Center for Systemic Peace

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Feminist theory in international relations argues that "gender" is an important explanatory variable in the willingness of states (and other political actors) to use force in conflict interactions; this claim has never been subjected to empirical validity testing. A related claim is forwarded by the democratic peace theorists that "democracy" is important in explaining the willingness to use force; this proposition has been tested with mixed results. Following the lead of those who claim that it is the "entrenchment" of democratic values, rather than the democratic form of government, that lessens the predilection of states to use force in political relations, the authors propose that the quality of democratic entrenchment can be measured by the degree of "gender empowerment." This study, then, uses a measure of gender empowerment only recently made available to test the gender-as-entrenchment proposition against the more conventional propositions forwarded by realist and liberalist theories. Using data on 88 countries in a series of best fit regression analyses, the study finds strong support for the feminist position as complementary to the standard understandings of the resort to force in foreign policy. We conclude that progress toward effective gender empowerment (and by implication, universal enfranchisement) is an important indicator of a state's capacity and commitment to seek non-military solutions to interstate disputes.

Within the discipline of political science, there are a variety of contending perspectives on the relationships among international political, economic, and security issues. A great deal of contention surrounds the relationship(s) or linkages among domestic, interstate, and systemic realms of political dynamics. Recently, the debate has been broadened still further with the

treatises of feminist theorists vying for recognition in the historically fraternal order of International Relations. The challenge presented by feminist theory and gender research is especially acute in the contemporary context wherein the passing of the Cold War is ushering out whole ways of thinking about politics, security, and, especially, sources of threat.[1] Gender issues, while receiving increasing attention since the 1970s, have not generally been accepted by conventional scholars nor incorporated into the mainstream of the discipline.[2] However, the growing strength of feminist scholarship and the persistence of feminist international relations scholars, such as Cynthia Enloe (1989; 1993), J. Ann Tickner (1992), and Christine Sylvester (1994), in articulating and locating gender in their theoretical treatises and analyses argues for serious consideration of the gender concept. The most pertinent criticism of the gender argument concerns its empirical validity; detractors claim that the term lacks definition and, so, the argument is irrefutable and, therefore, ideological.

A review of the extant literature reveals the paucity of empirical study into the influence of gender on international conflict. Currently, the three major threads of research into war and peace, namely research into the influences of power, interdependence, and liberal democracy, overlook the potential relevance of gender variables. Missing has been the will and a means and a measure by which gender could be incorporated into the established research methods and procedures. Without an empirical reverent, the study of gender has been characterized mainly by the development of an alternative research "language" (e.g., feminist research methods or gendered discourses). The adoption of such bilingualism has served to compartmentalize research agendas even further rather than integrate the gender concept with more conventional research, thus

deepening and fortifying the division and distorting the meaning of the differences in fundamental perspective.

This study seeks to bridge the divide and perhaps give a small nudge toward reconciliation by presenting research results that strongly support the argument for consideration of gender as an important factor in the determination of security issues. There are other compelling reasons for studying the relationship between gender and the use of force. The appearance of a "gender gap" in voting patterns and public opinion polls in the US following the Vietnam War stimulated mainstream researchers to measure and explain the phenomenon:

> Studies from the 1970s and early 1980s that focused on the existence of interpretable structure in public attitudes on foreign policy generally reported that gender was at best a relatively unimportant predictor of attitudes. Yet research that focused more narrowly on attitudes toward the use of military force has consistently reported that women are less supportive of the use of military instruments in foreign policy than men (Bendyna et al, 1996:1; footnotes that appeared in the original are not reproduced).

This categorical distinction has been noted by other authors, "Gender differences appear whenever the use of force is involved--but apparently only in these cases" (Togeby, 1994:375). The first generation of survey studies of the "gender gap" are often criticized as capturing a, perhaps temporary, Western cultural bias because they are based primarily on U.S. and European opinion polls. However, an assumption of universality in a relationship between gender and the use of force seems pervasive in the gender literature and such an assumption is foundational in feminist theories of international relations.[3] Despite the weaknesses of the "gender gap" literature, they establish a plausible basis for further research. There is sufficient reason to believe that women have fairly consistent attitudes on the use of force that differ significantly from men's attitudes and that, when women and their feminine-gendered attitudes are empowered within the

political process, policy effects should be manifest as evidence of their influence. Archer (1996:465) makes this claim explicitly in a recent analysis of the peacefulness evident in the Nordic region, "It may be the case that the external policies of the Nordic countries will become more conflict-solving and peaceful as women play a greater role."

Archer's claim alludes to a serious difficulty in empirical research, in general, and in gender research, especially: that of establishing a causal link between crucial variables. The main method of inferring such a relationship is to discover a causal sequence, that is, to find evidence that a certain condition or stimulus directly precedes (and somehow contacts) a certain type or category of event. Unfortunately, gender-specific variables have not gained attention until recently and the availability of data has suffered accordingly. The issue is not that gender research is not amenable to quantitative methods; it is more the case that gender remains mostly "invisible" in our data banks.

This observation does not deny, however, that there <u>is</u> very strong and compelling evidence that the problem: force, violence, and war, is strongly associated with the male agent in his roles as warrior, defender, and leader. A causal explanation of this empirical observation can not be easily established as there is little or no variation in the sex of the causal agent: sex is, after all, a dichotomous variable and men have almost always served within a social division of labor as physical protectors and, also, as aggressors. The greatest variation comes into play as these same agents *use* force, *resist* force, and *eschew* force in various situations under varying conditions.

> It is still true that men more than women, and white men more so than any other group, advocate militarism, spread imperialism; that men continue to commit the majority of violent acts in war. Yet this sex role division of labor does not necessarily mean that women think differently than men about violence or would act significantly different if in power (hooks, 1995:62-3).

It could well be that the apparent relationship between the male agent and the violent event (or structure of events) is a spurious, rather than causal, relationship. This has been the predominant assumption in war, conflict, and security studies. In this context, the introduction of the gender term to conceptually distinguish between categorical values of agents regardless of sex appears to be nothing more than a tautology at best and a stereotype at worst: feminine means peace and masculine means war.

Further complicating the causation problem in gender research is the processual problem: how does change happen or how do we get there from here. We posit that, as the feminine gender is empowered, policies and actions will change. We also propose that the empowerment of the feminine perspective is effectively thwarted through the use of violence, so a reduction in the political use of force and violence apparently can not result solely from, or be caused by, women's empowerment. A catalyst is needed to "open the door" to a gendered-peace process. It is generally recognized in the feminist literature that when individual women are empowered within the dominant system, they tend to become masculinized; when women as a group, representing the feminine gender, are enfranchised and women are empowered to represent gendered values, the system itself is changed. The gradual inclusion of "mixed" gender-sex forms and viewpoints increasingly dilutes the purely masculine perspective. As such, we should expect that the gender argument, in its processual form, looks to a simultaneous, causal relationship between peace and empowerment.

We should also expect the dual processes of transformation to begin very slowly and increase the pace of change as gender empowerment advances and gains credible voice in the

political debate. Yet the results of gendered-transformation are largely systemic: a peaceful state is not likely to be able to operate independently of or contrastingly to operant conditions defined by a hostile or aggressive environment. "No man is an island" and neither is any woman. Pockets of relative peace may emerge and spread (a la an "evolution of cooperation," Axelrod 1984) but we expect that the speed of diffusion of any such transformative effects will be strongly conditioned by the strength of systemic provocateurs who are willing and able to draw others into the "force game." We agree with Conover and Sapiro (1993:1096) that women are not necessarily adverse to violence, that would be irrational play in a force game, but that they are gendered to engage in greater consideration of its effects.

> The point is *not* that women learn early in life never to engage in conflict nor use violence, but rather that they learn to put off the use of violence until later in the course of a conflict than do men, to escalate its use more slowly, and to be more emotionally upset by it.

Our expectation, then, of the effect of gender empowerment on the general willingness to use force should not be a sharp reduction and distinction in the foreign policy behavior of "feminized" versus "masculinized" states but, rather, that the increasing voice of women's gendered perspectives will contribute to a more compassionate resistance to or hesitation in the resort to force and that will lead to progressively fewer militarized disputes in the global system.[4]

CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE

Gender theory is not alone in its claims to explanatory power in regard to the decision to use (or threaten to use) force in international relations. The question of force is foundational in all macro-theoretical political programs. The two preeminent theories, or paradigms, of international politics (in Western thought) offer divergent explanations of the use of force that may be

exemplified as "power" and "interdependence" explanations. Power usually refers to a state's capability to use force as an option in conflict interactions; in simplest terms, those states most capable of bringing force to bear in the settlement of a dispute are those most likely to use it to alter the outcome. The interdependence school provides a qualification of the power proposition rather than an opposing or alternative explanation for the use of force. In short, the interdependence contribution proposes that, as trade among states increases, the likelihood of force being used in any particular dispute decreases. This should be viewed as a qualification rather than a proposition because of the generally acknowledged interconnectedness between "productive power" (i.e., the capability to trade) and "military power" (i.e., the capability to use force) and the fact that as trade increases the opportunities for disputes also increase. The interdependence argument proposes both a dampening effect and a learning curve such that a decrease in the probability of force more than compensates for the increase in conflict opportunities and disputes brought about by greater interaction density.[5] Both the power and interdependence propositions are true by definition and must be considered in any analysis of the use of force in interstate relations.

More recently, the democratic peace proposition has gained popularity. This hybrid explanation shifts the locus of explanatory power from conditional to decisional variables.

> Explanations of [the link between democracy and the non-use of force] have been divided into the normative or cultural and the structural, with the former reflecting the belief that democracy provides a normative disposition against war, while the latter points to democratic government and the process of leadership selection as being a structural constraint to going to war (Archer, 1996:452).

Proponents of the democratic peace find themselves standing in conceptual quicksand similar to that of the gender theorists. Democracy is not a singular object but rather a complex reality that

defies exact definition, and when its definition is exacted to mean "liberal democracy" it becomes nearly indistinguishable from a condition that has been referred to as a "security community" (i.e., value-similar, proximate states that agree not to fight each other so that they might be better able to fight "outsiders" -- Starr, 1992; Marshall, 1997b). In a world that sports multiple opportunities to fight, liberal democracies may have little incentive to fight each other as long as they have so many less-similar opponents from which to choose their enemies. A democratic peace may be viewed more as a matter of priorities than as structured inhibitions. This interpretation seems more plausible when one takes into account the often-cited corollary to the democratic peace: democratic states are no less likely to fight autocracies.

Like gender and peace, democracy and peace lean toward tautology; like the proposed link between gender and peace, a link between democracy and peace is very strongly, intuitively appealing and highly consistent with empirical evidence. One might conclude that the liberal democracy concept coincides with a gendered definition of the "feminized-state."[6] Yet, while the two concepts are closely related, they are dissimilar enough that they can and should be considered separate, distinct concepts and independent factors in the explanation of force. Conover and Sapiro (1993:1086) note that, "though feminist consciousness and [liberalism] are related, they are by no means the same thing." Our own research supports this proposition.

Archer, in the quotation above, makes what we consider to be the crucial observation in pointing to the division between normative or cultural and structural explanations for the democratic peace. In fact, Kegley and Hermann (1996, 1997) focus on these two aspects of democracy in their studies "putting military interventions into the democratic peace" by using two measures of the quality of democracy: normative and structural. For their normative indicator they

use a "definition that captures the *norms* regarding political rights and civil liberties operative [in the polity]."[7] Unfortunately, gender differences remain largely invisible in such a general accounting of rights and liberties as the special status of women and minorities in society are not captured. In fact, from Hermann and Kegley's (1995: 513) survey of the democratic peace literature, it appears that *identity* (or pluralism) has not even been considered as a contributing factor in research on the democratic peace. We believe that the fundamental norm that best distinguishes democracy from autocracy is its *inclusiveness* and that this quality is best captured by measuring the relative status and influence of women and minority group identities in society and the political process. Held (1995, chapter 3) has referred to this quality of democratic enfranchisement as the *entrenchment* of democracy. Minority identities vary from state to state and so present additional difficulties in analysis; the sexual dichotomy is a universal quality that can be easily identified and readily demarcated in all states. Women, as a traditionally disenfranchised group in politics, are assumed to represent the most profound gendered differences in values and perspective.

TESTING EXPLANATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE

The special focus, or research question, of the present study concerns the salience of the proposed gender linkage with a state's willingness to use force in dispute resolution. Specifically, the present study seeks to answer the question, "Does gender empowerment affect states' willingness to utilize military force (violence) to influence political outcomes in interstate relations?" One of the greatest impediments to such research has been the lack of a proper measure of the gender concept. The present study has been enabled mainly through the

development of a "gender empowerment measure" (GEM) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1995; UNDP, 1996).

In 1990, the annual UNDP *Human Development Report* began reporting the first of three measures designed to chart specifically human development progress at the global level: the human development index (HDI). The HDI "measures longevity, knowledge and access to the basic resources individuals need to develop their capabilities" (UNDP, 1995:72). In the 1994 report, a second indicator was introduced, the "gender-related development index" (GDI). The GDI measured the "overall achievements of women and men in the three dimensions of the HDI--life expectancy, educational attainment, adjusted real income--after taking note of inequalities between men and women. In other words, the GDI is the HDI adjusted for gender inequality" (UNDP, 1995:73). The third measure, the gender empowerment measure (GEM), was first reported in 1995 and was further refined for the 1996 report; it is the 1996 report that we rely on in the present study.[8]

The gender empowerment measure is an appropriate indicator for examining the effect of gender on public policy as it "concentrates on participation--economic, political and professional" (UNDP, 1995:82).[9] Measurable differences in gender attitudes do not translate directly into policy; such attitudinal differences must first be articulated and voiced meaningfully and then inserted in negotiations in actual policy debates. Compromises brought about through the necessity to satisfy, or "satisfice," the expectations of the political elite can be assumed to produce real changes in policy as the variation in elite perspectives is widened through the inclusion of the more feminine attitudes associated with a process of gender empowerment, that is, the inclusion of greater numbers of women in influential and decision making roles. As a result of increases in

gender empowerment, we expect to see a gradual modification of state policies regarding the use of force in international disputes rather than a dramatic shift to pacifistic policies. Foreign policies, especially, are co-determined by internal and external dynamics; we expect that increases in gender empowerment will make individual states less willing to escalate disputes to military confrontations leading to a gradual, systemic reduction in the general propensity to militarize disputes.

Of course, the militarization of an interstate dispute is only a first "step" in an escalatory conflict process that may eventually lead to an outbreak of interstate war (Vasquez, 1987; Vasquez, 1993). We argue here that it is the initiation of force in a dispute that defines the proper, gender consideration. Once force is used in a dispute, either as an explicit threat or an action, it transforms the nature of the dispute in complex ways; in one sense, it masculinizes the dispute thus rendering the conflict dynamics less amenable to feminine gender influence. Feminine gender empowerment should be expected to hinder the escalatory process to war but such timing is also subject to myriad strategic, tactical, and logistical considerations that would be difficult to identify, assess, and control in an empirical analysis. Thus, our objective is to focus on the decision to use force in an interstate dispute and make it our determining event. Another issue arises such that it may be the initiator of the use of force that is truly responsible for transforming the quality of the dispute. Our understanding of this issue is that it "takes two to tango." It is often difficult to assess which party in a dispute is actually to blame for the transformation to violence; we assume that all parties are complicit in the decision to use force as stubborn resistance, defiance, provocation, insincerity, or even aloofness on the part of one party may incite escalation and transformation (i.e., initiation of force) by the other. In any case, even the most innocent

bystander has a responsibility to recognize the warning signs of conflict escalation and has some influence on managing the conflict or defusing the situation (short of acquiescence or capitulation). Therefore, no attempt is made to distinguish the "righteous" or the "aggrieved" victim from the "evil" aggressor in a dispute interaction. A militarized dispute occurs, in the final analysis, because neither party to an important dispute is willing to acquiesce to the demands or accommodate the interests of the other.

As mentioned, we believe that gender empowerment and peaceful conflict interaction are simultaneous and symbiotic processes. As such, we are interested in seeing how each processual condition affects the other. Our research design proposes that each quality be examined both as a dependent variable and as an independent variable in a multiple regression analysis. Specifically, we are interested in examining whether gender empowerment affects the general willingness of a state to use force and whether the actual experience of militarized disputes inhibits gender empowerment. A multiple regression analysis is appropriate as we assume that "power," "interdependence," and "regime" all have substantial affects on both the gender empowerment and the conflict interaction processes.

DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES

Key Variables, Universe of Inquiry, and Methodology

The 1996 UNDP *Human Development Report* records gender empowerment (GEM) scores for 104 countries, 88 of which meet our definitional threshold of independent states with one million population in 1990.[10] Of course, the GEM score is only one of our key variables: the other being the willingness of a state to use force in interstate dispute settlements. However, the

availability of GEM scores is the more limited data and thus defines a statistical universe of inquiry for examining the explanatory power of the contending theories of the use of force (summary lists of countries, variables, and values used are included as Appendices A and B).

A problem is immediately apparent in that there is but a single GEM measurement at a single point in time for each country. Unlike the HDI measure which has been calculated for each country in each year as far back as 1960, the GEM score stands as a single (post-dictive) measure. Change is not quantifiable and so an assumption must be made if GEM is to be used as an independent variable in explaining the use of force; this "single image" quality is not as serious a difficulty when using GEM as a dependent variable. As the GEM variable can not be tested for change, a static model must be used. There is support for such an approach, as changes in the variables under study should all conform to Gibrat's law, also known as the law of proportionate effect, which holds that "during a given interval, [the development variables] grow at a rate that is independent of their sizes at the outset of the interval" (Mansfield, 1994:30). In order to justify using the GEM score to analyze (or "predict") a state's willingness to use force, reference is made to the very gradual, and systemically consistent, improvement measured by the human development index (see Figure 1). Gender empowerment, like other developmental outcomes such as technology, production, and income, happens slowly and is generally progressive and incremental. The assumption posits that the relativity (or ranking) among cases on a single developmental measure, while possibly fluctuating slightly in the short-term, remains fairly smooth and stable over time (dramatic reversals and "great leaps forward" in societal development processes are extremely rare occurrences). The relative values and positioning of cases in an aggregate sample should reflect the temporal stability function evident in the HDI variable (and

claimed by Gibrat's law); therefore, the GEM score is assumed to be a systemic indicator of a distinct developmental condition rather than a specific attributional measure.



Note: Graph is based on Table 1.4 of the Human Development Report 1996 (UNDP 1996, 15); the 1993 figure for Eastern Europe has been modified by substituting 1990 data (UNDP 1991, 15) to portray conditions prior to the dramatic political restructuring in that region.

FIG. 1. Improvements in Human Development, 1960-1993

As gender empowerment is a key variable with limited availability, the universe of inquiry is defined by the data availability of GEM scores. The resulting 88 cases represent only a large fraction of the 130 total cases possible. A question arises as to whether our statistical universe may be considered a "random sample" of the population universe. Our answer is "yes and no." The question of sample bias in this application is complex. Yes, there surely is a measurement bias that favors greater accuracy in the more-advanced industrial economy countries and lesser

accuracy in the less-advanced countries where reporting mechanisms are under-developed and less-institutionalized. This measurement bias mostly affects relative intervals; as we are using the GEM scores as a single indicator rather than an iterated measure, the measurement bias should not seriously affect performance. Yes, there is a coverage bias as there is excellent coverage of the advanced Western countries (100 percent), good coverage of Third World countries (65 percent), and poor coverage of advanced socialist countries (44 percent); however, there does not appear to be serious categorical biases as the category "advanced market economies" is complete and the "third world" category may be considered a random sampling.[11] In summary, we are confident that the statistical biases inherent in our population sample are analytically manageable and so we conclude that, "no," there is no serious sample bias that will disable our analysis.

Our other key variable is the "willingness of a state to use force." For data on this variable we look to the Correlates of War Project's (1994) *Militarized Interstate Dispute* (MID) events data base. Coverage provided by this data base is considered complete as the MID date base includes all countries in the world and all events that meet the standard definitional criteria and for all years, 1949-1992. That project defines a "militarized interstate dispute" event as "a dispute in which at least one of the [state] parties threatens the other [state] with the use of force" (Leng 1992, 116). The data base reports reasonably accurate and reliable data on all such standards and measures and is generally not considered to be systematically biased in its reportage. An obvious bias is contained, however, in the wide variation of state characteristics. Larger, more powerful, and more active states can be expected to experience more conflict opportunities; variations in state behavior accountable by differences in size must be controlled in the analysis. The quality of size is the focus of power explanations and will thus be controlled mainly by the inclusion of

power variables. Another difficulty is posed by changes in the composition of the state-system: many new states have been added to the system since 1945; differences in individual country-case coverage must also be addressed in the analysis.

Whereas data availability of GEM scores has served to define our study population, the availability of dispute data combined with a consideration of the systemic characteristics of international politics defines our study's temporal span. The study is bracketed by two major systemic events: the ending of World War II and the ending of the Cold War. We believe that the systemic quality of international politics remained fairly consistent through the period, 1951-1990, except for the "minor" disruption in practices resulting from the collapse of colonialism (we do not mean to dismiss the decolonization process as trivial, see note 12). The end of colonialism was accomplished through an incremental process that dramatically increased the number of independent states in the world system. This "minor" systemic transformation can also be expected to influence and thereby "bracket" the systemic quality that conditions interstate conflict processes.[12]

Consideration of contemporary system qualities leads us to use two measures of a state's "willingness to use force": one, the total number of militarized interstate disputes involving a particular state in a designated period (identified as the state's MID score) and, two, the average number of disputes per year (of independence) over a given period (the state's MIDAV score). The first score captures the state's total experience with militarized disputes which we believe is the more influential (cumulative) aspect in affecting developmental processes; the second score reflects the state's willingness to engage in (or be drawn into) the militarization of disputes by the initiation of military force in a conflict interaction and should be the aspect most closely influenced

by the state's quality of gender empowerment. The changes in the world state-system brought about by the end of colonialism (a process that begins in 1949 with the "Partition" of India and Pakistan and is mostly completed by 1970) suggests that the analysis should be broken into two time periods: 1951-1970 (period A) and 1971-1990 (period B).

World system characteristics also suggest dividing the analysis into categories based on the well-documented north/south or advanced/less-advanced structural differences. We consider two bases for making structural distinctions in our analysis: conflict and prosperity. It is common practice in international relations to differentiate categories of states based on economic characteristics. In the interests of simplicity, we consider three economic categories of states: advanced market economies (AME), advanced command economies (ACE), and other (less-advantaged) economies (OTHER). The two categories of advanced economies can be combined into one category: advanced industrial economies (AIE). Recent studies by Marshall (1997b, 1999) argue that the appropriate classification of states during the Cold War period is according to structural conflict criteria; the author suggests three categories of states: highly institutionalized states (HIS--the major powers); protracted conflict region states (PCR--states situated in regions experiencing generally high levels of armed conflict), and other Third World states (Non-PCR). We have chosen to use both, economic development and conflict, categorical schemes in our analysis (see Appendix B for information on states assigned to each category).

As mentioned, our choice of methodology is quantitative analysis at the systemic level. As we are interested in the several effects produced independently by qualities of power, interdependence, democracy, and gender on the development-related processual outcomes of gender empowerment and the willingness of states to use force, we employ a multiple regression

(OLS) analysis of each dependent variable.[13] Because of the categorical differences in cases identified above, we run separate regressions on each of the main classifications and for each of the two main time periods (this also allows us to detect changes in effects across the two periods due to developmental changes). Because this study is exploratory in nature, meaning that we have reasonable expectations that gender is an important analytical consideration but have not yet developed a specified theory of its contribution nor of its exact relationship to the other contending explanations, we employ a "best fit" criteria for determining and reporting the appropriate regression results.[14]

Independent and Control Variables

As stated above, we do not think that gender replaces any of the other contending explanations of the use of force but, rather, complements the extant, mainstream theories. In order to examine our gender propositions thoroughly and place them in proper context we must have variables that measure the independent variables: power, interdependence, and democracy, as well as variables to control some of the more obvious, confounding properties of states in the world system.

State power is measured mainly by reference to two performance attributes of state capabilities: security (military performance) and prosperity (economic performance); these state attributes are usually considered fungible as a society's resources are applied to each performance function in an essentially constant-sum arrangement (the "guns and butter" tradeoff). Military power variables are obtained from the Correlates of War Project's (1990) *National Material Capabilities* data base. This data base reports yearly figures on population, military personnel, and military expenditures for each independent country through 1985. From it we derive four

measures of military capabilities, the realist-standard indicators of power. Each of the four measures is averaged for each of the time periods under examination. We come up with relative indicators (averages) of total military personnel (MILPER), total military expenditures (MILEX), military personnel per capita (MILPERC), and military expenditures per capita (MILEXC).[15]

Economic power and interdependence variables are obtained from Summers, Heston, Aten, and Nuxoll's (1995) *Penn World Table, Mark 5.6*. This data base reports gross yearly figures on population, gross domestic product per capita, and openness to trade. From this data source we derive four measures of economic activity, the idealist-standard indicators of power and interdependence: gross domestic product (GDP), gross domestic product per capita (GDPC), openness to trade (OPEN--exports+imports/gdp), and total trade (TRADE--exports+imports). Again, each measure is averaged over each of the time periods to obtain an indicator of economic power. Closely related to power is size. We use three measures of a state's size: total population (POP--from *Penn World Tables*), total land area (AREA--from UN figures), and population density (DENSE--pop/area).

Regime characteristics are reported in Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore's (1989) *Polity II* data base. This data supplies annual measures of both democracy and autocracy characteristics for all years through 1986. From these figures we construct and average the annual regime scores for each country by subtracting its autocracy score from its democracy score (both are scored on a ten-point scale); this gives us a single, continual measure of democracy (REGIME) that ranges from +10 (pure democracy) to -10 (pure autocracy). Related to the regime indicator are the properties of regime coherence; an indicator of coherence is obtained by averaging the coherence variable (COHER--averaged dichotomous variable ranging from 1 'consistently coherent' to 0

'consistently incoherent'). A hybrid indicator combining regime and coherence characteristics is constructed by using the absolute value of the regime score (REGIME2--ranging from 10 'constantly and purely democratic or autocratic' to 0 'constantly incoherent'). Another related regime (stability) characteristic is its length of independence; for this we constructed a dichotomous variable for newness (NEW–'0' if the state was independent prior to 1945 and '1' if it gained independence since 1945).

Other cultural variables have been included that are not directly related to the four contending explanations that are the special focus of this study. Many authors have considered evidence of unique (geographic) regional qualities and characteristics and regional variation is often added as a control variable in global data compilations. We have included a series of dummy variables (eight in all) in order to control for possible regional differences. As mentioned above, Marshall (1997b, 1999) argues that the special circumstances obtained within protracted conflict regions substantially (sub-systemically) conditions the conflict behavior of the states situated within those regions. Thus, a pair of dichotomous variables are included that capture this specific quality of Third World states: protracted conflict region (PCR) and protracted conflict region--core (PCRC). Marshall argues that the conflict regions have grown through a diffusion of insecurity process to encompass ever greater territory (and more states) over the entire Cold War period, 1945-1990. Accordingly, it is assumed that only the states at the core of the affected conflict region (PCRC) will exhibit the special affect during the initial A period, 1951-1970, wherein the full affected region (PCR) should be specially affected during the later B period, 1971-1990.

.In an earlier study of gender inequality in the Third World, Susan Marshall (1985:230-1) reported that "the most important finding of this study is the significance of region for predicting national variations in female participation rates and sex ratios." She found the regional effects most striking for the "Muslim region" and Latin America and that the effects in these two areas were quite distinct; although she does not attribute a source to the observed effects, she identifies "the most plausible explanation" as coming from "indigenous factors" rather than system structures. The PCR culture-of-violence system variables are then complemented by the inclusion of variables connoting two civilizational system variables: Catholicism/Christian Orthodoxy (CATHORTH) and Islam (ISLAM). Both are dichotomous variables that denote special cultural properties that are thought to elevate the relative status of males in affected societies and "justify" gender differences (variables are coded '1' if 70 percent or more of the state's population is claimed by the *1995 World Almanac* to profess that particular religious heritage).

In all cases, we have striven to use those operationalized variables and indicators that enjoy the widest acceptance among political science researchers and to take them without substantial modification from the most recognized and respected data sources. It is only the addition of the gender empowerment measure that clearly distinguishes the present analysis from previous studies of the use of force by states.

REPORTING THE RESULTS

The results of the multiple regression analyses used to test the contending explanations of the willingness to use force in interstate disputes are reported in Tables 1-3 below; results of the regressions run to examine factors that help to determine the observed variation in gender

empowerment measures are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The reader is reminded that the methodology used is a "best fit" regression analysis, that is, given the variables described above, every plausible combination of variables was "fit" into a regression equation and only the "best fits" are reported here (see note 14). The general results of the analysis strongly support this method as there was an incredibly large gap in the quality of fit between the reported equations and the rejected equations. In short, the reported equations stood out remarkably as the only reasonable fits; comparably good fits were found only in those cases where substitutable measures were available (e.g., choosing among the variables MILEX, MILPER, MILEXC, or MILPERC as the measure for military force capability). Three statistics are reported for each regression equation: the adjusted R^2 (aR^2-- explained variance) of each equation, the beta weight (*beta*–standardized coefficient), and the p-value (*sig*--statistical significance) score of each independent variable. As the regression indicators use widely divergent scales and values, the beta weights are reported so that we might have some basis to compare the relative influence of each factor in the specification. Despite the relatively small numbers of cases in the analyses (87 or fewer), all but two of the seventy (70) independent variables reported in the fifteen (15) equations have reported p-values of 0.05 or less; nearly half the variables (34) have values reported as 0.001 or less. All of the equations approximate the standards of parsimony: a high percentage of the variance is explained with a few key variables, each of which meet rigid statistical significance expectations. As such, we report the results with a high degree of confidence. There are several important general findings to report:

- Our findings strongly support the proposition that gender empowerment is closely associated with a state's willingness to use force: the gender factor is negative and

significant in all of the analyses (i.e., the closer to equity of gender empowerment, the fewer involvements in militarized disputes, *ceteris paribus*). The gender measure proved to be particularly robust as it reported nearly the same scores regardless of the combinations of variables used--even the inclusion of the gender-related development index (GDI) did not seriously weaken the influence of the gender empowerment measure (GEM). A corollary to this finding is the deduction that the gender empowerment measure is a unique, efficient, and effective measure of the gender quality in political decision making processes.

- The contending explanations of the use of force may be better understood as complementary explanations; military capability, developed economic capacity, gender empowerment, institutional authority, and security environment each appear to have strong, independent, and significant relationships with a state's willingness to use force during the latter half of the twentieth century.[16]
- Relative differences in unit (state) characteristics, especially size and experience, also have substantial behavior-defining qualities; old states with large populations tend to be more active in the use of or response to military provocation as an instrument of conflict interaction. On the other hand, the relatively new states of the world system are very hesitant in soliciting or engaging military confrontations.
- Each of the definitional qualities listed above appears to be both unique and robust. Even though each defining quality may have multiple measures or indicators that reflect complexities inherent in those qualities, the qualities themselves are analytically distinct and generalized throughout an authentic world system. They are deemed robust because

they are evident regardless of categorization of states, time periods, or combinations of variables in the analysis. Yet, in spite of their uniqueness and robustness, each quality (and contending explanation) is related in essential and important ways to the other qualities. The results are supportive of a claim that a distinct world system of political interactions among states does exist.

- Taken together, the contending explanations account for the great majority of the variation in the states' willingness to use force and, thus, may provide the basis for a general systemic theory of a state's willingness to use force in the settlement of interstate disputes.
- Gender empowerment itself appears to be a conscious corollary policy to a political development process that is characterized by (i.e., strongly, positively correlated to) economic prosperity, military power, and active gender development policies. Gender empowerment is not necessarily negatively affected by militarization (i.e., the preparation of military power) even though it is negatively affected by militancy (i.e., the actual use of military power): it appears to thrive in states that can afford a pervasive distribution of prosperity throughout society while protecting its citizens from the experience of militarized disputes by deterrence or non-provocative defense rather than by strategies of direct instrumental control of interactions with adversarial powers. There is strong evidence that gender empowerment processes also make important gains as a result of situations where the state faces serious, long-term challenges to its viability. Serious existential challenges appear to "force" the state to widen the political, economic, and social franchise to encompass and embrace formerly discounted and discriminated groups,

we suspect, whether they are gender groups or minority groups. However, this positive function of "pulling together" for survival and prosperity can be and is thwarted by "masculinized cultures" that rationalize and ritualize the superior status of males in society.

The MIDAV Regression Tables

Our main interest focuses on the influence of the contending theories on the propensity of states to become involved in militarized interstate disputes. As such, our first set of regression equations are set up with this "willingness to use force" as the dependent variable. However, two considerations lead us to use the average number of disputes (MIDAV) rather than the absolute number of disputes (MID) as our dependent variable. First, political tensions between states, even when they are continual (as between rival states), are not constant but, rather, rise and fall over time as issues appear, change, or transform. As such, our measure should capture general tendencies or proclivities rather than periodic fluctuations in activities. Second, the world system is in transition during the entire test period (1951-1990) and former colonial and conquered territories are attaining political independence and becoming states throughout the period. By using the averaged measure of disputes, new states can be included in the analyses without unnecessarily biasing their willingness measure because they were only active states for part of the analytical time frame.

Table 1 displays the results of a best fit analysis of "willingness" for the first half of the Cold War period (period A). This period encompasses the reconstruction of the world system following its devastation during World War II and is characterized primarily by the height of the Cold War culture of systemic (superpower) conflict. The old world colonial system is in the process of disintegrating and remains ill-defined outside the core systemic structures of the

European powers. As conflict and insecurity appear to be the defining conditions of the world system at this time, we use the conflict categories to analyze the willingness to use force during this period. The Highly Institutionalized States (HIS) are those major powers who are most actively involved in defining the culture of systemic conflict: the Western powers and the Socialist Bloc countries (including mainland China). The behavioral characteristics of these states are similar and these similarities are qualitatively distinct from the other (non-HIS) states. While the core states' category (i.e., HIS) is stable throughout the period, the "other" category is in a state of flux. Many new states gain independence during this period. Actual gender empowerment is probably not generally a strong factor in politics at this time, although the enfranchisement of women within the political process and their acceptance in the economy is certainly a factor. The recognition and presence (i.e., visibility) of women and the feminine gender during the healing period of systemic reconstruction may be thought to create a potentiality and disposition toward gendered distinctions in foreign policy and behavior, a nominal or intermediate rather than factual or immediate empowerment. In an environment of systemic disruption and (artificially) heightened tensions (but relatively little "acting out"), perhaps it can be claimed that a little (feminine) gender goes a long way in influencing world politics.

Three categories are analyzed in Table 1: HIS, Non-HIS, and the full set (ALL). The gender factor (GEM) is significant and negatively correlated to the willingness to use force (AMIDAV) in all the equations; it is particularly strong in defining the policies of the major powers. For the major powers' category (HIS) it appears that states with larger populations (APOP), greater authority coherence and stability (REGIME2), and higher military expenditures

(AMILEX) are those most often involved in militarized disputes; this tendency is tempered (i.e., reduced) by the existence of (or dispensation to) greater gender equality.

TABLE 1. "Best Fit" Regression Statistics with Dependent Variable AMIDAV:
Average Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1951-1970 (Conflict Categories)

	HIS		Non-HIS		ALL	
	beta	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*
aR^2	0.885		0.696		0.759	
GEM	-0.371	0.010	-0.202	0.007	-0.196	0.003
PCRC			0.436	0.000	0.341	0.000
APOP	0.508	0.000	0.296	0.000		
ATRADE					0.224	0.003
REGIME2	0.319	0.021				
AMILPERC			0.462	0.000	0.191	0.003
AMILPER					0.591	0.000
AMILEX	0.633	0.000				

Note: Highly Institutionalized States "HIS" n=18; "Non-HIS" n=65; "ALL" n=81.
Not included: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cuba, Kuwait, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, U.A.E.

For the category encompassing the minor powers, it appears that the states with larger populations (APOP) and greater proportions of armed forces (AMILPERC) (i.e., states with large armies) are more prone to become involved in militarized disputes, especially those identified by as being the core states embroiled in protracted conflicts.[17] Again, greater gender equity appears to dampen the disposition to use force.

In considering the full complement of states, militarized disputes are seen to be more likely to involve states with larger armies (AMILPER) that are more intensely militarized (i.e., more military per capita--AMILPERC), and more actively involved in world trade (ATRADE); again, the protracted conflict core states (PCRC) are more heavily involved in such disputes and, again, the states characterized by higher gender empowerment (GEM) scores are resistant to such involvement.

As a new world order begins to emerge following systemic reconstruction (i.e., period B, 1971-1990; refer to Table 2 below), the conflict behavior of the more advanced major power states (HIS) remains fairly consistent. Military expenditures become the predominant factor as they directly reflect a state's investment in the utility of force as a projection of power in world affairs. There appears to be strong evidence of sub-system institutionalization based on a division of (security) labor: large, strong states increase their military power and take the lead in engaging militarized disputes as the smaller and weaker (middle power) states become less active. There is general evidence that the advanced countries are approaching homogeneity as regards the remaining characteristics during this period (e.g., GDP per capita, trade, human and gender development).

TABLE 2. "Best Fit" Regression Statistics with Dependent Variable BMIDAV:
Average Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1971-1990 (Conflict Categories)

	HIS		Non-HIS		ALL	
	beta	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*
aR^2	0.952		0.872		0.628	
GEM	-0.176	0.018	-0.239	0.000	-0.426	0.000
COHER			0.131	0.008		
NEW			-0.115	0.040	-0.294	0.001
PCR			0.246	0.000	0.336	0.000
BPOP	0.242	0.001	-0.182	0.000		
REGIME*	0.172	0.028			0.203	0.013
BMILPERC					0.292	0.000
BMILEX	0.881	0.000	0.870	0.000	0.622	0.000

Note: Highly Institutionalized States "HIS" n=19; "Non-HIS" n=68; "ALL" n=87.
REGIME*: The REGIME variable was converted from a "continuous scale" indicator of democracy (i.e., +10 `pure democracy' to -10 `pure autocracy') to the REGIME2 variable, a "parallel scale" indicator of coherence (i.e., +10 `perfectly coherent democratic or autocratic regime' to 0 `perfectly incoherent regime'), for application with the full case set (i.e., the "ALL" category).
Not included: Cuba.

A similar differentiation of states according to the investment in military infrastructure is evident and determinate for the group of less-advantaged states. For this (Non-HIS) category, it

appears that it is the medium-size, older, more-coherent states with (relatively) large military expenditures who are most prone to engage in militarized disputes; states in protracted conflict regions experience the most militarized disputes while gender empowerment impedes the use of force. The full set (ALL) analysis again supports the contention that militant (i.e., high military personnel per capita--BMILPERC), militarized (i.e., high military expenditures--BMILEX), coherent (REGIME2) states in contentious (in)security environments (PCR) are more likely to experience militarized disputes, while new states try to "lie low" and stay away from shows of force and states with higher gender empowerment scores exhibit the lowest propensity to engage in force.

TABLE 3. "Best Fit" Regression Statistics with Dependent Variable BMIDAV:
Average Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1971-1990 (Development Categories)

	AME		AIE		Non-AIE	
	beta	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*
aR^2	0.939		0.925		0.881	
GEM	-0.181	0.004	-0.178	0.015	-0.142	0.008
COHER					0.131	0.008
NEW					-0.100	0.066
PCR					0.221	0.000
BPOP			0.233	0.002	-0.187	0.000
REGIME			0.146	0.059		
BMILEX	0.963	0.000	0.857	0.000	0.889	0.000

Note: Advanced Market Economies "AME" n=21; Advanced Industrial Economies "AIE" n=25; "Non-AIE" n=62.
The "AIE" category includes all "AME" states and the four Advanced Command Economies "ACE": Bulgaria, China, Hungary, and Poland.
Not included: Cuba.

Table 3 takes a second look at the latter (B) period by separating the analyses according to development, rather than conflict, categories. In analyzing the willingness to use force of only the advanced Western countries (AME), we see that there are only two factors that account for

almost all the observed variance: military expenditures (BMILEX) and gender empowerment (GEM). This is perhaps the most vivid and accurate image of the current situation: the (militarily) powerful states are somewhat constrained in their ability to use force by the political influence of gender. Extending the category somewhat to include the Socialist states does not disconfirm the stark contrast between realism and feminism presented in the first analysis. The reformulation of the Third World category (non-HIS), too, simply reaffirms the analysis displayed in Table 2.

The GEM Regression Tables

The preceding analyses test only one of the two principle claims made by the gender-force hypothesis, that is, the dampening effect of gender empowerment on the willingness to use force. The other claim reverses the causal mechanism and proposes that the (greater) willingness of states to use force inhibits or impedes the gender empowerment process. While our analyses can not discriminate causal relationships, we can test the feasibility of the simultaneous claims. Tables 4 and 5 reverse the target variables, making the gender empowerment measure (GEM) the dependent variable in the regression equations. As a negative relationship between gender and the use of force has been firmly established in the earlier analyses, we focus our study on the development categories to distinguish the real gap in global living conditions between the advanced economies and the less-advantaged states. Also, because we are looking at long-range development processes, statistics covering the entire period, 1951-1990, are used.

Table 4 reports the results of the best fit regression analyses for the development categories: advanced market economies (AME), the Third World (Non-AIE), and the full data set (ALL). The advanced market economies have experienced the highest levels of development

according to most of the recognized measures of advancement.[18] If these countries may be assumed to stand as a generalizable model of state-centered global development, it appears from the analysis of the AME category that several factors are important in defining the gender empowerment process: the consistency of liberal democratic authority patterns (REGIME), a commitment to equitable gender development (GDI), and a generally well-performing economic and security system (MILEX--military expenditures are very highly correlated with absolute and per capita gross domestic product measures: GDP and GDPC); essentially, it appears that gender empowerment occurs as the "highest stage" of the societal development process. This process is severely inhibited by a general policy utilizing force in interstate relations (MIDAV).

TABLE 4. "Best Fit" Regression Statistics with Dependent Variable GEM: Gender Empowerment Measure

	AME		Non-AIE*		ALL	
	beta	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*
aR^2	0.678		0.610		0.739	
REGIME	0.380	0.016			0.186	0.016
GDI	0.476	0.004				
BGDPC			0.493	0.000	0.377	0.000
NEW			-0.253	0.004	-0.207	0.003
ISLAM			-0.316	0.000	-0.199	0.002
AIE					0.184	0.042
MIDAV	-0.932	0.016				
MILEX	0.757	0.046				
BMILPER			-0.269	0.003		
PCR			0.286	0.002		

Note: Advanced Market Economies "AME" n=21; "Non-AIE*" n=60; "ALL" n=87.
Non-AIE*: Kuwait and U.A.E. are considered outliers due to their very high GDP/capita and very low GEM scores and, so, are not included in the "Non-AIE" analysis (they are included in the "ALL" category).
Advanced Command Economies "ACE" (n=4) are included only in the "ALL" category.
BGDPC: The later "B" period was used to compute "GDPC" indicators due to incomplete data records for the earlier period.
Not included: Cuba.

The analysis of the Third World category reveals some indication of the difficulties in "start-up" procedures in a proposed, general development process.[19] In this neighborhood the experience of violence is more common-place and so the actual use of force in interstate relations is not especially influential in the development process; the use of force in domestic relations is far more common and intense and, thus, formative in the setting of policies in these states (Marshall, 1997b, 1999). Here we see evidence that new states that, we assume, "start from scratch" in the general development process give low priority to gender empowerment; the demands placed on the nascent state are probably too great for leaders to give much attention to expanding the societal franchise (and thus expand the demands made on the state--Huntington 1967). The better-performing Third World states (BGDPC)[20] are better able to extend the societal franchise by, first, committing to policies of equitable gender development and, later, expanding opportunities for women. We also see evidence that the militarization of the society (measured by numbers of military personnel--BMILPER) may be equivalent to the masculinization of the state (the larger the armed forces, the lower the gender empowerment score); this inhibiting effect of militarization appears to be undone (or counteracted) under conditions of pervasive insecurity and violence, as states in protracted conflict regions show greater gender empowerment.[21] What is especially distinguished here is the poor performance of the Islamic countries in gender empowerment (ISLAM). The regression analysis for the full data set (ALL) affirms the inferences made from the categorical analyses: liberal democracy (REGIME) and economic performance (BGDPC) are positively correlated with gender empowerment (with a "premium" added for the superior performance of the advanced industrial economies--AIE--and a "handicap" apparent with the states only recently emerging from colonialism--NEW).

TABLE 5. "Best Fit" Regression Statistics with Dependent Variable GEM: Gender Empowerment Measure

	Non-AIE*		Non-HIS*		Non-HIS	
	beta	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*	*beta*	*sig*
aR^2	0.610		0.773		0.670	
GDI					0.477	0.000
BGDPC	0.493	0.000	0.729	0.000		
NEW	-0.253	0.004	-0.184	0.006	-0.622	0.000
ISLAM	-0.316	0.000	-0.212	0.001	-0.237	0.006
CATHORTH					-0.503	0.000
MID					-0.333	0.000
BMILPER	-0.269	0.003	-0.208	0.002		
PCR	0.286	0.002	0.201	0.003		

Note: "Non-AIE*" n=60; "Non-HIS*" n=66; "Non-HIS" n=67.
Non-AIE* and Non-HIS*: Kuwait and U.A.E. are treated as outliers due to their very high GDP/capita and very low GEM scores and are not included in these analyses (they are included in the "Non-HIS" category).
BGDPC and BMILPER: Figures from the later "B" period are used due to incomplete data records in the earlier period.
Not included: Cuba.

Table 5 completes the present analysis by extending the coverage to compare different looks at the Third World categories. The regression statistics for the Non-AIE category are reproduced from Table 4 for comparison with the statistics resulting from a best fit for the conflict categorization of Third World states (Non-HIS); the analyses are nearly identical, lending greater support to the conclusions drawn. The third categorical analysis departs slightly from the best fit methodology to impose a special condition. The analyses of Third World categories are seen to be largely determined by two distinct cultural contexts, Islamic and Latin American. Prior analyses have reported a negative correlation between Islamic culture and gender empowerment, other things being equal; we have expectations that the *machismo* culture that is particular to Latin American countries would have a similar, negative effect on the gender empowerment process. Of course, Catholicism is the religious heritage of all Latin American countries and is well-known for preferencing males in its authority patterns. Catholicism also presents itself as measurable whereas

machismo culture is not easily defined or measured. Eastern Orthodoxy has very similar authority structures imbedded in its culture. A new variable (CATHORTH) was created to test the culture proposition further; we don't think that Islam is entirely unique in regard to its preferencing of males to the detriment of females in society. The analyses using economic performance as the main indicator of development do not exhibit a significant correlation between Catholicism-Orthodoxy and gender empowerment.

There are perhaps three categories of Third World states in our particular data set: Latin American countries, characterized as old with middle-range economic performance; Islamic countries, characterized as old and mostly situated in protracted conflict regions; and the "fourth world" newly independent states that are mostly very poor and underdeveloped. Economic performance scores (BGDPC) have a different meaning in the Third World context: they are not necessarily associated with societal development, broadly defined. In many Third World states, the distribution of incomes within society are highly skewed to favor a small elite faction and societal development processes are similarly skewed to favor certain groups within those countries. We, therefore, alter the analysis to focus on a more equitable measure of societal development, substituting the gender-related development index (GDI) for the economic performance indicator (GDP per capita--BGDPC).

The results of the modified analysis are quite remarkable and help us to better analyze developmental conditions in the amorphous Third World category. Using gender development (GDI) as our control variable, we see striking evidence that, whereas gender development may be strongly encouraged in a modernizing society, the gender empowerment process is specifically and strongly impeded by the existence of cultures that have male preferences deeply embedded

within them (NEW, ISLAM, and CATHORTH) and that these male preferences are fortified by the experience of force in interstate relations (MID--the total number of militarized disputes; a systemic factor). In this analysis, the CATHORTH variable displays a very strong inhibiting (negative) influence on gender empowerment as this cultural context promotes gender development but impedes gender empowerment. The variable ISLAM seems to lose its strong influence in this modified analysis mainly because Islamic countries tend to inhibit both equitable gender development and gender empowerment.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusion drawn from this study is that more quantitative research is needed to determine the exact nature of the relationship between gender empowerment and the use of force. The results of the study have been generally consistent with the expectations of feminist theory and have fit very well into the standard gender narrative, or explanation, concerning political violence. No causal inferences can be made with confidence from the analyses but neither can any causal relationships be discounted. There appears to be a very real and robust relationship between the quality of gender empowerment and the unwillingness of states to use force; we submit that the relationship is simultaneous and symbiotic. It is important to keep in mind, however, that disparities in the empowerment of the sexes is only one form of gender discrimination that may afflict societies and signal a predilection toward the use of force in political relations; sex distinctions are simply the most universal and visible. Other identity distinctions, such those based on race, religion, and ethnicity, are often coterminous with gendered status, role, and empowerment disparities; women should be viewed in this context as

the largest societal power "minority." Gender difference may be thought of as synonymous with value difference; gender research focuses on an assumed, structured bias in the orientations, priorities, and strategies of polities. It is argued that increasing gender empowerment progressively neutralizes value-bias in rational decision making and, thus, allows for the inclusion of the broadest range of values and options in political analysis and collective action.. We deduce from this study that it is the perfectly inclusionary and the most deeply entrenched democratic state and society that is the most civil, responsible, and accommodative neighbor in the global community of states and the least likely to enforce its "national interests" extraterritorially and to the detriment of its neighbors. We believe that what best explains the democratic peace and gives humankind the best prospects for a peaceful and prosperous future is the establishment of a consistent pattern of domestic authority relationships that eschew coercion and discrimination across all identity borders.

A second important conclusion drawn from the present study is that gender theory and analysis may be successfully integrated with traditional international relations theory and quantitative research methods. Indeed, we find that, rather than standing as an alternative explanation of political violence events, gender analysis complements and invigorates conventional explanations of the use of force. Since war has been outlawed by the United Nations Charter, the standard argument that the "feminization" of states through gender empowerment will weaken those states and make them less competitive, less protective, or less instrumental in pursuing the "national interest" in a "realist" world anarchy is no longer compelling or convincing; such claims are probably, in themselves, an artifact of an outmoded cultural tenet of male-preferencing. Our study has found that gender empowerment can and does coexist with military

preparedness. It is not the fact of militarization in the presence of external threat (real or imagined) that inhibits societal equity, on the contrary, the full development of a state's capabilities requires the greatest possible expansion of the political franchise. It is, rather, the act of militancy and violence that institutionalizes discrimination and inhibits the development of more equitable relations.

The importance of the present study to the field of international relations, in general, and to the study of international conflict, in particular, is fourfold. First, the present study will further ongoing research into the causes of war and political violence. Second, as it is believed that women are more empowered in democratic states than in nondemocratic states, the present research will help to inform the democratic peace proposition. Third, this study lends important empirical support for feminist theory and arguments for the inclusion of a gendered analysis in international relations. Finally, should the dual hypotheses of the present study be found to hold true, there are important policy implications, especially in strengthening the strategy of affecting better political behavior through the empowerment of women and other under-represented minority groups and in developing more effective ways of improving and protecting universal human rights.

NOTES

1. "Unlike **sex** (the biological distinction between males and females), **gender** refers to socially learned behavior and expectations that distinguish between masculinity and femininity. Whereas biological sex identity is determined by reference to genetic and anatomical characteristics, socially learned gender is an acquired identity....When we look at activities associated with masculinity (e.g., team sports, politics, military), it appears simply that men are present and women are absent" (Peterson and Runyan, 1993:5-7). "Gender" is a macro-concept similar to "democracy" or "freedom" that is difficult to define precisely; however, such definition is not crucial to the present study. It should suffice to point out that, due to the long history of the "sexual division of labor," sex and gender have become very closely correlated: sex is a very good indicator of gender, especially in regard to the crucial categories of societal control and power. For more detailed discussions of gender, see Enloe

(1993), Nelson (1993), Peterson and Runyan (1993), Peterson (1995); for recent empirical research on the relationship between feminism, gender, and war attitudes, see Conover and Sapiro (1993), Togeby (1994), Bendyna, Finucane, Kirby, O'Donnell, and Wilcox (1996).

2. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the acceptance of feminist perspectives in the international relations discipline, see Tickner (1997) and the subsequent discussion published in 1998 in the *International Studies Quarterly* including commentaries by Tickner, Keohane, and Marchand.

3. For a feminist critique of the presumption of universality of Western feminist scholarship and its applications to 'third world' experiences, see Mohanty 1991.

4. It is particularly problematic to speak in terms of a feminized or masculinized state as the gendered nature of change in the characteristics of a state can only be discerned in relative terms as gender itself refers to a socially constructed attribute. What we are really referring to here is a change or movement from a more exclusive (gendered) state toward a more inclusive (non-gendered) state.

5. Research conducted by Mansfield (1994:121) in the relationship between "power, trade, and war" focuses on the complex linkages between power and trade and leads him to argue that "no generalizations can be made regarding the relationship between international trade and the onset of war."

6. The ideal state in this reckoning would be the "non-gendered" state (see note 4 above).

7. Kegley and Hermann (1996, 1997) use Freedom House's trichotomous classification of states as "free, partly free, and not free" as their normative indicator.

8. The analyses were also run with the recently reported GEM scores for 1997 (UNDP 1998) and with an indexed GEM score that combined information from 1995, 1996, and 1997. The alternate use of GEM scores did not change the results substantially and so the original (1996) results are reported here.

9. The gender empowerment measure "concentrates on three broad classes of variables:
1) For power over economic resources based on earned income, the variable is per capita income in PPP dollars (unadjusted).
2) For access to professional opportunities and participation in economic decision-making, the variable is the share of jobs classified as professional and technical and administrative and managerial.
3) For access to political opportunities and participation in political decision-making, the variable is the share of parliamentary seats" (UNDP, 1995:82).

10. The 1995 report provides GEM scores for 116 countries, of which 101 meet the project threshold. Using the data of a larger number of cases would have served to increase the confidence of the analyses. The decision to rely solely on the 1996 figures was made in consideration of the better accuracy and reliability of the later figures. The UNDP decision to drop coverage by a tenth reflects their lack of confidence in the earlier figures: changes in the figures "reflect changes in the basic information and sources in the underlying data sets" (UNDP, 1996:36). The population threshold reflects a standard judgement in political analysis that micro-states are incapable of acting independently in international relations.

11. There is a regional bias wherein Latin American countries are over-represented; there does not appear to be any strong developmental argument as to why such regional bias should affect the sample. One possibility for the existence of a serious regional bias involves the distinction noted later in the paper concerning protracted conflict regions (PCR); a quick look at coverage differences between PCR and non-PCR states in the Third World notes little difference (64 and 67 percent, respectively). The poor coverage of "advanced socialist" countries prevents any comparison between Western and Socialist countries' performance, however, this is not considered a serious problem as the USSR's conflict behavior (as well as its characteristics, except economic power) closely mirrored that of the US during the Cold War; it is our opinion that the inclusion of the USSR would not substantially alter the regression results (and would most likely strengthen the findings--the USSR was also less active in the world system with fewer militarized disputes than the US). The "ideology issue" itself may have been rendered moot by the recent transformations that have redefined the former-socialist countries.

12. We consider the end of colonialism as a "minor" transformation in the sense that the general quality, or culture, of international politics is mostly determined by the actions of the "major powers" (see especially Waltz, 1979). By the use of the term "minor," we are not being intentionally provocative or contentious, nor do we mean to trivialize the very major upheavals that have characterized domestic and regional politics in and among the "minor powers" through the Cold War period. We readily acknowledge that the cumulative effects of such "minor"

disturbances has had a profound effect upon world politics, see Marshall 1997b, 1999.

13. As we are engaged in an exploratory analysis to see if the inclusion of gender contributes meaningfully to the more-accepted analytical methods in international relations, we will side-step, for now, the more complicated issue of using simultaneous equations to determine the supposed interactive effects of our two dependent variables.

14. In order to determine the best fit we have run hundreds of regressions using different combinations of independent variables. The criteria for determining best fit are that, 1) the equation explains a large amount of the variance; 2) the independent variables used are statistically significant; 3) the equation remains parsimonious (fewer variables are preferred to more); and 4) the intercept variable is reported significant.

15. There exists a great divide in the militarization of the world system: the advanced countries (i.e., the "major powers") have capitalized their militaries to a profound degree in the twentieth century whereas the less-advantaged countries (i.e., the "minor powers") have remained mostly labor-intensive through the same period. The analyses show that military expenditures are better predictors of military power for the major players and the numbers of military personnel are better predictors for the lesser powers and for all states in the early half of the Cold War era (i.e., the A period). There is evidence of the greater capitalization of the Third World militaries in the analyses of the later B period.

16. Although an indicator specific to "developed economic capacity" does not appear in the regression analyses, such indicators (e.g., gross domestic product) are highly correlated and interchangeable with military expenditure variables. This observation supports the mercantilist proposition that military and economic resources are fungible. Taken together, these resources may accurately measure a state's potential ability to use force; "military expenditure" is simply a more efficient indicator of a state's willingness to use force (Arendt, 1972). For a discussion of the issue of complementarity between the theoretical explanations of "realism" and "neoliberalism," see Niou and Ordeshook (1994).

17. Marshall (1997a; 1997b, 1999) proposes a three-step diffusion of insecurity process that increasingly engulfs regional states in the security dilemmas of core conflicts: a protracted conflict region (PCR). He identifies six core conflicts that continue through most of the Cold War period: Arab-Israeli, Cuba-US, Vietnam, India-Pakistan, Korea, and South Africa. In the early years of the Cold War period, these six (core) conflicts are characterized by multiple incidents of militarized disputes and warfare; as time goes on, the second tier of states (the category of "peripheral" states) experiences increases in tensions and militarized disputes and then, eventually, a third tier becomes affected (the "marginal" states). In the early period of the present study, only the core PCR states (i.e., PCRC) should exhibit the conflict condition.

18. The measures of development are admittedly value-oriented to the Western experience and preferences. The advanced countries are also furthest advanced in wasteful consumption and pollution-causing technologies, making their developmental performance highly parochial, that is, their "inefficient" development may be seen to hinder, impede, or disable the pooled-resource development processes of other states in a global system. We must side-step this very important issue in political economy and ethics in favor of advancing the present study.

19. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are removed from some of the analyses of Third World states (the reduced sets are designated by an asterisk: Non-AIE* and Non-HIS*); they are considered outliers due to the anomalous condition of very high GDP per capita and very low gender empowerment scores. They are included in the analysis of the full data set (Table 4) and in the final analysis of Table 5, where GDP per capita (i.e., BGDPC) is not used as an independent variable.

20. The B period measure of variables for Third World states' attributes (e.g., BGDPC, BMILEX) are used because many Third World states are only states in the latter period and such measures for Third World states are problematic, in general, for the earlier period.

21. For an examinations of women's participation in war and the consequences of sustained civil conflict on the relative empowerment of women, see Davies 1983, Eisen 1984, Mason 1992, and Tetrault 1994.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Country	CCODE	GEM	GDI	MIDAV	AMIDAV	BMIDAV	POP	BGDPC	REGIME
Niger	436	0.102	0.192	0.061	0.091	0.050	7.73	475.96	-6.600
Mauritania	435	0.163	0.338	0.212	0.091	0.300	2.02	680.88	-6.571
Pakistan	770	0.165	0.383	1.250	1.700	0.800	112.05	992.78	-2.200
Togo	461	0.182	0.364	0.152	0.273	0.100	3.53	532.81	-7.000
Nigeria	475	0.198	0.380	0.121	0.000	0.200	108.54	916.04	-2.000
C.A.R.	482	0.205	0.346	0.060	0.091	0.050	3.04	519.58	-7.333
Zaire	490	0.209	0.364	0.758	0.818	0.750	35.56	388.61	-8.000
Congo	484	0.213	na	0.273	0.455	0.200	2.27	1767.94	-4.000
Papua N.G.	910	0.230	0.490	0.389	na	0.312	3.70	1391.84	10.000
Turkey	640	0.235	0.680	1.136	0.950	1.400	58.69	2563.43	4.533
India	750	0.235	0.410	1.841	2.450	1.300	827.06	831.12	9.067
Mali	432	0.237	0.215	0.121	0.091	0.150	8.16	470.87	-7.000
Iran	630	0.239	0.618	2.318	0.650	4.300	54.61	3057.95	-6.800
Rwanda	517	0.253	na	0.161	0.111	0.150	7.18	610.25	-6.800
U.A.E.	696	0.253	0.710	0.273	na	0.250	1.59	27349.22	na
Ethiopia	530	0.255	0.227	0.568	0.400	0.850	49.24	227.76	-5.286
Malawi	553	0.255	0.312	0.069	0.000	0.100	8.29	417.53	-8.000
Burkina Faso	439	0.257	0.211	0.091	0.000	0.150	9.00	384.56	-4.643
Tunisia	616	0.257	0.647	0.297	0.400	0.250	8.18	2077.29	-4.400
Sudan	625	0.260	0.327	0.622	0.333	0.850	25.20	653.09	-6.071
Zambia	551	0.270	0.405	1.000	0.857	1.150	8.07	759.10	-6.000
Algeria	615	0.280	0.596	0.258	0.444	0.200	24.96	2140.29	-7.467
Egypt	651	0.280	0.545	1.614	2.150	1.250	53.15	1393.13	-3.600
South Korea	732	0.282	0.816	1.182	1.350	1.050	42.79	3360.97	-2.267
Bangladesh	771	0.291	0.336	0.400	na	0.389	115.59	949.84	-1.200
Morocco	600	0.299	0.486	0.595	0.400	0.800	25.06	1560.56	-7.200
Sri Lanka	780	0.306	0.679	0.091	0.000	0.150	16.99	1437.44	5.000
Kuwait	690	0.308	0.719	0.594	0.300	0.650	2.14	15211.21	-8.667
Ghana	452	0.317	0.459	0.278	0.571	0.100	15.03	705.06	-4.833
Cameroon	471	0.339	0.455	0.121	0.000	0.200	11.83	974.63	-6.000
Paraguay	150	0.340	0.649	0.045	0.100	0.000	4.28	1696.39	-6.000
Haiti	041	0.349	0.354	0.114	0.050	0.100	5.96	715.48	-6.666
Mauritius	590	0.357	0.740	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.08	3486.40	10.000
Burundi	516	0.363	0.271	0.129	0.111	0.150	5.46	416.21	-6.600
Indonesia	850	0.367	0.616	0.455	0.700	0.300	179.30	1184.27	-5.000
Greece	350	0.370	0.853	0.591	0.250	0.900	10.05	4740.51	6.000
Bolivia	145	0.380	0.549	0.045	0.050	0.050	7.40	1457.09	-0.500
Chile	155	0.380	0.767	0.523	0.600	0.550	13.17	3060.38	-5.571
Brazil	140	0.383	0.739	0.136	0.150	0.150	150.37	3246.83	0.200
Iraq	645	0.386	0.486	2.023	1.100	2.900	18.92	3672.05	-5.933
Ecuador	130	0.388	0.661	0.386	0.450	0.300	10.78	2328.70	1.800
Thailand	800	0.390	0.811	1.159	1.350	1.150	57.20	2027.79	4.934
Venezuela	101	0.394	0.784	0.318	0.350	0.350	19.74	5288.41	8.000
Peru	135	0.407	0.634	0.409	0.350	0.400	22.33	2243.08	1.615
Honduras	091	0.408	0.542	0.273	0.150	0.400	5.10	1198.32	0.071
Uruguay	165	0.413	0.837	0.045	0.050	0.050	3.09	3631.34	-4.602

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (continued)

Country	CCODE	GEM	GDI	MIDAV	AMIDAV	BMIDAV	POP	BGDPC	REGIME
Dominican Rep.	042	0.422	0.641	0.182	0.200	0.100	7.17	1799.09	2.200
Guatemala	090	0.422	0.506	0.159	0.100	0.250	9.20	1873.85	0.928
Zimbabwe	552	0.425	0.525	0.741	1.200	0.700	9.37	1001.54	5.500
Malaysia	820	0.425	0.772	0.306	0.286	0.300	17.86	3178.70	10.000
Mozambique	541	0.427	0.245	0.278	na	0.312	15.66	754.42	-6.909
Singapore	830	0.427	0.833	0.107	0.000	0.100	3.00	6693.04	2.000
El Salvador	092	0.428	0.544	0.114	0.100	0.150	5.25	1556.89	3.100
Poland	290	0.431	0.802	0.136	0.250	0.050	38.18	3377.87	-6.000
France	220	0.437	0.913	0.909	0.700	1.000	56.44	9665.45	5.800
Philippines	840	0.438	0.644	0.318	0.300	0.350	61.48	1396.13	-6.667
Panama	095	0.441	0.792	0.205	0.000	0.450	2.42	2553.90	-6.134
Japan	740	0.445	0.897	1.195	1.737	0.750	123.54	9046.36	10.000
Colombia	100	0.447	0.797	0.136	0.050	0.250	32.99	2417.20	9.867
Lesotho	570	0.448	0.454	0.037	0.000	0.050	1.77	706.64	-4.072
Botswana	571	0.464	0.723	0.481	0.200	0.600	1.29	1760.89	10.000
Mexico	070	0.471	0.755	0.091	0.100	0.100	86.15	4446.71	-3.400
Costa Rica	094	0.475	0.813	0.205	0.100	0.350	2.99	2817.70	10.000
China	710	0.478	0.601	2.682	3.650	1.850	1139.06	843.49	-6.333
Israel	666	0.485	na	2.432	3.150	1.750	4.66	6677.05	10.000
Bulgaria	355	0.486	na	0.273	0.250	0.250	9.01	5567.85	-6.000
Spain	230	0.490	0.866	0.500	0.300	0.750	38.96	6288.14	5.000
Portugal	235	0.491	0.833	0.545	0.750	0.450	10.52	4229.97	6.769
Ireland	205	0.504	0.835	0.045	0.000	0.100	3.50	5644.76	10.000
Hungary	310	0.507	0.835	0.159	0.200	0.050	10.55	4014.53	-6.000
Cuba	040	0.522	0.699	0.500	0.300	0.800	10.61	na	-7.000
South Africa	560	0.523	0.622	0.591	0.100	1.200	35.28	2813.52	4.000
U. K.	200	0.530	0.886	1.818	2.350	1.150	57.24	8645.82	10.000
Trinidad	052	0.559	0.809	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.22	7363.09	8.000
Belgium	211	0.580	0.885	0.182	0.200	0.150	9.84	9020.01	10.000
Australia	900	0.590	0.912	0.136	0.150	0.100	17.09	10684.51	10.000
Italy	325	0.593	0.856	0.364	0.400	0.350	57.06	8300.89	10.000
Switzerland	225	0.594	0.869	0.068	0.100	0.000	6.71	11745.48	10.000
Austria	305	0.641	0.887	0.105	0.188	0.000	7.71	8442.89	10.000
U. S. A.	002	0.645	0.923	4.045	4.250	4.150	249.98	12982.62	10.000
Netherlands	210	0.646	0.898	0.295	0.450	0.200	14.94	9288.68	10.000
West Germany	260	0.654	0.883	0.500	0.500	0.550	63.23	9844.32	10.000
Canada	020	0.685	0.927	0.250	0.050	0.400	26.52	11958.98	10.000
New Zealand	920	0.685	0.906	0.091	0.100	0.050	3.35	8905.00	10.000
Finland	375	0.710	0.921	0.045	0.100	0.000	4.99	9169.54	10.000
Denmark	390	0.718	0.913	0.227	0.300	0.200	5.14	9698.86	10.000
Sweden	380	0.779	0.929	0.205	0.150	0.250	8.56	10439.83	10.000
Norway	385	0.786	0.926	0.318	0.250	0.450	4.24	9565.98	10.000

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (continued)

Note: Only independent states with at least one million population in 1990 are included in the analyses. Eligible states not included in the data base (i.e., states for which GEM scores were not available) are as follows:

Highly Institutionalized States (HIS) (5/24; 0.208)–Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia

Third World States (Non-HIS) (36/106; 0.340)

Protracted Conflict Region (PCR) states (20/58; 0.345)–Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Chad, Jamaica, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam, Yemen AR/PDR

Non-PCR states (16/48; 0.333)--Albania, Argentina, Benin, Bhutan, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nepal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda

APPENDIX B: ANALYTIC CATEGORIES

Country	HIS	AIE	PCR	NEW	ISLAM	CATH	Country	HIS	AIE	PCR	NEW	ISLAM	CATH
U. S. A.	1	1	0	0	0	0	Ghana	0	0	0	1	0	0
Canada	1	1	0	0	0	0	Togo	0	0	0	1	0	0
Cuba	0	0	1	0	0	1	Cameroon	0	0	0	1	0	0
Haiti	0	0	1	0	0	1	Nigeria	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dominican Rep.	0	0	1	0	0	1	C. A. R.	0	0	0	1	0	0
Trinidad	0	0	0	1	0	0	Congo	0	0	0	1	0	0
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	1	Zaire	0	0	1	1	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	1	0	0	1	Burundi	0	0	0	1	0	0
Honduras	0	0	1	0	0	1	Rwanda	0	0	0	1	0	0
El Salvador	0	0	1	0	0	1	Ethiopia	0	0	1	0	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0	1	0	0	1	Mozambique	0	0	1	1	0	0
Panama	0	0	1	0	0	1	Zambia	0	0	1	1	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	1	Zimbabwe	0	0	1	1	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	1	Malawi	0	0	1	1	0	0
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	1	South Africa	0	0	1	0	0	0
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	1	Lesotho	0	0	1	1	0	0
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	1	Botswana	0	0	1	1	0	0
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	1	Mauritius	0	0	0	1	0	0
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	1	Morocco	0	0	0	1	1	0
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	1	Algeria	0	0	0	1	1	0
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	1	Tunisia	0	0	1	1	1	0
U. K.	1	1	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	0	1	1	1	0
Ireland	0	1	0	0	0	1	Iran	0	0	1	0	1	0
Netherlands	1	1	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	0	1	0	1	0
Belgium	1	1	0	0	0	1	Iraq	0	0	1	0	1	0
France	1	1	0	0	0	1	Egypt	0	0	1	0	1	0
Switzerland	1	1	0	0	0	0	Israel	0	0	1	1	0	0
Spain	1	1	0	0	0	1	Kuwait	0	0	1	1	1	0
Portugal	1	1	0	0	0	1	U. A. E.	0	0	1	1	1	0
West Germany	1	1	0	0	0	0	China	1	2	0	0	0	0
Poland	1	2	0	0	0	1	South Korea	0	0	1	1	0	0
Austria	1	1	0	0	0	1	Japan	1	1	0	0	0	0
Hungary	1	1	0	0	0	1	India	0	0	1	1	0	0
Italy	1	1	0	0	0	1	Pakistan	0	0	1	1	1	0
Greece	0	1	0	0	0	1	Bangladesh	0	0	1	1	1	0
Bulgaria	1	2	0	0	0	1	Sri Lanka	0	0	1	1	0	0
Finland	0	1	0	0	0	0	Thailand	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sweden	0	1	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	0	1	1	0	0
Norway	0	1	0	0	0	0	Singapore	0	0	1	1	0	0
Denmark	1	1	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	0	1	0	0	1
Mali	0	0	0	1	1	0	Indonesia	0	0	1	1	1	0
Mauritania	0	0	0	1	1	0	Australia	1	1	0	0	0	0
Niger	0	0	0	1	1	0	Papua N. G.	0	0	0	1	0	0
Burkina Faso	0	0	0	1	0	0	New Zealand	0	1	0	0	0	0

Note: The category "AIE" includes two sub-categories: Advanced Market Economies (AME) coded "1" and Advanced Command Economies (ACE) coded "2."
Also, notice that the category "CATH" is a shortened designation of the variable "CATHORTH."

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