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# Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004

A Macro-Comparative Perspective



Cover photo:

A Mai Mai rebel soldier. The Mai Mai are one of many rebel groups at large in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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# Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004

## A Macro-Comparative Perspective

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The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect official UK Government policies



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# Executive Summary

Sub-Saharan Africa is an extremely weak and volatile regional sub-system in the globalizing world system; pervasive and persistent violence has confounded efforts to improve economic capacity and performance in the region. Eight macro-comparative perspectives on conflict trends in Africa are charted in order to establish a fairly comprehensive picture and understanding of the background of the situation in the region in mid-2005. Regional variations in three principal conflict trends are then presented for the Central, East, West, and Southern regions of Africa. The report concludes with discussions of three models that help to explain the conditions that undermine stability and limit the capacity of African states to better manage societal conflicts. The report also includes seven data annexes that list 1) major armed conflicts and other violent internal crises; 2) adverse regime changes and coups d'état; 3) periods of political instability; 4) minority groups involved in violent conflicts; 5) peace agreements; 6) drivers of post-formation instability; and 7) factors of general peace-building capacity.

The report documents the following principle conflict trends in Africa:

- The total magnitude of major armed conflicts increased rapidly during the decolonialization period (mid-1950s through the mid-1970s); it increased strongly again through the 1980s. The general trend reversed in the 1990s and has decreased by nearly 50% since its peak in 1991. The vast majority of armed conflicts since 1955 have been societal (ethnic, communal, and revolutionary) wars; international wars are largely accounted as wars of independence during the decolonialization period.
- The total numbers of "forcibly displaced populations" (refugees and internally displaced persons) appears to have skyrocketed from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s; the numbers fell sharply (by about half) in the mid-1990s and have risen slowly since. There are currently about 15 million displaced, mainly internally displaced (there are about 3.5 million transnational refugees). The relatively recent, sharp increases and large numbers of displaced persons may partly reflect the increased attention that the humanitarian plight of the displaced has received from the international community.
- Two distinct trends in political instability have combined to keep general levels of instability quite high in Africa since the first wave of independence in 1960. Over half of new countries in Africa experienced varying periods of "state-formation instability" and three countries have not yet gained initial stability: Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda. Instances of "post-formation instability" increased dramatically with the end of the greater Cold War period; two principle factors involve difficulties/opportunities associated with regime liberalization processes and countries with large Muslim populations (over 40% of the country's total population).

- Democratic forms of governance were generally few and short-lived through the decolonization and Cold War periods; most African regimes were autocratic and well over half of African regimes were ruled by ethnically-exclusive political elites. Autocratic regimes fell from a peak of 36 countries (of 41 total) in 1989 to only 5 (of 43) in 2004. Democratic regimes, however, have emerged only slowly (13 in 2004, from 3 in 1989). Most regimes in Africa are characterized by mixed democratic and autocratic traits; ethnic exclusivity of ruling elites remains high. The problem of extreme failures of states doubled in the 1990s, affecting about 10% of African countries.
- The number of minority groups subject to official policies of political discrimination has fallen steadily since the mid-1980s (by about 70%), whereas the number of groups benefiting from remedial policies increased steadily from 1960 through the 1990s. On the other hand, the number of groups that continue to be politically disadvantaged due to historical conditions or through general social practice remains fairly high and level.
- There is some evidence of a dramatic increase in both the number and level of violence of inter-communal conflicts in the 1990s, although this may be partly explained by an increase in media reporting since the end of the Cold War. It may also be partly due to the proliferation of light weapons.
- Whereas there has been some progress charted in each of the four sub-regions of Africa, the Central and East Africa regions remain highly unstable and volatile. West Africa shows some substantial signs of recovery from the instability that has plagued the area mainly in the 1990s. Southern Africa has shown very strong trends toward stabilization and recovery since the early 1990s.

The report uses macro-comparative, statistical modeling to identify key explanatory factors in state formation and post-formation instability in African states and general peace-building capacity:

- "State formation instability" is largely explained either by "political factionalism" in more open political systems or "exclusivity" by ruling elites in more autocratic states. These structural conditions of politically divisive contentiousness stem from problems of social marginalization and system manageability.
- "Post-formation instability" is explained by varying combinations of dependency, polarization, unmanageability, leadership succession, neighbourhood (spillover) effects, and large Muslim population.
- "Peace-building capacity" measures the ability of a state to manage conflict and respond to domestic challenges peacefully; peace-building capacity is greater in countries that can provide reasonable levels of human security, have no official policies of discrimination, have successfully managed previous group demands for greater self-determination, maintain stable and durable (democratic) governance institutions, have attained substantial human and material resources, and are free from serious threats from neighbouring countries.

The peace-building capacities of African states are generally weak but there are some signs of improvement in recent years. This is particularly important given the increasing challenges that many African countries are facing. In the absence of the conflict mitigating effects of a broad-based, proactive civil society with substantial stakes and personal interests in maintaining the system, elite rivalry, outgroup resistance, and entrepreneurial violence can be expected to further complicate the inherent problems of manageability in African societies. Globalization adds powerful, new dynamics to politics in weak African states that are not fully understood but almost entirely unregulated. Yet, given the propensity for instability in African states, the substantial decreases in armed conflict, autocratic regimes, political discrimination, and political instability charted over the past several years are encouraging. A downside to the decrease in wars is an attendant increase in unemployed fighters; increases in organized crime are common in post-conflict regions. Given the general weakness of the commercial sector and civil society in many African countries, the recent shift toward the democratization of central government will be difficult to sustain. Proactive international engagement, particularly by governments, is and will remain crucial over the medium term (ten to twenty-five years) in helping countries to manage social tensions and stimulate the development of self-regulating civil societies.



# African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

The modern state system in Sub-Saharan African<sup>1</sup> (hereafter referred to simply as Africa) is relatively new; only Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa were recognized as independent states prior to 1950 and most states in the region only gained their independence since 1960. For the most part, the economies of the African states at the time of their ascensions to independent status were primarily extractive and mainly directed toward trade with the extra-regional system. There was little or no industrial or service economic capacities in place at independence, except in South Africa. Indeed, after three or more decades of independent public policy, the industrial and service sectors of most African countries remain severely underdeveloped, averaging about 15% of export earnings, and the value of formal inter-regional trade is only about one-fifth the value of trade with OECD countries.<sup>2</sup> In 2001, per capita income for the Africa region (US\$318) was only about one-fourteenth of the global average (US\$4,376).<sup>3</sup> Coincident with Africa's poor economic performance and severely low levels of infrastructural and industrial development in the contemporary era has been high levels of political instability and political violence. Indeed, Africa is an extremely weak and volatile regional sub-system in the globalizing world system; pervasive and persistent violence has confounded efforts to improve economic capacity and performance in the region. Eight macro-comparative perspectives on conflict trends in Africa are charted in order to establish a fairly comprehensive picture and understanding of the background of the situation in the region in mid-2005. Regional variations in three principal conflict trends are then presented for the Central, East, West, and Southern regions of Africa. The report concludes with discussions of three models that help to explain the conditions that undermine stability and limit the capacity of African states to better manage societal conflicts.

**Trends in Armed Conflicts.** Figure 1 provides a standard view of Africa regional trends in major armed conflict. The basic assumption underlying the methodology used to construct the warfare trends graph is that violent conflict stands as a measure of a fundamental disturbance in the "normal" social dynamics of state-societal systems, that is, warfare is symptomatic of the degree to which social conflict, coupled with ineffective conflict management, has transformed collective action from constructive to destructive modes of behavior. Much as the strength of storms and earthquakes can be measured independently from their largely circumstantial effects on affected systems, episodes of violent social conflict can be measured on a comparable magnitude scale that can be aggregated to chart general trends.<sup>4</sup> Figure 2 plots the annual numbers of countries experiencing any magnitude event of each of three general types of armed conflict, as well as the annual number of countries experiencing any type or magnitude of armed conflict, for further reference.

1 The Sub-Saharan Africa region, for the purposes of this study, include all independent countries on the African continent with total populations greater than 500,000 in 2005, except the northern tier states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Additionally, the island states of Madagascar and the Comoros are included in the analyses. Thus defined, the region comprises forty-three states in mid-2005.

2 Data on manufacturing exports comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and data on trade comes from the IMF Direction of Trade database.


3 World Development Indicators, constant 1997 US\$.

4 Only countries with at least 500,000 total populations in 2004 are included in this study (43 total in 2004); interstate and societal wars must have reached a magnitude of over 500 directly-related deaths to be listed. The magnitude of each major armed conflict is evaluated according to its comprehensive effects on the state or states directly affected by the warfare, including numbers of combatants and casualties, size of the affected area and dislocated populations, and extent of infrastructure damage. It is then assigned a single score on a ten-point scale measuring the magnitude of its adverse effects on the affected society; this value is recorded for each year the war remains active. See Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Effects of War," chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) for a detailed explanation of the methodology used. A full list of major armed conflicts and the magnitude scores assigned to each is provided in Annex 1a, following.

## African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

The general trend line in figure 1 is charted in orange and shows a fairly constant increase in the magnitude of warfare in Africa during the Cold War/decolonization period, 1946-1989 (each of the trends graphs is marked with a vertical line at 1989 as a point of reference demarcating the end of the Cold War). The upward trend continued through the early years of the 1990s; over forty percent of the region's countries were experiencing wars at the peak in 1993. The upward trend is mainly attributable to the protracted duration of wars during the Cold War period; very few wars were ended by negotiated settlement during this period.<sup>5</sup> Since 1993 the trend has reversed and the general magnitude of war decreased to about half its peak value by 2004. That downward trend appears to be continuing in 2005.

Figure 1



The majority of warfare during the period is comprised by the several variants of "societal war:" ethnic, revolutionary, inter-communal, and political mass murder. Interstate wars are largely comprised by wars of independence against European colonial administrations. Upon gaining independence, about half of the anti-colonial wars degenerated into civil wars. Interstate wars between African countries have been minor and brief, mainly concerning territorial or cross-border issues. During the contemporary era, there have been only two interstate wars that have risen above the minimum magnitude: the 1978-79 invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops that ousted the Idi Amin regime in Uganda (magnitude 2) and a magnitude 5 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, a war strongly linked to the long and bitter separatist war that Eritreans fought in Ethiopia prior to gaining their independence in 1993. These examples are emblematic of the conflation of domestic and international conflict dynamics that has characterized armed conflicts in Africa during the contemporary period and obscured the traditional distinction between civil and

<sup>5</sup> Negotiated settlements are listed in Annex 5: Africa Peace Agreements, following

interstate conflicts. Of greatest importance in this regard is the issue of transnational support for both government security forces and anti-state militants. Various forms of foreign support and, even, direct military intervention have increased the likelihood and scope of violence in many instances and seriously complicated efforts at conflict resolution; the provision of countervailing military assistance from rival Western and Socialist countries during the Cold War period is well known. Access to cross-border refuge can be a crucial factor in the ability of militant groups to sustain insurgency and active support of such groups has been a common component in regional rivalries. Since the end of the Cold War, there is some evidence that African states are becoming more "adventurous" with their armed forces operating across borders in neighbouring countries. This has been particularly troublesome in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as Rwandan and Ugandan troops have used DRC territory as staging areas for battles against rebel groups driven from their own countries. Cross-border movement and operations by both rebel, state, and state-less armed forces is becoming increasingly common in Africa. On the more positive side, multilateral engagement in peace negotiations and peacekeeping operations by African regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and a more activist African Union have been instrumental in the observed decline in armed conflict in recent years.

Figure 2




Figure 2 provides a slightly different aggregation of the trend in "societal wars" charted in figure 1, above. The category of "interstate wars" remains the same across the two figures and includes both classic interstate and "extrasystemic" (colonial) wars (the two types are not shown separately in figure 2). The category of societal wars is broken down according to whether the war was primarily mobilized along ethnic identity or political-ideological (revolutionary) perspectives. The main difference in these two classifications regards the composition and intent of rebel group challenges to state authority. The mobilization of ethnic violence is largely exclusive to a particular social

identity group that desires to change its political status, either through greater autonomy or separatist goals or competition with another identity group, or groups, over capture and control of the central state apparatus. The mobilization of political violence and war may incorporate distinct identity groups as a supplementary organizational framework but the goals of the political group are more inclusive, appealing to members of more than one group, and more progressive. The trends indicate that Africans are not necessarily bound to local and parochial identities for the mobilization of political action. Broader, more inclusive agendas are similarly persuasive and may actually be formed in reaction to common perceptions of injustices or ineffectiveness of governance by more exclusive or restricted political or military states. In any case, both forms of societal warfare show marked decreases in recent years, although political wars have declined substantially only in the past few years. This may be due to the difficulty of negotiating terms in wars in which the opposing sides have broader and more complex political interests and agendas.


An additional (orange-dotted) trend line in figure 2 charts the annual numbers of African countries that are experiencing any form or magnitude of major armed conflict in that year. The numbers of countries affected by war during the Cold War period hover around one-quarter of countries in the region (about 10 countries each year from the mid 1960s through the late 1980s), although the number of conflicts and the magnitudes of those conflicts tend to increase during the period. The number of states directly affected by serious armed conflicts increases sharply during the transition to a post-Cold War political environment (to a peak of 18 in 1993), giving some indication of the effects of dramatic changes taking place in the qualities of support and expectations of foreign donors and the global system and the transformation of many African regimes to more open systems. The number of countries affected by war declined to 8 by the end of 2004; this number is not substantially lower than the Cold War period annual rate of about 10 countries. The recent steep decline in war magnitude trends since the early 1990s indicates that some of Africa's most serious and protracted wars have been ended, such as the wars in Mozambique, Ethiopia (Eritrean separatism), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and southern Sudan.

An important corollary to the recent decline in organized and sustained armed conflicts in many areas of Africa is an overabundance of unemployed, armed fighters in a region that offers limited opportunities for reintegration of former combatants into a peacetime economy. The life experiences, skill set, and "tool box" of ex-combatants provide powerful incentives for many to pursue post-war occupations in banditry, organized crime, mercenary activities, or "strongarm" politics. At least over the medium term (about 25 years on average), the pacification, transformation, and reintegration of former combatants, as well as populations traumatized by the violence and deprivation of war, will place enormous strains on local economies and political systems that have themselves been seriously weakened by the war experience.

**Trends in Forcibly Displaced Populations.** Figure 3 charts trends in the numbers of "forcibly displaced populations" in African countries for the years 1964-2004, as reported by the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) in their annual report, *World Refugee Survey*. Forcibly displaced populations are fleeing serious deterioration in local security environments due to armed conflicts and include cross-border "refugees" and "internally displaced" persons, those who do not cross international borders (the two classifications are charted separately and summed in

figure 3). As explained by the organization, "Refugee status precedes its recognition. Most of the world's refugees do not receive formal determinations of their status under the 1951 Convention. USCRI, therefore, not only counts those who are officially recognized as refugees (until a durable solution is available), but also asylum seekers awaiting determinations, beneficiaries of more general forms of protection granted for similar reasons, and others USCRI considers to be refugees." Internally displaced populations resemble the status and conditions of refugee populations in all ways except that they do not cross international borders and, so, do not enjoy special recognition and protections through international conventions. The enormous increase in the numbers of forcibly displaced populations since the mid-1980s is remarkable, particularly in the numbers of internally displaced people. This trend, in particular, may be controversial as the amount of attention and the quality of reporting in this region at the local, regional, and global levels has also increased dramatically over the same period, so, part of the documented increase may simply reflect changes in the way information is produced. However, the increase may reflect changes in the nature of local economies where once migratory populations have become increasingly settled. It also surely reflects a long-term deterioration in conditions affecting already marginalized, subsistence-level populations that lead increasingly and more immediately to humanitarian crises in armed conflict locations.


**Figure 3**



## African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

**Trends in Political Instability.** The fourth African trend graph, “Political Instability in Africa, 1946-2004” (figure 4), combines information on the onsets of regime and political violence events with annual trends in the numbers of unstable states to gain a more comprehensive picture of political instability in African states. “Political stability” here is defined by the absence of major armed conflict and lack of serious disruptions to the central regime’s ability to make, implement, and administer public policy.<sup>6</sup> Corollary to these basic traits is the proposition that changes to the quality of government reform toward greater transparency, openness, inclusiveness, competitiveness, and accountability are more likely to occur during periods of political stability. Societal-system stabilization is a process that can only be considered successful, in these terms, when the state manages to avoid the occurrence of political violence or disruptive regime events for a period of ten years or more. Instability provides greater opportunities for both societal and elite challenges to the status quo. For analytic purposes, a period of instability for any given country begins with the onset of the first instability event and ends with the conclusion of the last instability event in a sequence of adverse events. Sequential instability events in African states occur fairly frequently with armed conflict often overlapping shorter or sudden regime instability events.

**Figure 4**



<sup>6</sup> Once a serious political violence or regime instability event occurs, the relative weakness of political institutions and disruptions of normal societal processes create opportunities for additional challenges to the status quo. As such, instability events very often happen concurrently, that is, the onset of one event coincides with or is followed by the onset of overlapping or sequential instability events. Periods of instability are often characterized by unique combinations of instability events and these “consolidated cases” of general political instability can thus be distinguished from periods of political stability. The approach used here builds on the approach originally developed by the US Government’s State Failure Task Force but expands coverage to include three additional types of instability events: 1) successful coups d’etat, 2) attempted coups d’etat, and 3) serious episodes of inter-communal violence in which the state is not directly involved. Each of these several types of political instability events were plotted along a time-line for each of the forty-three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and clusters of events demarcated periods of general, political instability. Individual events are listed in Annexes to this report, as are periods of stability and instability for each country in Africa since 1946.

The green, dotted-line charts the aggregate number of states that are experiencing general instability in any given year. This trend line shows that the number of unstable states in Africa has remained fairly constant over the contemporary period, with peaks in the initial years of African independence and in the immediate post-Cold War period. These twin peaks belie two distinct phases of fundamental political adjustments in African regimes: the original formation of self-rule and the incorporation of more open, electoral regimes. These two distinct forms of instability are charted in figure 4: state formation instability (orange line; instability that disrupts the establishment of a viable state in a newly independent country) and post-formation instability (black line; instability that disrupts an established, stable state). A list of the periods of stability and instability for each country in Africa is provided in Annex 3 of this report.<sup>7</sup> It is very important to note that, while the shape of the state formation instability trend line is an authentic depiction of the historical record of a regional process that is nearing completion, the post-formation instability trend is historically authentic only through the late 1990s. As noted in the preceding paragraph, state-systemic stability can only be established empirically by the absence of armed conflict and regime instability events over a period of about ten years. Fifteen countries that are noted in Annex 3 as having (re)gained stability during the past ten years and, of these, nine have been free of instability events for five years or less.<sup>8</sup> The steep decline in the number of unstable states over the past ten years is based on a conditional assessment of the current situations in recently unstable states and a critical assumption of a continuation of current levels of international engagement and commitment to political stabilization in Africa.

The chart in figure 4 shows that instability in African states has remained a fairly constant and serious problem since the decolonization period began in the 1960s. Stabilization of newly independent countries proved difficult as more than half of all countries (23 of 40) experienced a period of state formation instability immediately following independence (ranging from four to thirty-five years for the twenty countries that eventually gained stability; fourteen years on average). Of these, three countries have not yet achieved effective and comprehensive political stability: Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda; a fourth country, Angola, appears to have finally gained systemic stability with the end of its protracted civil war with UNITA in 2002 (including the three cases that have not yet stabilized raises the average for state formation instability to over eighteen years). Ten countries experienced a second period of instability and one (Democratic Republic of Congo) has experienced two subsequent periods of instability. On the other hand, seventeen countries were able to establish stable states at the date of independence and, of these, ten have remained stable through mid-2005.

On average, over seven new instability events occurred annually and twenty-five to sixty-one percent of African states were experiencing a period of instability at any point from 1960 through 2002 (an estimated nineteen percent are unstable in early 2005). Although there is a much lower number of unstable states in between the peak in state formation instability in 1968 and the rapid onset of post-formation instability in the early 1990s (affecting about half of African countries), the scope and

<sup>7</sup> Event plots for each of the fifty countries in Africa can be viewed on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site at <http://members.aol.com/cspm/gm/africa>.


<sup>8</sup> The nine countries that have gained or regained stability in the past five years are Angola, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Of these, the situation in the Central African Republic is the most tenuous.

## African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

frequency of instability events in Africa only begins to decrease in the late 1990s. In the most recent year (2004), eight states are considered politically unstable. as already noted, the relatively low number of unstable countries in mid-2005 (the lowest percentage since 1953) is somewhat speculative as it is based on projections of continued stabilization in several countries (see, footnote 8). These countries are particularly vulnerable to new challenges and disruptions that would mark a continuation of the prior period of instability; proactive international engagement is particularly vital to ensure recovery in these situations. Countries with ongoing instability problems in early 2005 include Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

**Trends in the General Quality of Governance.** Figure 5, "Africa: Regimes by Type, 1946-2004," charts annual changes in the numbers of three basic types of political regimes: democracies, anocracies, and autocracies.<sup>9</sup> The chart presents a very distinct "signature" for institutional authority in African countries that was shaped largely by the period of European colonization. In 1950, there were only three independent states in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. The number increased to five by the end of the 1950s but jumped sharply as seventeen countries, mainly French colonial territories, gained independence in 1960. The number of states gradually rose to thirty-six by 1970. The last territory to leave European control was Djibouti (from France in 1977). More recently, two countries have emerged from control by other African countries: Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 1990 and Eritrea separated from Ethiopia in 1993.

Figure 5



<sup>9</sup> For a description of the Polity IV project and the regime coding scheme and data used in figure 5, see the Polity IV Web site at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity>. For a more detailed explanation of the three basic regime types charted in figure 5, see chapter 4 in Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*, available from the Center for Global Policy Web site at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu>.



The picture that emerges from the regime trends diagram is that experiments in democratic forms of governance in Africa were relatively rare and short-lived during the Cold War period. At the time of emergence as independent states, only nine countries were governed by democratic regimes, eighteen countries had autocratic regimes, eleven were anocracies, and one emerged without an effective central government (Zaire in 1960). Within ten years from their date of independence, six of the ten new African democracies had failed and those states seized were by autocratic rule: Lesotho, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Only Botswana and Namibia have maintained democratic regimes since their inception; the democratic regime in The Gambia lasted nearly forty years before falling to autocratic rule in 1994.<sup>10</sup> All eleven countries that emerged from the period of colonial rule with mixed, or incoherent, forms of governance (i.e., anocracies) fell into autocratic rule within fifteen years. In the late 1980s, over eighty-five percent of African countries were governed by personalistic, bureaucratic, or military dictatorships. Only seven countries initiated democratic transitions during the Cold War era: Sierra Leone and Sudan in the 1960s; Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana (twice), Nigeria, and Uganda in the 1970s; and Sudan, again, in the 1980s. None of these early attempts lasted more than five years before falling once again under autocratic rule.

The end of the Cold War period triggered major changes in the prevalent forms of governance in Africa. By 1992, the number of autocracies in Africa had fallen by half and continued to decline through the 1990s, reaching a low of five in 2000. The number of democratic regimes, however, increased to just eleven by 1994 from three in 1989; there were thirteen democracies in Africa at the end of 2004. Nearly all African countries have experienced some improvement in the qualities of governance since 1990. However, many of the new democratizing regimes have faltered along the way and some, such as Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea-Bissau, and Ivory Coast, have failed. Two countries counter the generally positive trend by moving toward greater autocracy in the 1990s: The Gambia and Zimbabwe. The sudden shift away from autocratic forms of governance in post-Cold War Africa provides strong evidence of the negative link between political violence and democratization. The countries that made the most dramatic moves toward democracy were almost invariably those that had experienced no, or fairly minor or localized, armed conflict since 1946. Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, and Senegal have established democratic regimes in largely peaceful societies.<sup>11</sup> Bold moves toward democracy sometimes triggered armed conflicts in peaceful societies: regime transitions in Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Niger, and Sierra Leone have been complicated or compromised by serious armed violence. Three relatively peaceful countries, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, and Tanzania, have begun to liberalize their regimes at a more measured pace; others, such as Cameroon, Gabon, and Guinea have only modestly eased restrictions on political activity. Only Nigeria and Mozambique instituted major democratic changes following protracted experiences with civil or communal warfare. By and large, states with past, recent, or current experiences with major societal wars remain autocratic, are struggling to design or establish a power-sharing government to end civil wars and dampen intense factionalism, or have collapsed.

<sup>10</sup> The white-minority regimes in Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were nominally democratic but highly restricted, with the majority of the populations in these countries politically, economically, and culturally disenfranchised.

<sup>11</sup> Low levels of violence are common in most African countries, as is the case generally in low income countries. Episodes of armed conflict are organized and sustained and are characterized by higher magnitudes of systematic violence. In this context, "peaceful" societies are not free from violence, they are free from serious armed conflicts. Democratization in Senegal occurred despite the onset of a low-intensity separatist war in the isolated Casamance region and in Mali despite a low-level rebellion by ethnic-Tuaregs in the north.

## African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

The greatest change in the governance profile of Africa has been a dramatic increase in the number of quasi-democratic, or anocratic, regimes. Sixty percent of African countries were governed by anocratic regimes in 2004 and, of these, half are characterized by highly factionalized political competition. General poverty, parochialism, and political factionalism have proven inimical to the persistence and consolidation of democratic forms of governance. During the Cold War period, anocratic regimes were highly prone to the onset of instability events; liberalizing regimes lasted less than four years on average and seldom lasted for more than ten years.<sup>12</sup> In the initial years of post-Cold War Africa, poor, anocratic regimes appear to be less prone to political crises; many have persisted for ten or more years without serious disruption or setback. Incomplete democratization and persistent poverty remain a potentially volatile mixture and a major concern for regional security and development prospects. Also of great concern is the occurrence of failed states where central authority breaks down and administrative and allocative functions and essential social services cease or are severely limited. The black bars in figure 5 mark the annual number of states in a condition of central governance failure. The numbers remain fairly constant through the Cold War era, fluctuating between one and three cases each year. The annual numbers of failed states has doubled in the post-Cold War period. Once states fall apart, it is very difficult to put them back together and, during the interim, violence and predation tend to predominate political interactions.

Political factionalism has been identified as one of the most important factors leading to the onset of political violence and regime instability events by the Political Instability Task Force.<sup>13</sup> Such factionalism has characterized the political processes in over half of African states since the general wave of political liberalization swept through Africa upon the end of the Cold War period (23 of 38). Additionally, four of the five states that remain tightly autocratic are masking highly factionalized societies: Mauritania, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Of course, in its most extreme forms, political factionalism leads to the onset of civil war or separatist rebellions and the collapse of civil order and the authority of the central state. In its most benign forms, factionalism creates legislative gridlock and undermines public confidence in deliberation, legislative process, and, ultimately, the legitimate rule of law. It also raises incentives for bureaucratic corruption, and public toleration of corruption, as "effective" ways to skirt legislative deadlock and break through political impasse and intransigence. In almost every case of political factionalism in Africa, the precursors of factionalism in electoral and legislative politics can be found in the exclusionist politics of earlier, autocratic regimes.

**Trends in Exclusionary Politics and Discrimination.** The prevailing conditions and the rush to institute "modern" state structures in the immediate post-colonial states not only favored autocratic governance but also favored the creation or capture of the state by parochial social groups who often used state authority to enrich groups members and consolidate their group's domination of the political process. These groups used the state apparatus to further retard, restrict, and repress the normal mobilization of social forces so that these social forces could not mount a challenge to the

<sup>12</sup> See, Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003* (College Park, MD: CIDCM, 2003), figures 4.2 and 4.3; available on the Web at [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace\\_and\\_conflict.asp](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict.asp).

<sup>13</sup> The Political Instability Task Force is an assembly of leading academic experts sponsored by the US Government that has issued four, periodic "Phase" reports on its ongoing, active research agenda. Information on the Task Force, case selection criteria, and copies of the first three reports are available on the Task Force Web site at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/stfail>; the Phase IV report will be available soon. Phase V findings will be presented at the September 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC.

wealth and privileges of the dominant group. The complex social integration that is the foundation of modern economies was severely hampered, or even thwarted, in the more immediate interests of preserving the relative power of the dominant group or groups. Competition between and among social groups was thus focused on control of the state and trust and cooperation was undermined by the instrumental methods used to secure political power and influence. Similarly, the more recent push to institute democratic reforms has often induced political leaders to court political support from loyal kin groups and broader ethnic support bases to help secure electoral victories, limit support for political rivals, and restrict the mobilization of potential challengers.

Figure 6 uses data on “elite characteristics” collected for the Political Instability Task Force to chart African trends in the salience of elite exclusionary ethnicity and/or ideology annually since 1955. The chart shows that well over half of African regimes have relied, and continue to rely, on exclusionary policies that favor distinct social identity support groups. This trend has only begun to diminish in the last ten years as more states move to form broader support coalitions under the auspices of more open, electoral systems. The chart clearly illustrates the importance of ethnic identity in maintaining regime authority. Only during the Cold War was ideology a factor in ensuring the continuity of regimes and restricting access to political opportunities by marginalized outgroups and these ideologies were largely underwritten by ethnic constituencies. The ideological patina was almost completely overwritten by political ethnicity at the end of the Cold War.

Figure 6





Figure 7, “Trends in Political Discrimination, 1950-2003,” focuses on the other side of the political salience of ethnopolitical exclusivity, that is, discriminatory practices affecting social identity

outgroups.<sup>14</sup> It is based on data collected by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.<sup>15</sup> Countries that comprise the Africa region strike a unique profile in the treatment of ethnic groups. The regional trend in governmental discrimination closely follows the regional trend in autocratic regimes (see figure 5, above) with a steep increase in the number of groups subject to official sanctions through the mid-1980s and falling sharply from the peak in 1985 (30 groups) through the most recent year recorded (8 in 2003). A similar trajectory is found for numbers of groups subject to societal discrimination; those numbers increase until they peak with nineteen in 1990. However, the numbers of groups facing social exclusion have not continued to fall but have, rather, leveled off in recent years. Another unique aspect of ethnic politics in Africa is the large number of historically disadvantaged groups that continue to subsist on the margins of states and societies in this relatively poor region. What is common between the African trends and the more general global trends is the steady and substantial increase in the number of ethnic groups benefiting from remedial policies. Most of the MAR groups in Africa are “communal contenders” for power. When one group gains hegemony it reduces political access for rival groups. When the latter gain power they redress the balance. This “taking turns” at the political table may explain some of the steep decline in levels of governmental political discrimination in the region since the mid-1980s. In turn, these improving trends must be contrasted to the persistence of elite ethnicity and exclusivity and the factionalism that characterizes electoral politics in many African countries. The interaction between ethnic ethnicity and group political discrimination can reinforce the politics of exclusivity and lead to protracted, deadly competition between rival groups and the most severe forms of discrimination and repression, as has the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry in the Great Lakes region.

**Figure 7**




<sup>14</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the discrimination data used and a broader analysis of global trends see, Victor Asal and Amy Pate, “The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950-2003,” chapter 6 in *Peace and Conflict 2005*.

<sup>15</sup> The data is available from the MAR project Web site at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar>.

**Trends in Inter-Communal Group Conflict.** The final perspective on general conflict trends in Africa presented in this report concerns an apparent upsurge in inter-communal violence in the region since the end of the Cold War. Using data on collected by the Minorities at Risk project, figure 8 charts decadal figures on inter-communal conflict for the study period (on the left side of the diagram) and annual figures beginning in 1990 (on the right side). Because information on non-state conflict situations in remote localities was often actively suppressed by governments and otherwise scarce prior to the end of the Cold War and the very recent advent of the information and communications “revolution,” data on early inter-communal conflicts was recorded by the MAR project for ten year periods. The decadal records indicate the most intense level of conflict interaction that occurred between each of the politicized minority groups covered by the MAR project and any rival group. As the minimum threshold for inclusion by the MAR project is set at 100,000 group population or one percent of the country’s total population and its coverage of groups is comprehensive, most significant communal conflict situations should be covered by the data. There is, of course, some unanswerable questions regarding the quality, accuracy, and reliability of reporting at the local level in poor and remote locations during these times. However, countering these questions is the knowledge that violence of any sort attracts media and/or scholar attention. In any case, the data can only be considered suggestive under these conditions. And, what the data suggests is an enormous increase in inter-communal conflict in the 1990s, both in the numbers of group-pairs involved and in the intensity of the conflict interactions in Africa.

Figure 8



Improvements in information and communication in the post-Cold War period have allowed the MAR project to collect annual information on inter-communal group conflict beginning in 1990. These annual figures are charted on the right side of figure 8. It is difficult to compare across the two sides of the graph, except to point out that the 1990s bar on the decadal side corresponds to, and

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subsumes, the information contained in the first ten bars on the right side of the figure (the years 1990-1999). The recent, annual data charts an apparent decline in inter-communal conflicts since the mid-1990s that appears to follow the general trends in other forms of social conflict noted in the trends graphs and discussed above. Of concern, are the red portions of the data bars that denote "communal warfare." These remain relatively high and require special attention; what appears to explain the recent downward trend is the near absence of "communal rioting" in the most recent 6-year period. It is rare, however, for inter-communal conflicts to escalate to high levels of violence or to affect large areas without drawing in state security forces and, thus, transforming to civil warfare; communal conflicts are quite self-limiting in scope. Notable exceptions include the Christian-Muslim conflicts that have enveloped the central portion of Nigeria for many years and resulting in as many as 55,000 deaths over the past ten years and the much more limited, but no less brutal, violence between Hema and Lendu groups that has occurred recently in the lawless northeast region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Sub-regional Conflict and Governance Trends.** There are important differences in conflict and governance trends in the four sub-regions of Africa: Central, East, Southern, and West. Three trends graphs are presented for each of these four sub-regions; these include trends in armed conflicts, forcibly displaced populations, and regimes by type.

### Central Africa

The Central Africa region includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Rwanda (9 countries).

Figure 9a.




Figure 9b.





Figure 9c.



Central Africa experienced an increase in armed conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War period, although the magnitude has declined from its peak in 1994. Nearly all armed conflict has been societal, however, foreign interventions in local conflicts or in cross-border pursuit of rebel groups have been common.

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One particularly troubling characteristic of armed conflicts in the 1990s in the Central Africa region has been the massive dislocation of populations fleeing violence and predation by marauding rebel groups.

There have been no democratic regimes established in the Central Africa region; autocratic regimes that predominated during the post-independence period have given way to anocratic regimes in which participation is severely restricted.

There has been an attempt in the DR Congo to form a broad coalition as a way to re-form an effective central government following the failures of the Mobutu and Laurent Kabila regimes; it enjoys an uneasy peace as it tries to extend central government authority to outlying regions while guarding itself against political intrigues and coup attempts at the center. Burundi continues to forge a power-sharing coalition government between former warring Hutu and Tutsi groups. Recent progress in reducing armed conflicts in the Great Lakes countries is partly due to the "export" of rebel groups to "ungoverned" areas of the DR Congo; as central authority is reestablished in those regions, armed rebel groups may return to their home countries.

### Horn and East Africa

The Horn and East Africa region includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (8 countries).

Figure 10a.





Figure 10b.





Figure 10c.



There is a long and pervasive trend of severe armed conflicts in the East Africa region. The magnitude of violence is the highest of all African regions and has remained particularly strong in the post-Cold War period. There is some evidence that armed conflict is decreasing in recent years, except for the spike that denotes the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war, 1998-2000. Conflicts in this region may be more difficult to resolve and recover due to their social complexity, protractedness, and high levels of violence; this coupled with general poverty and long-term degradation of local environments and social systems.

## African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

Population displacements, mainly internally displaced, have been extremely high in this region since the mid 1980s, doubling the numbers that have occurred in the Central region. Following a peak in the early 1990s, the numbers fell briefly but have risen sharply again with the outbreak of serious violence in the Darfur region of Sudan in 2003. The peace agreement with rebel groups in southern Sudan is an essential component in any improvement in regional trends, particularly as the continental interior area spanning from Chad and the CAR in the west to Ethiopia in the east and the DR Congo in the south has been a staging area and refuge for rebel groups from the several concurrent armed conflicts that have plagued the region.

The quality of governance in the countries of this region has been generally poor and highly restricted.

### West Africa

The West Africa region includes Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (15 countries).

Figure 11a.




Figure 11b.





Figure 11c.



The West Africa region comprises a number of relatively small and less populated states, with the notable exception of Nigeria, and this “compartmentalization” has contributed to the much lower general levels of violence in contemporary period. However, there has a dramatic increase in the levels of violence and numbers of episodes in the 1990s, beginning with the collapse of civility and authority in Liberia in 1989. Violence has since spread across the region surrounding Liberia. Nigeria has played a key role in helping to stabilize the region, despite its own difficulties in establishing civilian government and managing communal and separatist conflicts among its diverse population.

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Active international engagement in this region has led to notable improvements in the shared security environment and continuing engagement is crucial in supporting regional stabilization. The extent of the war damage, though quite severe in some locations, is relatively limited compared to the Central and East regions.

The West region has had some success with democratic governance and the prospects for increasing liberalization are good, despite pervasive poverty. Special attention must be paid to the fact that the region remains 'under-mobilized'; many social groups remain non-integrated in the formal economy and the central governance systems. Greater political openness will bring additional groups with new demands upon the region's poor economies and governments. The "Ivorite" issue in Ivory Coast is emblematic of the factionalism that has stalled creation of a common "national" agenda.

### Southern Africa

The Southern Africa region includes Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (11 countries).

Figure 12a.




Figure 12b.





Figure 12c.



The conflict profile for Southern Africa shows remarkable improvement since the early 1990s. During the Cold War period, this region experienced the highest levels of violence in Africa, due in large part to the Apartheid policies of white- rule and the strength of Cold War rivalries and involvements.

With the end of open hostilities, the extremely large numbers of displaced people have also dissipated, resettled, or returned to their homes. Although some tensions remain and disagreements are common, there appear to be few incentives for returning to armed conflict to settle those disputes. Zimbabwe has become a regional pariah but its aging leader will soon pass away and the situation there will change. Too much pressure could further radicalize the situation and lead to unnecessary suffering and disruptive influences in the region. Tensions regarding former white-rule and continuing white ownership of valuable lands and resources are the most volatile issues facing the increasing democratic regimes of the Southern region. Like Nigeria in the West, post-Apartheid South Africa has acted as a stabilizing influence in the region. Prospects for this region improved even more with the reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA in Angola, following Jonas Savimbi's death.

The Southern Africa region has the largest number of democratic regimes in Africa (7 in 2004); only Botswana democratized prior to 1990. The peaceful transformation of Africa's wealthiest country from an Apartheid state to an inclusive democracy has been instrumental in fostering open regimes in the region.

**Summary of Conflict Trends.** During the main part of the African decolonization period (1960-1975), interstate and societal wars were roughly comparable in annual magnitude. As political agendas transformed from establishing the general facts of local sovereignty to designing and administering the details of public policies, societal warfare in African countries jumped sharply and increased steadily through the remaining years of the Cold War period; finally peaking in 1991 and accounting for about one-third the global total. Since 1991, annual warfare totals in Africa have diminished by half; most of the decrease has occurred in the past five years.<sup>16</sup> Except for the fairly brief, but intense, border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000 (which was, in many ways, simply a resurgence of their bitter civil war), interstate war has not been a major factor in African armed conflict. This simple observation, however, obscures the importance of cross-border support for rebel groups and periodic raids against rebel refuge bases in neighbouring states. The difficulties that poor and developing states have in defending their borders, territory, resources, and populations from external intervention has been quite vividly illustrated by the complexities and intrigues that have beset the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) since 1996, as five neighbouring countries, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, openly committed armed forces to combat in Congo's civil war. Gurr and Marshall have found that support from foreign states is a crucial element in the decision of ethnic groups to wage and sustain war against the state; support from kindred groups in neighbouring countries and remittances from abroad can also be important.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> The historical record is crucial in fixing the end of wars and periods of political instability; endings of wars and periods of instability can only be objectively demarcated by the absence of political instability events over a period of five or more years. Recent trends are the result of expert assessments of current situations; there is a risk that some wars will experience a resurgence of hostilities or that a new instability event will occur, however, such resurgence has been rare in the post-Cold War era. In general, a war is considered to have ended with an effective cease-fire and agreement on, or a commitment by warring parties to actively and faithfully negotiate, a peace accord.

<sup>17</sup> Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall, "Assessing the Risks of Future Ethnic Wars," chapter 7 in T. R. Gurr, *Peoples versus States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).

Two factors help to explain the great disparity between the expected low levels of political violence in the generally poor and poorly integrated and mobilized countries of Africa and the observed high levels of violence and warfare. Perhaps the most important factor is the economic and political **marginalization** of the majority of the populations of many African countries. The formal economies in most African countries are heavily dependent on extra-regional trade in primary commodities. The value of trade with OECD countries in the most recent years is five times greater than trade with all other African countries and ten times greater than the value of trade with neighbouring countries. Government revenues are less often based on taxation of exchange transactions, incomes, or commercial activities and more likely derived from state-ownership or control of principle commodities, collection of export duties, and receipt of foreign assistance. Commercial cross-border trade among African countries is almost non-existent; most local trade, including cross-border trade in consumer goods, is conducted through the informal economy or “black markets.” Vast populations are neither integrated into formal national economies nor organized in productive endeavors and information/exchange networks (i.e., they remain non-organized, non-politicized, and non-mobilized in reference to the national economy and political system). They have little or no personal stake in the existing system nor, in all likelihood, in any alternative system other than traditional social groups. They remain both vulnerable and undervalued populations and, in times of war, they are often treated as expendable or exploitable populations, both by government authorities and rebel challengers. The voices of marginalized populations remain silenced when politics are debated or peace is negotiated. Very often during wars, marginalized civilian populations are neither provided basic services nor protected from assaults or confiscation by the armed forces or criminal elements. Even the most essential services may be neglected, destroyed, or consciously withdrawn. During times of war, their main form of protection is to abandon their land and livelihood and flee. They become the wards of foreign states, catered by NGOs, and, sometimes, protected by international organizations. Far more people die in African wars as a result of disruptions in essential production, exchanges, and health services and at the hands of armed marauders than die “honorably” on the battlefields. Small wars tend to create enormous humanitarian disasters.

How do wars persist under conditions of poverty and the systematic victimization of marginalized populations? Without an economically viable and defensible support base, the attrition of warfare should work to end wars rather quickly or, at least, reduce them to a sustainably low level of activity. The second most important factor in explaining the anomaly of large wars in poor societies is **external involvement**. Whereas, local populations have little stake in the outcomes of national politics and national politics has little stake in local populations, foreign actors may feel they have high stakes in the outcomes of local competition and control of commodity production. War efforts in Africa are largely sustained through external exchange and supply with foreign agents, whether through direct military assistance, informal trade in small arms and contraband, or formal exchange of raw materials for security goods. During the Cold War period, the “superpower rivalry” largely accounts for the protractedness of wars, as well as their escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, large wars have almost disappeared from Africa. Yet, large populations remain vulnerable and large groups continue to be “armed and dangerous”; the legacies of war carry the plague of personal violence and organized crime. This is the cultural foundation of the modern, African state: a culture of violence and marginalization. And this is the climate in which democracy is expected to blossom and endure.

**Drivers of Conflict and Instability in Africa.** In order to better understand the related problems of conflict and instability in African states, we must first examine the process of state formation. As mentioned above, transitions from European colonial to local administration were successful in establishing a stable state system in only fifteen of thirty-eight colonial territories. Two states that emerged more recently from control by other African states, Namibia from South Africa in 1990 and Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, also successfully established stable states. Eight African countries gained self-rule following wars of independence; of these, four wars ended with independence (Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Namibia) and four independence wars transformed to civil wars (Algeria, Angola, Kenya, and Mozambique). France and Great Britain were the main colonial powers in Africa and these two powers administered their respective colonial territories in different ways. The British were far more likely to foster open, electoral systems of governance in their territories, going so far as to establish "self-governing" territories in selected cases, whereas the French were more likely to establish autocratic administrations. In all, eight former-British territories were ruled by democratic regimes at the date of independence but, of these, only two democratic systems survived for more than seven years: Botswana and The Gambia (The Gambia fell to autocratic rule in 1994). Two former-British colonies succeeded in establishing stable, autocratic regimes: Malawi and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). In all, four (of fourteen) former-British colonies established stable states upon gaining independence (Cameroon may be counted as a fifth, as it emerged as a union of British and French territories). The French territories favored autocratic (11) or restricted anocratic regimes (7) at independence and these fared somewhat better than the former-British territories in establishing stable systems of governance: ten of eighteen (eleven if one includes Cameroon). Five of these stable states, however, later lapsed into instability, whereas only one of the five, former-British, stable states lapsed into instability. Former-British colonies were somewhat more likely than the French to have established democratic or partly democratic systems by the end of 2004: ten of fifteen compared to nine of eighteen (Cameroon is partly autocratic). No significant differences, other than the differences in forms of government described above, that can be attributed to colonial heritage have been identified in extensive data analyses of instability in Africa.

Political instability in African states has resulted from two, quite distinct social conflict scenarios: instability associated with the original formation of self-governance and instability in established governmental structures. In order to better understand the roots of instability in newly independent African countries, that is, *state formation instability*, a binary logistic regression analysis was conducted. Two factors were identified by the analysis that distinguish the seventeen stable from twenty-three unstable states:

- **Political Factionalism**, distinct political and/or social identity groups polarize and promote incompatible or uncompromising political platforms prioritizing parochial interests and creating a contentious atmosphere in which negotiated solutions to policy differences are difficult to achieve; political deadlock, coercive practices, and inequitable policy outcomes are common under such circumstances (in more democratic systems), and



- **Elite Ethnicity, or Ethnic Group Capture of the State**, ethnicity is politically salient among ruling elites and members of the ruling ethnic group(s) are strongly favored in the distribution of political positions and, especially, in command positions in the military, often including restrictions on political access and activities of other constituent ethnic groups (in more autocratic systems).<sup>18</sup>

These two factors alone correctly distinguish eighty percent of the cases. In short, new states had great difficulty in establishing social bases of support for central authority and managing contention among competing, politicized social groups over control of the political agenda and public policies. Local or parochial interests, including identification with and loyalty to traditional social systems, tended to outweigh common interests and overpower the central state's nascent conflict management capabilities. Stabilization was most often accomplished through autocratic force rather than broad-based coalitions and negotiated accords among competing groups. Countries almost invariably emerged from periods of state formation instability with strongly, autocratic governments of one type or another; the only exceptions are Chad, which only established reasonable stability in 1995, and Mozambique, which ended its long civil war and established a stable system in 1993; these two countries emerged with anocratic regimes. As mentioned, three countries have not yet managed to establish a reasonably stable state system: Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda; a fourth country, Angola, appears to be entering a period of stability with the end of its civil war against UNITA rebels in 2002 and its effective repression of Cabindan separatists.

Further tests were conducted in order to gain greater understanding of the dynamics of state formation. Stable state formation tended to occur in countries with smaller, non-mobilized and non-politicized populations at the time of independence. Unstable states tended to have large, diverse, and urbanized populations, lending further credence to the difficulties of manageability and group integration in larger, more complex social systems. Factors that correlate strongly with measures of the intensity and duration of state formation instability include ethno-linguistic fractionalization, large populations, large urbanized populations, and regional insecurity (armed conflicts in neighbouring countries). In addition, higher energy imports and energy consumption, indicating a more modernized economic sector, correlated with greater intensity of state formation instability.

In brief, problems of system manageability and contending social identities presented enormous challenges to efforts by indigenous, modernizing political elites in establishing and administering a modern state structure in newly independent African states. These challenges were substantially muted in countries where large segments of the population were not politically mobilized. Lack of politicization and mobilization continue to characterize political dynamics in many African countries and these are strongly associated with issues of marginalization and other impediments to

<sup>18</sup> "Political factionalism" and "elite ethnicity" are very closely related problems in newly independent states where political parties and professional associations are weak or absent and local patronage or ethnic affiliations are the main bases of support for political action. The two problems diverge as political opportunities and social networks diversify and institutions are established. As measures of political interaction, "factionalism" can only occur where there is open (democratic) competition; factionalism is repressed under autocratic rule. On the other hand, elite ethnicity is most likely to occur when leaders rely on ethnic group loyalties for support in establishing and maintaining (autocratic) control of the state; securing loyalty and support often requires leaders to favor their ethnic group and exclude rival groups, especially, in regard to the military.

progressive social integration and societal development, that is, the progressive development of a civil society. The most serious impact of marginalization for conventional political processes is its attendant lack of collective pressure for accountability in ruling elites and transparency in political processes. Corruption and coercion tend to thrive in such an environment. It appears that differences in state formation experiences have not, by themselves, affected the likelihood of a state falling into a period of post-formation instability. Evidence does show that subsequent lapses back into periods of instability were much more likely to involve outbreaks of armed conflict than initial lapses into instability.

In order to gain better understanding of *post-formation instability* in African states, a second series of models were developed to distinguish between conditions characterizing periods of stability from conditions associated with periods of political instability, particularly the onset of instability. After demarcating periods of instability for all countries in Africa (see Annex 3), the two years just prior to the year of onset of instability were tagged as the target set. Five year periods just prior to the target set years were designated as leading years and the five years immediately following the end of a period of instability were designated as recovery years. Stability years were thus defined as all years more than five years after the end of a period of instability (including wars for independence) and more than seven years prior to the onset of a period of instability. Bivariate correlations were run on various instability measures using over one thousand possible explanatory variables to verify known correlates of conflict and instability (identified in theoretical literature and research findings) and to identify new candidate variables.<sup>19</sup> Patterns of association emerged from initial tests and promising variables were used in the development of regression models. Binary logistic regression models were developed to distinguish between the stability/pre-instability dichotomy and multiple regression models were developed to test ordered progressions in affective conditions for various system phases: stability, leading years to instability, years immediately preceding instability, years of instability, and recovery years. The indicators used in the final version of the model were selected because they are well-grounded in conflict theory and prior research and remained robust across various formulations of the dependent variable, different methodologies, and model designs. The research modeling provides the basis for the Africa Instability Ledger (Annex 6).<sup>20</sup> Key factors identified with the onset of post-formation instability include the following:

- **Dependency**, governments that are overly dependent on foreign aid and foreign trade for operating revenues (foreign aid as a percent of gross capital formation; foreign aid per capita; trade openness; high export duties, low government revenues, low investment);
- **Polarization**, societies that have politicized and mobilized social identity constituencies through inequitable use of public policies, particularly in regard to ethnic differences (official policies of political discrimination or repression of constituent ethnic groups; ethnic group capture of the state; political factionalism);

<sup>19</sup> The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) global database was used for the tests (version 15v1; data covers all countries over the period 1955-2002). The PITF global, annual time-series database has been compiled and developed by the Task Force since 1994; it integrates data from all major data sources that have reasonably broad country and temporal coverage.

<sup>20</sup> For more detailed explanation of the instability models, see chapter 7 and Appendix 4 in *Peace and Conflict 2005*.

- **Unmanageability**, countries that must manage large territories, particularly those with substantial forested regions; concentrated, high density, populations; or contentious social divisions institutionalized during conflicts over the original terms of state formation (state formation instability; high population density; large land area; high percentage of forest cover);
- **Leadership Succession**, states where the political process is overly dependent on key personalities are highly susceptible to succession struggles, leading to instability (top ranking political leader in power for twenty years or more);
- **Neighbourhood Effects**, weak states not only have trouble managing internal political dynamics, they are highly vulnerable to negative external influences from repressive or unstable neighbouring countries (less democratic neighbours; societal war in at least one neighbouring country); and
- **Islamic Countries** (countries with Muslim populations comprising forty or more percent of the country's population), only one-third of Islamic countries in Africa experienced state formation instability but seventy percent have experienced post-formation instability; on the other hand, sixty-four percent of non-Islamic countries experienced state formation instability with only one-third experiencing post-formation instability.<sup>21</sup>

**Peace-Building Capacity.** Another important consideration in assessing the risks of future armed conflict and political instability is a country's "peace-building capacity," that is, its established and institutionalized capabilities that enable the state to perform its crucial conflict management function when faced with serious and contentious societal challenges or crises. The *Peace and Conflict Ledger* published biennially in the Peace and Conflict report series rates the African countries according to their scores on seven indicators of capacity for peace-building in early 2005. It rates a country's peace-building capacity high insofar as it has managed to:

- avoid outbreaks of **armed conflicts** while providing
- reasonable levels of **human security**,
- shows no active policies of political or economic **discrimination** against minorities,
- successfully managed movements for **self-determination**,
- maintained stable and durable (democratic) **governance** institutions,

<sup>21</sup> Seventeen countries are denoted as "Islamic countries" in the study. The source is the PITF data on religious groups compiled by Mark Woodward, Arizona State University (see fn16). According to the PITF data, eleven countries had Muslim confessional group populations with greater than 50% of the total population in the most recent year coded (2000); these countries are Chad, Comoros, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan. In addition, six countries had Muslim group populations greater than 40% but less than a majority in 2000; these countries are Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The post-Cold War increase in political instability in Islamic countries is not specific to African countries; increased instability has also been observed in non-African Islamic countries.

## African Regional Trends in Warfare and Political Instability

- attained substantial **human and material resources**, and is
- free of serious **threats from its neighbouring countries**.

Countries are evaluated and placed into three ordered categories of peace-building capacity: red, yellow, and green. Red-flagged countries are considered to be at the greatest risk of neglecting or mismanaging emerging societal crises such that these conflicts escalate to serious violence and/or government instability; green-flagged countries enjoy the strongest prospects for successful management of new challenges. Annex 7 lists peace-building ratings for each of the forty-three African countries. These rankings do not necessarily indicate impending risks of armed conflict or instability in the red or yellow flagged states, only that these states are vulnerable to such challenges. The Ledger is designed to complement “early warning” or “risk” models such as the instability models discussed above. Actual risk factors for individual states must be informed by current situations and qualities of societal conflict dynamics at any particular point in time

African countries have generally low capacity for conflict management and continue to face serious and complex challenges to peace and stability in 2005. However, important progress has been made in increasing regional capacity and there are important differences within the region. In the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, there are seventeen red-flagged countries (down from twenty-five in the 2003 Ledger) and nineteen yellow-flagged countries (there were thirteen listed in 2003). These vulnerable countries are contrasted with only eight green-flagged countries (Benin, Botswana, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe). Almost every country across the broad middle belt of Africa—from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, and from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south—has a volatile mix of poor human security, unstable and inequitable political institutions, limited resources, and, inevitably, a “bad neighbourhood” of similar crisis-ridden states. Further complicating prospects for stabilization in the African crisis zone are some of the more pervasive consequences of long-term poverty and warfare: deteriorating sanitation and health and, especially, the related AIDS pandemic; widespread and recurring famine; and large numbers of refugee, displaced, and otherwise marginalized populations.

**Model Application: The Case of Darfur in Sudan.** The most important element in analyzing the onset of armed conflict in poor and underdeveloped countries is the recognition that military action, while ostensibly hierarchical in organizational structure, reflects the general organizational capacities of the society as a whole. Issues of command, discipline, and loyalty are best viewed at the local level and coordination across localities is largely a fiction of unreasonable expectations. Societal wars are not, in most cases, “launched” by respected leaders in the rational pursuit of identified political goals; they erupt rather chaotically from a general deterioration in local economic, social, and security environments. Violence becomes the currency by which societal transactions are conducted. The precursors of serious armed conflicts can be found in the qualities of general and more specific local conditions.

The models of conflict drivers in Africa and general peace-building capacities presented above have painted a fairly bleak picture of the prospects for conflict management and mitigation in Sudan. Sudan was flagged “red” on each of three essential qualities: peace-building capacity, actual instability, and predicted instability prior to the onset of serious armed conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan in early 2003. In the general terms of the models, the likelihood of serious challenges to central authority in Sudan was high, the capacity of the central government to manage emerging conflicts was very low, and the society was already organized on a war footing with the protracted armed conflict in southern Sudan exacting an enormous toll on the societal system since 1983. The ongoing war in the south both diverted resources from regional development, obscured local dynamics, and distracted attention from the deteriorating conditions and rising tensions in the west.

The models point to several, specific systemic weaknesses and conditions that help to explain the rising probability of serious armed conflict in the Darfur region and the government’s failure to prevent the onset of organized and sustained violence or dampen escalation of the violence. Sudan is the largest country in Africa and comprises three major social identities: Arab Muslim, non-Arab Muslim, and non-Arab non-Muslim. Although Sudan began modern statehood with a democratic government in 1954, politics were riven with factionalism and a military coup ended the democratic experiment shortly thereafter, in 1958. Two subsequent attempts to democratize were similarly riven by factionalism and fell to military coups within five years (in 1969 and 1989). Sudan has experienced, in all, three adverse regime changes and twenty-five coup events during its fifty years of statehood, more than any other state in Africa. The government has been dominated by the Arab Muslim group and has instituted policies of discrimination against non-Arab groups. Prior to the recent power-sharing peace agreement with the non-Arab separatists in the south in early 2005, Sudan had no history of accommodation with self-determination movements. Human security has been very poor and societal (resource) capacity has been very limited, although recent discoveries of oil have altered that basic limitation by increasing government revenues, lending it institutional stability that is largely independent from bases of popular support. This artificial institutional stability is further augmented by al-Bashir’s consolidation of instrumental (autocratic) authority. Sudan is situated in a “bad neighbourhood” characterized by intense and protracted armed conflicts, autocratic governments, and very large forcibly dislocated populations.

The region comprising North, South, and West Darfur in western Sudan has been the site of deteriorating local conditions since, at least, the mid-1980s. The region hosted a very large refugee population (mainly from Chad) in the 1980s and large internally displaced populations (from the south) beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the 1990s. The western area was a refuge and staging area for rebel fighters from neighbouring Chad until Déby-led forces succeeded in toppling the Habré regime in Chad in 1990. Arab Muslim group militias in Darfur were formed and armed by the Sudan government in the 1980s for use as an auxiliary defense force to help contain and control southern rebel force movements in the area. Existing tensions between non-Arab agriculturalists and Arab pastoralist groups were further exacerbated by the influxes of dislocated and vulnerable peoples and the general impunity granted to the Arab militias. The first report of serious fighting in the Darfur region was in May 1985; this situation led to an emergency meeting of the Sudan National Defence Council. A massacre of up to a thousand non-Arab Dinkas was reported in March 1987. Weapons flowed into the region across borders with Chad and Central African Republic. General lawlessness and armed banditry by both Arab and non-Arab militias prevailed in the region

through the 1990s, until an outbreak of heavy fighting in July 1998 led to the imposition of a State of Emergency that has continued through the present. The violence in Darfur escalated dramatically in early 2003.

**Some Observations on Instability, and Systemic Development, in Africa.** In reviewing the contemporary trends in political violence and instability in Africa, the first consideration must be of the enormous human and material losses, costs, and consequences of such widespread and persistent turmoil. African states have been and remain generally poor, underdeveloped, and overly dependent on export trade in primary commodities with OECD countries. Evidence suggests that, during the Cold War period, countries that continued to concentrate export trade with one country, usually the former-colonial power, enjoyed a lesser risk of instability. This may be explained by the foreign power's vested interest in supporting stability in their client state. On the other hand, countries that had substantial trade with one of the superpowers had relatively high incidence and intensity of instability, suggesting that the strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union may have exacerbated, or at least capitalized on, conflict dynamics in developing states in Africa. Supply of armaments to client states surely helps to explain the intensity and longevity of many of these conflicts. The increasing globalization of trade becomes evident in Africa during the 1980s as diversification of trading partners becomes increasingly common. Globalization adds powerful, new dynamics to politics in weak African states that are not fully understood but almost entirely unregulated.

What can be said is that, since 1990, per capita incomes have fallen substantially in one-third of African countries and remained stagnant in another one-quarter. Of those that have made gains, the majority has experienced little or no civil warfare since independence. Four others that have made gains, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Uganda, emerged from devastating civil wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s and their economies are better considered to be rebounding rather than expanding (the first three remain among the poorest countries in Africa). Sudan stands as an anomaly as it has managed to wage deadly wars through the 1990s and still increase its income, mainly due to the recent discovery of oil.<sup>22</sup> What seems clear is that, in countries that are heavily dependent on primary commodity trade, entrepreneurial incentives to gain and maintain control of the state are extremely powerful. Established, well-organized, social identity groups enjoy crucial advantages in the competition to gain control of the state and gaining control of the state may enable these groups to increase their advantages over contending groups. This, of course, assumes that acquired capital gains are re-invested in local enterprises and not transferred out of the country. Only as the foundation of the economy moves from primary commodities to commercial enterprises would co-optation of a rising commercial class and the formation of a broader-based support coalition among political elites be necessary. Given the general weakness of the commercial sector and civil society in many African countries, the recent shift toward the democratization of central government will be difficult to sustain.

<sup>22</sup> The greatest gain has been in Equatorial Guinea, where the discovery of oil has increased per capita income by over 700% since 1990. The autocratic regime in this country has a long history of severe repression of oppositional groups.

In the absence of the conflict mitigating effects of a broad-based, proactive civil society with substantial stakes and personal interests in maintaining the system, elite rivalry, outgroup resistance, and entrepreneurial violence can be expected to further complicate the inherent problems of manageability in African societies. Under these circumstances, it can be expected that both deprivational and aspirational grievances among marginalized populations and disadvantaged outgroups would be similarly intense counterparts to the elite struggle for control of the state in defining the character and quality of political dynamics in the societal development process. As such, both "greed" and "grievance" should be expected to provide strong motivations to challenge and change the status quo, or, in the worst case, to simply undo it.<sup>23</sup> The probability of instability under these conditions is high and the actual occurrence of instability events, then, depends largely on circumstantial opportunities.<sup>24</sup> Things can fall apart very quickly in weak countries and, once they have fallen apart, it can be extremely difficult to put things back together. In particular, evidence suggests that capital and investment flows shift significantly away from countries in the years immediately preceding their lapse into instability and this shift may further increase system destabilization and undercut the potential for managing the crisis and for post-crisis recovery. Needless to say, countries experiencing instability do not attract favorable capital and investment flows, making stability even more difficult to regain.

Yet, given the propensity for instability in African states, the substantial decreases in armed conflict, autocratic regimes, and political instability charted since 1991 are encouraging. Ideologies of political confrontation and struggle that dominated Cold War politics have given way to the rhetoric of engagement and accommodation. The numbers of humanitarian and other non-governmental organizations have increased thirty-fold. Important gains have been made but the continuation and consolidation of those gains remains in jeopardy. Wars may end but the complex consequences and legacies of war will continue to resonate for many years to come. Research provides strong evidence that political instability in African states, and particularly serious and protracted armed conflicts, create long-term impediments and complex challenges to societal development processes. While the majority of countries in Africa enjoy more open political processes since the 1990s, many others remain deeply-divided societies with failed or failing states and limited alternatives for transforming divergent images of the past and present to convergent images of the future. The most invidious consequences of past wars and instability are the abundance of unemployed fighters, the proliferation of weapons, and unregulated markets. Organized crime thrives under such conditions.

Proactive international engagement, particularly by governments, is and will remain crucial over the medium term (ten to twenty-five years) in helping countries to manage social tensions and stimulate the development of self-regulating civil societies. While non-governmental organizations may be able to respond to situations more quickly than government agencies and may enjoy greater access and flexibility, they lack the capacity to provide the broad structural support necessary in overcoming

<sup>23</sup> The "greed" versus "grievance" debate concerning alternative motivations driving civil wars in developing countries is most closely associated with Paul Collier's work at the World Bank; see Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56.4 (2004): 563-595.

<sup>24</sup> These findings and claims are largely consistent with those presented in Fearon and Laitin's recent study of civil wars, in which they argue that "The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war...the conditions that favor insurgency. These include poverty, political [regime] instability, rough terrain, and large populations." James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, 97.1: 75-90.

local conflict dynamics and development shortfalls; their efforts are also more greatly hampered by coordination and security problems. A focus on humanitarian assistance, conflict mediation, and security guarantees in the short term should give way to an emphasis on transparency and accountability guarantees over the longer term. Corruption is generally recognized as one of the most serious impediments to the development of civil society. Whereas petty corruption is a general nuisance that requires the complicity of state authority, grand corruption is, perhaps, the greatest threat to security and development in Africa and this plague requires mobility, liquidity, and a sophisticated network of global accomplices. In the new world order, corruption and insecurity are transnational issues that require multilateral solutions. Compensating for in-country security and accountability deficits can best, and may only, be accomplished through regulatory procedures instituted and administered by the larger, established, global and regional legal systems. Transparency is the key to a self-regulating society and investments in communication technologies are as critical in the era of democratization and globalization as electrification has been to the era of industrialization.

Our evidence suggests that political instability in African countries is strongly, negatively correlated with general issues of human security; provision of education, health, and basic social services; investments in commercial infrastructure; and expansion of modern, communications and information technologies. This is the essence of a conflict-poverty trap. If the new democracies of Africa are going to foster these freedoms and tap human potential to lead the way out of the current cycle of poverty and violence, voice and visibility will have to improve until responsiveness by African governments becomes routine. Citizens must feel they have a stake in the system and that they share a common cause in a promising future, not only in regard to competing interests and constituencies within their society but with the world around them.



# Major Episodes of Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1946-2004

The following table lists 88 episodes of armed conflict that comprise a comprehensive accounting of all forms of major armed conflicts in the world over the contemporary period: 1946-2004. "Major armed conflicts" are defined as episodes of organized and sustained, collective violence during the course of which there occur at least 500 direct, battle-related deaths at a rate in excess of 100 deaths per annum. Episodes listed include, **wars of independence, interstate warfare, civil warfare, and political mass murder**, (all of which involve direct action by state authorities) and **inter-communal violence** (in which the state is not directly involved). Cases **highlighted in red** were ongoing and serious in mid-2005; cases **highlighted in yellow** were ongoing but fighting had diminished and/or was occurring at a low intensity in early 2005 and may be ending. All episodes that are denoted as having ended within the past three years (i.e., since January 2002; cases **highlighted in gray**) are considered at high risk of return to warfare. The variables listed in the table are as follows:

**Inclusive years (Begin and End):** The beginnings and endings of most political violence episodes are difficult to determine exactly; various researchers denote various dates. The "begin" and "end" years listed for each episode (below) are those considered by the author to be those most likely to capture the transformative moments (beginning and ending) of the episodes, according to a comparison of the varying claims of the sources noted. No "end" year is listed for episodes that began and ended in the same year.

**Episode type (Type):** Episode type is listed according to two character codes. The first character denotes either a (C)ivil-intrastate involving rival political groups; (E)thnic-intrastate involving the state agent and a distinct ethnic group; or (I)nternational event-interstate, usually two or more states, but may denote a distinct polity resisting foreign domination (colonialism). The second character connotes either an episode of (V)iolence-the use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals; (W)ar-violence between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral result to the contention; or i(N)dependence-an attempt to forcibly remove an existing foreign domination.

**Magnitude of societal-systemic impact (Mag):** The rationale and methodology for assessing the societal and systemic impact of warfare episodes is discussed and described in detail in the accompanying text. The number listed represents a scaled indicator of the destructive impact, or magnitude, of the violent episode on the directly-affected society or societies on a scale of 1 (smallest) to 10 (greatest). Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. Scores are considered to be consistently assigned (i.e., comparable) across episode types and for all states directly involved. For a more detailed explanation of the coding scheme used, see Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Impact of War," chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

**Episode location (States Directly Involved):** Countries listed are only those upon whose territory the political violence episode actually takes place, that is, those state-societies directly affected by the warfare. Countries intervening in the episodes are not listed as the violence does not take place on their territory and, so, these intervening actors are considered to be indirectly, or remotely, affected by the violence.

**Estimates of “directly-related” deaths (Deaths, Battle Deaths, and High Estimate):**

Accountings of the number of deaths resulting directly from an episode of political violence are difficult to determine and estimates often vary widely. This difficulty is especially problematic as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is especially obscure in the less formal civil conflict interactions in poorer and/or less institutionalized societal systems that predominate in the Africa region. Such estimates of “direct battle-related deaths” should be regarded simply as estimates of the general magnitude of the violence. The numbers listed here reflect the most common estimates and are based on often widely disparate estimates listed in the various sources and are provided solely as referent points. Casualties among non-combatants directly related to the violent conflict are inconsistently estimated (if at all) in the various source estimates. Far more problematic than “battle-related deaths” for societal systems are the much larger numbers of survivors directly and indirectly, physically and psychologically, scarred and disturbed by violence and the massive disruptions and dislocations that occur during episodes of armed conflict. Up to three estimates are provided for each episode. The first estimate, **Deaths**, is a general estimate of the number of persons whose deaths are directly-caused by armed conflict, including both combatants and non-combatants. The second, **Battle-Deaths**, is an estimate of combatant deaths recently compiled by the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); see, Lucinda and Gleditsch 2005 (cited below, item p). The third column provides a **High Estimate** of deaths attributable to the war, including both direct deaths and deaths brought about through war-related deterioration of living conditions and intentional or unintentional disruptions in essential social services or food supply.

**Information sources (References):** There is no general agreement among scholars as to what constitutes a major episode of armed conflict. The following sources were consulted in the compilation of the list of episodes:

- a. Ruth Leger Sivard. 1996. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*. 16th ed. Washington, DC: World Priorities. Criteria: “...armed conflict involving one or more governments and causing the death of 1,000 or more people per year.”
- b. Patrick Brogan. 1989. *World Conflicts: Why and Where They are Happening*. London: Bloomsbury. Criteria: “...includes all the major wars and insurrections since 1945, but leaves out many lesser insurrections and riots, many of which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people.”
- c. Melvin Small and J. David Singer. 1982. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills: Sage. Criteria: Interstate wars during which the total “battle-connected fatalities among military personnel” for all participants was at least 1000 per year; extra-systemic wars during which battle deaths exceeded the 1000 per year threshold for the system-member; civil wars which resulted in at least 1000 deaths per year including both civilian and military personnel.

- d. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 1968-1993. *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook*. Annual series. Stockholm: SIPRI. Criteria: Major armed conflicts, defined as "prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments or of one government and at least one organized armed group, involving the use of weapons and incurring battle-related deaths of at least 1000 persons."
  
- e. Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945." *International Studies Quarterly* 32: 359-371. Criteria: Cases of "massive state repression" which are "sustained episodes in which the state or its agents impose on a communal or political group 'conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.'" Updated in chapter 8 of *Peace and Conflict* 2005.
  
- f. G. D. Kaye, D. A. Grant, and E. J. Emond. 1985. *Major Armed Conflict: A Compendium of Interstate and Intrastate Conflict, 1720 to 1985*. Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defense. Criteria: "In a general sense, the conflict modes involve two or more groups (nations and/or actors) in which the use of force was a significant factor in the event. This includes both internal and international events. At least one nation is involved in every conflict listed."
  
- g. Herbert K. Tillema. 1991. *International Armed Conflict Since 1945: A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions*. Boulder: Westview Press. Criteria: "An international armed conflict is operationally defined to include all directly related foreign overt military interventions undertaken by one or more states within one or more foreign political territories....Onset of the first directly related foreign overt military intervention and cessation of the last intervention are taken as the beginning and the end of an international armed conflict."
  
- h. J. David Singer and Melvin Small. 1993. *The Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1997*. Computer file. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Criteria: See source reference number 3 above, except that the criteria for "Extra-systemic" wars has been changed from "1000 annual average battle deaths per year" to "1000 battle deaths total for all participating interstate system members and the troop commitment criterion." Updated through 1997 by the Correlates of War Project.
  
- i. List of International and Civil Wars Excluded (1980-1988). Personal correspondence with Ricardo R. Rodriguiz, Data Management Assistant, Correlates of War Project, dated May 25, 1993. Criteria: Recognized in the literature as an episode of "armed conflict" but fail to meet minimum criteria for definition as one of the three COW categories.
  
- j. Ted Robert Gurr. 2002. "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly* 38: 347-377. Criteria: Serious ethnopolitical conflicts involving armed violence and resulting in large numbers of casualties and dislocated populations. Updated in Ted Robert Gurr, 2000, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- k. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Thomas M. Parris, John C. Ulfelder, Mark Woodward, and Michael Lustik. Forthcoming 2005. *Political Instability Task Force Report: Phase IV Findings*. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The Political Instability Task Force "Problem Set" is available from the State Failure Web site: [www.globalpolicy.gmu.edu/stfail](http://www.globalpolicy.gmu.edu/stfail). Criteria: The State Failure Problem Set includes four types of events: Ethnic Wars, Revolutionary Wars, Geno/Politicides, and Abrupt or Disruptive Regime Transitions. Only the first three types of events meet the general criteria to be considered a major armed conflict for cross-referencing here. Ethnic Wars are "episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status." Revolutionary Wars are "episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region." Geno/politicide is "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents-or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities-that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal and/or politicized communal group." Episodes of Geno/Politicide must have lasted six months or more to be included. Revolutionary and Ethnic Wars are included if they pass a minimum threshold wherein each party must mobilize 1000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops) and average 100 or more fatalities per year during the episode. The PITF Problem Set is updated bi-monthly by the author of this report.
- l. Correlates of War. 1994. *Militarized Interstate Disputes*. Computer File. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Criteria: Fatality category 5 and 6 cases were chosen for cross-referencing; category 5 includes disputes where fatalities range from 501 to 999 (1 case) and category 6 includes disputes with over 999 fatalities (24 cases).
- m. Patrick M. Regan. 1996. "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40: 336-359. Criteria: Regan defines episodes of intrastate conflict as "armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities." Appendix lists only the 85 conflicts that had at least one intervention (of 138 total), only three of the conflicts listed fall below the standard 1000 fatalities threshold.
- n. The PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, 1946-2003. Version 3.0, released 7 December 2004. Center for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. <http://www.prio.no> Criteria: includes three types of events: minor armed conflict, intermediate armed conflict, and war. Only the latter two types meet the general criteria for inclusion here. Intermediate armed conflicts have "more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year." Wars have "more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during any given year."
- o. Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIK). COSIMO 1.3 database, 1945-1999. University of Heidelberg, Germany. <http://www.hiik.de>

- p. Bethany Lucinda and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* (forthcoming 2005).
- q. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr. 2005. *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

Begin	End	Type	Mag	States Directly Involved	Brief Description	Deaths	Battle Deaths	High Estimate
1947	1948	IN	4	Madagascar	Rebellion; colonial repression	40000	7000	80000
1952	1963	IN	3	Kenya	Independence (Mau Mau rebellion)	20000	13000	
1955	1960	IN	3	Cameroon	Independence	30000	4300	
1956	1972	EW	5	Sudan	Ethnic warfare (Islamic v African)	500000	20000	600000
1957	1958	IV	1	Mauritania Morocco	International violence (border dispute)	1000		
1959	1964	EW	3	Rwanda	PARMEHUTU overthrow of Tutsi Monarchy; repression of Tutsis	75000	14000	
1960	1965	CW	4	Zaire	Katanga/civil war	100000	31000	
1961	1975	IN	4	Angola	Independence	50000	79000	90000
1962	1964	IV	1	Burundi Rwanda	International violence	1500		
1962	1973	EV	1	Ethiopia	Eritreans	2000		
1962	1974	IN	3	Guinea-Bissau	Independence	15000	7200	
1963	1964	IV	1	Somalia Egypt	International violence	1000		
1964	*	CV	1	Zambia	Civil violence	1000		
1964	*	CV	1	Tanzania	Zanzibar/civil violence	4000		
1964	*	IV	1	Ethiopia Somalia	Ogaden clashes	2000	700	
1964	1966	EV	1	Kenya	Somali separatism	1000		
1965	*	EV	2	Burundi	Ethnic violence (failed coup; Hutu/Tutsi)	5000		
1965	1975	IN	3	Mozambique	Independence (FRELIMO)	30000	36750	60000
1965	1990	IN	2	Namibia	Independence	25000	25000	40000
1965	1994	CW	4	Chad	Civil war	75000	43000	
1966	*	CW	3	Nigeria	Repression of Ibo	20000		30000
1966	*	EV	1	Uganda	Ethnic violence (Buganda)	2000		
1966	1970	EW	6	Nigeria	Ethnic warfare (Biafra separatism)	500000	75000	2000000
1967	*	CV	1	Zaire	Civil violence	800	800	
1969	1979	CV	4	Equatorial Guinea	Repression of dissidents; coup	50000		
1971	1978	EW	5	Uganda	Ethnic warfare (Idi Amin regime)	250000		500000

## Annex 1a Major Episodes of Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1946-2004

Begin	End	Type	Mag	States Directly Involved	Brief Description	Deaths	Battle Deaths	High Estimate
1972	*	EV	2	Burundi	Ethnic violence (Hutus target Tutsis)	2000		
1972	1973	EW	4	Burundi	Repression of Hutus	100000		200000
1972	1979	EV	3	Zimbabwe	Ethnic violence (ZANU/ZAPU v Whites)	20000	27000	
1974	1991	EW	6	Ethiopia	Ethnic warfare (Eritrea, Tigray, and others)	750000	218000	2000000
1975	1979	IV	1	Mozambique Zimbabwe	International violence	1500		
1975	1989	CW	3	Mauritania (1979) Morocco	Colonial war (Western Sahara) <sup>3</sup>	15000		
1975	2002	CW	6	Angola	Civil war (UNITA)	1000000	160500	1500000
1975	2004+	CV	1	Angola	Civil violence (Cabinda separatists; FLEC)	3500	815	
1976	*	CV	1	Sudan	Coup attempt	1000		
1976	*	EV	1	South Africa	Ethnic violence	1000		
1977	*	IV	1	Angola Zaire	International violence (dispute over Shaba)	1000		
1977	1979	EW	2	Ethiopia	"Ogaden War" ethnic violence (Somalis)	10000	38000	
1977	1983	CW	2	Zaire	Shaba separatism, rebellions; repression of dissidents	10000		
1978	*	CV	1	Somalia	Military faction	500		
1978	*	IV	1	Angola Zaire	International violence (dispute over Shaba)	1000		
1978	1979	IW	2	Tanzania Uganda	International war (ouster of Idi Amin)	3000	4000	
1980	1985	EV	2	Nigeria	Ethnic violence (Islamic groups)	9000		
1981	*	CV	1	Gambia	Coup attempt	650	650	800
1981	*	CV	1	Ghana	Civil violence (Konkomba v Nanumba)	1000		
1981	1986	CW	4	Uganda	Repression of dissidents	100000	108000	500000
1981	1987	EV	1	Zimbabwe	Ethnic violence (Ndebele)	3000		
1981	1992	CW	6	Mozambique	Civil war (RENAMO)	500000	145000	1000000
1983	1996	EW	3	South Africa	Ethnic/civil warfare	20000	4000	27000
1983	2002	EW	6	Sudan	Ethnic war (Islamic v African)	1000000	55500	2300000
1984	*	CV	1	Cameroon	Coup attempt	750	500	
1984	*	EV	1	Zaire	Ethnic/civil warfare	1000		
1985	*	CW	2	Liberia	Repression of dissidents (failed coup)	5000		
1986	1993	EV	2	Nigeria	Communal violence (Muslim-Christian)	10000		
1986	2004+	EV	2	Uganda	Ethnic violence (Langi and Acholi); LRA	12000	4600	

Begin	End	Type	Mag	States Directly Involved	Brief Description	Deaths	Battle Deaths	High Estimate
1988	*	EV	3	Burundi	Ethnic violence (Tutsis against Hutus)	10000		50000
1988	2004+	CW	5	Somalia	Civil war	100000	66000	350000
1989	1990	IV	1	Mauritania Senegal	International violence	500		
1990	1994	EW	3	Rwanda	Ethnic warfare (Tutsis v Hutu regime) <sup>6</sup>	15000	5500	
1990	1995	EV	1	Mali	Ethnic violence (Tuareg)	1000	200	2000
1990	1997	CW	4	Liberia	Civil war	40000	23500	200000
1990	1997	EV	1	Niger	Ethnic violence (Azawad and Toubou)	1000	500	1500
1991	*	CV	1	Burundi	Civil violence	1000	750	3000
1991	1993	EV	1	Kenya	Ethnic violence (Kalenjin, Masai, Kikuyu, Luo)	2000		
1991	1994	CW	1	Djibouti	FRUD rebellion	1000	400	5000
1991	2001	CW	3	Sierra Leone	Civil-Ethnic warfare (RUF, Mende)	25000	13000	50000
1992	1996	EV	2	Zaire	Ethnic violence	10000		
1992	1999	EV	1	Senegal	Casamance separatism	3000	1600	
1993	*	EV	1	Congo-Brazzaville	Ethnic violence	2000	175	
1993	2004+	EW	4	Burundi	Ethnic warfare (Tutsis against Hutus)	100000	6000	200000
1994	*	EW	7	Rwanda	Ethnic violence (Hutus target Tutsis) <sup>6</sup>	500000		1000000
1994	*	EV	1	Ghana	Ethnic violence	1000		5000
1994	1998	EW	3	Rwanda	Ethnic warfare (Hutus vs Tutsi regime) <sup>6</sup>	15000	4000	200000
1996	2004+	CW	5	Dem. Rep. of Congo (Zaire)	Civil War (ouster of Mobutu & aftermath)	1500000	149000	2500000
1997	1999	CW	3	Congo-Brazzaville	Civil warfare	10000	8500	
1997	2004+	EV	1	Nigeria	Communal violence (Delta province; Ijaw, Itsekeri, and others)	1500		
1998	*	CV	1	Lesotho	Civil violence (May elections)	1000	114	
1998	1999	CW	2	Guinea-Bissau	Coup attempt; civil war	6000	1850	
1998	2000	IW	5	Eritrea Ethiopia	Interstate war	100000	50000	
1999	2000	EW	1	Ethiopia	Oromo separatists	2000	1500	
2000	2001	CV	1	Guinea	Fighting in Parrot's Beak	1000	1100	
2000	2003	CV	1	Liberia	Civil violence (attacks by LURD guerrillas)	1000	750	
2000	2004+	CW	2	Ivory Coast	Civil war (north, south, and west divisions)	3000	600	

## Annex 1a Major Episodes of Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1946-2004

Begin	End	Type	Mag	States Directly Involved	Brief Description	Deaths	Battle Deaths	High Estimate
2001	*	EW	1	Rwanda	Attacks by Hutu rebels	2500		
2001	2003	CV	1	Central African Rep.	Civil violence (attacks by Bozize loyalists; coup)	1000	219	
2001	2004+	EV	3	Nigeria	Ethnic violence (Christian-Muslim; Plateau, Kano regions)	55000		
2002	2003	CV	1	Congo-Brazzaville	Civil violence (Ninja militants in Pool region)	500	116	
2003	2004+	EV	4	Sudan	Communal-separatist violence in Darfur	35000		400000



# Additional Violent Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1946-2004

YRBEG	YREND	TYPE	COUNTRY	NSTATE
1963	1965	interstate	Benin (Niger)	
1987	*	civil	Burkina Faso	Popular Front
1974	1975	interstate	Burkina Faso (Mali)	
1985	1986	interstate	Burkina Faso (Mali)	
1963	1964	interstate	Burundi (Rwanda)	
1996	*	interstate	Cameroon (Nigeria)	
1983	*	interstate	Chad (Nigeria)	
1997	2002	civil	Chad	various rebel forces
1987	*	interstate	Chad (Libya)	Aozou Strip
1989	*	civil	Comoros	Presidential guard
1995	1997	civil	Comoros	Anjouan, Moheli
1999	*	civil	Djibouti	FRUD
1997	2003	civil	Eritrea	Islamic Jihad Movement
1946	1952	civil	Ethiopia	Eritrea
1960	*	civil	Ethiopia	military faction
1960	1961	civil	Ethiopia	Somalis
1989	1991	civil	Ethiopia	Oromo LF
1996	2002	civil	Ethiopia	Ogaden NLF, ARDUF, Islamic Union
1964	*	interstate	Ethiopia (Somalia)	Shifta
1980	*	interstate	Ethiopia (Somalia)	
1964	1965	interstate	Ethiopia (Sudan)	ELF
1977	*	interstate	Ethiopia (Sudan)	
1964	*	civil	Gabon	
1966	*	civil	Ghana	military faction
1983	*	civil	Ghana	military faction
1970	*	civil	Guinea	military faction
2000	2001	civil	Guinea	RFDG
1964	*	civil	Kenya	
1965	1967	civil	Kenya	Shifta
1982	*	civil	Kenya	military faction
1963	1964	interstate	Kenya (Somalia)	
1980	*	civil	Liberia	military faction
1971	*	civil	Madagascar	NMIM
1974	1975	interstate	Mali (Burkina Faso)	
1985	1986	interstate	Mali (Burkina Faso)	

Annex 1b Additional Violent Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1946-2004

YRBEG	YREND	TYPE	COUNTRY	NSTATE
1989	1990	interstate	Mauritania (Senegal)	
1971	*	civil	Namibia	Caprivi
1963	1965	interstate	Niger (Benin)	
1983	*	interstate	Nigeria (Chad)	
1996	*	interstate	Nigeria (Cameroon)	
1963	1964	interstate	Rwanda (Burundi)	
1989	1990	interstate	Senegal (Mauritania)	
1978	*	civil	Somalia	military faction
1981	1987	civil	Somalia	rebel groups
1964	*	interstate	Somalia (Ethiopia)	Shifta
1980	*	interstate	Somalia (Ethiopia)	
1963	1964	interstate	Somalia (Kenya)	
1971	*	civil	Sudan	SCP
1964	1965	interstate	Sudan (Ethiopia)	ELF
1977	*	interstate	Sudan (Ethiopia)	
1992	*	interstate	Sudan (Uganda)	
1953	1955	civil	Sudan (UK)	
1972	*	interstate	Tanzania (Uganda)	
1986	*	civil	Togo	MTD
1991	1994	civil	Togo	regime crisis
1964	*	civil	Uganda	
1996	1997	civil	Uganda	
1992	*	interstate	Uganda (Sudan)	
1972	*	interstate	Uganda (Tanzania)	
1966	*	civil	Zaire	
1960	*	civil	Zaire (Belgium)	
1999	2004	interstate	D. R. Congo (Rwanda)	Hutu rebels
1980	1982	interstate	Zaire (Zambia)	
1980	1982	interstate	Zambia (Zaire)	
1973	*	interstate	Zambia (Zimbabwe)	
1977	1979	interstate	Zambia (Zimbabwe)	
1965	1966	civil	Zimbabwe	UDI
1973	*	interstate	Zimbabwe (Zambia)	
1977	1979	interstate	Zimbabwe (Zambia)	

# Adverse Regime Changes in Africa, 1955-2004

COUNTRY	MONTH BEGIN	YEAR BEGIN	MONTH END	YEAR END	DESCRIPTION	POLITY* CHANGE
Sudan	11	1958	11	1958	Parliamentary democracy overthrown in military coup. Constitution abrogated and opposition parties banned as General Abbud consolidates political power.	-15
Congo-Kinshasa	6	1960	11	1965	Independence is followed by intense political and tribal factionalism and emergence of secessionist movements. Failed attempt at democracy leads to establishment of military dictatorship under General Mobutu.	SF
Senegal	12	1962	3	1963	Increasing tensions between President Senghor and his prime minister lead to a failed coup attempt by Prime Minister Dia. President Senghor arrests Dia, strengthens the constitutional powers of the presidency, and establishes one-party rule.	-6
Burundi	6	1963	11	1966	Unstable political alliance between Tutsis and Hutus produces democratic stalemate. King increases his authority but is unable to resolve ethnic tensions. Failed coup and rebellion by Hutu majority results in the military overthrow of the monarchy.	-7
Benin	10	1963	12	1965	Labour and ethnic tensions undermine fragile democracy. In an attempt to quell political instability the military intervenes twice before finally abolishing democratic institutions and institutionalizing military rule.	-9
Congo-Brazzaville	12	1963	12	1963	Fragile democracy weakened by ethnic and labour tensions. The military forces President Youlou to resign. Interim government established prior to the popular approval of a new constitution which creates a one-party Marxist-Leninist state.	-11
Nigeria	12	1964	1	1966	Ethnic violence sparked by democratic elections triggers military coup and abandonment of the state's federal structure. Counter-coup by mostly Muslim officers from the north results in the re-establishment of the federal system.	-15
Uganda	4	1966	12	1969	Allegations of corruption and persistent ethnic tensions within the federal democracy leads to the suspension of the constitution, centralization of political authority and the creation of a de facto one-party state under the control of President Obote.	-14
Sierra Leone	3	1967	3	1967	Regional factionalism within two party democratic system triggers a series of military coups after Siaka Stevens (a Limba) defeats Albert Margai (a Mende). Army mutiny restores democratic institutional and civilian government.	-13
Zambia	8	1968	12	1972	Democratic institutions weakened as political opposition to President Kaunda is restricted. Kaunda consolidates his political authority with the formal establishment of a one-party state.	-9

## Annex 2a Adverse Regime Changes in Africa, 1955-2004

COUNTRY	MONTH BEGIN	YEAR BEGIN	MONTH END	YEAR END	DESCRIPTION	POLITY* CHANGE
Equatorial Guinea	2	1969	3	1969	Following elections that brought President Macias to power in the newly independent, former Spanish colony, a public dispute arose when the new president demanded that Spain reduce its control over the domestic economy. A state of emergency was declared on March 1 after a failed coup attempt; the President used the crisis to consolidate power.	-9
Sudan	5	1969	10	1971	Left-wing military officers overthrow democratic government. Nimeiri establishes one-party state after failed coup by communist elements within the ruling military coalition.	-14
Kenya	7	1969	10	1969	On October 30, 1969, President Kenyatta bans the Kenya People's Union (KPU), the country's only opposition party. On November 7, 1969, he dissolves the National Assembly and institutes one-party rule under the Kenya African National Union (KANU).	-7
Somalia	10	1969	10	1969	Increasingly autocratic style of elected government triggers clan-based violence. Military intervenes and establishes one-party socialist state.	-14
Lesotho	1	1970	1	1970	Westminster-styled democracy brought to an abrupt end after opposition wins narrow victory in first post-independence election. Prime Minister Jonathan invalidates vote, imprisons opposition leaders, dissolves parliament and assumes dictatorial powers.	-18
Sierra Leone	4	1971	4	1971	Consolidation of power by elected president triggers failed coup. President Stevens declares himself executive president and systematically restricts democratic opposition.	-7
Ghana	1	1972	1	1972	Reformist military regime permits multiparty elections. Inflation, corruption and ethnic tension trigger military coup and suspension of party politics.	-10
Benin	10	1972	10	1972	Regional rivalries force military to transfer power to civilian governments. Ethnically diverse civilian triumvirate falls in second successful coup in three years. A Marxist-Leninist state announced the following year.	-5
Swaziland	4	1973	4	1973	Swaziland's first post-independence elections were held in May 1972, in which King Sobhuza's Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) won 75% of the vote and the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress won 20% of the vote. The king claimed the latter was incompatible with Swazi life and on April 12, 1973, dissolved parliament and assumed all powers of government. Political parties and trade unions were also outlawed.	-10

COUNTRY	MONTH BEGIN	YEAR BEGIN	MONTH END	YEAR END	DESCRIPTION	POLITY* CHANGE
Ethiopia	9	1974	3	1975	Emperor Selassie deposed by left-wing military government. After an internal power struggle within the Provisional Government, the Derg establishes a repressive one-party socialist state.	REV
Comoros	1	1976	1	1976	Twenty-eight days after the declaration of independence, on August 3, 1975, a coalition of six political parties known as the United National Front overthrew the Abdallah government, with the aid of foreign mercenaries. After the coup, a three-man directorate took control. One of the three, Ali Soilih, was appointed minister of defense and justice and subsequently was made head of state by the Chamber of Deputies on January 3, 1976.	-9
Chad	2	1979	6	1984	Failed attempt at national unification triggers religious, regional and international conflict as country lapses into civil war.	SF
Burkina Faso	11	1980	11	1980	Leader of former military regime, President Lamizana, elected as head of civilian government. Subsequent economic crisis and labour unrest triggers military coup and suspension of constitution.	-12
Ghana	12	1981	12	1981	Limann's People's National Party (PNP) began the Third Republic with control of only seventy-one of the 140 legislative seats; the percentage of the electorate that voted had fallen to 40 percent. Unlike the country's previous elected leaders, Limann was a former diplomat and a noncharismatic figure with no personal following. As the country's economy continued to decline and widespread strikes threatened to shut down the government, Jerry John Rawlings led a successful coup on December 31, 1981, and established personalistic rule backed by the AFRC.	-13
Nigeria	1	1984	1	1984	Ethnic competition, widespread corruption and electoral malpractice weaken the democratic institution of the Second Republic. Successive military coups bring to an end the Second Republic and expand the role of the armed forces in the political arena.	-14
Uganda	7	1985	1	1986	An army brigade composed mostly of ethnic Acholi troops took Kampala and proclaimed a military government, replacing President Obote, who had been elected in 1980 but had failed to accommodate or contain Museveni's popular National Resistance Army insurgency.	-10
Zimbabwe	12	1987	12	1987	Ethnic tensions and crackdown on political opposition weakens Zimbabwe's fragile democratic institutions. Merger of ZAPU with ruling ZANU effectively establishes a single party system.	-7

## Annex 2a Adverse Regime Changes in Africa, 1955-2004

COUNTRY	MONTH BEGIN	YEAR BEGIN	MONTH END	YEAR END	DESCRIPTION	POLITY* CHANGE
Sudan	6	1989	6	1989	Military overthrows democratic government after attempts to reduce the influence of religion in politics. Legislature dissolved and non-fundamentalist parties banned as an Islamic state is established.	-14
Liberia	9	1990	8	1996	Repression by military leads to widespread civil war. Rival ethnic and tribally-based political groups compete for control of devastated society. Abuja Peace Accord in August 1997 leads to new elections and inauguration of President Taylor in August 1997.	SF
Somalia	1	1991	99	9999	Hawiye-based United Somali Congress overthrows the authoritarian regime of Siad Barre. Chronic violence among clan-based warlords prevents the establishment of an effective central government.	SF
Ethiopia	5	1991	5	1993	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) defeats military backed communist government. Democratic elections boycotted by opposition parties as EPRDF consolidates power.	DIS
Angola	5	1992	4	1997	Civil war is rekindled after Savimbi multiparty election results. Savimbi establishes a rival government in Huambo as UNITA forces establish control over half of the country. Lusaka protocol of 1994 reunites country and reconstitutes single, central authority in April 1997.	SF
Congo-Kinshasa	12	1992	7	2003	In reaction to the absolute power wielded by Mobutu's military-backed regime, opposition forces coalesce to oust government. Kabila seizes power in May 1997 but is unable to establish central authority due to serious challenges from re-formed ethnic militias and foreign interventions. A breakthrough in the deadlock came with a power-sharing agreement during the Inter-Congolese National Dialogue in April 2003. On July 1, 2003, President Kabila issued a decree forming a transitional government and on July 17 the new government was sworn in.	SF
Burundi	10	1993	7	1996	Opposition forces win first multiparty elections, ending longstanding rule by Tutsi minority. Coup by Tutsis officers aborts transition to democracy as ethnic clashes escalate to civil war. Subsequent attempt at multi-ethnic civilian government falls in second Tutsi coup. New constitution is created in June 1998.	SF
Rwanda	4	1994	7	1994	Hutu-dominated military government promises a return to democratic rule. Transitional government established as Tutsi guerrillas invade. Assassination of President Habyarimana triggers genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.	REV

COUNTRY	MONTH BEGIN	YEAR BEGIN	MONTH END	YEAR END	DESCRIPTION	POLITY* CHANGE
Gambia	7	1994	7	1994	Long-standing multiparty system, dominated by President Dawda, is overthrown in military coup. Military rule reaffirmed with controversial elections of 1996.	-15
Comoros	9	1995	3	1996	Foreign-led mercenaries and disaffected Comorian troops overthrow the elected government of President Djohar. French troops sent to the island one week later arrest the mercenaries, reinstall the elected prime minister, and arrest Djohar.	SF
Niger	1	1996	1	1996	Military coup overthrows democratically elected government and suspends the 1992 consolidation. Coup leader, Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Barre, elected president in seriously flawed elections.	-14
Zambia	11	1996	11	1996	Constitutional amendments in May 1996 disqualify main opposition leader; President Chiluba easily wins subsequent elections.	-5
Sierra Leone	5	1997	3	2002	Mutinous soldiers side with RUF guerrillas to overthrow President Kabbah. Junta is defeated by ECOMOG in February 1998 but violence continues. Brokered peace agreement is reached between Kabbah government and RUF forces in May 2001 and State of Emergency is lifted in March 2002.	SF
Congo-Brazzaville	10	1997	10	1997	Transition to democracy ends when Sassou-Nguesso ousts President Lissouba after five months of fighting.	-11
Lesotho	5	1998	1	1999	Mass protests in wake of controversial elections are joined by government officials and military officers. Foreign troops impose order; new elections are proposed within 18 months.	SF
Guinea-Bissau	6	1998	5	1999	Fighting breaks out when President Vieira dismisses General Mane. Peace accord of November 1998 breaks down and fighting resumes. New elections held and new government of elected-President Yalla sworn in February 2000.	SF
Comoros	4	1999	4	1999	Army Chief of Staff Col. Assoumani Azzali leads April 30, 1999, coup that dissolves constitution and government. Promised transition to new elections based on Antananarivo agreement do not materialize.	-6
Ivory Coast	9	2002	99	9999	Following coups and highly contentious elections that result in a default victory for a minor candidate, tensions escalate to open rebellion in north and west regions in September 2002 and central authority is effectively limited to the south. Negotiated settlements are rejected or stalled by President Gbagbo.	SF

## Annex 2a Adverse Regime Changes in Africa, 1955-2004

COUNTRY	MONTH BEGIN	YEAR BEGIN	MONTH END	YEAR END	DESCRIPTION	POLITY* CHANGE
Central African Republic	3	2003	3	2003	Forces loyal to Gen. Bozize succeed in ousting government of elected-President Patasse while he is out of the country, having failed in several earlier attempts.	-6
Guinea-Bissau	9	2003	9	2003	New elected-government of President Yalla and former-opposition parties is besieged by challenges and continuing instability. Armed forces led by Gen. Seabre oust Yalla and establish junta to rule country until new elections are held.	-6

**\*Note (Polity Change):** The last column on the left records the change in the country's Polity regime score that resulted from the adverse regime change noted. Alpha codes indicate more profound change in the nature of the regime: an "SF" indicates that the change resulted in a collapse of central authority or "state failure," a "REV" denotes that a revolutionary change took place in which the previous regime collapsed and was replaced by a radically different form of government and ruling elites, and a "DIS" is recorded when the change results in the collapse of the previous regime and the dissolution of the state into two or more independent states.



# Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1946-2004:

Successful (1), Attempted (2), Plotted (3), and Alleged (4)

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Angola	10	27	1974	2	Antonio Navarro (inter alia)	0
Angola	5	27	1977	2	Cdr. Nito Alves, Jose van Dunen	200
Benin	10	28	1963	1	Gen. Christophe Soglo	999
Benin	11	29	1965	1	Congacou	0
Benin	12	17	1967	1	Alley	998
Benin	12	13	1969	1	de Souza	998
Benin	10	26	1972	1	Maj. Mathieu Kerekou	0
Benin	10	18	1975	2	Urbain Nicoue	0
Benin	1	16	1977	2	unspecified	8
Benin	3	26	1988	2	Capt. Hountoundji	0
Benin	5		1992	2	Pascal Tawes	0
Benin	11	15	1995	2	Col. Dankoro, Mr. Chidiac	1
Burkina Faso	1	3	1966	1	Lt. Col. Sangoule Lamizana	0
Burkina Faso	11	25	1980	1	Col. Saye Zerbo	0
Burkina Faso	11	7	1982	1	Maj. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo	20
Burkina Faso	8	4	1983	1	Capt. Thomas Sankara	13
Burkina Faso	10	15	1987	1	Capt. Blaise Campaore	100
Burkina Faso	10	20	2003	4	Norbert Tiendrebeogo, Capt. Wally Diapagri	0
Burundi	10	18	1965	2	unspecified	500
Burundi	11	29	1966	1	Capt. Micombero	999
Burundi	5		1972	4	unspecified	100000
Burundi	11	1	1976	1	Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	0
Burundi	9	3	1987	1	Maj. Pierre Buyoya	0
Burundi	3	4	1992	2	Bagaza?	0
Burundi	7	3	1993	2	officers loyal to Buyoya	0
Burundi	10	21	1993	2	Gen. Bikomagu, Francois Ngeze	150000
Burundi	4	25	1994	2	Tutsi paratroopers	999
Burundi	7	25	1996	1	army	6000
Burundi	4	18	2001	2	Lt. Passeur Ntarutimana	0
Burundi	7	22	2001	2	unspecified	3
Cameroon	4	6	1984	2	Col. Ibrahim Saleh	750
Cameroon	8		1993	3	Maj. Oumharou, Capt. Salaton	0
Cameroon	5		1994	3	Cdr. Mbia Meka	0
Cen. African Rep.	12	22	1965	1	Gen. Soglo	0
Cen. African Rep.	1	1	1966	1	Col. Jean Bedel Bokassa	8
Cen. African Rep.	4	10	1969	2	Lt. Col. Banza	0
Cen. African Rep.	11		1974	2	incl. Gen. Lingoupon	0
Cen. African Rep.	9	20	1979	1	David Dacko	999

## Annex 2b Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1946-2004

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Cen. African Rep.	9	1	1981	1	Gen. Andre Kolingba	0
Cen. African Rep.	3	3	1982	2	Ange Patasse, Gen. Alphonse Mbaikoua, and Gen. Francois Bozize	5
Cen. African Rep.	11	15	1996	2	unspecified (army mutiny)	999
Cen. African Rep.	5	28	2001	2	Andre Kolingba (alleged)	300
Cen. African Rep.	3	15	2003	1	Gen. Francois Bozize	15
Chad	8	26	1971	2	Ahmed Abdallah	0
Chad	4	18	1975	1	Gen. Noel Odingar, Lt. Dimtoloum	999
Chad	3	31	1977	2	Sub-Lt. Brahim Abakar Koumba	8
Chad	6	7	1982	1	Hissene Habre	999
Chad	4	1	1989	2	Brahim Itno, Hassan Djamoussi, Idriss Deby	999
Chad	12	1	1990	1	Idriss Deby	5000
Chad	10	13	1991	2	Maldom Bada Abbas	4
Chad	2	21	1992	2	unspecified	13
Chad	6	18	1992	2	Col. Abbas Koty	0
Chad	1	27	1993	2	Col. Toke	0
Comoros	8	3	1975	1	Ali Soilih	999
Comoros	6	4	1977	2	unspecified	999
Comoros	1	14	1978	3	Ali Mohamed	0
Comoros	5	12	1978	1	Said Atthoumani	999
Comoros	2	14	1981	4	various	0
Comoros	3	8	1985	4	Mustapha Said Cheikh	3
Comoros	11	30	1987	2	Members of Presidential Guard	998
Comoros	8	3	1991	2	Ibrahim Ahmed Halidi	0
Comoros	9	26	1992	2	Lt. Abderamane Abdallah, Lt. Cheikh Abdallah	0
Comoros	9	27	1995	2	Bob Denard (mercenary)	3
Comoros	4	30	1999	1	Col. Azali Assoumani	0
Comoros	3	21	2000	2	Capt. Abderame Ahmed Abdallah	0
Congo-Brazzaville	8	15	1963	1	Debat	0
Congo-Brazzaville	2	26	1967	3	Defense civile	0
Congo-Brazzaville	1	17	1968	2	unknown	998
Congo-Brazzaville	5	13	1968	2	commando group	0
Congo-Brazzaville	8	1	1968	1	Capt. Marien Ngouabi	0
Congo-Brazzaville	11	8	1969	2	Maj. Bernard Kolela	0
Congo-Brazzaville	3	23	1970	2	Lt. Pierre Kikanga	32
Congo-Brazzaville	2	22	1972	2	Maj. Ambroise Noumazalay	1
Congo-Brazzaville	3	18	1977	2	Capt. K. Kadidi, Massemba-Debat	1
Congo-Brazzaville	8	14	1978	3	Mssrs. Miakassissa, Kolela, Finamantsiona, Mouzabakani	0

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Congo-Brazzaville	10	15	1997	1	former Pres. Sassou-Nguesso	999
Congo-Brazzaville	4	11	2005	3	Capt. Pandi Ngouari, Nguila Mougounga Nkombo	0
Djibouti	1	8	1991	2	Ali Aref Bourhan	1
Djibouti	12	7	2000	2	Gen. Yasin Yabeh	2
DR Congo	11	25	1965	1	Gen. Mobutu	999
DR Congo	3	28	2004	2	unspecified	998
DR Congo	6	11	2004	2	Maj. Eric Lenge and members of Presidential Guard	998
Equatorial Guinea	3	5	1969	2	Sr. Ndongo	0
Equatorial Guinea	8	3	1979	1	Col. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo	250
Equatorial Guinea	4	10	1981	2	Pedro Ekong, Angel Masie Ntutumu, Andres Moises Mba	17
Equatorial Guinea	5	11	1983	2	Sgt. Venancio Miko Obiang	0
Equatorial Guinea	7	19	1986	2	Eugenio Abeso Mondu	999
Equatorial Guinea	8		1988	4	several	0
Equatorial Guinea	3	7	2004	2	Severo Moto, Simon Mann, Nick du Toit	0
Ethiopia	12	14	1960	2	Gen. Mengistu Newaye, Germain Newaye, Col. Workineh Gebeheyu, Getachew Bekele	999
Ethiopia	9	12	1974	1	Derg; Andom Banti	998
Ethiopia	11	23	1974	1	Derg; Gen. Tafari Banti, Major Mengistu	60
Ethiopia	2	3	1977	1	Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam	999
Ethiopia	2	3	1977	2	unspecified	10
Ethiopia	5	16	1989	2	Gen. Merid Negusie, GEN. Amha Desta	400
Gabon	2	18	1964	2	Jean-Hilaire Aubame	998
Gambia	7	29	1981	2	Kukli Samba Sanyang	650
Gambia	7	23	1994	1	Lt. Yahya Jammeh	0
Gambia	11	10	1994	2	Lt. Basiru Borrow	3
Gambia	1	27	1995	2	Lts. Sana Sabally & Sadibu Hydara	999
Ghana	2	24	1966	1	Gen. Joseph Ankrah	27
Ghana	4	17	1967	2	Lt. Samuel Benjamin Arthur	4
Ghana	1	13	1972	1	Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong	0
Ghana	5		1977	2	Lt. Col. George Minyila, Attoh Quarshie	0
Ghana	7	5	1978	1	Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo	0
Ghana	5	15	1979	2	Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings	1
Ghana	6	4	1979	1	Jerry Rawlings	13
Ghana	12	31	1981	1	supporters of Rawlings	50
Ghana	11	23	1982	2	followers of Sgt. Alolga Akata-Pore	0
Ghana	6	19	1983	2	Lt. Col. Ekow Dennis, Capt. Edward Adjei-Ampofo	26
Ghana	3	23	1984	4	unspecified	5

## Annex 2b Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1946-2004

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Ghana	11	6	2004	3	Members of disbanded 64 Infantry Regiment	0
Guinea	11	9	1965	4	unspecified	0
Guinea	2	16	1968	3	National Liberation Front of Guinea	998
Guinea	3	10	1969	3	M. Foderba Keita and Col. Kaman Diaby	999
Guinea	11	22	1970	2	Guinea exiles in Guinea-Bissau	998
Guinea	1	15	1984	4	incl. Maj. Fedebe Keita, Col. Kaman Diaby	0
Guinea	4	3	1984	1	incl. Col. Lansana Conte	0
Guinea	7	4	1985	2	Col. Traore	18
Guinea	2	2	1996	2	unspecified	0
Guinea	3	17	1997	4	unspecified	0
Guinea	11	30	2003	4	unspecified	0
Guinea-Bissau	11	14	1980	1	Maj. Joao Bernardo Vieira	999
Guinea-Bissau	11		1985	4	Col. Paulo Correia (1st VP)	1
Guinea-Bissau	3		1993	4	unspecified	0
Guinea-Bissau	6	7	1998	2	Gen. Ansumane Mane	2
Guinea-Bissau	5	7	1999	1	Gen. Mane	300
Guinea-Bissau	11		2000	2	Gen. Mane	10
Guinea-Bissau	12	2	2001	4	Almane Alam Camara, Lamine Sanha	0
Guinea-Bissau	9	14	2003	1	Gen. Verissimo Correira Seabre	0
Guinea-Bissau	10	6	2004	2	Army mutiny	998
Guinea-Bissau	5	25	2005	2	Deposed President Kumba Yalla	0
Ivory Coast			1980	2	unspecified	999
Ivory Coast	7	23	1991	2	junior soldiers	17
Ivory Coast	10		1995	2	Unspecified (Gen. Robert Guei implicated)	998
Ivory Coast	12	24	1999	1	Gen. Robert Guei	999
Ivory Coast	1		2001	2	unspecified	0
Ivory Coast	9		2002	4	1st Gen. Guei accused; then Ouattara was accused	1
Kenya	4	8	1970	4	Daniel Owino	0
Kenya	8	1	1982	2	unspecified	159
Lesotho	1	30	1970	1	Chief Jonathan	999
Lesotho	12	19	1983	4	Charles Molap	999
Lesotho	1	20	1986	1	Gen. Lekhanya	0
Lesotho	2		1990	4	Lt. Col. Sekhobe Letsie	0
Lesotho	2	21	1990	1	Gen. Lekhanya	0
Lesotho	4	30	1991	1	Col. Elias Tutsoane Ramaema	0
Lesotho	8	17	1994	2	King Letsie III	5
Lesotho	2		1996	4	Makara Sekautu, Matsoso Bolofo, Lepoko Molapo, David Jonathan	998

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Liberia	3	7	1980	4	Gabriel Matthews	0
Liberia	4	12	1980	1	M. Sgt. Samuel Kanyon Doe	1
Liberia	4	14	1980	2	Maj. William Jerbo	1
Liberia	5	18	1980	2	Bernie Warner	0
Liberia	5		1981	4	unspecified NCOs & soldiers	0
Liberia	11	21	1983	4	Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa	4
Liberia	8		1984	4	Dr. Sawyer, Col. Borteh, Col. Jorwley, Mr. Kieh	0
Liberia	11	3	1984	4	unspecified	0
Liberia	11	12	1985	2	Gen. Quiwonkpa	800
Liberia	3	22	1988	4	William Kpolleh	0
Liberia	9	7	1994	1	Tom Woewieyu	999
Liberia	9	15	1994	2	Charles Julue	999
Liberia	5		2003	4	VP Moses Blah	0
Madagascar	12	31	1974	2	Col. Brechard Rajaonarison	0
Madagascar	1	24	1982	4	Col. Rasolofo, Fr. J. Randrianoelisoa, A. Rakotozafy	0
Madagascar	7		1989	2	unspecified	0
Madagascar	5	13	1990	2	Joma Ernest, Jean-Jacques Rafalimanana	35
Madagascar	7	29	1992	2	unspecified	0
Malawi	3	26	2001	4	unspecified	0
Mali	11	19	1968	1	Lt. Moussa Traore	999
Mali	8	12	1969	4	unspecified	0
Mali	2		1978	4	Col. Kissima Doudkara, Tiecoro Bagayoko	0
Mali	12	30	1980	3	Karim Sissoko	0
Mali	3	26	1991	1	Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure	999
Mali	7	14	1991	2	Maj. Lamine Diabira	0
Mali	12	9	1993	3	Lt. Col. Oumar Diallo	0
Mali	10	27	1996	3	Mady Diallo	0
Mauritania	7	10	1978	1	Lt. Col. Ould Salek	0
Mauritania	1	4	1980	1	Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla	999
Mauritania	3	16	1981	2	Lt. Col. Ould Sidi, Lt. Col. Abdelkader	28
Mauritania	2	6	1982	2	Col. Ould Salek, et al	0
Mauritania	12	12	1984	1	Col. Moaouia Taya	0
Mauritania	10	22	1987	3	Lt. Ba Seydi, Lt. Sarr Amadou, Lt. Sy Saidou	0
Mauritania	11		1990	2	unspecified	0
Mauritania	10		1995	4	unspecified	0
Mauritania	6	8	2003	2	Maj. Salah Ould Henena, Abderrahmane Ould Mini, Mohammed Ould Cheikhna, Mohammed Ould Salek	15

## Annex 2b Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1946-2004

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Mauritania	8	10	2004	3	"Knights of Change"	0
Mauritania	8	3	2005	1	Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall; Military Council for Justice and Democracy	0
Mozambique	6	24	1991	3	Col. Antonio, Gen. Mabote	0
Niger	4	15	1974	1	Lt. Col. Seymi Kountche	20
Niger	8		1975	4	Maj. Souna Sido, Maj. Dilbo Bakary, Maj. Maitourane Gadjio	0
Niger	3	15	1976	4	Maj. Basere Moussa, Capt. Sidi Mohamed, Ahmed Mouddour	0
Niger	10	5	1983	2	Mahamane Sidikou, Lt. Amadou Dumarou	0
Niger	1	27	1996	1	Col. Ibrahim Barre Mainassara	2
Niger	1		1998	3	Hama Amadou	0
Niger	4	9	1999	1	Maj. Dauda Malam Wanke	5
Nigeria	10	1	1962	3	Chief Enahoro, Samuel Ikoka, Aye Adabaujo	0
Nigeria	1	15	1966	1	Maj. Nzeogwu	10
Nigeria	7	29	1966	1	Hausa army officers	998
Nigeria	7	29	1975	1	Gen. Murtala Ramat Mohammed	0
Nigeria	2	13	1976	2	Lt. Col. Bukar Dimka	6
Nigeria	12	31	1983	1	Gen. Mohammed Buhari	25
Nigeria	10		1984	3	unspecified	0
Nigeria	8	27	1985	1	Gen. Ibrahim Babangida	1
Nigeria	12		1985	3	Gen. Vatsa	0
Nigeria	4	22	1990	2	Maj. Gideon Okar	10
Nigeria	11	17	1993	1	Gen. Sanni Abacha	0
Nigeria	3		1995	3	Gen. Obasanjo	0
Nigeria	12		1997	3	Gen. Diya, Gen. Adisa, Gen. Olarenwaju	0
Nigeria	4	8	2004	3	Maj. Hamza al-Mustapha	0
Nigeria	10	31	2004	3	Maj. Hamza al-Mustapha, Lt.Col. Mohammed ibn Umar Adeka, Onwuchekwa Okorie, Cmd. Yakubu Kudambo	0
Rwanda	7	5	1973	1	Gen. Juvenal Habyalimana	0
Rwanda	5		1980	4	Maj. Theonaste Lizinde	0
Senegal	12	17	1962	2	PM M. Mamadou Dia	0
Sierra Leone	2		1967	2	Siaka Stevens?	0
Sierra Leone	3	23	1967	1	NRC (army officers): Genda, Juxon-Smith	999
Sierra Leone	4	18	1968	1	Stevens	999
Sierra Leone	10		1970	4	unspecified	0
Sierra Leone	3	23	1971	2	Gen. John Bangura	2
Sierra Leone	3		1986	3	Edison Gorvie, Capt. Abdul Kamara	0

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Sierra Leone	3	23	1987	2	Mr. Minah (1st VP)	1
Sierra Leone	4	30	1992	1	Capt. Valentine Strasser	999
Sierra Leone	12	28	1992	2	unspecified	26
Sierra Leone	10		1993	3	unspecified	0
Sierra Leone	10	2	1995	2	unspecified	999
Sierra Leone	1	16	1996	1	Gen. Julius Maada Bio	0
Sierra Leone	9	8	1996	2	unnamed sergeant	0
Sierra Leone	5	25	1997	1	Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma	999
Somalia	12	10	1961	2	Hassan Kayd	998
Somalia	10	21	1969	1	Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre, Revolutionary Council	0
Somalia	4	27	1970	3	Gens. Korshel, Guled, Kedie and others	29
Somalia	4	9	1978	2	unspecified	20
Somalia	6	23	1988	2	Gen. Mohammed Ali Samater	0
South Africa	7		1983	3	Gen. Charles Sebe	0
Sudan	3	4	1959	2	Dissident military	998
Sudan	4	21	1959	2	Dissident military	998
Sudan	11	9	1959	2	Dissident military	998
Sudan	12	28	1966	2	Lt. Khalid Hussein Osman	0
Sudan	5	25	1969	1	Col. Jaafar Mohammed al Nemery	0
Sudan	7	20	1969	3	Dr. Sadiq el Mahdi?	0
Sudan	7	26	1969	3	unspecified	0
Sudan	8	17	1969	3	Abdalla Abderrahman Nugdalla	0
Sudan	7	19	1971	2	Maj. Hashem el Atta	38
Sudan	9	5	1975	2	Military; joined by communist and religious groups	998
Sudan	7	2	1976	2	Capt. Bushra Abdullah, Gen. Mohammed Nur Saad	1000
Sudan	2	3	1977	2	Philip Abbas Gaboush	9
Sudan	3		1981	3	Gen. Saad Buhar	0
Sudan	7		1984	3	Mohammed Kati Gibriel	0
Sudan	4	6	1985	1	Gen. Abdel Rahman Swar el Dahab	999
Sudan	9	25	1985	2	Col. Garang, Yacoub Ismail, Youssef Kewa	2
Sudan	6	30	1989	1	Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir	0
Sudan	4	23	1990	4	Gen. Khalid al Zayn Ali, Gen. Abdul Kader, Gen. Mohammed Osman Hamed Kavar	0
Sudan	9	12	1990	2	unspecified	0
Sudan	8	23	1991	4	unspecified	0
Sudan	2	2	1992	4	unspecified	0
Sudan	4	15	1992	4	unspecified	0
Sudan	3	7	1996	4	unspecified	0

## Annex 2b Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1946-2004

Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Sudan	3	31	2004	3	Hasan Abdullah Al-Turabi	0
Sudan	9	25	2004	3	Hasan Abdullah Al-Turabi	0
Swaziland	2		1983	4	unspecified	0
Swaziland	12		1983	4	Prince Matatazela, Princess Neane, Princess Buyisile, Royal Wife Lamndzebele	0
Swaziland	3	20	1984	2	unnamed	0
Swaziland	6		1984	4	Prince Sozisa	0
Tanzania	1	19	1964	2	unknown	999
Tanzania	6	26	1980	2	unspecified	0
Tanzania	1		1983	4	unspecified	0
Tanzania	1		1988	4	unspecified	0
Togo	1	13	1963	1	Sgt. Maj. Emmanuel Bodjolle	1
Togo	7	4	1964	2	Maj. Bodjolle	0
Togo	11	20	1966	2	Maj. Kutuklui	0
Togo	1	13	1967	1	Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema	0
Togo	8	8	1970	2	Maj. Noe Kutuklui	2
Togo	10		1977	3	unspecified	0
Togo	1		1983	3	Gilchrist Olympio?	
Togo	9	23	1986	2	Gilchrist Olumpio, Capt. Francisco Lawson	26
Togo	8	26	1991	2	Supporters of Pres. Eyadema	0
Togo	10	1	1991	2	Lt. Gnassingbe Ta, Maj. Marusse Djoua	0
Togo	11	28	1991	2	Troops loyal to Eyadema	0
Togo	12	3	1991	2	Rebel soldiers	17
Togo	2	6	2005	1	Military; Faure Gnassingbe	0
Uganda	1	25	1971	1	Gen. Idi Amin	75
Uganda	3	23	1974	2	Gen. Charles Arupe (in question)	50
Uganda	9	9	1975	2	Lt. Col. Gori	998
Uganda	5	12	1980	1	Gen. David Dyite00jok, Mr. Muwanga	0
Uganda	7	27	1985	1	Gen. Bazilio Olara Okello	0
Uganda	3		1986	4	unspecified	0
Uganda	9	2	1986	4	unspecified	0
Uganda	10		1986	4	Panlo Muwanga, Dr. Kayiira, M. Lwanga, Mr. Nyanzi	0
Uganda	1	6	1987	4	unspecified	0
Zambia	10	16	1980	2	Gen. Kabwe, Mr. Musakanya, Mr. Shamwara, Gen. Miyanda	2
Zambia	6	14	1981	3	unspecified	0
Zambia	10	7	1988	4	Gen. Christon Tembo	998
Zambia	6	25	1990	2	unspecified	26



Country	Month	Day	Year	Success	Leaders	Deaths
Zambia	3		1993	4	Maj. Wezi Kuanda, Tilyenji Kuanda, Panji Kuanda	0
Zambia	10	28	1997	2	Capt. Stephen Lungu	1
Zimbabwe	10		1995	4	Rev. Ndaboningi Sithole	0
Zimbabwe	12		1998	4	unspecified	0
Zimbabwe	5		2001	4	Air Marshal Perence Shiri	0

**Notes:** Coup leaders must seize and hold central authority for at least one week to be considered a "successful" coup d'état. The names of coup "leaders" listed are those named in reports, accusations, and/or subsequent trials.

The date of the coup event is the beginning date for successful or attempted coups and the date of announcement for discovered coup plots and coup allegations.

An extralegal or legal seizure of central authority that results in an imposition of greater autocratic governance, measured as a 6-point or greater decrease in Polity score, or leads to a collapse of central authority is considered an "adverse regime change" and is listed as an event in Annex 2a.

An entry of "999" under "Deaths" indicates that no casualty figures were given and there may have been no deaths associated with this event. An entry of "998" indicates that no casualty figures were given but there was some indication in the report that casualties did occur during or in the immediate aftermath of the event.

# Periods of Political Instability of African States, 1946-2004

Country	War of Independence	Year Begin	Formation Instability Type	Initial Stability Gained	Post-Formation Instability	Instability Type	Regained Stability	Post-Formation Instability	Instability Type	Regained Stability
Angola	1961-75	1975	3	2003	1	1	1	2	2	2
Benin		1960	1	1973						
Botswana		1966	0	1966						
Burkina Faso		1960	0	1960	1980	1	1991			
Burundi		1962	3	1978	1987	3	x			
Cameroon	1955-60	1960	2	1960						
Central African Rep.		1960	1	1984	1996	3	2004			
Chad		1960	3	1995						
Comoros		1975	1	1979	1991	1	2001			
Congo		1960	1	1978	1993	3	2003			
D. R. Congo		1960	3	1966	1977	2	1981	1992	3	x
Djibouti		1977	0	1977	1991	3	1995			
Equatorial Guinea		1968	3	1982						
Eritrea	1961-91	1993	2	1993						
Ethiopia*		1960	3	2001						
Gabon		1960	0	1960						
Gambia		1965	0	1965	1994	1	1997			
Ghana		1960	1	1985						
Guinea-Bissau	1962-74	1974	2	1974	1997	3	x			
Guinea		1958	0	1958						
Ivory Coast		1960	0	1960	1991	3	x			
Kenya	1952-63	1963	3	1970						
Lesotho		1966	1	1970	1986	1	2001			
Liberia*		1980	3	2004						

Country	War of Independence	Year Begin	Formation Instability Type	Initial Stability Gained	Post-Formation Instability	Instability Type	Regained Stability	Post-Formation Instability	Instability Type	Regained Stability
Madagascar	1947-48	1960	0	1960	1	1	1	2	2	2
Malawi		1964	0	1964						
Mali		1960	0	1960	1990	3	1996			
Mauritania		1960	0	1960	1977	1	1986			
Mauritius		1968	0	1968						
Mozambique	1965-75	1975	2	1993						
Namibia	1965-90	1990	2	1990						
Niger		1960	0	1960	1990	3	1998			
Nigeria		1960	3	x						
Rwanda		1961	3	1974	1990	3	2002			
Senegal		1960	1	1964	1992	2	2000			
Sierra Leone		1961	1	1972	1991	3	2002			
Somalia		1960	0	1960	1969	1	1970	1987	3	x
South Africa*					1984	2	1997			
Sudan		1954	3	x						
Swaziland		1968	1	1974						
Tanzania		1961	0	1961						
Togo		1960	1	1971						
Uganda		1962	3	x						
Zambia		1964	1	1969	1990	1	1998			
Zimbabwe		1970	3	1988						

**Notes:** Countries marked with an asterisk\* established state independence prior to 1946.

State "Formation Instability Type" is coded "0" for "no instability"; "1" for "regime instability only"; "2" for "armed conflict only"; and "3" for "both regime instability and armed conflict." Four countries are given codes of "2" in this column, despite gaining stability in the year of independence, because those states emerged from wars of independence (Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Namibia).

An "x" in any of the "stability (re)gained" columns denotes countries that are currently experiencing ongoing periods of instability.

# Communal Minority Groups Engaging in Armed Rebellion since 1960

**Angola**  
Bakongo\*  
Cabindans\*  
Ovimbundu\*

**Burundi**  
Hutus\*  
Tutsis\*

**Cameroon**  
Westerners\*

**Chad**  
Northern clans  
Southern clans\*

**Rep. of Congo**  
Lari\*  
M'Boshi\*

**Dem. Rep. of Congo (Zaire)**  
Hutus\*  
Luba  
Lunda/Yeke  
Tutsis\*

**Djibouti**  
Afars\*

**Eritrea**  
Afars\*

**Ethiopia**  
Afars\*  
(Eritreans)  
Nilo-Saharan  
Oromo\*  
Somalis\*  
Tigreans\*

**Guinea**  
Fulani\*  
Malinka\*

**Madagascar**  
Merina\*

**Mali**  
Tuareg\*

**Mauritania**  
Kewri\*

**Namibia**  
East Caprivians\*

**Niger**  
Tuareg\*

**Nigeria**  
Ibo  
Ijaw\*

**Rwanda**  
Hutus\*  
Tutsis\*

**Senegal**  
Diolas\*

**Sierra Leone**  
Mende\*  
Temne\*

**Somalia**  
Issaq clan\*

**South Africa**  
(Black Africans)  
Europeans\*  
Xhosa\*  
Zulus\*

**Sudan**  
Black Muslims\*  
Black Non-Muslims\*  
Nuba\*

**Tanzania**  
Zanzibarans

**Togo**  
Ewe\*  
Kabre\*

**Uganda**  
Acholi\*  
Ankole  
Baganda\*  
Kakwa  
Karamajong  
Konjo/Amba  
Langi  
Lugbara/Madi

**Zambia**  
Bemebe\*  
Lozi\*

**Zimbabwe**  
Ndebele

(\*denotes groups in active rebellion since 1990)

# Communal Group-Pairs Engaged in Rioting or Warfare Since 1990

## Angola

Bakongo – Kimbundu  
Bakongo – Ovimbundu  
Kimbundu – Ovimbundu

## Burundi

Tutsis – Hutus

## Cameroon

Kirdis – Hausa  
Bamileke – Beti/Bulu

## Central African Rep.

Kaba – Yakoma

## Congo

Lari – M'Boshi

## Democratic Rep. of Congo

Luba – Lunde/Yeke  
Hema – Lendu  
Hunde – Hutus  
Hutus – Tutsis

## Ethiopia

Anuak – Gambella

## Ghana

Mossi-Dagomba – Konkomba

## Guinea

Guerze – Mandingo

## Ivory Coast

Bete – Burkinabe  
Burkinabe – Guere  
Diola – Guere

## Kenya

Borana – Gabra  
Kalenjin – Kikuyu  
Kalenjin – Kisii  
Kalenjin – Luhya  
Kalenjin – Luo  
Kikuyu – Maasai  
Kisii – Maasai  
Luhya – Maasai  
Luo – Maasai

## Mali

Arabs – Tuareg

## Nigeria

Fulani – Tarok  
Hausa/Fulani – Ibo  
Hausa/Fulani – Yoruba  
Ibo – Yoruba  
Ijaw – Yoruba  
Ijaw – Itsekeri  
Ijaw – Urhobo  
Urhobo – Yoruba

## Rwanda

Hutus – Tutsis

## Sierra Leone

Mende – Temne

## South Africa

Xhosa – Zulus

## Sudan

Arabs – Black-Muslims  
Arabs – Black Non-Muslims  
Nuer – Shilluk

## Togo

Ewe – Kabre

# African Peace Agreements

## Angola

- Ceasefire Agreement between Government of Angola and UNITA (April 2002)
- Angola Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the Lusaka Protocol Concerning a Second Round of Presidential Elections (1999)
- Angola Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the Lusaka Protocol Concerning the Appointment of UNITA cadres to Government Positions (1999)
- Angola Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the Lusaka Protocol Concerning the Reinstatement of Government Administration over the National Territory (1999)
- Agreement Between Government of Angola and the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) (April 1996)
- Lusaka Protocol (11-15-1994)
- Angola Peace Accords (1991)
- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola for the Conclusions of the International Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent (12-22-1988)
- Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa (12-22-1988)

## Burundi

- The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi (10-08-2003)
- Power-sharing Agreement Between President Buyoya and Hutu parties (July 2001)
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (08-28-2000)

## Chad

- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) (December 2003)

- Draft Agreement Between Government of Chad and the National Resistance Army (ANR) (January 2003)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) (January 2002)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Armed Resistance against Anti-Democratic Forces (RAFAD) (June 2000)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Chadian National Liberation Front – People’s Armed Forces (Frolinat-FAP) (August 1997)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (FARF) (April 1997)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Action for Unity and Development (January 1996)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) (November 1995)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) and the National Revival Committee for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD) (October 1992)
- Agreement Between Government of Chad and the Chadian National Front (September 1992)

## Comoros

- Antananarivo Peace Agreement between Comoran Government and delegation from island of Moheli (April 1999)  
*Note: the Anjouan delegation to the talks refused to sign the agreement*

## Republic of the Congo

- Accords de cessation des hostilités en République du Congo (November and December 1999)

## Democratic Republic of the Congo

- Inter-Congolese National Dialogue Agreement (April 2003)
- Ceasefire Agreement (July – August 1999)

## Democratic Republic of the Congo – Rwanda

- Peace Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (July 2002)
- Programme of Implementation of the Peace Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (July 2002)

## Democratic Republic of the Congo – Uganda

- Agreement Between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda on Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cooperation and Normalisation of Relations Between the Two Countries (September 2002)

## Djibouti

- Agreement Between Government of Djibouti and breakaway faction of FRUD (February 2000)
- Agreement Between Government of Djibouti and faction of Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) led by Ahmed Ougoureh Kible and Ali Mohamed Daoud (December 1994)

## Eritrea – Ethiopia

- Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea (December 2000)



## Eritrea – Sudan

- Agreement Between the Governments of Eritrea and Sudan (May 1999)

## Guinea-Bissau

- Agreement between the government of Guinea-Bissau and the self-proclaimed military junta (November 1998)

## Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire)

- Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (January 2003)

## Lesotho

- Agreement Between ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and opposition parties (October 1998)

## Liberia

- Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties (August 2003)
- Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (June 2003)
- Supplement to the Abuja Accord (August 1996)
- Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement (August 1995)
- Acceptance and Accession Agreement (December 1994)
- Agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement (December 1994)
- Akosombo Agreement (September 1994)

- (Cotonou) Agreement (July 1993)
- Yamoussoukro IV Accord (October 1991)

## Mali

- Bamako Peace Pact (April 1992)
- Agreement Between Government of Mali and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad (January 1991)

## Mozambique

- General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (October 1992)
- Joint declaration (August 1992)
- Declaration by the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and RENAMO on the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance (July 1992)
- Joint communiqué (July 1990)
- Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire (1990)
- Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict (1984)
- Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good Neighborliness between the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa (Accord of Nkomati) (1984)

## Namibia

- Geneva Agreement (1998)

## Niger

- Agreement Between Government of Niger and the Union of Armed Resistance Forces (UFRA) and the Saharan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARS) (November 1997)

- Ouagadougou Agreement Between Government of Niger and Tuareg rebels (October 1994)

## Rwanda

- Arusha Accord (Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front) (1993)

## Senegal

- Ziguinchor Peace Agreement Between Government of Senegal and MFDC (December 2004)  
*Note: At least three factions of the MFDC refused to sign the agreement, including the Atika faction led by Abdoulaye Diedhiou, diaspora elements based in Paris, and the so-called Northern Front.*
- Agreement Between Government of Senegal and the MFDC (March 2001)
- Agreement Between Government of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) (May 1991)

## Sierra Leone

- Peace Agreement Between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group and the pro-government Civil Defence Forces (CDF, the Kamajor militia) (May 2001)
- Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (July 1999)
- Communiqué issued at Conakry on 23 October 1997 at the conclusion of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States and the delegation representing Major Johnny Paul Koromah (October 1997)
- Economic Community of West African States six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone (October 1997)
- Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996 (October 1996)

## Somalia

- Cairo Declaration on Somalia (1997)
- Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993 (March 1993)
- Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee (January 1993)
- The General Agreement (January 1993)
- Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (January 1993)

## South Africa

- Interim Constitution (1994)
- National Peace Accord (September 1991)
- DF Malan Accord (1991)
- Pretoria Minute (August 1990)
- Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990)

## Sudan

- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 2005)
- Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan (June 2004)
- Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict (May 2004)
- Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States (May 2004)

- Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing (May 2004)
- Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur (April 2004)
- Framework Agreement on Wealth Sharing Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A) (January 2004)
- Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period (September 2003)
- Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (February 2003)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Sudan And the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (October 2002)
- Machakos Protocol (July 2002)
- Agreement between the Government of Sudan, and the South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) comprising: the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP); the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM); the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF); and the South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG) (1997)
- Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) (1997)
- Peace Agreement (1997)
- Agreement Between Government of Sudan and the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA)-United faction (April 1996)
- Political Charter (1996)
- Political Charter between the Sudan Government and the SPLA (United) (1995)
- Koka Dam Declaration (1986)

## **Sudan – Uganda**

- Agreement between the Governments of Sudan and Uganda (December 1999)

## Uganda

- Agreement Between Government of Uganda and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II) (December 2002)
- Agreement Between Government of Uganda and the Uganda People's Democratic Movement (UDPM) (July 1990)
- Power-sharing Agreement Between Government and the National Resistance Army (NRA) (August 1986)

## Uganda – Rwanda

- Agreement Between the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda (November 2001)

## Western Sahara

- Houston Declaration (1997)
- Compromise Agreement on Troop Confinement: Lisbon (August 1997)
- Compromise Agreement on Outstanding Identification Issues: London (July 1997)
- Agreement Between Government of Mauritania and the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) (November 1979)

## Africa: Political Instability Model

Peace-Building Capacity	Actual Instability	Predicted Instability		Aid Dependency	Political Discrimination	Elite Ethnicity	Political Factionalism	State Formation Instability	Population Density	Land Area	Forest Cover	Leadership Succession	Neighbourhood: Democracies	Neighbourhood: Armed Conflict	Muslim Country
<b>West Africa</b>															
■			Benin			■		■	■		■	■	■	■	
■			Burkina Faso	■				■			■	■	■	■	■
■			Gambia	■									■		■
■			Ghana					■	■		■			■	
■	■	■	Guinea Bissau	■			■		■		■		■		■
■		■	Guinea			■	■					■	■	■	■
■	■		Ivory Coast	■		■	■		■		■		■	■	■
■	■		Liberia	x			■	o			■			■	
■			Mauritania	■		■						■	■	■	■
■		■	Mali	■			■			■				■	
■			Niger	■						■			■	■	■
■	■		Nigeria	■	■			■	■				■		■
■	■	■	Senegal		■			■	■		■				■
■	■	■	Sierra Leone	■		■	■	■	■					■	■
■			Togo			■	■	■	■			■	■		
<b>Central Africa</b>															
■	■	■	Burundi	■				■	■						■
■		■	Cameroon		■	■	■				■	■		■	
■	■	■	Central African Republic				■	■			■			■	
■		■	Chad			■	■	■		■				■	■
■	■	■	Congo (Brazzaville)	■		■		■			■	■		■	
■	■	■	D.R. Congo	■				■		■	■			■	
■		■	Equatorial Guinea	x	■	■		■			■	■			
■		■	Gabon	■	■						■	■		■	
■	■	■	Rwanda	■		■		■	■					■	
<b>East Africa</b>															
■			Djibouti	x			■							■	■
■			Eritrea	■									■	■	■
■	■	■	Ethiopia	■		■	■	o	■					■	■
■			Kenya					■	■				■	■	
■	■		Somalia	x		■							■		■
■	■	■	Sudan		■	■		■		■				■	■
■			Tanzania	■			■				■		■	■	
■	■		Uganda					■	■			■		■	

## Annex 6 Africa: Political Instability Model

Peace-Building Capacity	Actual Instability	Predicted Instability		Aid Dependency	Political Discrimination	Elite Ethnicity	Political Factionalism	State Formation Instability	Population Density	Land Area	Forest Cover	Leadership Succession	Neighbourhood: Democracies	Neighbourhood: Armed Conflict	Muslim Country
<b>Southern Africa</b>															
■	■		Angola				■	■		■		■	■	■	
■			Botswana	■							■		■		
■	■	■	Comoros	■		■		■	■						■
■	■		Lesotho				■	■	■				■		
■			Madagascar	■		■					■				
■			Malawi	■					■		■		■		
■	■		Mozambique	■								■	■		
■			Namibia										■		
■			South Africa	■		■		o		■			■		
■			Swaziland					■	■			■	■		
■			Zambia	■		■	■	■			■		■	■	
■			Zimbabwe			■		■				■	■		

### Notes:

"x" under Aid Dependency denotes missing data; model scores are estimated.

"o" under State Formation Instability denotes states that gained independence prior to the post-World War II

"decolonization" phase.

**Continuous variables:** Red icons indicate bottom quintile; yellow icons indicate second from bottom quintile; green icons indicate top quintile.

**Dichotomous variables:** Red icons indicate that dynamic quality exists; yellow icons indicate that structural/exogenous quality exists.



# Peace-Building Capacities of States in Africa in 2005

Peace-Building Capacity	Armed Conflict		Human Security	Self-Determination	Discrimination	Regime Type	Regime Durability	Societal Capacity	Neighbourhood
<b>West Africa</b>									
■		Benin	■			■	■	■	■
■		Burkina Faso	■			■	■	■	■
■		Gambia	■			■	■	■	■
■		Ghana	■			■	■	■	■
■		Guinea			■	■	■	■	■
■		Guinea Bissau				■	■	■	■
■	■	Ivory Coast	■			■	■	■	■
■	■	Liberia	■			■	■	■	■
■		Mauritania	■		■	■	■	■	■
■		Mali	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■		Niger		■		■	■	■	■
■	■	Nigeria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■		Senegal		■		■	■	■	■
■	■	Sierra Leone	■		■	■	■	■	■
■		Togo	■			■	■	■	■
<b>Central Africa</b>									
■	■	Burundi	■		■	■	■	■	■
■		Cameroon		■	■	■	■	■	■
■	■	Central African Republic				■	■	■	■
■		Chad	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■	■	Rep. Congo (Brazzaville)	■		■	■	■	■	■
■	■	D.R. Congo (Zaire)	■	■		■	■	■	■
■		Equatorial Guinea		■		■	■		■
■		Gabon	■			■	■		■
■	■	Rwanda	■		■	■	■	■	■
<b>East Africa</b>									
■		Djibouti	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■		Eritrea			■	■	■	■	■
■	■	Ethiopia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■		Kenya	■		■	■	■	■	■
■	■	Somalia	■	■		■	■	■	■
■	■	Sudan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■	■	Uganda	■			■	■	■	■
■		Tanzania	■	■		■	■	■	■

Annex 7 Peace-Building Capacities of States in Africa in 2005

Peace-Building Capacity	Armed Conflict		Human Security	Self-Determination	Discrimination	Regime Type	Regime Durability	Societal Capacity	Neighbourhood
<b>Southern Africa</b>									
■	■	Angola	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■		Botswana	■			■	■	■	■
■		Comoros	■	■		■	■	■	
■		Lesotho	■			■	■	■	■
■		Madagascar	■			■	■	■	
■		Malawi	■			■	■	■	■
■		Mozambique				■	■	■	■
■		Namibia	■	■		■	■	■	■
■		South Africa	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
■		Swaziland	■			■	■		■
■		Zambia	■	■		■	■	■	■
■		Zimbabwe		■	■	■	■	■	■

