different ways. Emotions provide a physiological stimulus to action, but the action itself may be rationally defined or restrained. The emotions of individuals within an identity group can be orchestrated processually by charismatic leaders (Brass’s argument) or may escalate and erupt spontaneously in a mob situation. Usually, however, emotional responses are restrained or channeled “rationally.” It is those times when significant numbers of individuals allow their emotions to outweigh, override, or distort their rationality that is of importance, leading collectivities to pursue actions resulting in possibly relative gains but definitely suboptimal social outcomes. Perception of threat (or selfish gain), then, becomes a crucial determining factor in the regulation of emotional response and justification of political violence.

Some conflict situations definitely involve a credible threat to a vital collective concern and thus instigate a strong emotive quality to the relationship, such as the threat by a repressive regime to withhold vital resources from a targeted minority or the threat of an aggressive state to conquer the territory of another group. These types of threat, whether explicit or implicit, relate to the issue of *structural violence* and the question of bifurcation in the point of origination and initiation of violence. (Galtung 1964 1971) We are reminded that violence is not always

committed directly by force of arms; it may involve a gross transgression or abuse of authority and trust.⁹ Perhaps it is not the quality of specific issues which affects the decision to engage in warfare, but rather the quantity or accumulation of unresolved issues which determines the extent of warfare. (Midlarsky 1990, 175) It remains that the only issue that expressly determines modal transformation in political relations is the initiation of violence by the antagonist (i.e., defensive violence is *caused*, in the real sense, by offensive violence).

If it is true that wars are not caused but chosen, and that conflict issues are not a dynamic force leading groups into warfare but, rather, symbols manipulated by elites in order to rationalize and justify the option to initiate warfare in a dispute (i.e., increase the net group benefit), then the solution to the social problem of political violence might better be conceived as a search for the *conditions* which effect the perception of expected utility in the political use of warfare.¹⁰ Humans are unique beings in their incredible range of instrumental behaviors and learning capabilities; physical laws neither determine nor govern human behavior, they determine the contextual parameters or environment within which those behaviors must operate and they provide the tools and mechanisms of adaptive and purposive action. Physical and psychic structures, however, are the implements and resources of instrumental actions and so may be seen to have a definitive or determining influence on the relative viability of various conflict management options. The strong influence wrought by human constructs and institutions on the decisional preference ordering of collective action alternatives may be termed *structural determinism*.

The effects of structural determinism fall short of direct causation; they do, however, directly affect the probability that any specific option will be chosen over comparable and substitutable alternative options (i.e., value or policy preferences). It is a rare occurrence indeed to find oneself with many options in the face of a serious challenge and to have one option stand out clearly as *the* rational choice. Especially in complex group interactions, it is much more likely that several options will seem nearly equal in viability and utility except that each will have special advantages and drawbacks. What is generally sought in such a social context, however, is the one option that can be most simply and similarly comprehended by the greatest number of persons involved and which promises the most readily identifiable and immediate results. Warfare is always seductive in that it imposes a vital certainty on an otherwise uncertain future; it dichotomizes all options and further reduces the choices by making one of the two wholly unacceptable. Yet, as we better learn and recognize the unpleasant certainties that are the unavoidable consequences of warfare, we become more interested in developing the structural determinism of non-coercive conflict management.

A full consideration of the externalities and repercussions of an anticipated course of action in such situations is practically impossible and, in any case, would greatly hinder response time and impair decisive action. One general strategy for addressing societal complexities, the “political culture” approach, is to use

socialization processes in the “making” of the social individual or citizen through the construction of societal norms and conventions which manage social conflict through a medium of tacit or voluntary compliance; emphasizing *ideational* methods. Another strategy, the “political process” or “multilateral” approach, is to manage social conflict among competing individuals and politicized groups in the institutionalized political arena (i.e., either endogenous or exogenous arenas); emphasizing *associational* methods. These two approaches are important components in *normative strategies* of conflict management. A third general strategy is an action-oriented approach: the “do nothing/do something” approach, whereby interactions remain mostly unregulated and self-serving until violence (or the very real threat) breaks out and becomes a threat to essential social order or survival (i.e., crisis) recognized by systemic elites. This third strategy favors *instrumental* methods: basically, unilateral solutions to multilateral contentions, that is *utilitarian strategies*. These basic strategies of conflict management form the basis of the ongoing rhetorical debates between the various genre and offspring of the “realists” and “idealists” in international relations.

Conventional perspectives on this fundamental debate, like the previously mentioned conventional distinction between “levels of analysis,” view these strategies either implicitly (most often) or explicitly as separate, exclusive, incompatible, or competing “ideologies.” Niou and Ordeshook (1994, 211-12 and 234) echo the arguments presented here, that “domestic and international politics are not...conceptually distinct,” that “different world orders identified by realists and neoliberals...can coexist as equilibria in the same general model,” and that political goals of groups are endogenously determined. Figure 2.1 presents a basic conceptual visualization scheme of the social conflict process that forms the basis of a macro-theoretical model that will be developed through the remainder of this chapter and the following two chapters. These basic conflict management strategies address crucial conflict transformations in general social interactive processes: (1) conflict; (2) mobilization; and (3) violence.

The initial condition in a simple, single-issue, social conflict process comes with Cognition, the perception and objectification of a goal-directed interaction with the external environment. Such actions are initiated almost continuously by individuals and many of these actions will trigger a response, a reaction, from other individuals in the external environment that modifies the original attainment of the goal. At that point the first transformation of social process takes place: the recognition of a state of conflict. Such recognition (or anticipation) motivates the individual to reassess the situation and alter their behavior, for example, they may terminate their pursuit; they may downgrade or otherwise condition their expectations; they may communicate, cooperate, or coordinate with other affected individuals in a common response; or they may continue to be totally or partially frustrated in their pursuit. Gurr (1970) has written the seminal work, *Why Men Rebel*, detailing this aspect of the social conflict process.




Figure 2.1 Transformational Aspects of Conflict Management

The second transformation occurs when the individual, after deciding to either maintain the aspiration or continue the goal pursuit, identifies a frustrating object and, further, considers it to be an illegitimate (unjust or simply unacceptable) impediment. The target of action then shifts away from the goal to the intervening obstacle. In order to overcome the obstacle, the individual seeks information, support, and resources from the external environment, especially including other individuals similarly affected (“relative deprivation” is Gurr’s term for the motivation to pursue what Tilly terms “collective action”). Mobilization “conveniently identifies the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.” (Tilly 1978, 69) The process of mobilization involves “an increase in the resources or in the degree of collective control” of an interest organization. (Tilly 1978, 54) According to Coser (1973), there are three mobilization options *vis-à-vis* the frustrating object: participation (working with the system); innovation (working within the system to effect adaptation to or adoption of group interests); or rejection (working outside or against the system). Tilly (1978) has written the preeminent text detailing the social process of the rejection option. Dahl (1989) succinctly describes the participation option in his treatment of pluralism and polyarchy. Schumpeter (1911) eloquently elaborates the role of entrepreneurship and the innovation option.

So far, we have been considering *normal* conflict processes; these processes are necessarily distinguished by remaining non-violent. Conflict occurs continuously, energizing political process and stimulating societal development. Each transformational leap requires a qualitative additional increment of activity, energy, and resources directed specifically to the conflict function and independent of those expended in pursuit of the original goal. Conflict dynamics are, then, conditioned by a general principle of energy conservation and communication, cooperation, and coordination problems, that is, conflict escalation dynamics are dampened by collective action problems. (E.g., Olson 1965; Axelrod 1984; Conybeare 1984)

What is of paramount importance, however, are the *abnormal* aspects of conflict processes: those that experience the third transformation to violence. Violence, itself, involves the threat or realization of physical or psychological harm with an attending sense of violation of the harmed person's integrity. I refer the reader to Arendt (1969/1972), Rapoport (1989), Keane (1996), or Falk and Kim (1980) for more complete examinations of the subject of violence. Six points are important to the present discussion:

1. Violence is an extreme behavior that is very dramatic, strongly emotive, and, so, highly visible; it tends to distort general perceptions by "flooding" the senses and sensibilities of observers.
2. The decision to use violence *directly* involves only a subset of the mobilized population; even in the most extreme situations, only a minority of any population is actively engaged in violent action.
3. Violent action is extremely consumptive and, so, requires a relatively large *support* group; the majority of the mobilized population is indirectly involved in the violence through such acceptance and support activities.
4. The most insidious aspect of protracted violence is the increasing scope and range of violent affect; victims of violence (the survivors) and others who are directly affected by violence are very strongly imprinted by the experience and such imprint will often stimulate a will to revenge the violence and will remain as life-long physical and psychological impairments.
5. The non-violent (normal) infrastructure of the mobilized group is retained throughout the conflict process, is directly supported by the majority of the population, and remains the preferred alternative to violence.
6. A group that has repeated experiences with violence will tend to institutionalize and glorify its capacity to engage in violence; in such situations, the conflict process becomes "overgrown" with stylized ornamentation and ritual (the culture of violence) and, so, becomes increasingly less transparent. (Becker 1975)

It is this last aspect (number 6) that most seriously impedes security studies. As you recall, political violence is considered to be the "fundamental problem" of the present inquiry. I will return to the discussion of conflict transformation and conflict management in chapter 3.

The “ending” of the simple, single-issue, social conflict process is signified in Figure 2.1 as Abreaction. Abreaction is defined as the “release [of emotions] by acting out, such as in words, action, or the imagination, the situation causing the conflict.”¹¹ This term does not imply long-term resolution of the conflict, although it may include such a possibility as the preferred result; the concept only implies an eventual and immediate solution to the conflict issue. Such a solution may, at the other extreme, result from the mere weariness of the conflict actors so that the conflict issue becomes latent or dormant. Unresolved conflict issues tend to link or “snowball,” transforming simple conflict processes into very complex, conflict interactions and relationships. (Midlarsky 1990)

In iterated hostile interactions, where the goal is similarly and highly valued by the antagonists and where cooperative solutions or resolutions are unattainable, the conflict management function is itself transformed to a *crisis* management function. (See Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1990 for a discussion of “crisis.”) It can be assumed that, under these special circumstances, the number of resolution options will decrease, the complexity of the hostility will increase, the optimal response time to actions of the adversary will decrease, and the perceived utility of unilateral strategies will increase as a function of time and the number of failed exchanges. (Vasquez 1987 1993) The illusory nature of such iterated and complex, hostile interactions is such that the final resolution of the contention between groups seems to become more clear as the number of viable options decreases (gaining optimal clarity when the options are reduced to one—attack and annihilate). An incomprehensibly complicated problem quickly focuses on a very simple solution, warfare; and a greatly simplified decisional mechanism, unilateralism.

Under conditions of crisis management, repercussions and externalities are discounted toward zero and all resources (including human resources) become expendable and their loss, justifiable. The social costs of coercive, militant conflict management strategies are great and become enormous when actual violence is involved.¹² The longer the duration and the greater the scope and intensity of political conflicts transformed to violence, the higher the costs and the lower the probability that the conflict can be resolved (i.e., a mutually beneficial and acceptable solution). A *solution* is reached only when one side of the dispute capitulates, though such a solution rarely *resolves* the contention: the vanquished party experiences grievance with the unequal terms of the solution and this becomes another issue for future contention. A “natural” limit to the exchange of violence occurs as the increasing costs consume all available resources and the actors’ capabilities are exhausted. This limit may be, and often is, abrogated through the replenishment of the contending actors’ resources by exogenous sources and “benefactors.”

A major problem of conventional security studies (often termed Realism) is the concentration on crisis management techniques requiring military preparedness; these strategies are the most costly and least effective. By studying

war as the essential problem, researchers confine their inquiry to the most deterministic portion of the social interactive process (the far right side of the management process in Figure 2.1). Some recent research efforts have attempted to extend the processual scope of inquiry into war behavior to take into account the pre-conditions of war (e.g., the International Crisis Behavior project directed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld). These are a step in the right direction, but do not go far enough. Scholars and politicians who concentrate their inquiry on the left side of the process depicted in Figure 2.1 are usually dubbed Idealists. Because the influence of structural determinism is so weak in the nascent stages of social process, idealist-type inquiry and their prescriptive socialization and mobilization strategies (i.e., non-crisis strategies) are highly probabilistic and so consequential or causal relationships based primarily on psychological and social learning influences are extremely difficult to test with empirical methods. As social process matures and societal relationships and structures become more complex, *substitutability* of both stimulus/incentive and response/outcome and *linkage* of issues complicates the simple, linear, “causal” sequence of political action and interaction. Simple mathematic relationships do not provide an appropriate or adequate metaphor for formalizing highly probabilistic interactive sequences. As such, idealists have generally lagged behind their realist counterparts in formalizing and testing their theories of political interactions and international relations. Empirical data gathering is another hindrance to idealist theory as the number of actual events declines exponentially from left to right in Figure 2.1 (i.e., the number of events relevant to idealist theory is enormous and out of the reach of technological capabilities).¹³ Even data collection on incidents of political violence, other than formal war itself, is problematic due to direct and indirect suppression of crucial information by the state.¹⁴

The conditional aspects of conflict transformations, especially the transformation to violence, stem from probabilism and the indeterminate nature of complex interactive sequences involving rational choice responses to external stimuli. Whereas the *potential* for violence resides in all humans and may thereby be viewed as inherent to human nature, the strength of the psychic disposition to employ violence varies among individuals and the probability that violence will actually be used varies according to systemic conditions. The apparent tension between inherent and contingent influences on the human decision to transform conflict management strategies to violence makes them seem exclusive and incompatible explanations for collective action. Eckstein makes such a statement, arguing that “we cannot [choose between basic models of political man] effectively by incorporating both in our initial models. If we do that, results pointing to both assuredly will turn up, both being at work....” (Eckstein 1980, 164) Yet, if both are at work, our models must incorporate both or they will only be partial models.

Processual Dynamics and the Diffusion of Insecurity

A fourth and final intent of the present theoretical discussion is to question whether it is appropriate to predicate security studies on a conceptualization of war as a *discrete* conflict event. The conventional classificatory schemata of war events as specific “things” are usually impressive in their explicit clarity, their implicit certainty, and their apparent validity. These schemes serve to fortify the belief that we, as human collectivities, have perfect, or at least a great measure of, control over the exercise of military force. We cultivate an impression that when an actor initiates military action, that action is precisely executed, the goals are clear, the externalities are minimal, and the consequences are very quickly discounted. War is a stylized ideal; it involves armies locked in competition similar to an athletic contest (with heightened stakes!).

The ideas of “enduring rivalries” and “protracted social conflicts” address ways of looking at wars and other acts of warfare within their processual context.¹⁵ The differences between these ideas appear superficial in the context of this discussion: “rivalry” seems to refer to an affliction of the more-institutionalized states in the core of the world system, whereas, “protracted conflict” afflicts the less-institutionalized societies in the periphery. Protracted social conflicts are obviously more debilitating to the social groups consumed by them. These hostile interactions involve sporadic episodes of warfare that have no clear beginning or end; when they periodically erupt into warfare, it is fought without rules or standards of conduct. Rivalries, on the other hand, rarely involve actual warfare; the stakes are too high. They are probably equally, if not more highly, debilitating interactions, however, the costs of such hostile interactions, i.e., arms races, are not nearly as dramatic. They mainly involve altered policy priorities and the diversion of resources to military and other non-production uses within a highly complex bureaucratic allocation and budgetary procedure. (See Chan 1985 1991 for reviews of this literature.) They may even compensate their losses by stimulating greater production and innovation (although the distorted priorities of such innovation and production will contribute more to the system’s structural determinism and structural violence).

The will to engage in protracted conflict signifies the loss of capacity to engage in meaningful dialogue or to compromise one’s own position as an act of symbolic deference in order to signal, pacify, and, possibly, befriend a potential adversary. It marks an interaction which loses its outcome orientation and focuses instead on the means of interaction as an end in themselves; expected goals are transformed from absolute to relative gains. The meaning of life is repainted in the mortal hues of mourning, culture is recast to glorify the hero and the martyr and the instruments which exact retribution for the death of the spirit, and the gods start taking sides. Warfare is a process which takes command over the regular

processes of life and society and, thus, normal social process progressively loses control of itself and sight of its future.

The impression of control subsumed in classic treatments of war is deceptive. It is relatively simple, in a post-dictive sense, to categorize events; it is not so simple a task to predict how a military venture will play out in real time. It certainly can not be seen as a discrete, identifiable event until long after it is over. While it is still playing out, it is rarely confined to violence between armies. Modern military techniques necessarily involve the civilian population and the societal infrastructure in the destruction. Military warfare often masks the extension of violence into other arenas of social interaction: repression, terrorism, genocides, murder, rape, famine, deprivation, dispossession, and dislocation.

The Arendtian idea of violence as essentially arbitrary and an explicit loss of social control is instructive in this regard as it ignores any supposition that we control the consequences and contain the involvement in violent interactions. In this conceptualization, violence is inherently insidious and quickly displays powerful internal dynamics which push and pull the experience into ever increasing magnitudes of violence and ever diminishing degrees of human control. Violence tends to escalate, expand, and diffuse over time. The initiation of violence does not mark the beginning of those processes, however. The decision to transform politics to violence is itself a result of an escalation dynamic within a political conflict process. As Gurr has observed in regard to his global study of minorities in conflict with the state:

When tracing minorities over time, we have repeatedly observed that violent political action follows a period of nonviolent activity that was either ignored or dealt with repressively. Political action by minorities is a continuum; understanding its violent manifestations requires analysis of its nonviolent origins. (Gurr 1993, 94)

Warfare can not be understood nor even adequately described outside its existential context, that is, as a life-threatening processual force operating within the living social processual environment. Self-serving rationalizations of the utility of violence notwithstanding, the resort to violence is a disintegrating force and antithetical to the integrative imperative of civility and modernity in social systems.


Every act of violence has antecedents in nonviolent action and, once transformed to a violent mode of interaction, positively affects (increases) the probability of subsequent occurrences, *ceteris paribus*. The utilization of violence in one arena of political relations increases the probability that violence will be used in other arenas.¹⁶ Fortunately, the intermediation of other social dynamics (e.g., Arendtian “power” dynamics, the “conservation of energy” principle or “war weariness”) mitigates the otherwise unbridled pervasiveness of violence. Foremost among these is the gross quality of the socio-political relationship, that is, violence preys on power in a mathematical relationship based on increasingly diminished

returns; it will eventually extinguish the ability and will (i.e., the expected utility) needed to sustain it. It is an inherently self-limiting process. The memory of violence, however, is probably only limited by our existential mortality, that is, the psychology of victimization becomes an integral part of the psyche of those directly affected by it and an integral component in the culture of group identification and the security problematique. In order to examine the problem of violence meaningfully, the entire system must be examined because the full process of social conflict and the possibilism of violent dysfunction is complex and inextricably intertwined with normal social process. Once it becomes noticeable as violence and as a problem, it is already strong enough to defy rational control.

Re-Aggregating Typologies of Warfare

As pointed out above, the primary critique of conventional security studies centers on its obsessive preoccupation with major-power war, that is, the narrow universe of inquiry into the problem of political violence. Substitutability looms large here and, in the most extreme case, it may be possible to completely eliminate major-power war as a form without decreasing the total incidence of political violence in the global system.¹⁷ The general impetus to violence may simply be diverted to other forms; that is, changes in political behavior are not necessarily *peace-creating* but, rather, may be *war-diverting*. Systemic analysis of the problem of political violence must necessarily account for all substitutable forms.

In order to illustrate how the foregoing discussion affects the theoretical classification of episodic warfare, the phenomenal universe of the problem, and the concomitant inquiry into and specification of the problem of political violence and war, it will be helpful to compare representational schemes. To this purpose, I will attempt to build an intellectual bridge to span the gulf between where we are heading and where I think we should be going. As noted earlier, the conventional preoccupation in security studies has been with the occurrence of “major power war” as the broadest treatment of the problem and a focus on “general systemic war” as the narrowest concept. Examinations of other gross types of political violence, such as civil war and revolution, have been kept conceptually distinct, under the assumption that domestic forms of political violence are qualitatively different from inter-state varieties (meaning that they are assumed to have causes that are qualitatively distinguished from the causes of inter-state war) as are minor power wars and, even, major-minor power wars. A general theory of social conflict process and the transformation to violence necessarily assumes a common process dynamic among all types of political violence. The relevant universe of inquiry includes all forms and types of political violence and, so, must necessarily bridge the level of analysis gap in conventional security studies.




(adapted from Figure 2.1, Vasquez 1993, 70)

Figure 2.2 Classification of Individual War Efforts

Vasquez presents a foundation for such a bridge with an innovative treatment of war classification in *The War Puzzle* (1993, chapter 2). Vasquez criticizes previous war classification efforts on two accounts: one, because most “substantive typologies do not even pretend to be logically exhaustive (i.e., there may be a host of wars which do not easily fit any type)” and, two, “historical classifications have to date been insufficiently theoretical.” (Vasquez 1993, 64) I represent Vasquez’s classificatory schemata of “types of war” in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. The Vasquez models are conventional classificatory schemes of war and, as such, contain all the theoretic assumptions and biases that I have critiqued above. In addition, these models may be criticized on both accounts on which Vasquez criticizes previous efforts. These models more importantly, however, contain certain innovations which can be expanded into a broader and more meaningful classificatory scheme.

Vasquez develops two models for his typology of war: one depicting “individual war efforts” and another detailing a proposed typology. In constructing the first model, Vasquez acknowledges that the capability to conduct warfare is an essential element in the utility of warfare and, so, in the decision to initiate violent action. In analyzing earlier work by Singer and his cohorts, Vasquez draws two important conclusions. The first is that “the distribution of capability [across belligerents] will determine what form war will take, and not whether it will occur.” A second is “that capability differentials may be the most important



(adapted from Figure 2.2, Vasquez 1993, 73)

Figure 2.3 Typology of War

dimension upon which to construct a typology of war.” He goes on to suggest that “the purpose of the initiator determines the type of war that will be fought, and a search for the causes of war would start with the factors that made the initiator have that purpose in the first place and try to attain it through force of arms in the second place.” (Vasquez 1993, 58-61) These tenets allude to essential elements in the critique outlined above and make Vasquez’s approach conducive to conceptual metamorphosis.

From these observations, Vasquez builds his classification scheme of individual war efforts in classic fashion by emphasizing the behavior of the individual unit as opposed to focusing on the interactive process taking place between units engaged in opposition (Figure 2.2). In the model, capability is referred to as “Means” and purpose as “Goals.” The modeling technique is particularly problematic in that the apparent x and y axes do not represent continuous variables, as one might expect, but dichotomous variables. Instead of yielding a conceptual space which is inclusive of the infinite variation possible in the measures indicated, this model presents only four exclusive category cells. It would be nearly impossible to accurately classify any but the most extreme cases in this scheme; it is likely that most cases would cluster at the borders between the cells or fall in the “limited” category, as “total” is all and “limited” is everything

less than all. This is a problem inherent in categorical schemes: how to classify the borderline cases.

In constructing his model “typology of war” (Figure 2.3) Vasquez introduces more confusion by intermingling the measures presented in his previous model of individual effort with the new measures of his typology (Figure 2.3 is an adaption of the original models designed to facilitate comparative analysis). The confusion is confounded by the fact that his two models are not related well in the text of his argument, especially as to the measure of the “scope of the war.” The three dimensional axes of Vasquez’s typology model represent measures of (*x*) number of participants, dyadic or complex (adapted as Contagion, absent or present); (*y*) scope of the war, limited or total (Scope of Effort, assumed to be an aggregate measure of the efforts, i.e., means and goals, of all participants, although, as already mentioned, Vasquez is unclear on this); and (*z*) relative capability (ratio of individual means). Again, these are dichotomies, not continuous variables. The added dimension is intended to account for the added complexities of multilateral war, a Contagion effect that differentiates simple dyadic wars from multiple actor entanglements (systemic wars?). This 2x2x2 scheme separates episodes into eight exclusive category cells with the same problems of classification as the previous model. This model also contains a high degree of autocorrelation among the measures of the three axes (all three contain a measure of individual means). Vasquez departs from the classic method in a significant way, however, when he ignores legal-political status distinctions and incorporates civil warfare in his classificatory scheme. This, I would argue, is the main contribution of his typology of war scheme.

Figure 2.4 represents a reconstruction of the basic Vasquez model which addresses the four critiques discussed above: 1) the necessity of including the entire social conflict process; 2) the desire for continuous variability; 3) the requirement of interactive measurement; and 4) an inclusive classification scheme (one that transcends the problem of categorical boundaries). Much of what distinguishes different “types” of war, or warfare, are the unique characteristics of the parties involved: their special legal-political (or structural) status and relationship, including a unique agenda of situationally-specific conflict issues and standing grievances; their respective political and technological cultures; the relative capabilities, or means, that the involved parties are able and willing to bring to bear in the interaction; and the relational goals the interaction is serving to resolve. The instrumental means at the disposal of the disputing parties include both violent/military and non-violent/deliberative/administrative capabilities. The shifting balance between these two types of interactive capability will help to determine the relative utility factors of those strategies and thereby the probability that the character of the relationship will transform from non-warfare to warfare.

Utilizing the axes as continuous measures we can aggregate cases of episodic warfare rather than separate distinct war events, that is, we can construct a conceptual space in which all cases of collective violence and warfare may be




Figure 2.4 Political Conflict Classification Scheme

considered to fall objectively and independently of any subsequent, subjective interpretation. Due to the interactive nature of warfare, measures of the attributes and characteristics of individual participants become progressively irrelevant to the episode as each participant increasingly loses its independence in the exchange over time, that is, behavior of A at time t is partially (or even wholly) determined by the behavior of B at time $t-1$ (and A's anticipation of B at time $t+1$). Measures relevant to the processual dynamics of the episode, then, are the Relative Means of the actors (the x axis) and the Relational Goal (the y axis) of the instrumental exchange.¹⁸

The concept "relative means" is similar to the classic concepts of "relative capability" or "balance of forces" and should require no special explication. It refers to the comparison of instrumental means each party is able and willing to apply to the interaction. Prior to the decision to transform normal politics to violence, relative means incorporates the instruments of both structural and legitimate authority, i.e., the Arendtian notions of "power" and "violence." Once violence is initiated and escalates, relative means become increasingly biased toward structural capabilities. Thus, security studies conventionally focus on a comparison of measures of coercive capabilities as the relevant method of assessing relative means. Legitimate authority remains crucial to successful application of capabilities, to the continuation of the war effort, and to the eventual termination (or retransformation) of violence to non-violence or peace upon abreaction and must not be ignored in evaluating relative means. Legitimate




Figure 2.5 Relational Factors in Political Conflict: Relational Goals

authority decreases over time as a result of the use of violence and, as such, often must be augmented by the intervention of exogenous sources of legitimacy.¹⁹

“Relational goals” are determined originally by the violence initiator and thereafter by the party most active in maintaining the violence (the reactive party must match defensively the offensive intent of the active party or succumb in the exchange; only once the reactive party gains the initiative in the exchange can it initiate a de-escalation of the relational goal). Relational goals may be escalated unilaterally but they may be de-escalated only bilaterally (capitulation does not guarantee de-escalation), thus making de-escalation contingent on the retention of some degree of legitimate authority in the relationship. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 provide further elaborations of the conceptual scheme. The first figure (Figure 2.5, Relational Goals) presents a qualitative “step” categorization of possible interactive goals. The first step in the escalation of relational goals in political conflict is for the purpose of political *expression* of group special interests: one group’s leadership may decide that its group’s needs, values, or views are not adequately addressed or respected by another group in a relationship; so it may act (either non-violently or violently, usually non-violently) to express this discordance. A second step in an escalatory process would be signified by the intent of one party to *control* the political activity or influence of another party; purely non-violent means can not guarantee unilateral control in a political

relationship (unconditional acquiescence would be necessary) and so some form of violence (usually as coercion and credible threat) must be invoked according to some articulated political control criteria or agenda. A third step is brought about by the collective will of one group to *dominate* the political behavior of another group; in such a relationship the collective will of one group is in all ways subordinated (by use or threat of superior force) to the will of the dominant group. A fourth and radical step is defined as the intention of one group to *eliminate* completely the political activity or influence of another group from the public realm so there is no overt contention or meaningful challenge. The extreme manifestation of this relational goal is the complete physical elimination of the “other” group; such complete elimination is rarely necessary as psychological elimination of the group from the political arena is achieved prior to their total annihilation.

This scheme—that is, the conceptual space delimited by relative means and relational goals—allows for change in the characteristics of the interaction brought about by escalations in means and goals throughout the temporal course of an episode of conflict interaction and violence. The final classification of a particular warfare event, as is done in classic security and war schema, should be viewed as the equivalent of a Guttman scale rating in which it is acknowledged that the set (x,y) of the highest values obtained during the course of the interaction characterizes the furthest processual extent of the event but also subsumes the character of all lesser values and thereby captures the entire interactive process.²⁰ The assumption that war events are discrete ignores this quality of the interactive process. By incorporating process, episodes of political violence are better viewed as essentially similar phenomena; they are quantitatively varied in magnitude of violence based on the degree of influence the involved parties retain in the interactive exchange.

Referring back to the Vasquez model (Figure 2.2), he ranks his categorical cells according to the magnitude of effort expended. This ranking is assumed to correlate to the intensity of the warfare and thereby to the magnitude of the war’s consequences. So, a war in the category “total means/total goals” (1) would be the most intense type of war experience (for that individual party), the category “limited means/total goals” (2) ranks second, and so on. If such a ranking scheme were to be applied to the alternative model proposed in Figure 2.4, it would appear as presented in Figure 2.6. In this presentation, however, no strict inference is made to the intensity of warfare or to the magnitude of destruction. This matrix separates categories of exchange which are assumed to correlate moderately to intensity and magnitude (both temporal dynamics and military technology are intervening variables with great effect) but characterize the relational outcomes of the interaction more accurately: area (1) describes an outcome of high negative absolute gains and small relative gains; area (2), medium negative absolute gains and high relative gains; area (3), medium negative absolute gains and little or no




Figure 2.6 Relational Factors in Political Conflict: Relational Gains

relative gains; and area (4) low negative absolute gains and medium relative gains (see Snidal 1991a 1991b for a discussion of relative and absolute gains).

I have previously argued that every incidence of political violence has innate potential for escalation, expansion, and diffusion. Escalation, in this sense, is defined as an increase in relative means (i.e., toward greater equality) or relational goals or, more likely, both; expansion (or contagion) is the widening of the warfare episode to involve additional group actors (allies or coalitions) in conformance with the original oppositional dyad; diffusion is the heightened probability that warfare will spread through the web of interactive ties between social identity groups and be used in political relationships not directly involved in the *a priori* relationship of warfare. Because of this thesis of non-containment (or non-control), designating contagion (expansion) as a measure of differentiation contributes little of theoretic import to the conceptual scheme; all warfare begins as simply dyadic with a potential for expansion (i.e., to become complexly dyadic—meaning that distinct episodes of political violence remain essentially dyadic, regardless of the number of participants). What changes is not the nature of warfare but, rather, the nature of identity. Although it is important to understand under what conditions an episode is more or less likely to expand, the possibility of expansion does not justify qualitative differentiation of violence episodes.




Figure 2.7 Political Violence: Conceptual Space Model

What does matter in this scheme is the one left out of Vasquez's typology: the relative legal-political status of the participants. The authority structure of the state, based partly on coercive capacity and partly on legitimacy, is a qualitatively distinct factor in political relations. It serves as the gatekeeper between the internal and external environment and, in so doing, largely defines the contents of those relational spaces. Figure 2.7 is the full conceptual space model of the political conflict and violence phenomena. It should be noted that the position of the *y* axis does not designate the "point of origin" on the *x* axis, rather it connotes a conceptual juncture in the *x* axis, dividing the scheme into two separate, or dual, conceptual spaces in accordance with the fundamental political boundary of the state-structure, that is, the border between external and internal spaces (Community and Society). This is not meant to imply an *inherent* distinction between these political spaces (the classic "level of analysis" argument) but, rather, a *practical* one. The full model necessarily reflects the special characteristic that defines the Weberian "state" and differentiates it from sub-state groups: the monopoly of legitimate coercion, concentration of power, and legal authority. This legal distinction of sovereignty significantly conditions political activity and actor characteristics (i.e., political culture); it does not transform the conflict process itself.

The double x axis is meant to draw attention to how the relative capabilities of actors operating within a conceptual space translate into structural authority within the relevant political system (community or society). The amount of systemic-structural authority relates to the expected “rational” utility of violence (see the discussion relating to Figure 2.10 below). The greater the disparity in relative capability between actors in a political relationship (i.e., the lesser the “equality”), the greater the structural authority obtaining to the stronger actor (structural authority is defined as the amount of compliance which can be attributed to the agency of coercion). Simply put, preponderant power commands or induces “voluntary” compliance by weaker actors and may be seen as an effective method in the establishment and maintenance of political order.²¹ On the other hand, the more equal the relative capability between actors, the less structural authority can be brought to bear and the more dependent the stability of the political relationship is on legitimate authority (legitimate authority is defined as the amount of voluntary compliance which results through positive benefit derived from cooperative or coordinated association—for a detailed treatment of authority structures, see Eckstein and Gurr 1975).

In the external space (the Community space in Figure 2.7), the state acts within a more anarchical system as a specific and “equal” legal-unit; in the internal space (designated Society), the state claims predominant legal authority in a more hierarchical system.²² What separates these spaces is the structure of authority operative in those spaces; what binds them together is the fact that the state necessarily operates in both spaces. A third space may be identified as the concept of the state itself where episodes of political violence occur between community and society; these episodes are not contentions between groups but a contention with the definitional qualities of the state and which take issue with the extant state’s legal status *per se* (e.g., the “August coup” that characterized the changing nature and meaning of the Soviet state—represented as the double y axis in Figure 2.7). Complex warfare, in this schemata, involves the infusion of violence across the (state) political border between society and community or across the political boundaries that define sub-groupings within the main warring parties. Complexity in warfare can be mapped in the conceptual space model as multiple episodes of collective violence which “infect” the systemic structure itself and increasingly define all political relationships within that structure.²³

Figure 2.8 is an application of the model to standard forms of violent political behavior. Various categories of political violence are plotted in the conceptual space in order to illustrate how conventionally defined violence episodes are conceptually related and, therefore, may be aggregated for analytical purposes. It also provides a design for plotting the complexity of distinct collective violence episodes within the model’s conceptual space in order to better explain and understand the processual phenomenon of warfare.

As a way of further illustrating the potential of the conceptual space model to aid understanding of the processual complexity of warfare, Figure 2.9 gives an




Figure 2.8 Political Violence: Applied Conceptual Space Model

example of how the model might be used to map complex political violence episodes and processes. The situation that has engulfed the former territories of Yugoslavia is emblematic of the insidious nature of violence in the contemporary global political system, the complexity of protracted social conflicts, and the cognitive difficulties of applying political boundaries in security studies. As already noted, the ideational structure of our concepts of war and security affects how we perceive the subject of inquiry, how we structure our research, and, consequently, the results we obtain from our studies. The conceptualization of war as a discrete, military event leads us to trivialize the real trauma of warfare, the breadth of its effects on human society and community, and the vast majority of its repercussions (those troublesome externalities!). By trivializing the event and ignoring the process, we tend to discount the real social costs of warfare and overestimate its utility. By categorizing the process as an event, we lose a wealth of crucial information not only about the “main event” itself but also about all the auxiliary violence which is both stimulated, enabled, and obfuscated by the war. By discounting the auxiliary violence and collateral damage associated with an episode of warfare, such as the destruction of property, victimization of civilians, forced confiscations of property, rape, murder, dislocations and relocations, and the repression of domestic opposition groups, we lose valuable evidence in our attempt to understand the nexus of internal and external violence.




Figure 2.9 Yugoslavian Political Violence Experience

The situation in the territories formerly comprising the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is illustrative of the complexities of protracted social warfare. The first generally recognized outbreak of hostilities was a low-level violence episode which occurred between the Yugoslavian state and the breakaway republic of Slovenia over the issue of Slovenian statehood (position 1 in Figure 2.9).²⁴ A more serious outbreak of violence occurred when the Yugoslavian state attempted to assert control over the breakaway republic of Croatia (position 2). This led to an inter-state war of control or domination between Serbia (acting as the rump Yugoslavian state) and Croatia (position 3). A corollary to this inter-state war was an irredentist/civil war between resident Serbs and the Croatian state (position 4). The intensity of enmity between ethnic Croats and Serbs in Croatia escalated and spread to include reciprocal politicides (i.e., politically-motivated mass murders—position 5—see Harff and Gurr 1988). The violence in Croatia was duplicated in the neighboring republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as, first, ethnic Serbs (position 6) and, then, ethnic Croats (position 7) attacked the political integrity of the fledgling Bosnian state. The civil warfare in Bosnia was intensified by, mostly covert, interventions by both the Serbian-Yugoslavian (position A) and the Croatian states (position B) in the Bosnian situation. As the fighting in Bosnia escalated, reciprocal genocides and forced relocations (“ethnic cleansing”) were initiated between Serbs and Muslims (mainly by the Serbs—position 8) and Croats and Muslims (position 9). The deteriorating conditions wrought by the pervasive

violence in Bosnia and Croatia stimulated a peace-keeping intervention by the United Nations (position C). The violence in Bosnia continued to escalate, expand, and spread and the structural conditions of that society continued to deteriorate and disintegrate until the very existence of the Bosnia state and society came into jeopardy (i.e., total war against Bosnia—position 10). The Bosnia situation finally prompted threats from NATO forces led by the United States and eventually an intervention by NATO and Russia (position D), posing a very serious threat of violence expansion to the many, powerful member states of the recently defunct Cold War system. At the same time, the prior relationship of enmity between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian state in Kosovo continues to be controlled by repression and has more recently erupted into open violence (position 11).

This brief description of the complexities of the Yugoslavian episode does not begin to exhaust the incidence of political violence and the transgressions of civility perpetrated in that general context (e.g., the pervasive victimization of individuals by individuals and smaller groups under cover of collective warfare—refer to the “iceberg” proposition above, note 20), but it does illustrate the idea that wars are much more than we admit academically or are able to cope with intellectually or recollect accurately in our contemporary revisions of historical realities. Years from now, under the conventional scheme, most of the complexities of the Yugoslavian experience will be discounted and the event classified simply as a Bosnian civil war of specified duration during which a certain number of military personnel and an unspecified number of non-military personnel were killed, and in which some highly visible exogenous states and international organizations overtly intervened. The warfare rife in the former-Yugoslavia is by no means an exceptional case; it is emblematic of warfare in the Third World War. The State Failure project’s Internet website identifies 54 similar cases of complex state failure during the period 1955-1996.²⁵

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to transform our perceptions of the war phenomenon and to so inform the subsequent inquiry. It has described and delineated the primary problem under consideration, political violence, and the relevant universe for research. It has proposed a simple model of a general social conflict process so as to place the identified problem within its appropriate processual context. It has proposed that conflict management is the prime function of any political system and, so, has implied that the occurrence of political violence indicates, to some extent, a failure of that system. It was argued that the initiation of the transformation to violence is not caused in any meaningful sense but, rather, it is chosen by the leadership of a social group from an array of conflict management options; it was further asserted that violence is a substitutable and, therefore, more

or less probable consequence in a social conflict interaction. The implication of these assertions is that security studies should focus on *conditions* that contribute to the preference or justification of violence and, thereby, effect the likelihood or prolongation of a violence episode. A discussion of the full horror of warfare and an admonition against intellectual trivialization of the experience completed the examination. In short, this chapter has been concerned with problemation and, having expounded the problem, it leads the inquiry to the greater issue of expounding the social context, human nature and social construction, within which violence is the primary problem: an aspect of inquiry that might be termed *structuration*. (Sylvan and Glassner 1985; Wendt 1987 1992 1994; Jabri 1996)

By way of conclusion, I would like to return briefly to the conceptual space schema devised to capture the political violence phenomenon; this time, in order to discuss the “rational” utility of violence. While historically speaking much violence has surely been the result of human irrationality or misperception, this can no longer serve as the fall-back excuse; technology has precluded this luxury of tolerance and acceptance by blessing us with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Technology has changed considerably, in all areas and aspects. Perhaps the most profound changes of the twentieth century can be traced to the ways that groups are organized and the ways that political decisions are made. The unitary actor assumption is becoming much less salient and so the incidence of warfare directly attributable to the irrational acts of autocrats and dictators is greatly diminished. Decision-making groups become increasingly less susceptible to any such collective irrationality as their size increases; increasingly empowered subjects, followers, and citizens are less likely to accept or support irrational decisions to engage in warfare. Under these changed conditions of collective rationality, it would seem logical to assume a conditional or bounded rationality in outbreaks of political violence or structured relations of coercion.

Figure 2.10 reproduces the conceptual space model in order to examine ideas of rationality applied to group conflict situations. Three types of relational, “rational” utility are proposed: certain utility, expected utility, and interactive utility. *Certain Utility*, designated conceptually by the rectangle C(U)*i* in Figure 2.10, involves dyadic relationships of high structural authority or preponderant capability discrepancies. In such a situation, the utility of coercion is certain (i.e., strongly positive for the stronger party and strongly negative for the weaker party) so that the compliance of the weaker party to (usually unequal) exchange relations is maintained subtly through implicit threat and authority is rarely challenged directly, thereby minimizing the perceived need for explicit threats and coercive actions. This type of rational utility is usually associated with the relationship between the Weberian ideal state and its domestic component groups.

Expected Utility, designated by the rectangle E(U)*i*, involves dyadic relationships in which there is a clear capability advantage to one party but the salience of that material advantage is made uncertain by intervening factors such as geopolitical distance (e.g., a loss-of-strength gradient; Boulding 1962), lack of




Figure 2.10 “Rational” Utility of Political Violence

political will to utilize coercive capacity in a particular dispute or manner, unpredictable alliance relationships, unreliability or lack of fortitude in pressing capability advantages over time and throughout a conflict escalation process, etc. In such relationships, the maintenance of authority patterns depends more upon legitimacy for gaining compliance by the weaker party in the relationship, even though that legitimate authority is explicitly backed by (a more or less credible) threat of coercion or enforcement. In this scheme, it is generally “expected” (but not guaranteed) that the stronger actor will prevail in any contention that may arise or when a status quo relationship is challenged by a weaker actor. This type of rational utility is generally associated with the Waltzian inter-state system, comprised of equal state units with differential capabilities.

Interactive Utility, designated by the triangle $I(U)_i$, refers to the perceived utility of using coercion in an attempt to gain unilateral advantage in a (potentially) hostile conflict relationship; interactive utility is a subjective “rational” function of the interplay between relative means and relational goals. As such, this conception of utility deals directly with the justification of violence. Interactive Utility reflects the importance of relational goals and symbolic, emotive appeals in the decision to initiate violence in contemporary societies: as relative capabilities approach equality, the magnitude of relational goals must increase in

order to justify the increased costs of the warfare necessary to establish supremacy between antagonists.

An importance inference of the application of rational utility to the political violence concept relates to the “borders” of human rationality. The interactive utility triangle defines a perceptual space within which coercion and violence are most readily rationalized and “justified” and, so, highly influential in defining political relations; this is the Realists’ world: the zone of turmoil and structural violence. The conceptual space outside of the zone of turmoil is where coercion and violence are deemed irrational and least likely to be accepted, supported, or tolerated; this is the Idealists’ world: the zone of peace. The “grey” area along the conceptual border is where the transformation of conflict to violence is most likely to occur: this is the danger zone. This grey area is a slipstream of deadly currents which has the power to drag a struggling or rivaling relationship to ever greater degrees of animosity, ever widening scope and expansion, and rapidly escalating levels of violence.²⁶ In addition, once political violence has been initiated, it is proposed that there is a strong tendency for all relationships in proximity to the violence episode to become increasingly susceptible to violence. This is termed the diffusion of insecurity hypothesis and will be the subject of chapter 4. Also, as noted above, it is proposed that once violence is initiated, there will be an increased incidence of all types of violence and victimization within the immediate, affected region and a tendency for all relationships to be drawn into the turmoil zone as relational goals are increasing conceived in the most extreme terms.

The thesis of this chapter has been that the conventional conceptualization of war has hindered rather than facilitated our understanding of the social phenomenon of collective violence and warfare between social identity groups in the global system. War, in the Western sense, is a highly formalized, institutional-instrumental procedure which has few referents in the problems of political violence and protracted social conflict now plaguing large sectors of the non-Western world. Modern war is, in large extent, a stylized ritual and an artifact of the great power political culture and a very particular (civilized?) form of the general political violence phenomenon. The inference in most war studies is that there are great quantitative and qualitative differences between Western and non-Western societies and so the peculiar forms that violence takes in such divergent systems are non-comparable, irrelevant, or inconsequential to reality and so, also, to theory. This essay takes an opposing position by claiming that we can not adequately understand our own particular manifestations of political violence without controlling, somehow, for particularistic influences. One way to control for such influences is by comparison with forms of violence occurring under distinctly different circumstances. Combining the experiences of these separate worlds hinges on the explication of the nexus between internal and external conflict and warfare.

The nexus between internal and external conflict and warfare can be identified as the state. The state is both gatekeeper between the internal and external worlds and the primary player in both arenas. The illustration of the Yugoslavian experience above points to another powerful nexus between the internal and the external: violence tends to permeate social relations without much regard or respect for the political borders drawn on maps or devised in human minds. The spectacle of high-profile inter-state and civil wars often provide cover, excuses, or justifications for less “tasteful” acts of intra-state violence and victimization. Still a third nexus lies in the mechanisms employed by societal elites in their desire to augment social identity, societal cohesion, and political control. Directing attention to the threat posed by the external enemy “other” and capitalizing on fear as a method of enhancing internal cohesion (termed “diversionary theory”) is a sure sign of myopic leadership that often leads the unwary into debilitating rivalries which reinforce contention and confrontation and increase the likelihood of dyadic warfare and systemic anomie.

Notes

1. Political violence is defined simply as the use of violence as a social group activity. Of course, this simple definition is characterized by several complicating implications regarding decision making, coordination, goal orientation, and the distribution of costs and benefits, that is, politics. The broadest definition thus includes all acts of group violence; the more practical definition would focus on the subset of purposive acts of violence by groups that are intended to increase group welfare by affecting the political relationship between groups (communal violence) or among groups operating in the political system in general (state violence and anti-state violence).

2. COPDAB is the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, Edward E. Azar, principle investigator; ICB is the International Crisis Behavior data bank, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, principle investigators; ITERATE3 is the International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorism Events data base, Edward F. Mickolus, principle investigator; Polity II and Minorities at Risk data bases are directed by Ted Robert Gurr; SIPRI includes a broad range of data-gathering activity at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; and WEIS is the World Events Interaction Survey data base originally devised by Charles McClelland and currently directed by Rodney G. Tomlinson.

3. Feminists make a similar criticism when they examine the use of hierarchical binary oppositions or dualisms; these are conceptual dichotomies of type used for classification purposes which carry an implicit assumption of ordinal preference. (Tickner 1992) Social psychologists point to attribution theory and psychoanalysts to the psychic functions of externalization and projection and the (assumed) utility of “us-and-them” distinctions to explain our “innate tendency to dichotomize” in such hierarchical fashion. (GAP 1987; Volkan et al. 1990)

4. Waltz rationalizes his own predilection for ideal types in a rather curious fashion by explaining that, “[a] theory contains at least one theoretical assumption. Such assumptions are not factual. One therefore cannot legitimately ask if they are true, but only

if they are useful.” (Waltz 1979, 117-18) My argument is that, if our assumptions about such fundamental objects as man, the state, and war are wrong, how can we possibly demonstrate any real comprehension or understanding of anything, and particularly of interactive processes, that involves those objects? And, if we have theory devoid of such meaning, how can it possibly be thought of as being useful? Useful to whom? And for what purpose? In such a case, the political border between prediction and prescription becomes blurred, leading to self-fulfilling prophesies. A true cynic might look around to see for whose particular interests and aspirations an anarchic, male-dominated, war-striven world system might be thought of as being useful. This point commands a position of preeminence in criticism and scholarly debate and I won’t belabor it here.

5. Coercion in this sense is necessarily limited to the use of non-injurious force as a sanction explicitly prescribed by law. Repression is the use of injurious and potentially deadly force as a method of social control. Violence refers to a violation of the physical integrity of a being with the intent either of (1) forcing that being, or other beings who might collectively identify with the security of that targeted being, to alter their behavior; (2) invoking punitive sanction in retribution for a transgression of expected, or lawful, behavior; or (3) deriving purely selfish benefit from such action.

6. See Bloom (1990), Neumann (1992), Smith (1992), White (1992), Wendt (1994), and Wæver (1995) for various treatments of the “identity” issue.

7. Consistent with the prior claim of openness, all social relationships are essentially iterated and must be constantly reproduced or reconstructed. Even a relationship of non-interaction, or “exit” in Hirschman’s (1970) renowned trilogy of political relations, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, is an iterated sequence of choice involving the potential to interact at any time.

8. Whereas social identity groups are inherently (internally) political, they are not necessarily politicized groups, that is, they do not necessarily act politically in the external social context. Group resources, relations with other communal identity groups, and the conditions of the external political environment all help to determine the utility of group politicization and mobilization (see e.g., Tilly 1978).

9. It is argued later in this chapter that there are two basic types of authority: structural and legitimate. A weapon provides its user with a certain degree of structural authority in that the weapon may be used as an instrument for establishing an authoritative relationship between the wielder and the victim.

10. Arendt uses such a conditional argument in explaining *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1973). Conditional probability statements concerning political behavior used in the present explication are best related to those explained in Most and Starr (1989), that is, probability resulting from substitutable behaviors. Other treatments of probability which are relevant to political systems are chaos theory (e.g., Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Huckfeldt 1990; Kiel 1994) and indeterminism or disorder theory (e.g., Dupré 1993).

11. *The American Heritage Dictionary*, 2nd college ed., s.v. “abreact.”

12. For example, according to figures found in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* the U.S. spends about 30 times as much for military preparedness (Department of Defense budget) than it does for diplomatic and other non-military management efforts in the international arena. The “arms race” and “security dilemma” literature is based in large part on such an assumption of detrimental disparity in resource allocations.

13. Stuart Bremer has put the “probability of war breaking out in any given year between contiguous states” at 0.00455 (cited in Vasquez 1993, 127). The actual occurrence

of war is a relatively rare event; the Correlates of War project counts the actual number of major wars in the 45 year period, 1946-90, at 22 inter-state wars, 24 extra-systemic wars, and 70 civil wars (116 total: 2.58 events per year average). In comparison, the WEIS project counts 165,389 interaction events in the 25 year period, 1966-1990 (6,615.6 events per year).

14. The direct suppression of information on collective violence by the state is conventional and many extreme examples are well known, such as the violence against Native Americans during U.S. territorial expansion in the 19th century or that against the *kulaks* during Stalin's collectivization campaign in the 1930s or the victims of the French in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s or that against the "disappeared" in Chile, El Salvador, and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s. Archiving such information, as the Nazi regime in Germany did in their liquidation campaigns of the 1940s, is extremely rare. Indirect suppression occurs when the state, as the only actor with resources adequate to the task of aggregate data collection, simply does not record all potentially useful information.

15. See Azar (1990) for a theoretic treatment of the processual dynamics of protracted social conflict and Vasquez (1993) and Goertz and Diehl (1993) for a similar treatment of the concept of enduring rivalry. See, especially, Most and Starr (1989) for a discussion of process dynamics in political theory.

16. This is a favorite argument and assumption of feminist critiques and theory in international relations (e.g., Enloe 1989; Tickner 1992; Sylvester 1994). For one attempt to test this proposed linkage between international violence and domestic violence, see Ember and Ember (1994).

17. Hoole and Huang (1989) make this claim when they characterize the "global conflict process" as a "whirling motion" that alternates between inter-state and intra-state manifestations of the impetus to warfare.

18. The scheme presented here does not attempt to account for special properties of multilateral warfare. It is assumed here that the phenomenon of warfare is basically a dyadic interaction, regardless of the number of participants. In case of multiple actors, the tendency is to polarize and form dyadic coalitions of "friends" and "enemies," that is, to adjust social identities. In the special situations where such polarization does not adequately capture the interaction, then multiple wars are taking place in temporal coincidence and should be so analyzed.

19. Legitimate authority decreases due to the effects that the use of violence has on the physical security and morality of individuals, because of the economic impact of altered priorities and reallocations of resources, and as a result of dramatic changes in political performance in the provision of security and welfare (i.e., increased scarcities and deprivations). These decreases in legitimacy are at least partially offset by increases in the valuation of structural authority or the symbolic equivocation of instrumental means with legitimacy (e.g., "making the world safe for democracy," "fighting for freedom," or "holy war"). The politicization of grievance and discontent during periods of warfare and vital threat tends to be suppressed in deference to the "greater good" or in anticipation of decreased tolerance of dissent. The problem of delegitimization during political violence is least apparent when violence is most successful (i.e., when violence is least costly, affects the fewest lives, and procures the greatest benefits). Most episodes of political violence are not so conveniently characterized by clear distinctions between "legitimized victor" and "delegitimized vanquished." Most often, the diminution of legitimate authority will be augmented through exogenous sources by evocation of historical symbols of (former

or mythic) legitimacy, by reference to divine or theological tenets of legitimacy (“god is on our side”), or by association with external actors who are not directly involved in the violence.

20. I term this the “iceberg” assumption; the experienced observer may fairly accurately assess the nature of an essentially opaque political event by measuring the visible portion and extrapolating the full entity based on general knowledge of the phenomenal characteristics. This is the methodology (and rationale) adopted for coding domestic political violence episodes in the Minorities at Risk Project; domestic episodes are doubly opaque due to the inherent complexity of episodic violence and the active intervention of the state to suppress such information.

21. Relate this political dynamic to hegemonic stability theory (Keohane 1980 1984). This concept of power disparity also relates to classical conceptions of authoritarian regimes; hegemonic stability assumes an enlightened, or otherwise benevolent, authoritarian.

22. The stark distinction presented by Waltz (1979, chapter 5) between the anarchical external realm and the hierarchical internal realm is categorically overstated. This presentation serves the realist agenda but it critically obviates the essentially anarchical structure of democracy, a legal system of (popular) sovereign equality similar in many respects to the system of (state) sovereign equality that forms the basis of international legal order.

23. For an example of the use of the biological metaphor, or epidemiological argument, in conflict and security studies, see Houweling and Siccama (1985). The “infection” metaphor refers both to changes in environmental conditions resulting from the use of violence and the effects these conditions have on the social processes of all groups relationships affected by the violence (i.e., the increased probability that violence will be rationalized or justified in political interactions involving other group identifications--this proposed diffusion dynamic will be elaborated in the following chapters).

24. Ted Gurr has reminded me that the first outbreak of hostilities in this context was the forced suppression of political autonomy in Kosovo in 1988-1989, a precursory event to Yugoslavia’s state failure.

25. The State Failure project’s Internet website can be found at URL address: <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail>.

26. I apologize to Singer and Wildavsky (1993) for pirating their terminology and subverting it to my own ends.