

## CHAPTER 41

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# Systemic Peacemaking in the Era of Globalization

Monty G. Marshall

*[O]ne day we must come to see that peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek, but that it is a means by which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue peaceful ends through peaceful means.*

—Martin Luther King Jr.<sup>1</sup>

In the global context, the term *peace*, used on its own, may be viewed as indicating little more than the time period between episodes of open warfare, and, because episodes of open warfare have been a nearly constant feature in global politics throughout the recorded history of humankind, it can be understood as having little or no practical or applied meaning. The lack of an applied meaning would necessarily relegate the meaning of peace to an unattainable utopian ideal, a nonrelatable spiritual quest, or unknowable promise of an afterlife. The only practicable meaning for the term *peacemaking*, then, would be the act of warfare, which, through its emphasis on lethal violence, creates an applied pathway to the afterlife for large numbers of innocents for whom the promise of eternal peace is deemed most assured. The irony of war representing a pathway to peace is an extreme application of the peace paradox, in which the act of war defines the nature of peace. If peace is to have any real meaning, it must be a distinct condition independent of war. Peaceful relations can be neither created under nor enforced by the threat of war. The notion that peacemaking should, and can, have an applied meaning as a pathway to establishing an empirical peace on Earth must be, then, seen as the peace conundrum. The first step in practical peacemaking, which is the political process by which we attempt to solve the peace conundrum, begins with a question: How can we recast our notion of peace so that peace defines the problem of war?

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The applied science of peacemaking necessarily seeks referents in historical and circumstantial empiricism.<sup>2</sup> In our written histories, war can be seen to define both the state and civil society in a social Darwinian scheme of state survival and supportive societal growth and expansion. Our notions of security have been largely defined by war; we even believe that we must fight for freedom. Whether it is a Hobbesian, Machiavellian, or Marxist view of the relationship between the state and civil society or a Sun Tzuian or Clausewitzian view of the relations between states, victory in war (or, better, victory through the threat of war) empowers the state and conditions the subordination of civil society. What we observe in such a historical review of the evolution of human civilization are alternative examples of relative peace and separate peace, where peace is conditioned and defined by its relationship to war.<sup>3</sup> The concept of relative peace is more accurately portrayed as the temporal, and temporary, condition of not war; it signifies the period of relative calm punctuated by high levels of interpersonal violence and situated between episodes of collective violence or warfare. In this sense, peace is the preparatory process for war situated within a culture of violence; peace exists primarily because war cannot be sustained indefinitely. Warfare draws power from civil society and applies that power to consume everything in its path, and so it stands as an ultimately self-limiting social phenomenon. It ends when it has exhausted at least one civil society. Populations are understood to be ripe for peace when they can no longer effectively feed the appetite of war and can no longer reasonably envision a relational victory in war (a condition, perhaps, better considered war fatigue).<sup>4</sup>

The idea of a separate peace is predicated upon the spatial notion that a particular social group can somehow remove itself from the impetus, practices, and consequences of war. Both these conditional forms of peace are achievable, but neither are sustainable because both are entangled in the peace paradox and are themselves essential elements of war: complementary components that fuel war-making capacity and determine the self-limiting nature of warfare. Relative peace generates the potential for making war; separate peace provides the incentive and motivation for war (i.e., the target or enemy). In the act of being, the violence of war necessarily devours the power created by a relative peace and transforms that power into violence to effect the destruction of a separate peace.<sup>5</sup> Even when the power of such a peace is completely consumed by war, peace has consistently been observed to rise from its own ashes as a Phoenix, recovering its veracity to empower the next cycle of war. When we recognize that these forms of peace are both necessary and sufficient conditions for war, we take the first step in recasting the relationship between peace and war to one where peace defines war rather than war defining peace. Peacemaking, then, should be understood as the self-perpetuating process of making war by other means.

When war defines the peace, peacemakers are preoccupied with ending wars or soothing the most brutal aspects of war and, in effect, acting simply to create the conditions for both a relative and a separate peace; they act, ultimately, in service to war. The ending of a war does not create peace; it simply creates a calm during which the creation of a meaningful peace can be reasonably

considered. This understanding helps to explain why, by interfering with the self-limiting nature of war, peacemakers may contribute to the creation of a self-limiting peace and, in so doing, further accentuate and entrench a political culture wherein peace is defined by war. War-ending is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a meaningful peace. Wars do not create peace, nor do the endings of wars; wars reinforce and accentuate the conditions that favored the onset of the previous war and create additional circumstances that favor the onset of a subsequent war. This is the nature of the war paradox that fortifies the war conundrum against halfhearted, disorganized, or ill-prepared attempts to resolve the problem of warfare. The peacemakers find themselves subservient to the war makers, and civil society is subordinated to the state. Under these circumstances and within this scheme, war makers are circumstantially empowered by the very conditions that present impediments to the peacemakers' attempts to resolve the war conundrum. From the feminist perspective, we can see that the peacemakers are relegated the role of cleaning up the war makers' mess, and this effort further distracts them from pursuing a more meaningful and productive role.

Thus, traditional forms of peacemaking have developed a preoccupation with the immediate challenges of ending wars prematurely and ameliorating the humanitarian crises and adverse conditions that wars create so that new wars can be waged. This is a most cynical perspective on peacemaking, but it is not without merit. It places war and peace in a comparative, developmental schema within which warfare can be seen as having differential effects. What seems to emerge most clearly from a comparative historical review of human civilization is that both violence and warfare are very strongly associated with lower levels of societal development and that the general pace of societal development has been spotty and slow, at least until the latter half of the 20th century. What most distinguishes the latter 20th century from all preceding periods is the general renunciation of war as a tool of statecraft.<sup>6</sup> This renunciation was led by the victors of war, where advanced societal development had empowered an independent civil society whose voice could compete with that of the war makers. The renunciation of war presents civil society's first systemic intervention in solving the war conundrum. Because war is a policy decision, the alteration of the war decision requires a superior act of political will.<sup>7</sup>

Whereas unsupportable rates of consumption limit the conduct of warfare, determined acts of civil disobedience have been found to limit the viability of warfare. The fact that, seen from the global perspective, societal development has been spotty and slow has provided the circumstances within which two world wars occurred in the earlier half of the 20th century that presented incontrovertible evidence that the true costs of war can no longer be discounted, nor can the severe externalities and consequences of war be ignored or denied, even by the victors of wars. The defining circumstances of the first two world wars, I believe, are three: spotty development created a spatial concentration of power in European states, slow development that contributed to strong competition among inefficient economies in Europe, and uneven development (i.e., an interaction effect of spotty and slow) that provided Europe a

relative advantage in exporting its war-making capacity in conquest of the nascent world system (thus reinforcing its preference of war making over peacemaking). As such, violent forms of social interaction should most properly be considered as noncivil or uncivil impediments to societal development rather than the proverbial stimuli for technological advancement, employment, and economic growth as often claimed by the war makers. War, then, can be seen as a problem of societal-system development.

It is tautological to observe that the victors in warfare are the parties to war suffering the least (relative) destruction and enjoying the broadest access to the resources necessary for postwar recovery. Should there be a war, there is a distinct advantage in winning the war, and the more powerful states are intrinsically rational enough to recognize and pursue their advantages.<sup>8</sup> The vanquished are either incorporated to provide additional resources for the victors, adding organizational complexity to the victor, or they are further marginalized and denied access to vital resources (a process of ghettoization of the disenfranchised). Societal complexity increases interest and identity diversity and, thus, drives organizational innovation to promote coherency and cohesion in the victorious states. The vanquished tend to disintegrate into simple interest and identity constituencies; artificially imposed state structures tend to be captured by key constituencies that reinforce social divisions and promote simple interests, thus reinforcing uneven development in the nascent world system.

Examination of the long-term, biased old historical record controlled by the victors of war can be juxtaposed with an examination of the short-term, more balanced, and detailed new historical record that has been collected largely by elements of civil society and includes the experiences of the vanquished in war.<sup>9</sup> The new historical record emerged as a consequence of the Second World War and the critical examination of the war system that produced and prosecuted it.<sup>10</sup> The war makers were, at least temporarily, discredited by the scope of destruction that the world's concentrated power was able to transform into total warfare and project across much of the world, thus elevating the peacemakers' perspectives onto the policy agendas of the victors. Civil society leaders, following the example of those in the United States, also began to challenge their traditional subordination to the state and demand greater influence in the formulation of public policy in the world's still quite limited number of independent states.<sup>11</sup> In the nonindependent territories of the world, local civil society leaders began to organize independence movements to pressure for greater influence over local policy. The basic tenets of a systemic peace begin to emerge at this time in conjunction with a shift in thinking away from globalism, the expansion of unilateral, and necessarily instrumental (coercive), authority across the globe and toward globalization, the integration of social units into a dynamic global system.

The two major, enduring accomplishments of systemic peacemaking in the emerging era of globalization are the United Nations organization and the largely negotiated end of the colonial world system. These accomplishments, however, were largely overshadowed by the residual culture of globalism driven by insecurities, empowered by the advent of nuclear weapons, and

manifested in a cold war competition between ideological camps threatening mutually assured destruction and empowering war makers in the newly independent states of the world by proxy. And, as a result, war quickly regained its predominance and, once again, defined peace in the emerging era of globalization. While *cold war* defined peace in the more developed regions of the world, *hot wars* defined peace in the less developed regions. This led to uneven development in systemic peacemaking as peacemakers attempted to constrain war makers in the more powerful states while struggling to formulate responses to the proliferation of wars in the less powerful states.<sup>12</sup> At the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, if we discount the more powerful democratic peace states of the global West, over one-third of the remaining (lesser developed) countries were embroiled in major episodes of warfare during the peak year (46 of 136 countries in 1992); nearly two-thirds had experienced some form of major warfare (usually civil warfare) at some time during the cold war period (92 of 139 countries; 41 countries experienced 10 or more years of warfare); and almost one-quarter of all country-years from 1946 to 1992 were marked by warfare (1,077 of 4,701 country-years).<sup>13</sup> Peacemakers, though active and enfranchised within the new historical record, were clearly overwhelmed by the imperatives of war-ending and the attendant humanitarian concerns of the cold war system. More generally, systemic development was severely constrained; third world dependency was simply an epiphenomenal outcome of the third world war.

What the new historical record does provide empirical researchers is a broader, less biased, more detailed, and more comprehensive tool for expanding knowledge and developing more meaningful understandings of the relationships between peace and war and the societal and systemic conditions that may increase the risks of warfare. Foremost among the risks for the onset of warfare is the general lack of societal development in a particular societal system; this risk is increased substantially when that lesser developed societal system is situated regionally among other lesser developed societal-systems (the bad neighborhood effect). Directly related to the risks of warfare in lesser developed societal systems is their proclivity to adopt autocratic forms of governance as the most readily attainable method by which to establish and enforce a social order. Autocratic governance regimes enforce a public order through the threat and selective use of violence against the leadership of oppositional constituent groups. This dependence on the instrumental enforcement of public order intimidates and subordinates civil society to the will and agenda of the autocratic regime and, in so doing, institutionalizes a polarization or factionalization of society into ruling and ruled groups that is further fortified by systematic discrimination against out-groups.<sup>14</sup> Periodic outbursts of political violence reinforce the conditions of lesser development by impeding progress or negating development initiatives, leading to what I have elsewhere called a "syndrome of 'societal underdevelopment' or *arrested development*."<sup>15</sup> Most importantly, research conducted using the new historical record has strongly confirmed systemic linkages among congruent qualities of governance, conflict, and societal (physical and human capital) development and among increasingly interconnected societal-system units comprising regional and global

societal systems during the emerging era of globalization.<sup>16</sup> The war system is an integrated and mutually reinforcing set of systemic conditions in which the risks of war are reproduced by the dynamic logic of the system itself.

A new phenomenon emerged as a consequence of the cold war rivalry between the superpowers: the protracted social conflict that often persisted for decades due to the globalization of the localized war effort (i.e., the infusion of foreign governmental and nongovernmental material, military, and humanitarian support that interfered with and largely negated the self-limiting nature of warfare; with continual, external logistic support, localized wars can persist in perpetuity).<sup>17</sup> Protracted conflicts presented peacemakers with an almost insurmountable new complication of the peace conundrum: the intractable conflict in which coercion thoroughly subordinates cooperation as the society's organizational and aspirational principle and, thus, frames the prospect of war ending as an immediate and vital threat to the perceived well-being and security of the perversely affected society. Protracted war creates war-dependent populations whose sole source of livelihood is linked to external assistance and for whom continuation of war best ensures that their livelihoods will remain undisturbed. Warfare comes to be viewed as little more than an occupational hazard.

Despite these system distortions, the prospect of nuclear annihilation progressively disarmed the war makers in the more powerful states during the cold war period, and the rising influence of the peacemakers gained precedence in global policy. In the late 1980s, the dark shroud of the cold war system was discarded.<sup>18</sup> As the shroud was lifted, however, the peacemakers were faced with the sheer magnitude of the immediate and cumulative effects of warfare on the global system. Even though the peacemakers had succeeded in shifting the peace agenda to the forefront of public policy, the imperatives of war ending easily eclipsed all other considerations. The demise of the cold war system heralded the beginning of the era of globalization and the emergence of the global system; however, the severity of the cold war system's legacy has preempted and seriously constrained the systemic peacemaking agenda. Still, my own measurements of the amelioration of the cold war legacy show a reduction by nearly half of the number of states experiencing major armed conflicts between 1991 and 2009 (46 to 25; 46.7%) and a diminution of the summed magnitudes of all armed conflicts in the world by well more than half (179 to 77; 57.0%), bringing them to their lowest levels in 50 years (1970 and 1964, respectively). Of the 46 states experiencing warfare in 1991, 18 were experiencing protracted conflicts that had been going on for at least 10 years in 1991, and, of these, 13 were ended with only 4 recurring.

As mentioned earlier, the ending of existing wars is a necessary but not sufficient condition for promoting systemic peace. Because wars are costly in resources, lives, and welfare, there is little rationale for making or continuing warfare when less costly alternatives to war are available. The strong empirical relationship between low levels of systemic development and high levels of collective violence can account for a large part of the problem: the full costs of war are not known, and the alternatives to war as a method for conflict resolution and social organization are not available to the lesser developed

societies. Under conditions of low integration, low interactive networking, and low knowledge and skills, the emotive content of uncertainty, insecurity, and ambition inordinately conditions rationality and motivates collective action in favor of unilateral strategies that are necessarily predisposed toward the use of coercive or instrumental tactics. The uses of force further accentuate emotive and dissociative responses in both actor and target, seriously distorting and diminishing the social rationality of the affected populations in favor of more individualized forms of rationality, further impeding sociation, negotiation, and the implementation of conflict resolution schemes short of victory or loss in war (or the perversion of warfare as organized crime and predation). These adverse effects are probably not remediable, particularly in the more directly and seriously affected portions of the war population. The amelioration of the adverse effects of violence then becomes a generational strategy of assisting the affected society to favor the sociational efforts of the nonaffected portion against the instrumental proclivities of the affected portion of the population; this requires external administrative assistance, implementation assurances, and accountability guarantees.

War-ending efforts are an immediate requirement for systemic peace, but these must be followed by commitments to longer-term war-amelioration assistance—that is, helping the war-ravaged society recover its lost power. Of critical importance are the regulation of the abnormally high and persistent emotive content of the war-affected population(s) and systematic treatment of the worsened civil society deficits that contributed to the societal system's prewar risks for instability and warfare. These key systemic deficits are low integration, low interactive networking, and low knowledge and skills. Strengthening the capacity of the state to impose social control and infusing the economy with transfer payments as short-term fixes for a weak state are likely to further polarize rather than integrate the state and civil society. The state can grow to depend upon or even prefer external assistance payments to the internal taxation of civil society, which imply service obligations by the state to civil society. Likewise, coercing a poorly developed or divided society to adopt democracy is more likely to heighten rather than lessen the emotive content of postwar societies, because democratic process tends to politicize and mobilize the entire population, especially in conjunction with elections. Still, war-ending and war-amelioration efforts are necessary but not sufficient conditions for systemic peacemaking.<sup>19</sup>

The key findings for systemic peace that come from empirical research of the new historical record derive from the ability to engage in process tracing so that we include in our analyses interactive sequences and structural factors that condition both actionable decisions and policy implementation. This frees behavioral analysis from inappropriate reliance on causal inferences so that responsibility can be assessed and accountability assigned. By moving away from causal determination to probability scenarios, we develop fuller understandings not only of the relationship among structural attributes and behavioral outcomes (events) but also of the societal-system dynamics that unfold or diverge into problematic behavioral outcomes. Political events result from critical decisions that take place in the context of issue and policy streams that are

themselves conditioned by circumstances and influenced by the varied interests of multiple players. Particular outcomes cannot be considered predetermined or inevitable but continually (re)directable, malleable, or transformable. Political processes may have critical or definitive moments, but the decisions made at those moments are single instances in an interactive stream of decision points, any of which can alter the trajectory or attributes of the process. As such, critical points are as much defined by subsequent outcomes as they may be perceived to define those outcomes and so are very often not easily identifiable as critical when they are made but only as they gain clarity in hindsight—that is, as they are perceived to be related to outcomes of interest. Additional process streams may intersect to alter trajectories; even seemingly unrelated process streams can converge and alter outcomes. Yet social processes are not necessarily random walks. Patterns of regularized and standardized behaviors are associated with learned and conditioned strategic action. Institutionalized societal systems are complex, dynamic networks that are predominantly ordered by regularized (regulated and socialized) processes but that are also subject to random and nonregularized processes. No matter how well we understand patterned behaviors, new patterns may emerge to confound analysis. Both prediction and control can only be partial in complex societal systems; institutionalized administrative and management procedures are key to isolating problematic sequences for special attention. Conflict processes are a natural corollary to collective action that, when managed and governed properly, will minimize system disruption and generate sympathetic energy to perpetuate or pressure adaptations and trigger innovations in the societal system in response to changing circumstances. Improperly managed, conflict processes can disrupt or even derail societal systems.

Conflict is both a social phenomenon and stimulus to action that stands at the nexus between war and peace; it is the social dynamic that drives technological innovation and, thus, ultimately defines societal development and evolution.<sup>20</sup> Over time, social rationality has evolved an apparently innate capacity to constrain the warriors' appetite for consuming peace and redirect the raw, emotive energy of combat toward more constructive modes of cooperation and competition. Although historically conditioned by the state and war, societal development can be seen to evolve independently from either the state or war. Peace as a societal concept finds its greatest strength in its nearly universal, rational, and positive emotional appeal. It is a linking concept that emerges from the nexus of reason and spirituality to encourage and accentuate political communication across experiential and social distinctions. Peace is necessarily at war with war in the social context, a war that must be fought in perpetuity by peaceful means—that is, a systemic peace.<sup>21</sup> Systemic peace is not defined by the transformation of war to a corresponding (relative or separate) peace but, rather, through a myriad of everyday actions that together improve societal performance and the effective and efficient management of social conflict. War is a form of institutionalized violent behavior that is neither a natural nor inevitable feature of societal systems; it is a learned, strategic issue that can only be understood and managed within its appropriate systemic context, that is, systemically.<sup>22</sup> The adverse effects of warfare diffuse



through social networks and spill across geographical space; they are a systemic problem requiring a societal solution.

As proposed here, the end of the cold war system coincided with the maturing of the era of globalization, giving way to the advent of the nascent global system and greatly improving the prospects for systemic peace. Early evidence drawn from the post-cold war record supports this prognosis. As mentioned above, the number of states experiencing major armed conflict and the total summed magnitude of the societal impact of warfare in the global system decreased to about half their numbers by 2009 since their peak at end of the cold war period. Measuring the quality of governance in these same states over the same period, we chart a global shift toward greater democracy in the global system whereby the number of democracies has doubled and the number of autocracies has been cut by two-thirds.<sup>23</sup> Using a comprehensive, aggregate measure of state fragility based on our empirical findings regarding the key impediments to societal-system resiliency (i.e., the developmental capacity to effectively manage societal conflict without resort to violence) and applied to the same set of countries as the measures of warfare and governance, we report a 20 percent reduction in aggregated state fragility in the global system. The net reduction in state fragility was found to be distributed fairly evenly across five of six regional subsets of countries despite substantive differences in the regional mean state fragility scores across the five regions (the sixth region, the North Atlantic region comprising the states of the West, measured little or no state fragility across the period). Non-Muslim Africa and the Muslim countries are the most fragile regions in the nascent global system, whereas Latin America and the former Socialist regions are the least fragile of the five non-Western regions and show the greatest net and proportional reduction in state fragility since 1995.<sup>24</sup>

Most importantly, however, global trends in measures of the quality of governance show a doubling of the global numbers of "anocracies" that coincides with the end of the cold war and the general shift from an autocratic-dominant cold war system to a democratic-dominant global system; the high numbers of anocratic states remain fairly constant across the post-cold war period (about 50 countries; nearly one-third of all countries).<sup>25</sup> The risk models developed by the U.S. government's Political Instability Task Force (PITF) identify anocracies, and particularly factional anocracies, as having the highest risks of onsets of armed conflict and regime instability.<sup>26</sup> Given the predictive accuracy of the PITF models, we should expect a concomitant doubling in the onset of political instability events in the post-cold war period. In fact, the frequency of onset of new political instability events remains constant across the cold war and post-cold war periods, while the annual number of ongoing episodes of political instability decrease substantively over the post-cold war period (as does the number and magnitude of armed conflicts, already mentioned).<sup>27</sup> In a separate study focusing on the particular outcomes of factionalism, we find that cases of factionalism are far more likely to transition toward democracy in the post-cold war period than trigger an autocratic coup or an onset of armed conflict, as was the predominant outcome during the cold war period.<sup>28</sup> The evidence cited here clearly supports the proposition that the post-cold war period and

the nascent global system are characterized, in general, by substantive and comprehensive state-level improvements in the quality of governance, effectiveness of conflict management, and societal-system development. Systemic peace appears to be both a plausible and feasible attribute of globalization.

#### **KEY ELEMENTS OF SOCIETAL-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMIC PEACEMAKING**

Systemic peace refers to the means rather than any particular end of social endeavor and so should be understood as a variable function of systemic peacemaking, which itself must be viewed as a complex, conflict management approach to public administration that necessarily situates conflict processes in their relevant and comprehensive circumstantial context and within the dynamic societal system, accounting for and factoring in essential elements of both time (past, present, and future) and space (physical and relational). Indeed, it is the societal content of social conflict that makes its particular manifestations both comprehensible and manageable. The scope and effectiveness of systemic peacemaking is at once an evolutionary function of social learning and innovation and a developmental function of societal organization. The quality of systemic peace can only be assessed by measuring system performance from a holistic perspective; differential patterns and qualities of performance factors across the system provide crucial information for refining and sustaining systemic peace. An appropriate measure of systemic peace is to gauge the extent to which conflict processes are managed without resort to force and, particularly, without the use of violence and warfare.<sup>29</sup> Systemic peacemaking is a humanist approach to understanding peace and security wherein civil society defines the state and peace defines war.

As discussed above, systemic peacemaking is critically informed by societal-systems analysis. Traditional notions of peacemaking are largely the product of the old historical record written by the states that have emerged as the victors in war; that record is necessarily biased toward nationalist perspectives and unilateralist conceptions of peaceful relations. Traditional notions of peace and, therefore, peacemaking are defined by war and the war-making prerogatives of the sovereign state and within which civil society is subordinated to the state. Traditional peacemaking generally remains latent until spurred to action by the onset of war and is charged with ending the war or ameliorating the adverse effects of warfare. Perspectives on the potential for a perpetually vigilant systemic peace were generated by the socio-technological advent of world war, total war, and genocide in the first half of the 20th century and the culmination of war system logic in the threat of nuclear annihilation. With the technologies of warfare directly challenging human civilization and the sovereign state's limited capacity to restrain emotive affect and control perceptions regarding the rational utility of limited warfare, neither the war system nor the old world order can command the unconditional subordination of an ever-expanding and diverse global civil society.

Empirical evidence of the new activism and initiatives of civil society elements are found in the dynamics of globalization, primarily in the dramatic

expansion and integration of private enterprise (multinational corporations, global markets, foreign direct investment), private media (journalistic and scholarly reporting, data collection, and, particularly, the Internet), and non-governmental organizations and associations. Cold war characterized the transition from traditional perspectives on peace to elemental visions of a systemic peace. Key elements and principles of a systemic peace were encapsulated in the Charter of the United Nations; the organizational basis for a systemic peace was pushed forward by the dismantling of the Eurocentric colonial world system and finally realized by the reintegration of the Socialist bloc countries into an emerging global system.<sup>30</sup> The end of the transition to systemic peace is signified by the end of the cold war and the beginning of the era of globalization.

The concept of systemic peace differs from traditional conceptualizations of peace mainly in regard to the proposition that there is a knowable and manageable system that operates in regularized ways that, in totality, defines the existential quality of peace. This proposition is less controversial when applied to relatively small and well-structured organizations; it becomes increasingly controversial when applied to states, regions, and the world as a whole. Yet systems logic and systems analysis are increasingly recognized and embraced in the biosciences as essential aspects of learning, management, and treatment in organic systems. The term *system* did not enter the lexicon of Western political science until the mid-1960s and, then, only in reference to the inner workings of the Western state.<sup>31</sup> Neo-Marxist analysis brought about the concept of the modern world system by way of its critique of the continuing economic exploitation of the former colonial territories in the mid-1970s and neo-realists responded with reference to an anarchical world system in which a minimal pecking order of relative military capabilities conditioned relations among states.<sup>32</sup> At about the same time, neo-idealists began referring to increasing interdependence and interconnectedness among states in a world community or international society.<sup>33</sup> Scholars were beginning to acknowledge fundamental changes in the nature and quantity of interactions within world politics, but, to this day, many remain uncomfortable with or hostile to any claim that the density, regularity, and diversity of interactions, transactions, and communications constitutes the basis of an operational global system, despite the mushrooming of international intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and regulatory regimes. The end of the cold war appears to have stimulated consideration of the applicability of systems analysis in political science and public policy. However, statist approaches continue to be predominant in the early years of the 21st century and are unlikely to be supplanted by postmodern alternatives.<sup>34</sup>

A large part of the continuing reticence of scholars and analysts to consider systems approaches to political and policy studies is the difficulty of factoring dynamic complexities, multiple layers and loci of influences and effects, and alternative strategic avenues of interactive sequences with probabilistic consequences into critical analyses. This is certainly an issue of concern that would be prohibitive if it were not for the information and computation technological revolutions that have exponentially expanded analytic capabilities

since the 1980s. However, the analytic difficulty of factoring complexity may be overstated, or overimagined, as the ordering principles and institutionalized structures of societal systems, by the rational nature of their operationalization, simplify and regularize dynamic factors imparting discipline on societal complexity and channeling otherwise chaotic action into coherent and cohesive systems. Systemization supports analytic parsimony by standardizing and regularizing complex dynamics and systemic effects. For example, the U.S. government's Political Instability Task Force has analyzed a single mode of inquiry for over 15 years beginning in 1994, both extensively (using every available information resource) and intensively (using every known analytic technique), and found that a model with only four general, observable conditions can explain the onset of political instability in any country in the world during the contemporary period, 1955 to 2003, with a remarkable degree of accuracy (distinguishing cases of impending instability from cases of stability at better than 80%); these four conditions are the general qualities of regime governance and immediate neighborhood level of development and state-led political discrimination.<sup>35</sup>

In developing the societal-systems analytic approach, I have posited that all social organizations (i.e., social identity groups) are based on the same fundamental organizational structure and are differentiated primarily on their association with a shared interest in a unique circumstantial/environmental context.<sup>36</sup> Social identity groups (i.e., societal systems) are understood to be organic systems—that is, self-actuating, self-organizing, self-regulating, and self-correcting. Societal systems are organized by some combination of instrumental (coercive) and sociational (cooperative) forms of within-group organization and conflict management; societal-system development, then, is seen as a function of the group-specific shift in reliance away from instrumental toward sociational forms. Reliance on sociational forms (systemic power) can be measured by the numbers of associational ties (i.e., societal complexity) and interactional densities (i.e., societal networking). Complex societal systems have incorporated and integrated tens of thousands of diverse social identity groups with particular shared interests over time; group membership is non-exclusive, meaning that any individual can be a member of more than one group.<sup>37</sup> In contrast, the system's reliance on instrumental forms can be measured by the numbers and magnitudes of potential and actual demonstrations of political violence and state repression. Within-group organizational strategies are independent from relations (potential organizational strategies) with other, nonintegrated groups; however, group associational disposition and potential are conditioned both by its within-group experiences and its prior interactions with out-groups (i.e., level of societal-system development and circumstantial history).<sup>38</sup>

Societal-systems analysis, then, is primarily concerned not with the specifics of what group members are doing or what they have produced at any point in time but rather with the group's capabilities and capacities for effective conflict management; this activity is associated mainly with the societal elite or proto-state but is a function of the quality of development of the societal system as a whole (i.e., civil society). Obviously, this brief introduction is not intended to

explain societal-systems analysis in detail but to convey the idea that complex systems can be understood and their performance can be monitored in standardized ways in which potential problems can be identified and treated in order to increase the probability of forestalling unwanted outcomes (here defined as conflict management in the interests of greater system integration and warfare prevention). Effective conflict management improves system efficiency mainly by limiting system atrophy and destruction and dampening the emotive content of conflict interaction associated with the resort to force.

The societal-systems approach to systemic peacemaking is primarily concerned, then, with systemic development—that is, the incremental process of transforming general system reliance from instrumental to sociational forms of conflict management—from enforcement to compliance norms. This approach is necessarily concerned with lessening differences in societal development across constituent units populating the global system to increase complementarity and thereby improve political integration. These systemic propositions do not imply advocacy of particularist values, such as egalitarianism or wealth redistribution; the principal implication is that societal systems have the right to free systemic association and the creative expression of societal values and goals. Systemic peacemaking does demand open information, an active and informed civil society, and broad and consistent engagement in conflict management initiatives directed at ameliorating the residual effects of the war system (i.e., ending current and preventing impending wars and assisting in the recovery of war-affected societal systems). The political economy of conflict management is determined by two principles, time-dependent economic functions of conflict processes: the exponential increase in the social costs of conflict management and the exponential decrease in the probability of successful conflict resolution over the course of a social conflict process.<sup>39</sup> The onset of violence marks the intersection of these two principle economic functions and signifies the point of diminishing returns on societal investments in that process. Efficient conflict management must act proactively to resolve conflict processes without resort to violence.<sup>40</sup> Systemic conflict management strategy avoids donor fatigue by avoiding the creation of aid dependencies through the proactive distribution of learning and application technologies and creative responsibilities to members of affective units to accomplish societal-system development according to local needs and aspirations.

The age of empires that dominated world politics for the past five millennia reached its natural, systemic crescendo with the “century of world wars” and must be abandoned to history. Systemic security during this formative period was determined largely by pervasive ignorance and uncertainty that came to define a national security approach to societal relations. Politics in the coming millennia will necessarily be determined by systemic complexity that will necessitate an age of empirics that will inform a human security platform for the management of global relations. Globalization, then, should be understood as a systemic process of self-actuation, self-organization, self-regulation, and self-correction for the emerging global societal-system. The challenges posed by

complexity in a globalized societal-system encompassing more than six billion people can be overwhelming in and of themselves and have become even more so as they interact with the existential limits of the global ecosystem.

What has become clear is that the states comprising the global system can no longer afford to spend and invest their limited resources in the continuation of the man-made ecological disasters that are the essence of authoritarianism and war. If we accept that the phenomena of autocratic rule and warfare evolved as a circumstantial, societal response to promote and protect greater organization and development under the constraints of ignorance and uncertainty, then we must acknowledge that future organization and development must proceed under the more effective and efficient auspices of peaceful conflict management enabled by knowledge, communication, and system dynamics. Systemic peacemaking became possible with the general renunciation of war as *politics by other means* and the embrace of democratic governance.<sup>41</sup> Effective systemic peacemaking will require an irreversible shift in policy priorities away from the current emphasis on instrumentalities of force toward the promotion of efficient system management and effective humanitarian response to the real vulnerabilities of societal-systems to the complexities posed by natural, rather than man-made, boundaries and disasters.

## NOTES

1. Excerpted from "A Christmas Sermon on Peace," delivered by Martin Luther King Jr. at the Ebenezer Baptist Church and broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on December 24, 1967.

2. Circumstantial empiricism emphasizes the importance of contextual factors in the examination and comprehension of social outcomes. See Muzafer Sherif, "A Theoretical Analysis of Individual-Group Relationship in a Social Situation," in *Concepts, Theory, and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences*, ed. G. J. DiRenzo (New York: Random House, 1966) for an early treatment of the issue and Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997) for a more recent elaboration.

3. Relative peace encompasses the notions of *cold war*, a term coined by George Orwell in 1945 to describe a collective, passive-aggressive response associated with (nuclear) deterrence (Orwell, "You and the Atomic Bomb," *Tribune*, October 19, 1945) and *cold peace*, coined by Brazilian diplomat Achille Bonitto Oliva in 1952 in reference to the tensions resulting from competing interests between the more developed societies of the global north and the less developed societies of the global south. Separate peace is closely related to Johan Galtung's notion of negative peace, where an absence of war is made effective by the separation or lack of relations between social groups (Galtung, "An Editorial," *Journal of Peace Research* 1, no. 1, 1964).

4. See, for example, I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Victory in war is always relational (the victor emerges only in relation to the vanquished); while both victor and vanquished bear the extreme costs of warfare, the victor is relatively better off than the vanquished, and both are absolutely worse off than they had been prior to the war.

5. See, especially, Hannah Arendt's essay differentiating between power and violence in human social relations: "Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of

creating it" (Arendt, "On Violence," *Crises of the Republic*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969, 155).

6. The first treaty among states to renunciate the right of states to make war was promulgated on August 27, 1928, as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (otherwise known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact). Most importantly, this principle became a core precept of the Charter of the United Nations, signed on June 26, 1945.

7. Only in its most simple form can war be viewed as the result of a single declaratory decision. Wars are generally not declared but rather are the result of a series of political decisions in an interactive process. See John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

8. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981) for a compelling treatment of the conditional rationality of war making by powerful states. See also Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1988), 45–65, for a lucid argument for why victory in warfare entrenches a predisposition to war making in the leadership of states.

9. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963) presents one of the more successful early attempts to bring the perspectives of the vanquished into the historical record. Karl Marx had earlier articulated a theory to explain the subordination of civil society to the war-making state.

10. See Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim, *The War System: An Interdisciplinary Approach* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). Critical reflection on the impetus to and conduct of war was given powerful public exposure with the Nuremberg trials of the major (German) war criminals held from November 20, 1945, through October 1, 1946, when Nazi Germany's surviving leaders were tried for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

11. Civil society in the United States, due to that country's geographical isolation from the European war system, was not traditionally subordinated to the state by a history of warfare with rivals. The principle of civilian control over the military is embodied in the U.S. Constitution, particularly Art. 1 sec. 8 and Art. 2 sec. 2.

12. Adverse public reaction to the world's first televised war taking place in Vietnam in the late 1960s combined with the nonviolent civil rights movement in the United States and anticolonialist sentiments to consolidate a systemic peacemaking agenda and elevate peacemakers into the public eye through mass media attention. Most civil wars in third world countries were largely dismissed as proxy wars between the world's superpowers. Public recognition of the breadth and severity of these wars came about only after the end of the Cold War; see Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

13. The democratic peace proposition is based upon the observation that "absence of war between democracies comes as close to anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. M. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, 240). Democracies are not immune to civil warfare, however, and do make war with nondemocracies. Figures for warfare in states during the cold war period are derived from the Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2009, dataset posted on the Center for Systemic Peace website ([www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm), accessed on December 29, 2010).

14. See Jack Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, "A Global Model

for Forecasting Political Instability," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 1 (2010): 190–208.

15. Marshall, *Third World War*, 146.

16. See Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Arlington, VA: Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, and Center for Systemic Peace, 2009), [www.systemicpeace.org/Global Report 2009.pdf](http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf).

17. See Edward E. Azar, Paul Jareidini, and Ronald McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory as Practice in the Middle East," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 8 (1978): 41–60, and Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990).

18. The claim by the war makers in the West that the cold war ended in the military victory by the West is, at once, characteristic rhetoric and an absurd notion. The claim has, at least temporarily, rationalized popular support for maintaining the war system in the West. The global war on terrorism has, in many respects, supplanted the cold war rationale and places tangible limits on the influence of the peacemakers over public policy.

19. To be clear, I argue that the only legitimate use of force is to neutralize the perceived rational utility of force in political relations as explicitly prescribed in law. Marshall, *Third World War*, p. 14.

20. See, Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1956).

21. Systemic peace, then, relates to Galtung's "positive peace" emphasizing interaction and integration of social groups but takes that notion a step further by proposing a proactive, holistic (multilevel) approach to peacemaking emphasizing complex societal-systems analysis and systemic conflict management functions. See also Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace." Societal-systems analysis and an agenda for systemic peace are detailed in Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 7.

22. As point of clarification, I argue that the impetus to violence is an inherent and thereby inevitable feature of the individuation process in the societal context, which characterizes systemic sociopaths and isolates and insulates them instrumentally from sociational pressures. The management of personal violence requires tactics that dissuade, dampen, deter, or contain violent impulse to minimize its influence on collective action. Collective violence, on the other hand, is a societal phenomenon that critically depends on social organization, which is fundamentally amenable to alternative management techniques and initiatives. Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 3.

23. Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2009*, 3–13. Measures of the quality of governance refer to the POLITY score produced by the Polity IV Project at the Center for Systemic Peace under the direction of the author of this study.

24. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, "State Fragility Index and Matrix 2009" ([www.systemicpeace.org/SFI/matrix2009c.pdf](http://www.systemicpeace.org/SFI/matrix2009c.pdf), accessed December 30, 2010).

25. Anocracies are regimes with inconsistent or incoherent authority structures that combine autocratic and democratic modes of societal order or control. They may be considered alternatively as incomplete democracies, weak autocracies, or transitory regimes.

26. Goldstone et al., "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability."

27. Based on an analysis of the PITF State Failure Problem Set datasets posted on the Center for Systemic Peace website ([www.systemicpeace.org/inscr](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr), accessed December 30, 2010).

28. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, "A Macro-Comparative Analysis of the Problem of Factionalism in Emerging Democracies," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29, 2008, Boston.



29. This is also a standard measure of the quality of democratic governance.
  30. Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 1.
  31. See David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965).
  32. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974) and Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1979). Waltz's theory was simply an updating of the basic classic precepts of the 17th-century Westphalian state system codifying the distribution of power in Europe following the Thirty Years War.
  33. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) and Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
  34. Societal-systems analysis proposes the state as the organizational and managerial component of any and every societal system. The integration of simple and lesser societal systems into complex and greater societal systems is accomplished through the articulation and recognition of what Muzafer Sherif has called "superordinate goals"; see *In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). The coherence and cohesion of complex societal systems is predicated upon intersystem complementarity or symbiosis; this principle has been termed *subsidiarity*, wherein organizational management functions in complex systems should be guided by the most appropriate, competent authority in the system, usually the unit closest to the issue that enjoys comprehensive information and influence over policy outcomes. Subsidiarity is a natural, organizational corollary to accountability.
  35. Goldstone et al, *A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability*.
  36. This organizational universality is an existential property in groups of statistically significant size: at least 100 members.
  37. It is proposed that system resilience is a dynamic function of multiple-group identifications of system members and the general complementarity of group interests (i.e., associational ties and interaction densities of societal networks).
  38. Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 3.
  39. See Figure 3.15 in Marshall, *Third World War*, 101, for a graphic depiction of the political economy of conflict management.
  40. Legitimate enforcement of a formalized rule of law system should be considered the final arbiter of a conflict process; the use of force initiates violence into the process and must be considered a nonlegitimate resolution technique. The selective suspension of a societal-systemic interaction (optional play) is a superior strategy to the use of force in protracted conflict processes; see Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 6.
  41. See, Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2009*. See also, Monty G. Marshall, "The Measurement of Democracy and the Means of History," *Social Science and Modern SOCIETY* 48, no. 1 (2011): 24–35; and Monty G. Marshall, "The New Democratic Order: Complex Societal-Systems and the 'Invisible Hand,'" *Harvard International Review* 33 no. 1 (2011): 95–106.
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