

## Narrative Description:1

## **Executive Recruitment:** Designation (3)

Islam Karimov, former first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, was appointed president in 1991 in elections that international observers considered neither free nor fair. President Karimov had his stay in office extended to the year 2000 through a 1995 Soviet-style referendum. Subsequently, the

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National Assembly voted to make this extension part of Karimov's first term, thereby making him eligible to run again in 2000. Both domestic and international observers deemed the January 2000 election, won by Karimov with ninety-two percent of the vote, as fraudulent. In yet another attempt to consolidate his political authority, in January 2002 Karimov won overwhelming support for extending the presidential term from five to seven years. In this same referendum the populace approved a plan to replace the one-chamber parliament with a bicameral legislature. Karimov's term was scheduled to expire in 2007; however, Karimov ran for reelection once again in the 23 December 2007 presidential election despite a constitutional limit of two terms in office. The electoral commission explained that the 2002 extension of the presidential term to seven years allowed Karimov to run for a second seven-year term.

## **Executive Constraints:** *Unlimited Authority* (1)

While President Karimov has yet to develop the personality cult of his southern neighbor, former-President Sapormurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan, he is actively trying to do so. Little happens politically in Uzbekistan without his approval. He dominates all three branches of government, the military, and the security police. The National Assembly, which consists only of members that support the President, is a rubber-stamp institution with no real autonomy or power. While most of the members of government have ties to the former Communist Party, now the Democratic Party, this organizational body no longer plays a significant role in politics and does not represent a check on the powers of the President. Neither the legislature nor the judiciary has been able to effectively constrain the executive. Personal loyalty to the President is the defining characteristic of this polity.

Legislative elections held in December 2004, January 2005, and December 2009-January 2010 were widely viewed as fraudulent. The two major opposition groups, Erk (Freedom) and Birlik (Unity), were barred from competing as their leaders remained in exile. Only pro-government parties were allowed to participate in legislative elections; pro-government parties include the Liberal Democratic, Milliy Tiklanish Democratic, People's Democratic, and Adolat Social Democratic parties. In addition, fifteen seats in the legislature are reserved for the Environmental Movement of Uzbekistan.

## **Political Participation: Repressed Competition (1)**

President Karimov tightly controls political competition in Uzbekistan with the support of the People's Democratic (former Communist) Party and four "loyal opposition" parties. The government's effective manipulation of election laws and use of political intimidation and repression has resulted in the almost total absence of a true opposition party in Uzbekistan since the early 1990s. The country's best known opposition parties, Erk and Birlik, have been banned, their leaders have gone into exile, and, for the most part, their followers have been silenced. Without calling itself a one-party state, nevertheless, President Karimov has created a political system in which loyalty to himself is of paramount importance and opposition to his rule is not tolerated. Moreover, since 1997 the government has actively sought to restrict the activities of Islamic groups ("Wahhabis") within the country. In recent years these groups have responded to this crackdown with organized violence (particularly in the Fergana Valley).