Global Report 2014

Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility

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CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE

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COVER IMAGES:

The Pearl Monument (Manama, Bahrain; before and after its destruction)
The Pearl Monument was built to commemorate the 3rd Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in 1982 and the beginning of construction of the 25 km causeway that links the island of Bahrain to the Saudi Arabian mainland; it comprised six *dhow* "sails" (representing the six GCC countries) topped by a large pearl (a symbol of unity and homage to Bahrain's historic pearl diving economy). On 14 March 2011, following a month of large-scale, opposition demonstrations, Saudi troops crossed the causeway to help the Bahrain monarchy forcibly clear encampments centered on "Pearl Square" and suppress the nascent civil and political rights movement. As the Pearl Monument had become a symbol for opposition to the monarchy, the government ordered its destruction on 18 March 2011 (back cover).

Global Report 2014

## Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility

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SIG Networks: (I)nterest; (S)ocial; (E)conomic; (P)rofessional; (B)roker; (G)overnment; (A)lternative; (M)ilitant

Political Salience and Emotive Content: In modern, complex societal-systems, where individuals can commit, withhold, or transfer their loyalty among multiple Social Identity Groups (SIGs) that address their personal interests, actions, circumstances, technologies, and performance issues intermingle to determine the salience of options and actions at any point in time for any individual in the social scheme. Members withdraw from SIGs that are deemed incompatible with their values and interests and commit or transfer loyalty (and, thus, expand the membership) of SIGs that are seen to increase the individual's rational utility and/or emotive needs, wants, or desires; links among groups sharing common values and common members are also strengthened.

Societal Diffusion, Polarization, and Transference: As conflict management is the principal function of the state and governance, more generally, broad and protracted failure to regulate or correct conflict issues triggers increasing emotive content and political salience, causing (1) greater mobilization, networking, polarization, and militancy among constituent groups and (2) greater compounding of symbolic/ideological differences between the governing elites and oppositional groups (i.e., polar factionalism). As uses of force in contentious interactions among authorities and SIGs increase, militants and extremists are drawn or pushed into political action, facilitating their greater organization and effect.

The Societal-Systemic Effects of Protracted Social Conflict: The "unintended consequences" of political intransigence and protracted social conflict accumulate over time and increase systemic deterioration and societal atrophy through the diffusion of insecurity, both intensively and extensively, and contribute to a syndrome of societal-system un- and under-development. This syndrome has observable effects that act to reinforce conflict dynamics (increasing social costs) and make negotiated conflict resolution more complex and intractable (decreasing prospects for resolution), necessitating intercession by supra-ordinate authorities. The absence of political will to resolve societal-systemic crises simply extends and expands the ill effects.

– Excerpted from Monty G. Marshall, "Societal-Systems Analytics: Managing Complexity in Modern Societal-Systems," Video Book (part 7), Center for Systemic Peace, 2014.
www.systemicpeace.org/videobook.html

EMOTIVE CONTENT AND DISTORTED PRIORITIES IN PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS[1]

In November 2010, the lead author of *Global Report 2014*, Monty G. Marshall, was named as Lead Consultant for a planned UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia expert group meeting (EGM), titled "Governance: A Catalyst for Peace-building," to be held in Beirut in late January or early February 2011.[2] The paper he produced for the conference, titled "Emotive Response and Distorted Priorities in Protracted Conflict Regions: Applying Context to a Systemic Peace Conundrum," was not well-received by the conference organizers and the conference, itself, was quickly overtaken by a cascade of governance and conflict events sparked in Tunisia in January 2011 and termed the "Arab Spring" which exploded across the region in the years hence.

The "systemic peace conundrum" to which the title of the paper referred was actually drawn from the Terms of Reference (ToR) that described the duties of the Lead Consultant for the EGM: "In a background discussion document for the Seventh Global Forum on Reinventing Government entitled *The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries* [2007], the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concluded that 'Without effective governance institutions – an effective government, a strong private sector, and a vital civil society – little can be done to bring about peace, reconstruct war-torn countries, and stabilize political, economic, and social conditions.' Good governance is therefore a necessary precursor to peacebuilding."

This proposition begs the question, "How does good governance emerge following periods of political instability, state failure, and armed conflict?" Does it rise like a Phoenix from the ashes? Does it gallop in on its trusty steed from over yonder hill? Does it wake suddenly in a cold sweat as the innocent do from a seemingly interminable nightmare? Does it drop like *manna* from the heavens? Is it restored by the wisp of a magic wand? From where does good governance come if not from the peacebuilding process itself? Hence the conundrum. Political action is very often both triggered and driven by emotive content; whereas, good decisions are usually the product of careful and extensive deliberation, especially in complex societal-systems.

What may provide a bridge between incitement and reason are the sobering effects of experience viewed through reflections of the past, that is, periods of general war weariness that dissipate the emotive drive of contention to provide an opportunity for war-affected populations and, particularly, political elites to reassess the emotional baggage they are carrying that has distorted past policy priorities and remains to perpetuate poor governance and push societal-systems toward relapses into state failure. Good governance is past-informed and future-oriented; it is both cause and consequence of systemic peacebuilding. Within a general climate of trauma and lack of public trust, what is most supportive of recovery in war-torn societies are third party **accountability guarantees**

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[1] The term "protracted social conflict" was first used in reference to seeming intractable conflicts in the Middle East; see Edward E. Azar, Paul Jareidini, and Ronald McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory as Practice in the Middle East," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 8 (1978): 41-60.

[2] UNESCWA includes the mainly ethnic-Arab countries of Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, (North) Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

for good governance that ensure that investments and implemented public policies remain inclusive, equitable, and just. Public accountability, for past infractions and future behavior, improves performance and reduces the emotive content of politics.

The "war weariness effect," however, is most compelling for states that exist in geopolitical isolation (the historical case) or in "good neighborhoods" where they can receive third party support from countries constituting a regional systemic peace. In the modern era of increasing globalization, regional effects loom large and the negative influences, or "diffusion of insecurity," from neighboring states turn war weariness into a deeper and more volatile form of insecurity. Protracted conflict regions are ruled by an insecurity dilemma within which war-torn societies feel compelled to prepare themselves for the next war rather than working toward a future peace. Post-war recovery by states situated in protracted conflict regions need support from third-party **accountability and security guarantees**. Security guarantees are neither a prescription for re-arming or disarming affected populations; they must ensure that the political utility of force and violence is neutralized so that cooperation and trust can be re-established in the aftermath of enmity among contending, constituent groups. Re-arming state authorities and/or non-state groups in war-torn societies, even under the "controlled" auspices of "professionalization," will not increase the sense of local security as much as it increases the perceived political utility of force.

Even the sense of urgency, the perceived imperative that "something must be done" in response to a crisis situation, is itself an emotive stimulus. When emotions drive political action, something always happens; however, when emotions define politics, that "something" is most likely to be contentious and divisive and, ultimately, counterproductive. When confined to short outbursts, political action with high emotive content represents, simply, a momentary, collective lapse of reason. Emotive actions provide an opportunity for individuals to congregate in empathy, to vent their dissatisfaction and frustration with the political performance of leaders, and display the strength of their shared position on an issue. They provide "voice" in ongoing deliberations and demonstrate the importance of an issue to an affected portion of a population. In societal-systems analytics, this escalation of contentious politics is termed *issue factionalism*. (see figure 2, following).

Mass protest should not be viewed as an exercise in democracy but, rather, as a signal that the political process, whether democratic or autocratic, is failing to adequately recognize the levels of discontent and dissent and properly address an important and valued issue in public policy. Mass mobilization is simply easier to accomplish, better tolerated, and more likely to influence the political agenda in more democratic regimes; they are better tolerated because democratic regimes have been historically associated with higher levels of societal-system development (i.e, "an effective government, a strong private sector, and a vital civil society") and, so, public protests are more likely to be governed by civility and self-restraint. When civility and self-restraint break down, as they tend to do over a prolonged course of political action, then anarchy and disorder begin to prevail and even democratic regimes become less tolerant of dissent. The deteriorating conditions of mass political action provide both an opportunity and a cover for criminal, militant, and extremist political action, organized more or less spontaneously through attainment of a "critical mass" within a larger mass political action and stimulated by an increasing sense

of both utility and impunity. When emotive content is stoked to the level of anger and rage, political violence ensues. From this perspective, the popular term "democratic revolution" is an oxymoron, at best, and a seduction to embrace violence, at worst.

The emotive content of social conflict mobilizes political action, which expands and energizes the membership of both established and ad hoc social identity groups. This dynamic is depicted in the opening diagram (page 1). Social Identity Groups (SIGs) normally operate on the basis of the regular efforts of core member-ship (the shaded circles in the diagram); these are the members that identify strongly with the SIG and form the group's administration and maintain recruitment. When an issue of importance to group members and group identity gains salience within the general political process, latent and inactive members become energized and serve to expand the group's capacity to engage in collective action; this dynamic is depicted in the diagram by the wider circles. The heightened emotive content of political action stimulates greater reflection on a wider range of issues, dissatisfactions, and grievances and the heightened excitement (and incitement) tends to increase awareness and expand and prolong activism.

Of course, the responses of state authorities to political activism may act to dissipate emotive content through political accommodation or further stimulate emotive content through acts of rejection or denial (frustration). Acts of concession may help to alleviate single-issue activism but may increase multi-issue activism as greater concessions in more issue areas are sought through the perception of rewarding activism. Acts of suppression may temporarily alleviate a rise in emotive content so that authorities and activists can gain time to reach a suitable accommodation. Acts of repression may

serve to decrease overt political action but will do so at the cost of increasing emotive content and the transfer of loyalties of affected constituents away from the state and toward alternative sources of authority. More troublesome in this regard is the increasing linkages of militant groups to civil society groups and the increasing rationalization (and embrace) of the utility of force in conflict resolution. Most insidious to the process of protracted social conflict is that extremists, who are sociopathic by definition, are increasingly stimulated to "act out" and "link up" by the generally heightened emotive content of social relations and emboldened by increasing political turmoil and social disorder.

Protracted Social Conflict and the Emergence of *Polar Factionalism*

When governing authorities are either unwilling or unable to adequately address the sources of contention and institute accountability and accommodations that can successfully dampen, dissipate, or dispel emotive content within the general political process, discontent may energize and combine multiple issues of contention in a societal-system so that interests are perceived to overlap and issues (and social identity groups) become linked in common cause and concerted (often anti-state) political action. In societal-system analytics, this more complex form of factionalism is termed, ***polar factionalism.***

The social and political dynamics that lead to a condition of polar factionalism have generally been referred to in social science literature as "polarization," which is defined by the *American Heritage Dictionary* as "a concentration, as of groups, forces, or interests, about two conflicting or contrasting positions." The *Polity* data series codes this particular quality of

"competitiveness of participation" (PARCOMP) with the value "3" (factional) and defines "factional" as "[p]olities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas." When combined with values of "regulation of participation" (PARREG), factionalism can be viewed as "restricted" (POLCOMP=6), when the governing regime systematically restricts the participation of select opposition groups, or "open" (POLCOMP=7), when all main opposition groups are able to participate openly. It is a fairly common condition which, according to the 2013 version of the *Polity IV* data series, has affected about two-thirds (110) of the countries of the world for some period of time since 1946.

What we have observed in our systematic investigations into the condition of polar factionalism in the many diverse countries of the global system is an unmistakable coalescence and concentration of opposition to state authority in cases of protracted social conflict. Polar factionalism is uniquely characterized by an "unnatural alliance" of social identity and political interest groups that are engaged in systematic and overt demonstrations of contention with state authorities and their supporters. By "unnatural alliance," we mean that SIGs with few or no identifiable common interests or goals (or, even, contradictory or competing interests and goals) will align against state policies and unite in opposition to state authorities; these "unnatural" alliances are observed as additions to expected or "natural" alliances among opposition groups based on shared interests and common goals. Unnatural alliances appear to have only one, strong, shared interest and common goal: rejection of state authority and the capitulation of the state leadership. What appears to bond

diverse groups together in an unnatural alliance is the transference of potentially negotiable material interests to emotively-charged and ultimately non-negotiable symbolic issues. Polar factionalism tends to radicalize both anti-state and state factions and lead the political process toward greater levels of confrontation and greater depths of intransigence, placing it at the gateway to political instability and regime change.

While the association between regime type and political instability has been the subject of systematic study since the original compilation of the *Polity* data series in the mid-1970s and the connection between "anocracies" (regimes with mixed or weak authority, scoring between -5 and 5 on the POLITY scale) and political instability has been well-documented in research findings, the importance of polar factionalism in explaining political instability outcomes (i.e., onsets of civil wars and autocratic reversals of democratization processes) was first uncovered in 2005 during Phase V research conducted by the US Government-sponsored Political Instability Task Force (PITF). This finding initiated a systematic investigation by the authors of the *Global Report* series into the condition of (polar) factionalism as it was originally coded in the *Polity* data series. Their investigation confirmed the veracity of both the factionalism concept and the coded regime characteristic; their findings were reported in papers presented at annual meetings of the American Political Science Association (2006, 2008) and the International Studies Association (2007, 2012).

The Task Force (PITF) published their original findings in a 2010 article in the *American Journal of Political Science*, titled "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability." That article reports that "[t]he most striking result in the model...is the identification of partial democracies with factionalism as an exceptionally unstable

Figure 2. Societal-Systems Analytics: Political Process Model

type of regime. The relative odds of instability for such regimes were over 30 times greater than for full autocracies, other things being equal. This high level of relative risk was similar for the onset of [ethnic or revolutionary] civil wars, and even greater for adverse regime changes." (p. 197) Looking at the relationship between polar factionalism and our State Fragility Index, we find that countries with factionalism are twice as fragile on average as those without factionalism (13.6 to 6.9).[3]

Figure 2 presents a generalized conceptual model of the political process in societal-systems; it is proposed that the emotive

content of political action increases from left to right in the model (and decreases right to left). The model presumes that rationality is a structural variable that is a function of societal-systemic development; as such, rationality remains fairly constant across the political process model, whereas the emotive content is dynamic and largely circumstantial.[4] Changes in circumstances and general behavioral responses to those circumstances may "push" the process toward higher levels of emotive content (represented by the red arrows) or "pull" the process toward lower levels of emotive

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[3] By definition, factionalism cannot be observed in autocratic regimes (POLITY < -6), so these cases are not included in the calculations.

[4] It is argued that emotive content does not displace rationality with irrationality but, rather, distorts or otherwise alters political priorities, thus, changing political behaviors and, consequently, future circumstances.

content (the blue arrows). This "push and pull" coincides and tends toward congruence with greater or lesser qualities of legitimate (democratic) and instrumental (autocratic) authority and governance. This is the conceptual basis for the unique *Polity* coding scheme, which measures distinct qualities, or patterns, of democratic and autocratic authority concurrently. The general quality of the political process in a given societal-system at any particular point in time will fall somewhere along this spectrum characterized by six distinct categories, identified left to right as conventional politics, contentious politics, issue factionalism, polar factionalism, militancy, and open warfare. Each of these categories has already been, or will be in following pages, briefly described in terms of its emotive content and the general nature of political action and interaction that can be expected.

The Political Process Model denotes two processual equilibrium points (E): one is situated in conventional politics and is characterized by a positive-sum strategic interaction (game) that favors and sustains legitimate (democratic) authority; the second equilibrium point is situated in polar factionalism and is characterized by a zero-sum game dominated by instrumental (autocratic) authority. The far (right) end of the process spectrum is characterized by a negative-sum strategic interaction that tends toward political fragmentation or separation.

The societal-system rationale for autocratic authority strengthens as the process moves toward the right and weakens as the process shifts toward the left; conversely for democratic authority. Autocratic authority is most likely to characterize the political process in lesser developed societal-systems as the conditions for conventional politics are difficult to establish in complex societal-systems and instrumental (forceful) means are necessary to establish a basic social order in largely chaotic (underdeveloped) societal-systems. However, the basic social order established through instrumental, autocratic authority creates a fundamentally exclusive, state/anti-state polarization of the societal-system in which the anti-state polarity must be repressed through the maintenance of (superior) instrumental authority in order to maintain political stability. Greater levels of societal-systemic development favor and support more inclusive and deliberative forms of decision making and legitimate sources of authority. As autocratic authority emerges from and actively institutionalizes polar factionalism as a governance rationale, the problem of polar factionalism must be resolved before the democratization of regime authority can progress. For this to occur, the political goals of the established (state) political elites and the emergent (civil society) political elites must be compatible and congruent.

The Political Process Model in figure 2 also identifies two "crisis points" (C). The crisis point associated with legitimate authority is situated in "issue factionalism," whereby the regime must effectively address issues of factionalism before those (unresolved) issues accumulate. Multiple issues of contention provide the basis for polarization and complex factionalism. Failure of the state to remedy factionalism pushes the political process toward greater levels of emotive content and a shift in political priorities toward the perceived utility of instrumental means of conflict resolution. The crisis point associated with instrumental authority is situated in "militancy" when the coercive means used to maintain regime authority and repress dissent are directly challenged by the instrumental actions of non-state actors. Failure of the state to control non-state militancy undermines and erodes the critical capacity of the instrumental state to maintain coercive authority and enforce the social order. Without third party assistance,

the "push" of societal-system relations in post-conflict (violent; strongly emotive) politics and circumstances is toward an autocratic authority equilibrium and the re-imposition of a functional social order; the "pull" of post-factional (non-violent; less strongly emotive) politics is generally toward greater democratic authority.

The Rise of Militancy and Organized Extremism in Protracted Social Conflicts

Whereas failures of regimes based in legitimate, democratic authority are more likely to involve "autocratic backsliding" or societal-system fragmentation (termed *adverse regime change* by the PITF)[5], failures of regimes based on instrumental, autocratic authority are most likely to involve the onset of civil (revolutionary or ethnic) warfare. The onset of warfare necessarily empowers militants and the successful conduct of militant political action requires both effective organization and tightly orchestrated discipline, hallmarks of autocratic authority. Warfare is antithetical to democratic authority and only the most consolidated and entrenched (resilient) democracies are likely to withstand the intense and complex challenges presented by protracted social conflicts over the medium term, particularly in regard to internal (civil) conflicts. The autocratic pressures of warfare are conditioned by countervailing influences when militant action is directed or projected against external actors: successful defense against foreign aggression or pursuit of foreign interests can strengthen internal loyalty and increase active participation in democratic governance.

We have long argued that warfare is the greatest environmental disaster that can befall complex societal-systems. By sheer magnitude, scope, and long-term impact, the death and destruction accomplished in manmade disasters far surpasses anything that natural disasters have, so far, produced in the modern age (this proposition would certainly be undone by a massive asteroid strike or global pandemic or, potentially, human-induced climate change). Indeed, effective collective responses to the existential challenges posed by the natural environment provide a substantial portion of the "pull" toward democratization. However, the combined effects of war's environmental and emotive impacts intertwine to greatly diminish the prospects for progressive societal-system development and the good governance/peacebuilding process. Effective conflict management, then, must be understood to be the prime imperative of good governance.

While it requires the concerted efforts of the majority of constituents in a complex societal-system to produce steady progress in the development process, those efforts can be quickly undone by the systematic actions of a militant minority. For progressive development to occur, not only does the proportion of militants need to remain a relatively small minority but their willingness and ability to behave militantly must remain inhibited. The escalating emotive content of contentious politics erodes societal restraints and undermines systemic constraints on militant action creating a pathway and "slippery slope" toward militancy and warfare as individuals and groups gravitate and congregate in increasingly polarized factions.

Perhaps the most insidious corollary of protracted social conflict is the activation and congregation of militants and extremists. Whereas militants exhibit some sociability and some moral or ethical

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[5] *Adverse regime change* includes autocratic backsliding, territorial fragmentation (secession), or a "near total" collapse of central authority.

restraints on political action, extremists show little or no self-restraint; they are true sociopaths.[6] During periods of low emotive content in political action, extremists tend to shun social relationships and remain "lone wolves," thereby minimizing the social costs associated with extremist actions. However, during times of strong emotive content and increasing militancy, extremists are emboldened to act, and act not only with relative impunity but, also, with some "utilitarian" rationale and encouragement. What is worse, over time, as extremists become increasingly active and excited and general conditions become more desperate, they too are pushed to identify with social groups and congregate in otherwise highly "unnatural" associations steeped in ideologies of mass destruction and "rebirth." The social damage that can be inflicted by "lone wolf" extremists is self-constrained by their inability and unwillingness to form associations and coordinate action; the social damage that can be perpetrated by organized extremists is nearly boundless and impervious to rational deterrence.

Figures 3a, 3b and 3c, below, provide a representation of the "undevelopment" (reverse development) and societal-system disintegration process that is induced by protracted social conflict and, particularly, by the onset and persistence of political violence and warfare. The figure consists of three "snapshot" looks at the undevelopment process presented simply as changes in the Gaussian distribution of instrumental dispositions in individuals comprising a social scheme (that is, a societal-system). At the mid-point of the *x*-axis ("relative zero") are the "super-cooperators," those disposed to use no instrumental (coercive) action in social

relations and, so, relying strictly on legitimacy, compliance, and association to effect political action. Complex societal-systems are only possible because they have a core of super-cooperators and others favoring non-coercive political action. The development process can be viewed as an advanced function of the concentration of individuals around this cooperative "proactive" core.

In simplest terms, protracted social conflict causes the shape of the Gaussian curve to flatten, driving more individuals farther away from the cooperative core and toward a stronger, instrumental disposition, which can be either "active" to favor self-promotion or "reactive" so as to favor self-defense strategies. The social consequences of the "undevelopment" process are an increase in the numbers of militants and extremists and a concomitant decrease in the numbers and, so, countervailing conflict management capacity of core cooperators. Higher relative proportions of militants and extremists at lesser levels of societal-system development present a governance dilemma that favors the emergence of instrumental (autocratic) authority; the relative preponderance of cooperative individuals at greater levels of development not only allow for the transition to more legitimate and inclusive forms of governance (democratization) but necessitate that transition as the most effective means for managing increasing social complexity.

Table 1, then, provides an illustrative comparison of the compositions of the three "snapshot" views based on a constant population across the three models. The high degree of contrast across the models helps to emphasize the critical, instrumental aspects of the "undevelopment" process. The social dynamics of the development process also help to explain the observed prevalence of political violence and instability in lesser-developed societies.

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[6] In modern militaries, militancy is disciplined by "civilian (non-militant) control" of militant action in accord with the greater public interest.

Figure 3a

Figure 3b

Figure 3c

Figure 3a		Figure 3b		Figure 3c	
#	%	#	%	#	%
241	87.6	201	73.1	155	56.4
28	10.2	46	16.7	64	23.3
6	2.2	28	10.2	56	20.4

Table 1

For a more detailed explanation of the fundamental structures and dynamics of complex societal-systems, see Monty G. Marshall, "Societal-System Analytics: Managing Complexity in Modern Societal-Systems," a video book in eight parts produced by the Center for Systemic Peace: *www.systemicpeace.org/videobook.html*

ASSESSING THE GLOBAL QUALITIES OF SYSTEMIC PEACE

Societal-systems analytics focus on the complex relations between dynamics (human agency and environmental forces) and statics (physical and social attributes, conditions, and structures). Basic societal-systems analysis takes into account the interconnectedness of three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems: governance, conflict, and development (based on the accumulation of both physical and human capital).

The conditions, characteristics, qualities, and prospects of each of the three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems critically affect the other two dimensions to such a degree that it is not possible to meaningfully analyze one dimension without taking the other two dimensions into account. Any change in one dimension will have consequences for each of the other dimensions; any limitation or weakness in one of the key dimensions will lessen the prospects for improvement in the other dimensions. Successful performance of a societal-system can be expected to be both incremental and congruent among the key dimensions; unsuccessful performance in complex systems, on the other hand, can reverberate through the system, weakening its delicate webs of human relations, and lead to cascades of ill effects. Societal-system performance, then, depends on the system's capabilities for collective action. Successful improvement of conditions in a societal-system thus requires coordinated changes among all of the key dimensions and throughout the system. With regard to each dimension, change depends on a combination of applied coordination (effectiveness) and voluntary compliance (legitimacy).

Figure 4. Societal-System Triad

Performance evaluation of a societal-system must therefore track conditions in all key dimensions with a view toward both effectiveness and legitimacy. Problems that arise in societal-system dynamics can stem from any of the three fundamental dimensions but will manifest in all three dimensions if the problem is not managed effectively and resolved systemically. The qualities of governance and development must be taken into account when analyzing or leveraging conflict factors. Likewise, the qualities of conflict and governance must be included when examining the potential for development and the conditions of conflict and development critically affect the nature of governance. This approach goes beyond "whole-of-government" approaches as it recognizes that each of the three dimensions extend through the complex societal structures and networks of the system (i.e., civil society and marginal sectors) and integrates both "top down" and "bottom up" standpoints, that is, a holistic, societal-systemic approach.

This report series provides general, macro-comparative evaluations of contemporary conditions, qualities, and trends over time in the three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems analysis at the global level. These performance evaluations are intended to help inform our audience of the immediate circumstances of the emerging global system and future prospects for stabilizing dynamics and consolidating efficacious policies in the era of globalization.

Conflict Dimension: Global Trends in Armed Conflict

The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system performance is in regard to its conflict dimension, that is, changes over time in the status of all major episodes of political violence (armed conflict) taking place within the global system. These episodes include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and

interstate (including independence) warfare.[7] Figure 5, below, charts global trends in warfare over the contemporary period, 1946-2013. The graphic charts the global trend and breaks out that general trend into two distinct components: societal (internal) and interstate (external) warfare. In order to facilitate comparisons across the global trends graphs presented in the *Global Report* series, the year 1991 is denoted by a dashed line; that year marks the end of the Cold War period (1946-1991) and the beginning of the era of globalization. The global totals for both societal and interstate warfare have declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. However, during the Cold War period, interstate warfare remained fairly constant at a relatively low level, while societal warfare can be seen to have increased at an almost constant rate across the entire period. According to our calculations, the general global magnitude of warfare decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by 2010 to its lowest level since 1961.

Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often received crucial military and/or material support from foreign states and this support was often linked to the competition between the two, rival superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, much of the decrease in global armed conflict can be accounted for by the ending of many of these protracted societal wars. The rate of onset for new wars has diminished since 1991: from 5.26 new wars per annum during the Cold War period to 3.86 new wars per annum since the end of the Cold War. The recent decrease in the rate of onset for new armed conflicts is nearly evenly split between societal wars, decreasing from a rate of 3.86 to 3.23 per annum (a decline of 0.63), and interstate wars, decreasing from a rate of 1.43 to 0.64 (a decline of 0.79). The global trend line for societal wars can be seen to have increased slightly over the past several years, largely due to increasing warfare in the Arab League countries in the aftermath of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the "Arab Spring" upheavals that began in Tunisia in January 2011.[8]

In contrast to the relatively high magnitude and rate of onset for societal wars, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UN), particularly in comparison with the high levels of interstate war during the first half of the twentieth century. The UN was specially designed to "maintain international peace and security" without "interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Although there was a

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[7] Interstate and civil wars must have reached a magnitude of over 500 directly-related deaths to be included in the analysis. The magnitude of each "major episode of political violence" (armed conflict) is evaluated according to its comprehensive effects on the state or states directly affected by the warfare, including numbers of combatants and casualties, affected area, dislocated population, and extent of infrastructure damage. It is then assigned a score on a ten-point scale; this value is recorded for each year the war remains active. See Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Effects of War," chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) for a detailed explanation of the methodology used. A list of the events used in the analysis is posted on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site at www.systemicpeace.org ("War List").

[8] Arab League countries include the 17 UNESCWA countries listed in note 2 above, plus Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Somalia.

moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence, such as the Algerian and Vietnamese wars, fought during the decolonization of the "third world" during the first half of the Cold War period. Three-quarters of the seventy-four interstate wars remained at fairly low levels of violence and were of relatively short duration. The conventional distinction between interstate and intrastate wars has been blurred in the past by "internationalized civil wars," in which foreign powers engaged in direct military interventions, such as the Korean and Second Vietnamese wars, and more recently by the ongoing Global War on Terror and increased global activism directed toward humanitarian operations and the "responsibility to protect" (R2P). Early R2P operations in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1998-99) appear to have limited

the human costs of those wars; humanitarian disasters in Rwanda (1999) and Sudan-Darfur (2003) have resulted in extremely high human costs as a lack of political will and logistical capacity prevented R2P operations in those cases.

High magnitude interstate wars were limited to the several Arab-Israeli wars, the Vietnamese wars, the Afghanistan wars, the Iraqi wars, the India-Pakistan wars, and the more recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (2005); all except the Iraq-Iran (1980-88) war and the first Gulf War (1990-91) had some domestic, or former-domestic, conflict element (i.e., internationalized civil wars). Over the entire period, since 1946, wars have been quite common: there have been 332 distinct episodes of major armed conflict in the world. During the past twenty-five years (since 1989), over one-half of all countries have experienced some major armed conflict (85 of 167 countries; in addition, the armed conflict in the Comoros islands, though relatively "major," did not reach 500 deaths).

Figure 5. Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2013

Figure 6. State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System, mid-2014

In mid-2014, there were twenty-three countries experiencing major armed conflicts within their territory (see figure 6; denoted by diamond icons); all of these are beset by societal warfare: Mexico (drug lords), Colombia (FARC/drug lords), Nigeria (Boko Haram and Christian-Muslim), Mali (Tuaregs), Central African Republic (Christian-Muslim), North Sudan (Darfur and SPLM-North), South Sudan (Murle and Nuer/Dinka), Democratic Republic of Congo (northeast and Katanga), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Somalia (al Shabab), Yemen (Houthi and southerners), Egypt (Islamists), Israel (Hamas), Iraq (Sunni), Syria (Sunni), Turkey (Kurds), Russia (eastern Transcaucasus), Ukraine (pro-Russians), Afghanistan (Taliban), Pakistan (sectarian, Pashtuns, Baluchs), India (Kashmir, Maoist, Assam), Myanmar (various non-Burman groups), and Thailand (Malays). Four of the current, major armed conflicts have a substantial drug production and trafficking component: Afghanistan,

Colombia, Mexico, and Myanmar (Burma). The several episodes of warfare plaguing the central and eastern Africa region involve ethnic militias and cross-border tensions. Militants from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi take refuge and continue to create havoc in the northeastern DRC and southern Sudan. The global mapping of "State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System" (figure 6) indicates that state fragility and warfare are closely connected, topics that will be examined in more detail later in this report.

There are eight countries with "recently ended" wars; these are numerically tagged on the map. In many of these locations, political tensions and/or low level violence continue to challenge state authorities. "Recently ended" conflicts include those in 1) United States (Iraq and Afghanistan); 2) Libya; 3) Chad; 4) Cote d'Ivoire; 5) Nigeria (Delta); 6) Sri Lanka; 7) Kyrgyzstan; and 8) Philippines (Moro). The "down

side" of the dramatic decrease in the general magnitude of armed conflict in the global system since the early 1990s is a dramatic increase in the number of post-war "recovery" states.

War-ravaged societies are highly prone to humanitarian crises and are in dire need of broad-based assistance. Perhaps the greatest challenge in post-war recovery is the over-supply of arms and skilled militants under conditions ripe for economic exploitation and the expansion of organized crime. Of course, countries bordering on war-torn and war-recovery states experience serious diffusion and spillover effects that further increase and expand the reach of organized crime, stimulate political tensions and corruption, increase local and regional insecurity, challenge local authorities, and overwhelm the already severely limited provision of crucial social services.

One of the current wars in remission has been touted as a "global war" (the "global war on terrorism" led by the United States). In terms of systematic and sustained attacks, however, that "global war" had been confined almost entirely to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (see figure 7).[9] The onset in 2011 of a devastating civil war in Syria has been especially problematic as it has allowed Sunni Arab militants and extremists to coalesce across the border with Iraq, where formerly dominant Sunni Arabs have been marginalized by the Shia Arab majority government put in place following the US

military invasion and forced ouster of the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The re-formation of Sunni Arabs in the area has, in turn, acted as a buffer between the Iraq government in Baghdad and the ethnic-Kurd area in northern Iraq, increasing the Kurds' local autonomy and buoying their long-held aspirations for independence. Kurdish aspirations have been, and continue to be, kept in check largely due to their geographical isolation (they have no access to the sea) and, so, their economic viability remains dependent on the good will of neighboring countries. Sunni Arabs appear to be caught in a similar dilemma as they find themselves blocked from sea access by the Alawite Arab regime in Syria and the Shia Arab regime in Iraq; they appear intent on hammering out an access to the sea.

While there have been increases in militant activity in almost all areas along the periphery of the Muslim region (except in East Asia), militant and extremist activities appear to be concentrating in the center: the Arab Middle East and the interior of Africa. Extremist activities are increasingly focused in Syria-Iraq and in northern Nigeria. Islamic extremists are almost entirely responsible for the dramatic increase in "high casualty terrorist bombings" (HCTB) since September 2001 (i.e., bombings by non-state actors resulting in fifteen or more deaths; figure 7). These bombings, killing and maiming mainly non-combatants, are very often directed toward a specific political target. HCTB events have been concentrated almost entirely in Muslim countries and in Muslim-majority regions in neighboring countries and the vast majority of casualties that have occurred have been among local, fellow-Muslims. To be fair, foreign interventionary forces have relied heavily on aerial and "drone" bomb attacks in these same theaters of warfare and non-combatants often figure prominently among the resulting casualties (see note 10, below).

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[9] The six-month periods run from September 11 to March 10 and from March 11 to September 10; the latter period is denoted by the "y" marker on the horizontal axis. Terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the predominately Muslim region stretching from northwestern Africa through the Middle East and in the Muslim areas of southeastern Asia and Oceania. However, there is scant evidence that Islamic militants have established a "global reach" capability for systematic and sustained attacks beyond the Muslim region itself.

Figure 7. Deaths from High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 9/11/1989–3/10/2014

The frequency and lethality of acts of truly "international" terrorism (attacks against foreign targets) does not appear to have increased much, if at all, in recent years; in any case, those attacks remain at extremely low levels when compared with any other form of political or criminal violence. The tactical use of low-tech "smart bombs" (mainly car bombs and suicide bombers) against "soft targets" (mainly political and civilian targets) has increased dramatically since the 9/11/01 attacks. Tracking HCTB events provides a glimpse of extremist activity in the global system; however, this "public" form of extremist action pales in magnitude to the more "private" forms of massacre that are accomplished by roving bands of extremists operating as "death squads." HCTB events are subject to the availability of explosives. Low-tech "private" extremist activity is based on a proliferation of small weapons; it is easy to recognize, due to the frequency and brutality of this form of lethal intimidation but very difficult to monitor from the "outside." "Private"

forms of terrorism are often sponsored covertly by government authorities; this activity figured prominently during civil conflicts in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. It is also a prominent feature in genocidal events, which can be formal (state) or informal (non-state) and direct (lethal targeting) or indirect (withholding vital resources).

While the rise of the "super-empowered terrorist" as an innovation in tactical or criminal violence is certainly a disturbing trend, the evidence shows that it has remained an extreme and relatively rare event, outside the centers of organized extremism in Syria-Iraq and Nigeria. HCTB attacks have killed more than 32,000 people since the 9/11 events, with nearly sixty percent of the killings having taken place in Iraq. The frequency of HCTB attacks in Iraq decreased dramatically beginning in September 2007, falling to less than 12% of the toll at the peak of HCTB attacks there (falling from a six-month total of 2,677 in

mid-2007 to 319 in late 2012-early 2013). The number of HCTB deaths in Iraq has risen sharply since early 2013, averaging 1,200 killed in the two most recent six-month periods. HCTB attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained fairly steady with a peak in activity in Pakistan beginning in late 2009 and lasting through 2010. There has been a substantial increase in the numbers of people killed in HCTB events in "other Muslim countries" (particularly, Nigeria and Syria) since late 2011 and rising to its highest level, so far, in mid-2014.[10]

Lapses into systematic, extremist violence are an ever-present danger in protracted social conflicts. The PITF has identified forty-three (43) episodes of genocide or politicide in the global system since 1955; the most recent episodes have taken place in Sudan in 2003, Sri Lanka in 2008, and Central African Republic in 2013. Episodes of genocide and politicide represent the most extreme cases of organized extremist violence, that is, extremism as a form of public policy where state authority is complicit in, if not responsible for, systematic, lethal attacks on non-combatant populations. Elements of such organized extremism may be observed in all protracted social conflicts that have escalated to armed violence; currently prominent examples of such brutality are found in the civil wars in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and Nigeria. Non-

combatant populations are, by definition, particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of armed conflict and the environmental devastation which is the primary "product" of warfare.

Figures 8a and 8b, chart the global trends in direct, conflict-related deaths, including annual sums of estimated deaths for "formal combatants," "informal combatants," and "non-combatants," in order to place the problem of genocide and politicide, and other forms of political mass murder (during warfare), in global perspective. The charts cover nearly 350 armed conflicts (with a minimum of 500 total deaths per event) and includes all forms of political violence (interstate, societal, and communal, including episodes of "one-sided" violence). This global perspective on political violence was constructed by cross-referencing the UCDP-PRIO (Lacina) list of "reported battle-deaths" (1946-2005), the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) list of "directly-related deaths" in all "major episodes of political violence" (1946-2011), and Benjamin Valentino's list of "mass killing deaths" (1946-2008); all three lists contain "best estimate" figures (the CSP list is a comprehensive compilation of cases drawn from sixteen independent lists of political violence events and includes independent research on all included cases by CSP researchers to verify the estimates and basis for their inclusion). Only the UCDP-PRIO (Lacina) list of armed conflicts provided annual estimates of deaths; these annual death figures were summed for each conflict in order to be compatible with the method used by the CSP and Valentino lists (total deaths during the duration of the event). The lists were compared to identify which events had estimated total deaths greater than the "reported battle deaths" so the "non-battle deaths" could be listed separately. A single "conflict duration" period was set for each event based on information from each list and the

[10] Armed assaults on civilian targets that use firearms or other hand-held weapons (such as the November 2008 assault on Mumbai, India, that resulted in 173 deaths) are not included in this collection. The numbers of deaths attributed to "death squad" activities often far surpasses the death totals of the HCTB events recorded here. Since 2009, the US has used unmanned "drone" aircraft to strike targets in Pakistan. By way of comparison, using the same 15 death threshold to define "high casualty drone attacks" (HCDA), we see that over the peak years, 2009-2011, in Pakistan there were 798 killed in 32 HCDA events and 2,642 killed in 69 HCTB events (according to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal web site, www.satp.org).

categorical death totals were averaged over the span of each event's designated duration to provide annual death figures for each of the three personnel categories. Death figures were then summed for all events taking place in each year to produce an estimate of the global total deaths in each category. Differentiation between "formal" and "informal" (irregular) combatants was based mainly on the nature of the conflict.

Figure 8a includes estimated deaths that occurred during World War II (1939-1945)

in order to provide an appropriate point of reference regarding the global magnitude of deaths during armed conflicts. The average annual death totals for the entire global system during World War II were about 10 million; the average annual global death total over the contemporary period (1946-2011) has about 476 thousand. Based on our calculations, non-combatant deaths are seen to comprise about two-thirds of the estimated total deaths both during both World War II and across the contemporary period.

Figure 8a. Global Trends in Deaths from Political Violence, 1939-2011

Figure 8b removes World War II from the chart in order to focus on trends characterizing the contemporary period. What this chart shows is that the total number of "conflict-related deaths" remains fairly constant across the period with, perhaps, a slight decrease since 2003, although this decrease is within the expected range of fluctuation in the annual figures. This depiction of the number of conflict-related deaths contrasts sharply with the depiction presented in figure 5 (above) of

the summed "societal effects of warfare," highlighting how the state structure of the global system can condition data analysis. The trends depicted in figure 8b also provide a control for increasing global population by displaying the global annual average total death rate from political violence per million population (dotted red line); total global population has increased from just over 5.5 billion in 1946 to nearly 7 billion in 2011. This measure of deaths in political violence reveals a general decline in

the global death rate (solid red line) from just over 200 deaths per million population at the beginning of the period to under 40 deaths per million in the most recent year (2011), although the share of non-combatant deaths appears to be increasing across the contemporary period. Using the Cold War/Post-Cold War split highlighted in the prior conflict trends graph (figure 5), the share of non-combatant deaths during armed conflicts appears to have increased from about 62% during the Cold War period (1946-1991) to about 84% during the Post-Cold war period (1991-2011).

Figure 8b. Global Trends in Deaths from Political Violence, 1946-2011

Whereas genocide and politicide are direct affronts to our very humanity and civility, all forms of political violence, including even the several loosely aligned armed conflicts comprising the "global war on terror," present a serious challenge to both societal-system development at the local level and progressive globalization, more universally. The current conflicts have the potential for escalating to a more conventional regional war in the Middle East and an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in the interior of Africa. Egypt, Iran, and the "oil emirates" of the Arabia Peninsula are experiencing serious spillover effects from ongoing and seemingly intractable armed conflicts in that region. The extremely fragile states concentrated in the interior of

Africa are facing imminent implosion with extremely dire humanitarian consequences for their highly vulnerable populations. Increasing competition over oil supplies can only complicate, if not directly fuel, conflict dynamics in these regions; we can observe disputes over property rights and revenue shares from more recently discovered and exploited oil reserves having complicated conflict dynamics in many African countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea. Control of oil resources (or any other similarly fungible resource) is central to the conflict strategies in all actors in all countries experiencing civil warfare.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Sri Lanka's adoption of "total war" tactics in

defeating Tamil (LTTE) separatists in 2009 has been touted by some as an example of "effective" resolution for long-standing armed societal wars. Such an extreme approach to "effective resolution" requires serious reflection on what constitutes the effective prosecution of military victory and the systemic consequences of such victory. Donor fatigue and engagement frustration over the long course of recovery and development in the "global ghettos" may contribute to acquiescence in favor of, or even support for, more extreme solutions to intractable conflicts, greater neglect of the more insoluble development problems, and acceptance of repressive and predatory governance. The military prosecution of societal conflict has always played out on an unlevel "playing field" and military "victory" in such asymmetrical contests, while ending the fighting, has generally resulted in severe consequences for civilian populations and favored an uncompromising maintenance of the status quo.

Governance Dimension: Global Trends in Governance

Democracy and autocracy are commonly viewed as contrasting and distinct forms of governance. Principal differences are found in the ways executive power is acquired and transferred, how political power is exercised and constrained, how social order is defined and maintained, and how much influence public interests and opinion have on the decision making process. Despite fundamental differences, these two ideal forms of governance are often perceived as comparably stable and effective in maintaining social order. In real terms, however, different countries have different mixes and qualities of governing authority; the ideal types are rarely observed in practice. Even though some countries may have mixed features of openness, competitiveness, and regulation, the core

qualities of democracy and autocracy can be viewed as defining opposite ends of a governance scale. Our *Polity IV* Project has rated the levels of both democracy and autocracy for each country and year using coded information on the general qualities of political institutions and processes, including executive recruitment, constraints on executive action, and political competition. These ratings have been combined into a single, scaled measure of regime governance: the POLITY score. The POLITY scale ranges from -10, fully institutionalized autocracy, to +10, fully institutionalized democracy.[11] A fully institutionalized (+10) democracy, like Australia, Greece, or Sweden, has institutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the discretionary powers of the chief executive. Countries with POLITY scores from +6 to +10 are counted as **democracies** in tracking "Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2013" (figure 9). Elected governments that fall short of a perfect +10, like Bolivia, Mozambique, Turkey, or Indonesia, may have weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to, or by, opposition groups.

In a fully institutionalized (-10) **autocracy**, by contrast, citizens' participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are

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[11] The *Polity IV* data set was originally designed by Ted Robert Gurr in the early 1970s and, since 1998, is directed by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace. The *Polity* data series comprises annually coded information on the qualities of institutionalized regime authority for all independent countries (not including micro-states) from 1800 through 2010 and is updated annually. The *Polity IV* data series is available on the Center for Systemic Peace Web site ("Polity Project").

selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with no meaningful checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions. Only Bahrain, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are rated as fully institutionalized autocracies in late 2013. Other monarchies, such as those in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Swaziland, share some powers with elected officials. In general, except for a strong presence in the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, hereditary monarchy has nearly disappeared as a form of governance in the early twenty-first century. Autocratic governance at the turn of the century is far more likely to be characterized by the authoritarian rule of personalistic leaders, military juntas, or one-party structures; Belarus, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam are examples of these non-monarchical autocracies. Besides having less-clearly defined rules of succession, less-than-full autocracies may allow some space for political participation or impose some effective limits on executive authority; examples include Syria, China, and Zimbabwe. Countries with POLITY scores from -10 to -6 are counted as autocracies in figure 9. Curiously, some personalistic autocracies, such as Azerbaijan, Gabon, North Korea, Syria, and Togo, have adopted dynastic succession in executive leadership to forestall succession crises.

Anocracy, on the other hand, is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic regimes very often reflect inherent qualities of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader).

Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an often incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices. Their POLITY scores range from -5 to +5.[12] Some such countries have succeeded in establishing democracy following a staged transition from autocracy through anocracy, as in Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Taiwan. A number of African and a few Middle Eastern countries have recently begun a cautious transition to greater openness, among them Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ghana, Jordan, and Tanzania. Cote d'Ivoire appeared to be headed on a similar course before stumbling (in 2002) into civil war and regime failure; Iran reversed the course of democratic reforms and tightened autocratic control in 2004; Guinea has been wavering noticeably since the death of President Lansana Conté in late-December 2008. Many governments have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, for example, holding competitive elections for a legislature that exercises little effective control on the executive branch or allowing open political competition among some social groups while seriously restricting participation of other groups.

There are many reasons why countries may come to be characterized by such inconsistencies, or incoherence, in governance. Some countries may be

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[12] Also included in the anocracy category in this treatment are countries that are administered by transitional governments (coded "-88" in the *Polity IV* dataset), countries where central authority has collapsed or lost control over a majority of its territory (coded "-77"), and countries where foreign authorities, backed by the presence of foreign forces, provide a superordinate support structure for maintaining local authority (coded "-66"). As mentioned, none of the INSCR data series, including *Polity IV,* include information micro-states; a state must have reached a total population of 500,000 to be included in the INSCR data series.

implementing a staged transition from autocracy to greater democracy; others may institute piecemeal reforms due to increasing demands from emerging political groups; others may be weakened by corruption or dissension and losing their capacity to maintain strict political controls and suppress dissent. Societal conflict and factionalism often undermine democratic experiments: some regimes may be unable to fully institutionalize reforms due to serious disagreements among social groups or key political elites; some may harden their institutions in response to political crises or due to the personal ambitions of opportunistic leaders; and others may simply lose control of the political dynamics that enable, or disable, effective governance.

Figure 9. Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2013

Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms and strategies of governance, they are very similar in their general capacity to maintain central authority, articulate a policy agenda, and manage political dynamics *over the near term* (autocracies are much more susceptible to armed insurrections and separatism over the longer term). Some anocracies have been able to manage conflict between deeply divided social groups for substantial periods of time through the use of restrictions on political participation as in Russia, Malaysia, and Venezuela. This also appears to be the strategy adopted recently in Fiji to limit political influence by ethnic-Indians (until that policy was challenged by a military coup in late 2006) and in Iraq. Other anocracies are the result of failed transitions to greater democracy, as currently in Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, and Uganda. Anocracies can be further classified into three sub-groupings: "open" anocracies (POLITY scores from +1 to +5); "closed" anocracies (POLITY scores from -5 to 0); and failed or occupation regimes (POLITY codes -77 and -66), as they have been in the mapping of governance regimes in 2013 (figure 10).

In 1946, there were seventy-one independent states comprising the world's system of states (figure 9). Of these, twenty

(20) countries were ruled by democratic regimes and nineteen (19) by autocratic regimes; thirty-two (32) countries were subject to anocratic regimes. The high proportion of anocratic regimes was largely a consequence of the severe devastation and disruptions resulting from the Second World War. The Second World War was a watershed event for globalism as the Nazi "totalitarian" concept of "total war" made modern warfare a global systemic problem. And it was during the Nuremburg Tribunals following the war that the victors of the war finally determined that aggressive war is a crime that must be prohibited (crime of war); that the conduct of war establishes criminal liabilities (war crimes); and that the intentional targeting of non-combatant populations in war must be universally condemned (crimes against humanity).

Figure 10. Distribution of Governance Regimes in the Global System, mid-2014

One direct consequence of the devastation of Europe and the criminalization of war and empire was a serious erosion of European control over its colonial territories in Asia and Africa. Many new states gained independence in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, doubling the number of states in the world by 1975. During this period of decolonization, there was a dramatic increase in the number of autocratic regimes: to a peak of eighty-nine (89) autocracies in 1977. Although new states were about as likely to adopt democratic as autocratic forms of governance upon gaining independence, problems of manageability caused most new democratic regimes to fail within ten years and give way to autocratic rule. Newly independent and underdeveloped states proved particularly difficult to manage.

A second consequence of the technological intensification and expansion of classical war to its modern form as "total war" was the broadening and deepening of political participation in modern states. The demands of modern, systemic warfare brought about the integration of women in the workforce and the more active mobilization of both civil society and

marginal sectors in supporting the war effort. Expanding the political franchise to include women in the world's "advanced industrial economies" only began in the period following the First World War and was only completed following the Second World War. The extension of the political franchise to involve the marginalized sectors of societal-systems was the objective of the Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s in the United States. The end result was the general acceptance of the principle of universal suffrage in practice. The principle of universal suffrage has, at once, 1) accelerated the discrediting and dismantling of autocratic regimes (rendering them largely obsolete in the modern, global system) and 2) increased the societal complexities and management difficulties associated with, and integral to, regime transitions from autocratic to democratic governance.

A dramatic shift away from rigidly autocratic regimes and toward more open governance began in 1990. This "rush toward democratization" was led by Latin American countries and the former-Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. These regions were largely comprised of "old" and fairly well developed states rather than newly independent ones. During the Cold War period, there had been a steady increase in the number of democracies at the rate of about one new democracy every two years. During the early 1990s, the number of democracies increased by sixty percent in five years (from 48 in 1989 to 77 in 1994). There was a similar increase in the number of incomplete transitions toward democracy, as the number of anocracies rose from thirty (30) to forty-nine (49); that number has remained fairly constant through 2013. The number of autocracies continues to plummet: from the peak of eighty-nine (89) in 1977 to just twenty in late 2013. There are fifty-three (53) anocracies and ninety-four (94) countries

classified as democracies in late 2013. The one thing that most clearly distinguishes the Globalization Era is that, for the first time in human history, the global system is predominantly comprised of independent states and governed by democratic regimes.

While we view the major global shift toward greater democracy as a very important and generally positive trend, the sharp increase in the number of anocracies concurrent with the end of the Cold War is cause for concern. Research indicates that anocracies have been highly unstable and transitory regimes, with over fifty percent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years. Anocracies have been much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal conflict; they have been about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars. Anocracies have also been about three times more susceptible to autocratic "backsliding" than democracies; they are four times more likely than democracies to experience coup plots and about one and one-half times more vulnerable to coups than autocracies.

However, a "new truth" may be emerging regarding the vulnerability of anocratic regimes in the Globalization Era. In the past twenty-two years, there have been far fewer failures of anocratic regimes than would be expected from the historical trends. Despite the dramatic rise and continued high numbers of anocratic regimes, with their attendant problems of manageability and poor governance, there has been no increase in the rate of onsets of societal wars (less than four per year) or lapses into autocratic rule. We believe that the change in outcome trends for anocratic regimes is attributable to a post-Cold War "peace dividend" and explained largely due to:

- notable increases in proactive international (global) engagement (particularly, conflict mediation, election monitoring, accountability guarantees, NGO activity, direct investment, and foreign assistance);
- improved public capabilities, attitudes, and expectations (the local "peace dividend," examined in more detailed in the following section on state fragility);
- a lessening of political activism within more professionalized militaries, which have been far less likely to intervene directly in politics or support forceful repression of public challenges to ruling elites; and
- increased, expanded, and prolonged management challenges associated with the full incorporation of the complexities and demands associated with universal enfranchisement and the requirements of technological expertise in effecting successful regime transitions from autocratic to democratic governance in developing societal-systems.

In short, democratic transitions have become more complicated and, so, require greater and more protracted effort, and external support, to accomplish and consolidate. Transition periods, and the anocratic regimes associated with such transitions, then, tend to last longer than they had in the past, particularly in societal-systems with little or no previous experience in democratic governance.

Counter-examples have occurred recently as military coups have ousted elected governments in Thailand and Fiji in late 2006, Bangladesh in 2007, Mauritania in 2008, Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012, Egypt in 2013, and Thailand, again, in early 2014. Bangladesh, Mali, and Guinea-Bissau have returned to some measure of parliamentary rule by mid-2014. Militaries have also been instrumental in forcing the resignations of elected presidents in Honduras and Madagascar in 2009, Kyrgyzstan in 2010, Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, and Yemen in 2012. In contrast to the apparent, general successes of proactive global engagement in the post-Cold War environment, foreign military interventions have had mixed or less favorable outcomes in general, as these have resulted in several, seemingly interminable foreign occupations: Bosnia (since 1995), Kosovo (since 1999), Afghanistan (since 2001), and Iraq (since 2003, ending in 2011); continuing territorial disputes: Trans-Dniester in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Crimea in Ukraine; hotly contested independence referendums: East Timor (2001), Kosovo (2008), and South Sudan (2011); and in one instance (Libya 2011), near anarchy.

Widespread democratization pressures and demands for broad-based societal reforms within the dynamic context of pushback from entrenched, autocratic elites can, and sometimes do, lead to cascade effects whereby social and political movements for change in the status quo in different countries diffuse, link up, and stimulate greater local efforts in regional political and security complexes. This systemic dynamic has been greatly facilitated by technological advances in communication and the global spread of access to social media. Too much disruption of "normal" political processes can, and does, lead to impatience and overt reaction by entrenched economic elites and military leadership to abandon democratic transitions and experiments with more open forms of public participation in favor of a sudden return to a more autocratic status quo or, even, a return of the "old regime."

Systemic Complexity and Cascade Effects: A general theme of the *Global Report* series is the complex interconnectedness of social groupings and networks in societal-systems and their

linkages across traditional political boundaries in the formation of local, regional, and global dynamic systems. The importance of social networks and organizations in defining, refining, and driving the development of social structures and dynamics is generally recognized in the social sciences. Societal-system development, then, can be measured by the expansion of "associational ties and interaction densities" and the "movement of change in societal relations toward a maximal reliance on associative linkages and non-violent conflict management strategies and a minimal reliance on instrumental coercion and crisis management strategies."[13] In brief, it is proposed that, as societal-systems develop, "stakeholder" civil society organizations and interactions evolve as a function of system complexity and operate to complement the state and mediate between the state and the "non-stakeholder" marginal sectors of society to reduce the system's inherently destructive "revolutionary potential" and increase its intrinsically constructive and progressive "democratization potential" (refer to the Societal-Systems conceptual model on page 1 of *Global Report 2011*; for further elaboration of the model, consult the CSP *Video Book*, referenced on page 10, above).

In short, the democratization process in any societal-system is triggered by circumstances and manifests from its democratization potential. Democratization is an essential and necessary conflict management function of increasing systemic complexity which is, in turn, both a corollary and a consequence of the systemic development process. In contrast, the revolutionary process in societal-systems is a radical, crisis manage-ment function that is associated with systemic underdevelopment and poor state

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[13] Marshall, *Third World War*, chapter 3, "The Societal Dimensions of 'Human Nature' and the Dynamics of Group Conflict" (pp. 80, 87-88)

leadership and performance; revolutionary potential is politicized by the intransigence of the state in response to the mobilization of civil society and its increasing demands for progressive societal integration. The revolutionary process is articulated through social support structures in the marginal sectors and organized by disaffected elements of civil society. The revolutionary process (i.e., the manifestation of revolutionary potential as instrumental political action) challenges state authority and diminishes democratization potential. The logical outcomes of the revolutionary process in societal-systems include: 1) strengthening of the state's intransigence as the state acts forcefully to deny or repress the revolutionary challenge; 2) forestalling and prolonging the course of democrat-ization as civil society bears the political costs for repressing the revolutionary process; and/or 3) forcing the collapse of state authority as revolutionary action succeeds in diminishing state capacity.

While development is an inherent function of societal-systems, the course of systemic development is largely determined by the system's unique, local mix of endowments and circumstances. However, local development dynamics take place within a larger, systemic context and the internal dynamics of societal-systems are increasing-ly influenced by external dynamics in the Era of Globalization; no societal-system can be viewed as developing independently from the larger regional and global systems. The (partial) isolation of individual societal-systems from their systemic context comes at great cost. Social networking and organization at the regional and global levels have proceeded apace with the development of social networks and organizations at the local level. States have long acted to extend their influence outside their borders, both multilaterally and unilaterally; global civil society has increased its scope dramatically since the end of World War II.

With the establishment of the United Nations Organization in 1945, the interactions and influences of states have become increasingly regularized and regulated by international inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and, particularly, since the thaw in relations between the Socialist Bloc and the West in the 1980s. The global expansion in the numbers of IGOs has been paralleled (and, perhaps, led) by a dramatic expansion in the numbers and types of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational advocacy networks (TANs; see *Global Report 2011,* figure 8). These developments can be viewed as the emergence of the structures and dynamics of global and regional governance and civil society and this emergence can be understood as a development function of greater global system complexity.

Interaction densities, while structured by organizations, are transmitted through the prevailing media. Globalization has been empowered and conveyed though an accelerating and expanding series of technological innovations in transportation, broadcast communication, and information-computation resources. Globalization began with advances in transportation, expanded through radio and television broadcasting, and has intensified with the advent of digital-electronic networking.

Autocratic authority critically depends upon command and control of information and media in order to fabricate loyalty, dampen the politicization of dissent, and prevent the mobilization of opposition. As we have argued above, the general development of societal-systems has increased both system complexity and democratization potential; these changes, in turn, have altered the incentive structure for the state to broaden its support base and compliance with the rule of law by progressively incorporating civil society into the governance system.

The democratization process increases access, responsiveness, accountability, and innovation within the societal-system, making autocratic authority obsolete.

As already mentioned, there were only twenty (20) institutionalized autocratic regimes in the global system in late 2013. These include an odd mixture of isolationist regimes, communist and former-communist countries, traditional monarchies, and wealthy oil-producing states. Only one autocracy is among the world's poorest countries: Eritrea. The traditional link between underdevelopment and autocratic rule was broken with the collapse of communism as the world's poorest and most dependent countries reformed their autocratic systems as an explicit condition for gaining and/or retaining development assistance from largely democratic donor countries. The remaining autocracies are mainly middle and upper income countries that are, like their middle and upper income democratic counterparts, becoming increasing "tech savvy," "wired," and "wireless." As such, they may be sowing the seeds of their own reformation. Autocracies in the Era of Globalization must be economically self-sufficient and, so, relatively immune to external pressures and influences; however, in order to maintain self-sufficiency in a globalizing economy, autocracies have found it advantageous, in the near term, to accept and institute information-computation technologies. Rather than maintaining strict control of social networking technologies, closed autocracies appear to have embraced them to a degree that rivals that of the open democracies (see *Global Report 2011,* figure 9).

The post-Cold War surge in democracies and democratization processes has transformed the global system in the era of globalization to a democracy-predominant system. This transformation is connected to

generalized societal-system development and robust complexity and is currently characterized by four prominent, systemic, cascade effects. Systemic complexity and interconnectivity create the conditions for regional cascades of systemic change, the result of which is a relatively swift sequence of similar and related changes among societal-systems with high levels of "neighborhood" connectivity and shared circumstances, interests, and values.

First, initial evidence for systemic cascade effects in the transformation of governance systems in the Era of Globalization can be found in South America beginning in the late 1970s. South American countries had a fairly long history of experiments with democratic authority and, so, that cascade of democratization was not shockingly remarkable. Additionally, there had been only limited societal warfare in South America, except for the violence that pervaded the illicit drug producing and trafficking countries of Colombia and Peru. The countries of Central America have a similar history of democratic trials and show evidence of a two-step cascade effect beginning in the late 1970s and continuing in the late 1980s, hampered by the serious societal warfare that had engulfed Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.[14]

A **second** cascade of democratization became evident in the East European region in the late 1980s. The countries of Eastern Europe had relatively vibrant civil societies and several states also had prior experience with democratic authority. However, this history was overshadowed by the devastation of the Second World War and

the descending veil of post-war communism. When political change began to appear in Eastern Europe and spread to the Soviet Union, it was seen as a profound change that contradicted deep-seated "revolutionary" ideologies that had been forged in the crucible of European military rivalries and imperialist adventurism of the nineteenth century and fortified by the pervasive violence and insecurity of the early twentieth century, culminating in the mechanized destruction of two World Wars. Following the end of World War II, Europe experienced a "long peace" with few serious episodes of societal warfare, other than the 1945-49 Greek civil war and 1956 Hungarian rebellion, and until the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia beginning in 1991.

A **third** cascade followed the collapse of communism and the ending of the Cold War. As mentioned, the newly independent, underdeveloped, and foreign aid-dependent societal-systems of Sub-Saharan Africa were almost uniformly enticed by donors and the agents of the emerging global civil society to abandon autocratic rule and implement democratic procedural reforms. As most of these counties were poor, many had experienced brutal conflicts, and few had substantive experience with democratic governance, the democratization processes in Sub-Saharan Africa have remained incomplete and vulnerable to disturbance and instability. African regimes are considered largely anocratic as a result. Both their democratization and development processes continue to be dependent on continued infusions of donor support and humanitarian assistance.

Given the generalized global trends and broad scope of systemic changes that define the emerging Era of Globalization, the main issue should not be explaining why such changes have occurred in the regions in which they have taken place but, rather, why

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[14] *Polity IV* regional trends and individual country trends graphs covering the period 1946-2013 and (2010 version) individual country narratives can be found on the *Polity IV* Project pages of the Center for Systemic Peace web site:
 (www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).

these changes have not occurred in the regions where they have not yet taken place, that is, the middle belt of the Eastern Hemisphere that extends from northwest Africa across the Middle East and through to Central and East Asia.

A **fourth** cascade of democratization appeared to be unfolding in the Arab League countries that span North Africa and the Middle East. The now popularly termed "Arab Spring" can be viewed as having emerged in October 1988 in Algeria when mass demonstrations against the FLN one-party regime triggered an immediate, repressive response by the state but, then, led to the holding of Algeria's first multi-party legislative elections in December 1991. A landslide victory at the polls by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was thwarted by an abrupt military takeover which, in turn, triggered a brutal, fifteen-year civil war. The failed Algerian experiment with democratization, like the nascent social movement in China that was crushed in Tiananmen Square in 1989, contributed to a general dampening of the democratization process across the surrounding region. In the Arab League countries over the next twenty years, we see a gradual decline in autocratic rule due to some piecemeal reforms and concessions. The East Asia region shows some cautious progress in democratization since 1989, with Taiwan and Mongolia making solid strides, Bangladesh and Thailand fluctuating between more and less open governance, Indonesia pushing through a democratic transition in the late 1990s, and Malaysia moving tentatively toward multi-party competition.

It is in the Arab Spring that we can see most vividly the complex influences of the larger global system upon local and regional dynamics. Cascades of democratic change in Latin America and Eastern Europe occurred largely as a natural expression of local

conditions and regional development processes; early attempts to widen societal inclusion and integration were thwarted by the "anti-communism" rhetoric of entrenched elites and promoted by the particularist interests of the United States. The softening of the communist "anti-capitalist" rhetoric was certainly welcomed by the Western alliance but the democratization of the Socialist Bloc arrived unexpectedly. The Western democracies were unprepared for the dramatic changes that spread across Eastern Europe and were hard pressed to provide needed guidance and assistance for the institutional changes accompanying democratization. The *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) reforms in the Soviet Union certainly deflated the "anti-communist" rationale for military activism and regime rigidity in Latin America and, in doing so, removed a major impediment to the integration of a broader form of local populism in electoral politics in Latin America while reinforcing its own momentum.

On the other hand, democratization processes in the Sub-Saharan Africa region are largely artificial, induced by that region's general dependency on foreign assistance and the insistence of the donor community. Local and regional underdevelopment is neither congruent with nor conducive to the democratization process. Identity is staunchly parochial and introverted. Armed conflict and violence continue to be pervasive in many areas and civil society is both resource-poor and poorly organized (in both relative and absolute terms). As such, democratic reforms are partial, incomplete, and highly vulnerable to changes in local conditions and dynamics. Democracy is based upon a fundamental consensus regarding the rejection of force in conflict resolution; it remains particularly vulnerable to factionalism and tends to amplify rather than bridge complex identity divisions and rivalries.

Figures 11a and 11b. Regional Trends in Armed Conflict (a) and Governance (b) for the Arab League Countries, 1946-2013

Since the end of the Cold War, no region of the global system has been subject to the intensity of international interest and influence as has the region comprised by the Arab League countries. And nowhere, since the transformation of anti-communism in Latin America, has the "siren call" of anti-populism been so ardently promoted by foreign interests as in the Islamic countries, of which the Arab League is a principal component; populism in this region of the global system is necessarily Islamic. Current external interest in Arab politics stems from four principle issues: 1) **oil** (11 of the 22 members of the Arab League are net oil exporters and contain over 50% of the world's proven oil reserves); 2) **Palestine** (the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine has defied resolution since 1946); 3) **Iran** (Iran's Shia-Islamic theocracy has pursued an anti-West foreign policy since the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979; Iran has been particularly influential with Shia sectarian groups in Arab League countries); and 4) **al Qaeda** and similar *jihadist* ideologies (xenophobic radicalism and extremism in Islamic countries has been loosely organized by *jihadist* groups which promote a decidedly anti-West and revolutionary agenda). Systemic influences in the Arab League countries are complex and profound and offer the most potent explanations for

the inhibition and delay of democratization processes in those countries. (Similarly, the internal reticence and regional influence of China largely explains the slow pace of democratic reform in East Asia.)

Regional trends in armed conflict and governance for the Arab League countries are provided in figures 11a and 11b above. While both trends show evidence that the Arab region is responsive to general, global trends, there are some important differences that can help us to understand recent changes and future prospects in the region. Like the global trend, the regional trend in societal warfare can be seen to increase more or less linearly through the Cold War period and decrease thereafter. Unlike the global trend, however, warfare in Arab League countries began to change trajectory around the time of the 11 September 2001 al Qaeda attacks in the United States and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Societal warfare increased dramatically with the advent of the Arab Spring in January 2011; violent societal conflicts broke out in Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen in 2011. Perhaps of greater concern is the relative proclivity of the Arab region for interstate warfare, a type of warfare that holds far greater potential for destruction and contagion than societal warfare and a

type of warfare that the global system has been able to avoid in other locations, for the most part, since the establishment of the UN System.

Moving to the regional trend in governance (figure 11b) we can see that the global movement away from the classic reliance on strictly autocratic authority regimes since the mid-1980s is also evident in the Arab countries. What is starkly missing, however, are transitions to open, democratic regimes; democratization processes in the Arab countries have stalled in their transition to fully integrated democratic authority. Countries in the Arab region have very limited experience with democratic governance: only Comoros, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria have supported democratic regimes since 1946 and none have persisted for more than ten years. Currently, democratic regimes are found in Comoros and Lebanon; Tunisia has elected a constituent assembly and transitional government that assumed governing authority in November 2011. Egypt's experiment with elected government was thwarted by holdover conservative courts and, then, quickly overthrown, after only a year in office, by the military in July 2013.

Autocratic regimes are largely confined to the "oil emirates" of the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Moroccan monarchy is currently under domestic pressure to institute constitutional reforms and the Alawite-minority regime in Syria has been engulfed in a brutal civil war with its Sunni Arab majority since March 2011. The autocratic rule of Moammar Ghadafi in Libya was violently overthrown in October 2011 by rebel forces with considerable air support from NATO forces; however, no effective government has emerged in the nearly three years since Ghadafi's death. In mid-2013, Libya remains a failed state held hostage by the several

local militias that originally organized in the fight against the Ghadafi regime.

Seriously complicating conflict, governance, and development dynamics in the Arab countries is the region's maldistribution of income whereby ten percent of the region's population lives in rigidly autocratic states which control fifty percent of the region's income, almost exclusively derived from oil export revenues. Given the importance of broad, systemic support for democratic transition processes to both proceed and succeed, the severe disconnect between income and governance in the Arab League is cause for great concern. The hesitance, or outright refusal, of the region's oil emirates to allow for the development of civil society and provide crucial economic and logistical support for democratization efforts will severely handicap regional prospects over the immediate to medium term. The instrumental repression of democratization pressures in middle and upper income countries, in particular, can only be achieved at great cost and may not be forestalled indefinitely.

The regional trends in armed conflict and governance for the countries situated in East Central Africa are displayed in figures 12a and 12b.[15] The countries of this region provide a stark contrast to the countries comprising the Arab League. Whereas, the Arab League countries are primarily middle to high income countries (GDP per capita for the Arab League countries as a whole was US$5,316 in 2009) and characterized by a serious maldistribution of income across its member states, the countries comprising East Central Africa are almost uniformly

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[15] Seventeen countries are included in the analyses of the East Central Africa region: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

low income countries (regional GDP per capita in 2009 was US$744). However, their regional trends over the contemporary period are remarkably similar and their current trajectories are similarly problematic: while the Arab League countries appear poised for a widening regional war, the East Central Africa countries currently teeter on the brink of a region-wide collapse and consequential humanitarian catastrophe.

The regional trends in armed conflict for East Central Africa (figure 12a) show that

these countries have experienced an almost constant level of societal warfare since their decolonization began in 1960. The only serious interstate war in this region occurred during (early) wars for independence in Kenya and Cameroon and, later, as an interstate border war that erupted out of the simmering rivalry between Ethiopia and the former Ethiopian territory of Eritrea which had seceded in 1993 following a protracted separatist war. Bucking the global trend, armed conflict has not diminished much in this region since the end of the Cold War.

Figures 12a and 12b. Regional Trends in Armed Conflict (a) and Governance (b) for East Central African Countries , 1946-2013

Regional trends in governance (figure 12b) reveal the general vulnerability of countries in the region. Democratization is difficult to initiate and nearly impossible to sustain in poor countries, especially for those situated in poor regions (only Burundi, Kenya, and Niger are considered by the *Polity* Project to be borderline democracies in mid-2014). Autocratic authority is also difficult to sustain in chronically fragile states. Almost all countries in this region were subject to personalistic autocracies following independence and through the Cold War; these regimes have been replaced almost invariably with incoherent anocracies (only the personalistic one-party regime in Eritrea is considered an autocracy in mid-2014). The mean State Fragility score for countries

in East Central Africa was 16.65 in 2013; the mean for Arab League countries was 11.14; and the global mean was 8.33. The East Central Africa region also straddles a borderland between Muslim and Christian influences; several of the conflicts in the region involve rivalries between members of these confessional groups, most notably in Nigeria and Central African Republic.

Development Dimension: Global Trends in State Fragility

The third principal focus of the *Global Report* series is on global development and the general performance of the economic (material capital) and social welfare (human

capital) aspects of globalization and the global system. The initial (2007) *Global Report* highlighted the great regional (and, in some cases, intra-regional) disparities in economic development and the systemic distribution of income. It highlighted the contrast between the better-performing sub-systems, populated by net-consumers of energy resources, and the poorer-performing sub-systems, which are characterized by great income disparities between the resource-rich (often, net-producers of petroleum) countries and the resource-poor countries. The report raised serious concerns regarding the level of tensions that would likely occur in a global system characterized by relatively small, powerful, resource-demanding regions and large, weak, resource-producing regions. "It would seem that the potential for polarization and factionalism in such a system is quite high and, given the evidence that the 'income gap' is narrowing only slowly, will remain high for the foreseeable future." The report concluded by presenting three challenges for the emerging era of globalization: "one is narrowing the divide between 'well-being' and 'fragility' in constituent societies; a second is calming the voices of opposition and transforming their creativity and energy to promote rather than disrupt the global system; and a third is to recognize the full, disruptive potential of our growing dependence on petroleum and accept this as a global dilemma, requiring a global solution."[16]

In this section, we highlight measured changes in our State Fragility Index and Matrix from 1995 to 2013 in order to gain a better understanding of progress being made toward addressing the first challenge,

that is, "narrowing the divide between 'well-being' and 'fragility' in constituent societies." We then conclude *Global Report 2014* by presenting our most recent State Fragility assessments for each of the 167 countries that constitute the global system in mid-2014 (with population greater than 500,000; Luxembourg was added during the 2013 update}. The 2013 State Fragility Index and Matrix (table 3, following) rates each country according to its level of fragility in both effectiveness and legitimacy across four development dimensions: security, political, economic, and social.

Global Summary of Changes in State Fragility: In keeping with the global system perspective of this report, we examine changes in State Fragility across the period of study, 1995-2013, through a global system lens and summarize the results in figure 13 and table 2. The chart and table display aggregate changes in fragility indices and component indicators and is organized in the same array as the State Fragility Matrix (table 3) in order to facilitate comprehension and comparisons.

As already noted, the year 1995 was chosen as our starting point because it is well within the post-Cold War period (which we set as beginning in 1991) and a year for which we have full, annual data coverage on the relevant indicators in the State Fragility Matrix. The SFI Matrix design uses quartile cutpoints for the continuous measures used (such as income, infant mortality, and human development) in order to demarcate ordinal categories; the Economic Effectiveness indicator uses quintile cutpoints. The cutpoints are set using 2004 as the baseline year; change can be measured as a constant and comparative function across the annual data series. The 2013 Matrix update uses a slightly altered set of cutpoints for the Economic Effectiveness indicator due to a recent changes in World Bank *World Development Indicators* on which it is based.

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[16] Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007: Gauging System Performance and Fragility in the Globalization Era," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 17.1 (Winter 2007):3-21, p. 11.

Figure 13. Global Net Decrease in Fragility Scores, 1995-2013

	SFI	EFF	LEG	Security		Political		Economic		Social	
				eff	leg	eff	leg	eff	leg	eff	leg
1995	1769	921	848	116	187	236	226	328	202	241	233
2013	1350	655	695	70	162	159	178	268	212	158	143
diff	419	266	153	46	25	77	48	60	-10	83	90

Table 2. Total (Summed) Scores for State Fragility Indices and Indicators

It is important to keep three things in mind when considering our analysis of state fragility:

1) Our measures of fragility are designed to provide objective, empirical evidence of comparable levels of the "under-development" of individual societal-systems in the global system, so, **larger values of fragility are associated with lower levels of well-being**. This "more is less" perspective is somewhat counter-intuitive.

2) We use "state-level" measures to assess societal-system qualities due to the primacy of the state in setting public policy and because the state is the focal point for information and data on societal-system well-being; we cannot assess internal variations in or distributions of well-being.

3) "Zero" fragility is set at a reasonable, and perhaps sustainable, level of well-being that has been found to be associated with good governance; it is not presented as a maximum or optimal level of well-being.

Our use of standardized and comparable (objective) measures for each of the eight component indicators allows us to monitor and track changes in State Fragility annually since 1995 (the first year for which all eight measures are available). This is an important and unique innovation in monitoring global system performance that allows us to show that improvements in state fragility (and greater societal-system resilience) coincide with improvements observed in global armed conflict and governance. Taken together, these concurrent and congruent improvements in the global system provide both a general, progressive assessment of the performance of the global system and evidence of a "peace dividend" since the ending of the Cold War.

In summary, then, the global total of "state fragility points" assessed in 2013 (i.e., State Fragility Index, SFI) *decreased* by 419 points (23.7 percent) from the 1995 assessments. In the formulation in figure 13, **we present the decrease in state fragility as an increase in societal-system resiliency**. Breaking the aggregate State Fragility Index into its two principal components, we see that the improvements were accounted for to a much greater degree by gains in Effectiveness (266 points; 28.9 percent decrease) than gains in Legitimacy (153 points; 18.0 percent decrease). This imbalance characterizes three of the four fragility dimensions; only the Social Effectiveness and Legitimacy categories show greater change for legitimacy (90 points; 38.6 percent decrease) than effectiveness (83 points; 34.4 percent decrease) over the study period. This improvement in social indicators provides some evidence of the positive effects of international humanitarian assistance programs and standards such as the UN Millennium Development Goals.

Consistent with the relative paucity of major warfare in the global system in 2013 (although warfare increased sharply in the Arab League States since 2011, see figure 11a) and in light of the rapid decline in warfare globally since the early 1990s (as shown in figure 5, above), the Security Effectiveness category shows the lowest summed fragility score of the eight fragility categories: 70 total fragility points by 2013; and the greatest relative improvement among the eight categories of fragility (39.7 percent decrease from 1995). Six of the other seven categories contribute far greater fragility point subtotals to the global total in 2013, ranging from 158 points for the Social Effectiveness category to 268 points in the Economic Effectiveness category. Security Legitimacy (state repression) shows very modest improvement since 1995 (162 total; having dropped only 25 points for a 13.4 percent improvement). Political Effectiveness, reflecting the three regional cascades of democratization and stabilization of more open political systems in the Era of Globalization, shows strong improvement (156 total, down 81 points and a 34.8 percent improvement in that category of fragility). The Political Legitimacy category shows fairly strong improvement over the period (down 48 points to a 178 total; a 21.2 percent decrease). The economic dimension shows only modest gains in Economic Effectiveness (268 total fragility points, down 60 points; a 18.3 percent improvement) and no positive change in Economic Legitimacy at the global system level, reflecting the general failure of primary commodity producers to reinvest foreign exchange earnings into greater, local infrastructure and manufacturing capacity.[17] On the other hand, strong progress can be noted for general improvements in Social

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[17] Recall that our measure of Economic Effectiveness is a five-point scale (0-4) derived from quintile cutpoints in state income (GDP/capita) for the 2004 baseline year using constant 2005 $US. This indicator contributes as many as four points to the fragility index; all the other indicators contribute up to three.

Effectiveness (158 total, down 83 points; 34.4 percent decrease) and Social Legitimacy (143 total, down 90 points for a 38.6 percent decrease in fragility since 1995).

Individual and Regional Changes in State Fragility: As mentioned, in order to gain a better understanding of change in the general performance of the global system, we use the State Fragility Index and Matrix assessment methodology to calculate scores for each country in earlier years and, then, examine the changes in assessed values across time, as we have done in the prior section at the global level. To this purpose, we also examine changes in each country's fragility scores and regional mean scores from 1995 to 2013.

Over seventy percent (71.8%; 117) of the 163 countries listed in table 3 that have existed since 1995 show positive change in their State Fragility Index score with seventy-eight (78) countries showing reductions in fragility of three points or more over that period (i.e., a lower fragility index score for the year 2013 as compared with their 1995 score). In contrast, only eighteen (18) countries show negative change across the same period (i.e., a higher fragility index in 2013).[18] Twenty-eight (28) countries show no change across the time frame with nine (9) of those countries scoring zero (0) state fragility in both 1995 and 2013.

The countries showing the largest improvements in their fragility score across the study period are Guatemala (12 point decrease); Bosnia (10 points); Azerbaijan, Bhutan, and Peru (9 points); Croatia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (8 points); Angola,

Benin, Bangladesh, El Salvador, Georgia, Togo, and Tunisia (7 points); Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Estonia, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Madagascar, and Serbia (6 points); and Cuba, Djibouti, Ghana, India, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Zambia (improving by 5 points each).

Given the global trend toward substantial improvement in state fragility during the Era of Globalization, even modest increases in state fragility represent a serious (relative) debilitation of a state's capacity and resilience in global affairs. The most tragic case of state debilitation is that of Central African Republic, which increased by an incredible ten (10) points. Seventeen (17) additional countries show a modest increase in their state fragility score: Libya and the United States (3 point increase); Belgium and Kyrgyzstan (2 point increase); and Bahrain, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Israel, Malawi, New Zealand, Norway, Solomon Islands, Syria, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yemen (one point increase). Syria's state fragility score has increased five (5) points since 2010.

Regional Comparisons: Figure 14, then, provides a regional summary of changes in State Fragility Index scores during the study period. States were assigned to one of six politically-salient regions: Non-Muslim Africa (sub-Saharan countries); Muslim Countries (i.e., countries in which Muslim confessional groups comprise fifty percent or more of the total population); (non-Muslim) South and East Asia; Latin America; (non-Muslim) Former-Socialist countries; and North Atlantic countries.[19] The regional configurations are mutually

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[18] Four of the countries listed in 2013 did not exist in 1995 and are not included in the comparisons: Kosovo, Montenegro, South Sudan, and Timor Leste; Serbia is considered the successor state to Serbia and Montenegro.

[19] Israel and Mauritius are considered isolated states and are not included in the regional analyses.

exclusive categories; each state is counted in only one region.

Referring to figure 14, the bars in the graph show changes in the mean fragility score for each region across the three sub-periods (1995 to 2001, 2001 to 2007, and 2007 to 2013) and for the period as a whole (1995 to 2013); the bars are measured on the left-hand *y*-axis. The red- and blue-diamond icons indicate each region's average State Fragility Index score at the beginning (1995, red) and end (2013, blue) of the study period; the diamond icons are measured on the right-hand *y*-axis. Note that, while Muslim countries are largely geographically concentrated in northern Africa and the Middle East, there are Muslim countries in the North Atlantic area (Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo), the Former-Socialist area (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and the South and East Asia area (Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia). We treat the Muslim Countries as a separate category of states due to the current prominence of political Islam in global politics. The regions are arranged according to their mean State Fragility Index scores, with the most fragile region (Non-Muslim Africa; 13.89 mean score in 2013) on the left and the least fragile region (North Atlantic countries; 0.70 mean score in 2013) on the right.

The least fragile region in 2013 is the **North Atlantic** region; this region includes Western Europe, Canada, and the United States (twenty countries in 2013).[20] The North Atlantic region's mean State Fragility Index score in 2013 is 0.70, with scores

ranging from 0 (13 countries in 2010) to 3 (Cyprus and the United States). The largest changes in fragility score are that of the United States, for which there is a two-point fragility increase in Security Effectiveness (wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) and a one-point fragility increase in Security Legitimacy (increased use of state repression associated with the "global war on terrorism") and Belgium, for which there is a two-point fragility increase in Political Legitimacy (due to the political salience of ethnicity and active factionalism between Flemish and Walloon identity groups).

Overall, the North Atlantic region has long been and still remains the standard for gauging regional performance and (lack of) state fragility. The question remains open as to whether this region has set a reasonable and achievable standard that is accessible to all countries in the global system or whether some moderation in regional consumption, income, and wealth is a necessary corollary to broader system access to reasonable and sustainable standards of achievement.

Closely following the North Atlantic region in terms of overall fragility is the **Former-Socialist** region comprising countries that have emerged from the Socialist Bloc following the collapse of communism, including Eastern European countries and several of the former-Soviet republics (except the predominantly Muslim countries of Albania, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, and the Central Asian republics).[21] This region's mean score in 2013 is 3.05, with scores ranging from 0 (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia) to 10 (Moldova;

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[20] Twenty countries comprise the North Atlantic region: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

[21] Twenty countries comprise the Former-Socialist region: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 and, so, is not included in the comparative regional analysis.

Armenia, Georgia, and Russia follow with scores of 7 and Ukraine with 6).

This Former-Socialist region charts one of the greatest net improvements in fragility scores since 1995 with a decrease in the regional mean SFI score of 3.32 (cutting the regional mean by over half). The overall change in mean fragility scores for this region is due mainly to improvements in effectiveness (these countries scored well for legitimacy in 1995); these improvements are nearly equally spread across the Political, Economic, and Social Effectiveness dimensions (this region experienced relatively little fragility in the security dimension during the last decades of the Cold War). Smaller changes in fragility are notable in areas where this region had already made substantial achievements: Security Effectiveness and Legitimacy and Economic Legitimacy. Improvements were spread fairly equally across the initial two sub-periods with only slight improvement in the most recent sub-period. Of special note are Croatia, which reduced its State Fragility Index score by eight (8) points; Georgia (7 points); and Bulgaria, Estonia, and Serbia which reduced their state fragility scores by six (6) points each between 1995 and 2013.

Figure 14. Changes in Mean Fragility Score by Region, 1995-2013

The **Latin America region** improved its mean fragility scores by the largest margin: 3.46 points. The mean fragility score for the region in 2013 (6.46), however, stands at more than twice that of the Former-Socialist countries.[22] Scores for Latin American countries range from 1 (Costa Rica) to 15 (Haiti; Guyana follows with a score of 11; Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela score 10). Like the Former-Socialist region, the Latin America region shows strong improvement during the first two sub-periods with only limited improvement in the most recent sub-period (i.e., from 2007 to 2013).

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[22] The Latin America region comprises twenty-four countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,

Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Latin American improvement was driven largely by gains in effectiveness. By 2013, the Legitimacy component of the mean fragility score for the region had improved by only 1.12 points, whereas the Effectiveness component had improved by 3.29 points (nearly three times greater). The region performed particularly poorly in its Political and Economic Legitimacy; improving only slightly in Political Legitimacy and becoming more fragile in regard to its Economic Legitimacy; however, some strong gains are noted in reducing regional fragility in Social Legitimacy. Guatemala led the region in improvement over this period, reducing its fragility score by twelve (12) points (the most substantive improvement of any country in the global system); followed by Peru with a nine (9) point improvement; El Salvador with seven (7); Honduras at six (6); and Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama with five (5) point reductions in fragility. Contrary to the regional and global trends, the State Fragility Indices for Uruguay and Venezuela each increased by one (1) point across the study period.

As noted in our 2007 *Global Report*, the rate of growth of the regional income for the **South and East Asia region**, as a whole, nearly doubled the rate of economic growth in the world's richest countries; with much of the gains accounted for by the emergence of China as a major producer on the global market. Fragility scores for this region show moderate and consistent improvement across the three noted sub-periods, with an average decrease in overall fragility of nearly three points (2.72); the regional mean score stands at 7.55 in 2013.[23] This region shows

one of the broadest ranges of fragility scores, from zero (0, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to nineteen (19, Myanmar; Nepal scores next at 14 points; with India and Laos at 12; Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, and Sri Lanka at 11; and Solomon Islands at 10 points).

Measured improvements in this region are more limited than any of the four other lesser-developed regions; change is noted similarly in each of the two principal components: effectiveness (1.50 point decrease) and legitimacy (1.23 point decrease). Substantive improvements are noted for Security and Economic Effectiveness and Political and, especially, Social Legitimacy; there is no improvement in Economic Legitimacy. Improvement has been particularly strong in Bhutan with a nine (9) point decrease in fragility; followed by Cambodia, China, and Laos (six points each) and India and Papua New Guinea (5 points each). During the same period, the fragility ratings for New Zealand and the Solomon Islands increased by one point.

Due to popular perceptions of rising tensions across the Islamic countries, we examine these countries separately as a distinct, and nearly contiguous, global region. The **Muslim Countries** region was identified in the 2007 *Global Report* as one of the world's two "poor-performance" regions in terms of economic development (along with Non-Muslim Africa).[24] Between

[23] The (non-Muslim) East and South Asia region consists of twenty-three countries: Australia, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, India, Japan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. East

Timor became an independent state in 2002 and, so, is not included in the comparative analysis.
[24] Muslim Countries are identified as countries in which Muslim confessional groups comprise fifty percent or more of the country's total population. This regional category comprises forty-three countries spanning from West Africa to the Pacific Ocean: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar,

1995 and 2013, the Muslim Countries recorded moderate improvement in the regional mean fragility score (2.73); gains in Effectiveness outpaced gains in Legitimacy by nearly eighty percent (1.76 and 0.98 respectively). The range of fragility scores spans from a low of two (2, Albania; followed by Kuwait with 3 and Bosnia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates with 4 points) to the region's highest state fragility score of twenty-two (22, Afghanistan; Somalia follows with a score of 20; close behind are Chad, Iraq, and Yemen with scores of 19 and Mali, Niger, and Guinea with 18).

Improvements in regional fragility are moderate across the Security, Political, Economic, and Social Effectiveness dimensions. The Muslim Countries region stands out because of its relatively large net fragility increase in Economic Legitimacy (9 points, due to even greater dependence on revenues from primary commodities, mainly oil). This region is also notable because there is no measured improvement in Security Legitimacy (state repression); the region does show moderate improvement in Security Effectiveness as a whole, despite the recent onsets of new armed conflicts in Egypt, Mali, North Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The Muslim Countries region has made the largest gains in Social Effectiveness and Legitimacy, accounting for well over half of the region's net improvement across the study period. Despite its continued dependence on EU supervision and its trifurcation into ethnic blocs, Bosnia measures the largest improvement in this region with a ten (10) point improvement in its fragility rating since 1995. Other states in the region with notable improvement include Azerbaijan (9); Bangladesh and Tunisia (7); and

Albania, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Iran (6 points each). Becoming more fragile are Libya (3); Kyrgyzstan (2); and Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen (1; as mentioned, Syria's score has increased five points since 2010).

Countries comprising the **Non-Muslim (or Sub-Saharan) Africa** region have the world's highest mean State Fragility Index score (13.89) and showed an average net improvement in fragility ratings across the period (2.88).[25] After showing only limited net improvement in regional fragility in the first of the three sub-periods charted in figure 14 (0.37), Non-Muslim Africa made far more substantive gains in the second period (1.83) before slowing the pace of its improvement once again in the third period (0.68). Fragility scores for this region range from three (3, Botswana; followed by Namibia and Cape Verde with 5) to twenty-four (24, Central African Republic; followed by Democratic Republic of Congo with 23; North Sudan with 22; and Ethiopia with 20 state fragility points).

Some African countries are notable for having reduced their fragility ratings substantially across the study period: Liberia and Sierra Leone have improved by eight (8) points since ending their brutal civil wars in the early years of the new millennium; Angola also ended its protracted societal war around the same time and has improved its score by seven (7) points; Togo has also improved seven (7) points; while Madagascar has shown improvement of six (6) points. The Sub-Saharan Africa region

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Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, (North) Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

[25] Non-Muslim Africa comprises thirty-five countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

also has the state which has shown, by far, the greatest net increase in state fragility of all the countries in the global system: Central African Republic, which shows a ten (10) point increase in state fragility since 1995. Guinea-Bissau and Malawi show a slight net increase in fragility (1 point) across the 1995-2013 period.

Countries in the Non-Muslim Africa region show nearly equal net improvement in Effectiveness and Legitimacy. The region shows only modest improvement in each of the fragility categories; much of the region's net gain has come in Political Effectiveness. Particularly disheartening are the apparent lack of substantial improvement in the region's Security Effectiveness and Legitimacy, Economic Effectiveness and Legitimacy, and Social Effectiveness and Legitimacy scores; the interplay between insecurity, poverty, and poor social development presents serious impediments to future improvements in security, governance, and development in the region. Under these conditions, the region's net improvement in Political Effectiveness may not be sustainable, despite donor support.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Reason and rationality are clearly among the human traits upon which we must rely if we are to create a sustainable systemic peace and resist the subtle seduction of war. However, individual reason and rationality are far too limited to handle the continuously expanding breadth and scope of complexity in the Era of Globalization. In complex societal-systems, rationality must be forged through public deliberation and the free exchange of ideas and information. Emotive content stimulates the (common) senses and motivates individuals to act in concert. Emotion infuses reason to direct rational action; decisions among alternatives are biased by both (limited)

rationality and (potentially boundless) emotive content. Emotion is double-edged: passion creates but anger destroys. Recognizing the "power" of emotive content is an essential element in effective conflict management and, so, in guiding societal-system development. Dissipating and diminishing disruptive, destructive, and disintegrative emotive content in societal-systems affected by conflict, violence, and warfare is essential to their realignment, reintegration, and reinvigoration, thus, to the progressive quality of their collective rationality and policy decisions.

The end of the Cold War ushered in an Era of Globalization that is, for the first time, governed predominantly by democratic regimes. This marks a watershed moment in modern human history and the beginning of a new, global, social order. However, this new world order encompasses a global system that, while having improved steadily according to our analyses, lacks the capacity and resiliency that would provide a solid foundation for a stable and durable global system. Complexity challenges democratic and autocratic authority alike but, whereas democratic authority manages emotive content to foster and guide societal-system development, autocratic authority utilizes emotive content to control complexity and, thereby, sacrifices long-term development in favor of an imperative social order.

Global Report 2007 examined a global distribution of income among its constituent states characterized by highly unequal regional development and profiled a "system that is profoundly split into 'Haves' (about 15% of the global population) and 'Have-nots.' [A system in which] the potential for polarization and factionalism…is quite high and…will remain high for the foreseeable future."[26]

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[26] Marshall and Goldstone 2007, p. 11.

Global Report 2008 charted change over time in the global and regional parameters of state fragility. The State Fragility methodology provides an annual assessment of state performance which can be tracked on a global, comparative basis. We showed evidence of a "peace dividend" with the end of the Cold War and examined the link between state fragility and armed conflict.

Global Report 2009 underscored the continuing malaise affecting both Non-Muslim Africa and the Muslim regions and highlighted a general imbalance between substantial gains in effectiveness and continuing deficits in legitimacy. This imbalance is especially problematic when considered in the context of our growing investment in and reliance on democratic governance and aspirations for a "democratic peace." While the quality of governance in general has become predominantly democratic, the nature and quality of governance at the regional level is challenged by the large number of anocratic states struggling to recover and/or maintain political stability; a similar number of states working to consolidate recent democratic gains; a relatively small number of very powerful and influential, yet highly vulnerable, old democratic states; and a small and shrinking number of classic autocracies that control some of the world's most vital and coveted energy reserves.

Global Report 2011 introduced the topic of societal-system complexity and intimated that the increasing regularity of international association and organization and the increasing density of communication and information exchange, all of which have skyrocketed since the late 1970s, are foundational elements of "an effective government, a strong private sector, and a vital civil society" and, as such, a good basis for peacemaking. The report also discussed cascade effects within the global system and argued that a "fourth cascade" of

democratization was faltering in the Muslim countries, where trajectories were not following global trends. It also warned that the dramatic drop in global armed conflict since the end of the Cold War appeared to be leveling off and could change course.

Global Report 2014 has discussed the importance of emotive content in understanding dynamics and processes within complex societal-systems. Developing a full understanding of how systems work is the foundation of successful management and the formulation of effective public policy. The report outlines a general process model through which political action and emotive content may escalate and how this societal-system dynamic conditions conflict, governance, and development. It raises attention to the connection between "un" development and the relative numbers of militants and extremists in a societal-system. The report also provides evidence that, while the proportion of non-combatants killed in political violence appears to have increased somewhat in recent years; the rate at which non-combatants in the global system are killed continues to decline. We argue that regional dynamics in Arab League countries and in East Central Africa are each at a critical point that can easily lapse into broader and more deadly warfare and intense humanitarian crises.

We believe that our observations have, once again, compiled a cautiously encouraging report on global system performance in the emerging Era of Globalization. However, this progress has largely been purchased with a "peace dividend" that may now be largely spent. Further progress and consolidation of the new global order will demand a determined partnership and unwavering commitment among the world's less fragile states and more fortunate citizens to reason and understanding in managing the systemic challenges that define our common predicament.

THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2013

Having examined the general performance of the global system of states in the areas of security, governance, and development and discussed changes in the fragility of states since 1995, we conclude this *Global Report 2014* with our assessments of the fragility of the system's constituent units: the 167 independent (macro) states. The idea of a using a matrix of effectiveness and legitimacy dimensions as a method for assessing state fragility was originally developed at the University of Maryland's IRIS center, in response to a research request from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Contributions to developing the idea were made by a number of people at IRIS and those involved in parallel efforts at USAID; however, the matrix of indicators reported here was specifically designed and applied by Marshall and Cole and reported annually in the *Global Report* series (since 2007).[27]

The idea is similar to other multi-dimensional schemes for addressing state fragility, failure, or peace, including earlier indices developed by Marshall and Ted Gurr for the *Peace and Conflict* series, models designed by the US Government's Political Instability Task Force (in which Marshall, Jack Goldstone, and Gurr have played key roles), those developed by Frederick Barton and associates at CSIS, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy created by David Carment, metrics developed for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization under Carlos Pasquale in the State Department, the Fund for Peace's "Failed States Index," and the more recent "Global Peace Index" developed by the

Economist Intelligence Unit for the Vision of Humanity organization and the "Index of State Weakness" developed at The Brookings Institution.[28]

All of these schemes recognize that any assessment of a state's ability to win the loyalty of its people depends on its performance in multiple spheres, spanning governance, economic performance and opportunity, security, and delivery of social services. What the IRIS research team added was to make explicit the need for governing regimes to exhibit *both* effectiveness *and legitimacy* in its performance of those tasks. That is, to achieve maximum stability a regime must both carry out the tasks expected of a competent government, *and* maintain legitimacy by being perceived as just and fair in the manner it carries out those tasks. A state may remain in a condition of fragile instability if it lacks effectiveness *or* legitimacy in a number of dimensions; however a state is likely to fail, or to already be a failed state, if it has lost both.

The partnership between the Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc makes the State Fragility assessments unique in that they are based on real-time monitoring of security and political conditions in each of the 167 countries under examination and they use well-respected and annually updated data sources for the quantitative assessments. These primary information resources make the State Fragility Index and Matrix as current and consistent as possible.

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[27] Electronic copies of previous editions in the *Global Report* series are available in PDF format on the "Global Report" page of the Center for Systemic Peace Web site.

[28] See Monty G. Marshall, "Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing the Sources of Systemic Risk," Center for Preventive Action, Working Paper 1, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, for a detailed, comparative analysis of such composite indicators.

STATE FRAGILITY COLOR ICONS

Table 3, which begins on the following page, presents the State Fragility Index and Matrix 2013 and the corresponding ratings of the global system's 167 countries. It is accompanied by detailed Technical Notes that identify each of the data sources used and describe how the various indicators were constructed. Colors icons used in the table are employed intuitively:

■**Black Icons** (used only for the Economic Effectiveness) represent "extreme fragility" and a score of 4;

■**Red Icons** represent "high fragility" and a score of 3;

■**Orange Icons** represent "moderate fragility" and a score of 2;

■**Yellow Icons** represent "low fragility" and a score of 1; and

■**Green Icons** represent "no fragility" and a score of 0.

TABLE 3: STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2013
Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole
Center for Systemic Peace

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Central African Rep.	24	12	12	orange	red	War	red	red	SF	black	red		red	red	Afr
Dem. Rep. of Congo	23	13	10	red	red	War	red	orange	dem	black	red		red	red	Afr
Afghanistan	22	12	10	red	red	War	orange	yellow	—	black	red		red	red	Mus
Sudan (North)	22	11	11	red	red	War	red	red	aut	red	red		orange	orange	Mus
South Sudan	21	10	11	orange	orange	War	red	red	SF	orange	red	na	red	red	Afr
Ethiopia	20	11	9	red	red	War	orange	red	aut	black	red		red	orange	Afr
Somalia	20	10	10	red	red	War	yellow	yellow	dem	red	red		red	red	Mus
Chad	19	10	9	yellow	orange	X	red	yellow	aut	red	red	3	red	red	Mus
Iraq	19	9	10	red	red	War	red	red	dem	orange	red	26	orange	yellow	Mus
Myanmar (Burma)	19	8	11	orange	red	War	orange	red	aut	orange	red		orange	orange	
Yemen	19	8	11	yellow	red	War	red	red	dem	red	red		orange	orange	Mus
Burundi	18	12	6	orange	orange	*	red	green	DEM	black	orange		red	orange	Afr
Guinea	18	10	8	green	yellow	*	red	red	dem	black	orange		red	orange	Mus
Guinea-Bissau	18	10	8	green	yellow	*	red	yellow	dem	black	red		red	red	Afr
Mali	18	10	8	yellow	orange	X	orange	yellow	dem	black	orange		red	red	Mus
Niger	18	10	8	green	yellow	*	red	yellow	DEM	black	red		red	red	Mus
Uganda	18	11	7	orange	orange	*	red	orange	aut	black	yellow		orange	orange	Afr
Nigeria	17	8	9	orange	orange	War	yellow	yellow	dem	red	red	5	orange	red	Afr
Rwanda	17	9	8	orange	yellow	*	yellow	orange	aut	black	red		orange	orange	Afr
Zimbabwe	17	10	7	green	orange		red	red	dem	black	yellow		red	yellow	Afr
Angola	16	7	9	orange	orange	*	yellow	yellow	aut	orange	red	36	orange	red	Afr
Burkina Faso	16	9	7	green	yellow		orange	green	aut	black	red		red	red	Afr
Cameroon	16	7	9	green	yellow		orange	red	aut	red	red		orange	orange	Afr
Cote d'Ivoire	16	9	7	yellow	orange	X	red	yellow	dem	red	orange		orange	orange	Mus

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Liberia	16	10	6	yellow	yellow	*	orange	green	DEM	black	red		red	orange	Afr
Malawi	16	8	8	green	yellow		orange	yellow	DEM	black	red		orange	red	Afr
Mauritania	16	8	8	green	yellow	*	red	red	aut	red	red	+	orange	orange	Mus
Pakistan	16	8	8	orange	red	War	yellow	red	DEM	red	green		orange	orange	Mus
Eritrea	15	9	6	green	red	*	orange	green	AUT	black	orange		red	yellow	Afr
Haiti	15	9	6	green	yellow	*	red	red	SF	black	green		orange	orange	
Sierra Leone	15	8	7	yellow	yellow	*	green	yellow	DEM	black	red		red	orange	Afr
Syria	15	7	8	orange	red	War	orange	red	AUT	orange	orange	+	yellow	green	Mus
Algeria	14	5	9	orange	orange	*	orange	red	dem	yellow	red	15	green	yellow	Mus
Gambia	14	9	5	green	yellow		red	green	aut	black	orange		orange	orange	Mus
Nepal	14	9	5	yellow	orange	*	orange	orange	DEM	black	green		orange	orange	
Bangladesh	13	7	6	green	orange	*	orange	orange	dem	red	green		orange	orange	Mus
Congo-Brazzaville	13	6	7	green	yellow	*	orange	orange	aut	orange	orange	23	orange	orange	Afr
Djibouti	13	7	6	green	yellow	*	orange	green	dem	red	orange	+	orange	red	Mus
Mozambique	13	7	6	green	yellow	*	green	green	dem	black	red		red	orange	Afr
Togo	13	7	6	green	yellow		yellow	red	aut	black	green		orange	orange	Afr
Zambia	13	5	8	green	orange		orange	yellow	DEM	red	red		orange	orange	Afr
Comoros	12	7	5	green	green		orange	green	DEM	red	red		orange	orange	Mus
Egypt	12	6	6	yellow	orange	War	orange	red	aut	orange	green		yellow	yellow	Mus
Equatorial Guinea	12	4	8	green	yellow		orange	yellow	aut	green	red	168	orange	red	Afr
India	12	8	4	red	orange	War	green	yellow	DEM	orange	green		orange	yellow	
Kyrgyzstan	12	7	5	green	yellow	X	red	red	DEM	red	yellow	+	yellow	green	Mus
Laos	12	6	6	green	green	*	orange	yellow	AUT	red	red		orange	orange	
Libya	12	4	8	yellow	orange	X	red	red	SF	green	red	86	green	green	Mus
Uzbekistan	12	5	7	green	yellow		yellow	red	AUT	red	red		yellow	green	Mus
Cambodia	11	7	4	green	yellow	*	orange	orange	dem	black	red	+	orange	orange	
Gabon	11	3	8	green	yellow		yellow	orange	dem	yellow	red	51	yellow	red	Afr
Ghana	11	6	5	green	yellow	*	yellow	orange	DEM	red	orange		orange	yellow	Afr

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Guyana	11	3	8	green	yellow		green	red	DEM	orange	red	+	yellow	yellow	
Iran	11	3	8	green	orange	*	orange	orange	AUT	yellow	red	8	green	yellow	Mus
Madagascar	11	9	2	green	yellow		red	green	dem	black	green		orange	yellow	Afr
Papua New Guinea	11	6	5	green	yellow	*	yellow	green	dem	red	red		orange	yellow	
Philippines	11	8	3	red	orange	War	red	yellow	DEM	orange	green		yellow	green	
Sri Lanka	11	5	6	orange	red	X	orange	red	dem	orange	green	+	green	green	
Tajikistan	11	6	5	green	yellow	*	yellow	orange	aut	black	orange		yellow	green	Mus
Tanzania	11	6	5	green	yellow		green	green	aut	black	orange		orange	orange	Afr
Timor Leste	11	6	5	green	green	*	yellow	yellow	DEM	red	red	25	orange	yellow	
Azerbaijan	10	3	7	green	yellow	*	orange	orange	AUT	yellow	red	33	green	yellow	Mus
Benin	10	6	4	green	green		yellow	green	DEM	red	orange	+	orange	orange	Afr
Bolivia	10	4	6	green	green		yellow	orange	DEM	orange	red		yellow	yellow	
Colombia	10	3	7	orange	orange	War	green	orange	DEM	yellow	red	6	green	green	
Kenya	10	6	4	yellow	orange	*	green	green	DEM	red	yellow		orange	yellow	Afr
Moldova	10	5	5	green	yellow	*	yellow	orange	DEM	red	orange	+	yellow	green	
Nicaragua	10	4	6	green	yellow	*	orange	yellow	DEM	orange	red	+	orange	yellow	
Solomon Islands	10	7	3	green	green	*	orange	green	DEM	red	red	+	orange	green	
Venezuela	10	3	7	green	yellow		red	orange	dem	yellow	red	23	green	green	
Bahrain	9	3	6	green	yellow		red	orange	AUT	green	red		green	green	Mus
Indonesia	9	5	4	orange	orange	*	green	green	DEM	orange	yellow		yellow	yellow	Mus
Kazakhstan	9	3	6	green	yellow		orange	orange	AUT	yellow	orange	28	green	yellow	Mus
Paraguay	9	4	5	green	yellow		yellow	green	DEM	orange	red	+	yellow	yellow	
Saudi Arabia	9	1	8	green	orange	*	yellow	red	AUT	green	red	118	green	green	Mus
Senegal	9	5	4	green	yellow	*	green	yellow	DEM	red	green	+	orange	orange	Mus
Swaziland	9	5	4	green	yellow		yellow	green	AUT	orange	green	+	orange	red	Afr
Turkmenistan	9	3	6	green	yellow		yellow	yellow	AUT	yellow	red	9	yellow	yellow	Mus
Bhutan	8	5	3	green	green	*	yellow	orange	dem	orange	green		orange	yellow	
Ecuador	8	3	5	green	yellow	*	orange	yellow	dem	yellow	red	7	green	green	

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Guatemala	8	4	4	green	yellow	*	green	orange	DEM	orange	green	+	orange	yellow	
Israel	8	2	6	orange	red	War	green	red	DEM	green	green	X	green	green	
Jordan	8	4	4	green	orange		yellow	orange	aut	orange	green	+	yellow	orange	Mus
Lesotho	8	6	2	green	green		yellow	green	DEM	red	green		orange	orange	Afr
North Korea	8	3	5	green	red		green	yellow	AUT	orange	yellow		yellow	green	
South Africa	8	3	5	green	yellow	*	yellow	orange	DEM	yellow	green	+	yellow	orange	Afr
Turkey	8	3	5	orange	yellow	War	yellow	orange	DEM	green	yellow	+	green	orange	Mus
Armenia	7	3	4	green	yellow	*	yellow	yellow	dem	orange	orange	+	green	green	
Georgia	7	4	3	green	yellow	*	orange	orange	DEM	orange	green	+	green	green	
Honduras	7	4	3	green	yellow		yellow	yellow	DEM	yellow	yellow	+	green	green	
Kosovo	7	3	4	green	green	*	yellow	red	DEM	orange	green	na	green	yellow	Mus
Mongolia	7	3	4	green	yellow		green	green	DEM	orange	orange	+	yellow	yellow	
Morocco	7	5	2	green	yellow	*	yellow	orange	aut	orange	green	+	orange	yellow	Mus
Russia	7	3	4	orange	orange	War	green	green	dem	yellow	orange	18	green	green	
Suriname	7	2	5	green	green	*	green	yellow	dem	yellow	red		yellow	green	
Thailand	7	4	3	yellow	orange	War	yellow	yellow	DEM	yellow	green	+	yellow	green	
Vietnam	7	5	2	green	yellow	*	yellow	yellow	AUT	red	green		yellow	green	
China	6	2	4	green	orange	*	green	orange	AUT	yellow	yellow	+	yellow	yellow	
Fiji	6	4	2	green	green		red	yellow	aut	yellow	yellow	+	green	green	
Lebanon	6	2	4	green	yellow	*	yellow	red	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	Mus
Malaysia	6	2	4	green	yellow		yellow	red	DEM	yellow	green	1	green	green	Mus
Peru	6	1	5	green	yellow	*	green	yellow	DEM	yellow	orange		green	yellow	
Ukraine	6	3	3	green	yellow		yellow	orange	DEM	orange	green	+	green	green	
Brazil	5	1	4	green	orange		green	yellow	DEM	yellow	yellow		green	green	
Cape Verde	5	3	2	green	green		green	green	DEM	yellow	yellow	+	orange	yellow	Afr
Cuba	5	1	4	green	yellow		green	orange	AUT	yellow	orange	+	green	green	
Dominican Republic	5	1	4	green	orange		green	yellow	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	yellow	
Mexico	5	2	3	orange	orange	War	green	yellow	DEM	green	green	2	green	green	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Namibia	5	2	3	green	green	*	green	green	DEM	yellow	green	+	yellow	red	Afr
Oman	5	2	3	green	green		orange	green	AUT	green	orange	92	green	yellow	Mus
Panama	5	1	4	green	green	*	green	yellow	DEM	yellow	red	X	green	green	
Tunisia	5	3	2	green	yellow		orange	green	dem	yellow	green		green	yellow	Mus
Belarus	4	3	1	green	yellow		orange	green	AUT	yellow	green	+	green	green	
Bosnia	4	2	2	green	green	*	yellow	orange	—	yellow	green	+	green	green	Mus
El Salvador	4	2	2	green	yellow	*	green	yellow	DEM	yellow	green	+	yellow	green	
Qatar	4	0	4	green	green		green	green	AUT	green	red	261	green	yellow	Mus
Romania	4	1	3	green	yellow	*	green	orange	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	
Serbia	4	2	2	green	green	*	yellow	orange	DEM	green	green	+	green	green	
Trinidad	4	0	4	green	yellow		green	yellow	DEM	green	yellow	23	green	yellow	
United Arab Emirates	4	1	3	green	green		yellow	green	AUT	green	red	178	green	green	Mus
Botswana	3	2	1	green	green		green	green	DEM	yellow	green	+	yellow	yellow	Afr
Cyprus	3	0	3	green	green		green	red	DEM	green	green	X	green	green	
Jamaica	3	1	2	green	orange		green	green	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	
Kuwait	3	0	3	green	green	*	green	green	AUT	green	red	333	green	green	Mus
United States	3	2	1	orange	yellow	War	green	green	DEM	green	green	+	green	green	
Uruguay	3	1	2	green	green		green	green	DEM	yellow	orange	+	green	green	
Albania	2	2	0	green	green	*	yellow	green	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	Mus
Argentina	2	1	1	green	green		green	green	DEM	yellow	yellow		green	green	
Australia	2	0	2	green	green		green	green	DEM	green	orange	+	green	green	
Belgium	2	0	2	green	green		green	orange	DEM	green	green	X	green	green	
Bulgaria	2	1	1	green	green		green	yellow	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	
Chile	2	0	2	green	green		green	green	DEM	green	orange	+	green	green	
Croatia	2	0	2	green	green	*	green	orange	DEM	green	green	+	green	green	
Greece	2	0	2	green	yellow		green	green	DEM	green	yellow	X	green	green	
Macedonia	2	1	1	green	green		green	yellow	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	
Montenegro	2	2	0	green	green	*	yellow	green	DEM	yellow	green	+	green	green	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
New Zealand	2	0	2	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟧	+	🟩	🟩	
Norway	2	0	2	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟧	128	🟩	🟩	
Singapore	2	0	2	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟧	aut	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Costa Rica	1	1	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟨	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Czech Republic	1	0	1	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟨	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
France	1	0	1	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟨	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Lithuania	1	1	0	🟩	🟩		🟨	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Mauritius	1	1	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟨	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Slovak Republic	1	0	1	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟨	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Switzerland	1	0	1	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟨	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Austria	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Canada	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	17	🟩	🟩	
Denmark	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	3	🟩	🟩	
Estonia	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Finland	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Germany	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Hungary	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Ireland	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Italy	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Japan	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Latvia	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Luxembourg	0	1	0	🟩	🟩		🟨	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Netherlands	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Poland	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Portugal	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
Slovenia	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	
South Korea	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	X	🟩	🟩	
Spain	0	0	0	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	DEM	🟩	🟩	+	🟩	🟩	

	Fragility Index	Effectiveness Score	Legitimacy Score	Security Effectiveness	Security Legitimacy	Armed Conflict Indicator	Political Effectiveness	Political Legitimacy	Regime Type	Economic Effectiveness	Economic Legitimacy	Net Oil Production or Consumption	Social Effectiveness	Social Legitimacy	Regional Effects
Sweden	**0**	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
Taiwan	**0**	0	0	■	■		■	■	DEM	■	■	X	■	■	
United Kingdom	**0**	0	0	■	■	*	■	■	DEM	■	■	+	■	■	

TECHNICAL NOTES TO THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2011:

The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2013 lists all independent countries in the world in which the total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2013 (167 countries). The Fragility Matrix scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2013. Each of the Matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 "no fragility," 1 "low fragility," 2 "medium fragility," and 3 "high fragility" with the exception of the Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale (including 4 "extreme fragility"). The State Fragility Index, then, combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 "no fragility" to 25 "extreme fragility." A country's fragility is closely associated with its *state capacity* to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its *systemic resilience* in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development.

Fragility Indices

State Fragility Index = Effectiveness Score + Legitimacy Score (25 points possible)
Effectiveness Score = Security Effectiveness + Political Effectiveness + Economic Effectiveness + Social Effectiveness (13 points possible)
Legitimacy Score = Security Legitimacy + Political Legitimacy + Economic Legitimacy + Social Legitimacy (12 points possible)

General Notes: The State Fragility Index and Matrix was originally introduced in "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007." In order to standardize procedures for scoring each of the eight component indicators to make the indicators and indices comparable across time, we set threshold values for the categorical fragility scores based on cutpoints derived from values in a baseline year (2004). This methodology effects continuous measures used for Economic Effectiveness (GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars); Economic Legitimacy (manufacturing exports as a percent of merchandise exports); Social Effectiveness (human development indicator; HDI); and Social Legitimacy (infant mortality rate); baseline specifications are provided in the relevant indicator explanations that follow. Social Effectiveness scores were revised slightly due to a change in the formulation of the Human Development Index by the UNDP *Human Development Report* in 2010. The Economic Effectiveness indicator was rescaled in 2009 and a fifth value was added to denote "extreme fragility" in countries that have a GDP per capita of $500 or less (constant 2005 US$). As the World Bank regularly revises historical, country-level GDP and periodically adjusts "constant" GDP figures to a new base year, we recode the entire time series of the Economic Effectiveness indicator annually using the most recent GDP figures provided by the World Bank; this may result in some changes to historical indicators and indices in the time-series data set. In addition, a fourth indicator was added in 2008 to the calculation of the Political Legitimacy Score (scores for all previous years have been recalculated; state fragility scores have been calculated for all countries annually beginning with 1995). As several of the Matrix indicators

use "most recent year available" data, the Matrix scores are carried forward and adjusted when new data becomes available; see details below.

Security Indicators

Security Effectiveness ("seceff") Score: Total Residual War, a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence, 1989-2013 (25 years). Source: Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013, (www.systemicpeace.org), variable name "actotal." The formula to calculate this score is based on two assumptions: (1) the residual effects of low level and/or short wars diminish relatively quickly; and (2) the residual effects of serious or protracted wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period. Three indicators are used to calculate each country's "residual war" score (*reswartot*): *warsum1-4* (sum of annual scores for all wars in which the country is directly involved for each continuous period of armed conflict); *yrnowar1-3* (interim years of "no war" between periods of armed conflict); and *yrpeace* (years of peace, or no war, since the end of most recent war period). For states with one war episode: *reswartot = warsum* − [*yrpeace* + (0.04*yrpeace* x *warsum*)]. For countries with multiple periods of war, a *reswar* value is calculated for each, in chronological order. Thus, for a state with two episodes of war, to calculate the first episode: *reswar1 = warsum1* − [*yrnowar1* + (0.04*yrnowar1* x *warsum1*)]; and for the second episode: *reswartot = (reswar1 + warsum2)* − {*yrpeace* + [.04*yrpeace* x (*reswar1* + *warsum1*)]}; and so on. Any negative residual war (*reswar*) scores are converted to zero before calculating additional residual war scores. The final *reswartot* value is then converted to a four-point fragility scale, where: 0 = 0; 1 = 0.1-15; 2 = 15.1-100; and 3 = greater than 100.

Security Legitimacy ("secleg") Score: State Repression, a measure of state repression, 1999-2012. Source: Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale (PTS; www.politicalterrorscale.org). The PTS provides separate annual indicators drawn from U.S. State Department and Amnesty International reports; each indicator is coded on a five-point scale, from 1: "no repression" to 5: "systemic, collective repression." To determine the state repression score, we calculate the following: (1) nine-year average, 1999-2007; (2) four-year average, 2008-2011; and (3) most recent value, 2012; the three, mean indicators are then compared according to a fragility categorization: 0 = 1.0-2.0; 1 = 2.1-3.0; 2 = 3.1-4.0; and 3 = greater than 4.0. If the most recent year value agrees with the previous four-year average, then these two means are used to identify the repression category. When the most recent year score is not in agreement with the previous period, then the earlier nine-year mean is used to help determine a more general pattern in state repression. Historical treatments, that is, calculations of Security Legitimacy Scores for previous years, are further aided by reference to patterns in "future" PTS values. The exact year of change in the general practice of state repression and, so, the Security Legitimacy Score can be more confidently identified in the historical treatment. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2012 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2012 Matrix "secleg" score and that score is carried forward to the 2013 Matrix.

Referent Indicator: The *Armed Conflict Indicator* provides a general indicator of the country's most recent experience with major armed conflict, including wars of independence, communal wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and inter-state wars. Referent indicators are not used in the calculation of state fragility scores. Source: Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013, Center for Systemic Peace. A dark shaded "**War**" entry indicates a country is actively involved in a major armed conflict(s) in mid-2014; a medium shaded "**X**" indicates that the country has emerged from major armed conflict(s) in the past five years (since early 2009); and a light shaded "*****" indicates that the country has been directly involved in one or more major armed conflicts sometime during the previous twenty year period (1989-2008) but has not experienced a major armed conflict since, that is, for at least the past five years.

Political Indicators

Political Effectiveness ("poleff") Score: Regime/Governance Stability, 1997-2013. Sources: Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013; Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Leadership Duration (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, Coups d'Etat, 1946-2013, datasets (www.systemicpeace.org). Three indicators are used to calculate the Regime/Governance Stability score: Regime Durability (Polity IV, 2013); Current Leader's Year's in Office (Leadership Duration, 2013); and Total Number of Coup Events 1998-2013, including successful, attempted, plotted, alleged coups and forced resignations or assassinations of chief executives, but not including coup events associated with Polity adverse regime changes (these major regime changes cause the "durability" score to be reset to "0" and, so, would be double-counted, see above). These indicators are scored such that: Durability < 10 years = 1; Leader Years in Office > 12 years = 1; and Total Coup Events: 1-2 = 1 and >2 = 2. These indicators are then added to produce the Regime/Governance Stability score (scores of 4 are recoded as 3). Note: Countries coded in the Polity IV dataset as an "interregnum" (i.e., total or near total collapse of central authority, −77) for the current year are scored 3 on the Political Effectiveness indicator.

Political Legitimacy ("polleg") Score: Regime/Governance Inclusion, 2013. Sources: Polity IV, 2013; Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Victor Asal, Minorities at Risk Discrimination 2013 (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Elite Leadership Characteristics 2013 (updated by Monty G. Marshall). In the 2007 report, four indicators were used to determine the Regime/Governance Inclusion score: Factionalism (Polity IV, *parcomp* value 3 = 1); Ethnic Group Political Discrimination against 5% or more of the population (Discrimination: *POLDIS* values 2, 3, 4 = 1); Political Salience of Elite Ethnicity (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELETH* values 1 or 2 = 1); and Polity Fragmentation (Polity IV, *fragment* value greater than 0 = 1). To these indicators, we have added Exclusionary Ideology of Ruling Elite (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELITI* value 1 = 1). Political Legitimacy Score is calculated by adding these five indicators; scores of 4 or 5 (rare) are recoded as 3.

Referent Indicator: The *Regime Type* column provides a general indicator of the country's regime type on 31 December 2013 based on the "polity" score recorded in the Polity IV data series. An upper case "**AUT**" indicates the country is governed by an institutionalized autocratic regime (POLITY -6 to -10); a lower case "**aut**" indicates that the country is governed by an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," autocratic regime (POLITY -5 to 0). An upper case "**DEM**" indicates an institutionalized democracy (POLITY 6 to 10) and a lower case "**dem**" indicates an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," democratic regime (POLITY 1 to 5). Countries listed with a "**SF**" (state failure) are experiencing a "collapse of central authority" such that the regime has lost control of more than half of its territory through some combination of human and natural factors, usually due to serious armed challenges, poor performance, and diminished administrative capacity (Central African Republic, Haiti, Libya, South Sudan); those denoted with dash "**—**" indicates that the central government is propped up by the presence of foreign forces and authorities that provide crucial security support for the local regime and, without which, central authority would be susceptible to collapse (Afghanistan and Bosnia). Countries with transitional governments (Tunisia) are classified as either weak democracies (dem) or weak autocracies (aut) according to the transitional regime's authority characteristics. As the Polity IV indicator of "polar factionalism" has proven to be a very potent indicator of political instability, regimes that are denoted as factional (i.e., PARCOMP=3) are shaded; in addition, transitional (POLITY score -88), failed (POLITY score -77), and occupied (POLITY score -66) are also considered unstable and, so, are shaded for emphasis on this referent indicator.

Economic Indicators

Economic Effectiveness ("ecoeff") Score: Gross Domestic Product per Capita (constant 2005 US$), 2006-2012. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014 (www.worldbank.org/data). The annual values for the past seven years are reviewed to verify that the value in the most recent year is consistent with values in previous years and that a threshold/category change in a country's GDP per capita indicator score is part of a consistent trend and not simply a short-term aberration from that trend. The value for the most recent year (2012) is coded into a five-point fragility scale, based on cut-points derived from the threshold values for the fit of the State Fragility Index and GDP per capita in a baseline year (2005). The standardized categories are as follows: 4 = less than $500.00; 3 = $500.00 to $1199.99; 2 = $1200.00 to $2999.99; 1 = $3000.00 to $7499.99; and 0 = greater than or equal to $7500. When a country's 2012 value exceeds the borderline value separating categories, the fifteen-year income growth indicator is used to assign the final score: selecting the higher fragility category if long-term growth is negative or the lower fragility category if long-term growth is positive. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2012 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2012 Matrix "ecoeff" score and that score is carried forward to the 2013 Matrix. **Note:** These cutpoint values and the baseline year differ from previous versions of the Global Report due to revisions made by the World Bank in contemporary and historical data with the 2014 version of the data series: standardized categories are revised to conform with the change to "constant 2005 US$" and revised GDP figures were retro-coded for prior years, 1995–2011, in the SFI time-series dataset in May 2014.

Economic Legitimacy ("ecoleg") Score: Share of Export Trade in Manufactured Goods, 1998-2012. Source: UN Development Programme, Structure of Trade, 2014, and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2014, (manufacturing as a percentage of merchandise exports). Merchandise exports include two classes of products: manufactured goods and primary commodities; low percentage of manufactured goods indicates a high reliance on primary commodities for foreign exchange. The annual values of this variable are examined to ensure that the most recent annual value is a representative value within the established range for that country. The manufacturing percentage of merchandise exports is then converted to a four-point fragility score, where: 3 = less than or equal to 10; 2 = greater than 10 and less than or equal to 25; 1 = greater than 25 and less than or equal to 40; and 0 = greater than 40. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2012 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2012 Matrix "ecoleg" score and that score is carried forward to the 2013 Matrix. The world's main illicit drug producing/supplying countries: Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), and Columbia are given the highest value (3) on this indicator.

Referent Indicator: The *Net Oil Production or Consumption* indicator provides information on a country's 2012 petroleum energy profile expressed in net "barrels per capita" as reported by the US Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov). The indicator value is calculated by subtracting the country's reported total

daily consumption figure from its total daily production figure (in thousands of barrels), multiplying the result by 365 (to get an annual figure), and dividing by the country's total population (in thousands). A dark-shaded numerical value (e.g., Qatar's **261**) indicates a net petroleum producer expressed in barrels per capita. A plus sign "**+**" indicates a moderate net petroleum consuming country (1-10 barrels per capita) and an "**X**" indicates a major net consuming country (greater than 10 barrels per capita). Blank cells indicate country's with low petroleum profiles (less than one barrel per capita producer or consumer).

Social Indicators

Social Effectiveness ("soceff") Score: Human Capital Development, 2012. Source: UNDP *Human Development Report 2012*, Human Development Index (HDI), 2012 (www.undp.org). Reported HDI values are converted according to a four-point fragility scale based on the cut-points of the lower three HDI quintiles in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Effectiveness Score is assigned as follows: 3 = less than or equal to .400; 2 = greater than .400 and less than or equal to .600; 1 = greater than .600 and less than or equal to .700; and 0 = greater than .700. Because the calculated value on this indicator is based on year 2012 data, the indicator value is assigned to the 2012 Matrix "soceff" score and that score is carried forward to the 2013 Matrix. **Note:** These cutpoints differ from those reported in the 2007 - 2009 editions of *Global Report*. This is due to a change in the formulation of the Human Development Index reported in the UNDP *Human Development Report* beginning in 2010. The new UNDP report provides scores for earlier years and orders countries similarly across the two (old and new) formulations of the HDI; thus the two indices could be combined to provide consistent coverage annually for the entire period, 1995-2012.

Social Legitimacy ("socleg") Score: Human Capital Care, 2013. Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2014, (IDB; www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb), Infant Mortality Rate, 2013. This indicator is based on the infant mortality rate (number of deaths of infants under one year of age from a cohort of 1,000 live births), with values converted to a four-point fragility scale based on the upper cut-points of the lower three quintiles of the infant mortality rates in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Legitimacy Score is assigned as follows: 3 = greater than 75.00; 2 = less than or equal to 75.00 and greater than 45.00; 1 = less than or equal to 45.00 and greater than 20.00; and 0 = less than or equal to 20.00. These scores are then adjusted according to ranking comparisons between the country's income level (GDP per capita) and human capital development (HDI). If the country's HDI ranking among the 165 countries listed is more than twenty-five places above its GDP per capita ranking (meaning it provides better human capital care than expected by its level of income) the Social Legitimacy Score (fragility) is lowered by one point. If HDI ranking is more than twenty-five places below GDP per capita ranking, the fragility score is increased by one point.

Referent Indicator: The *Regional Effects* indicator provides information to identify two important "neighborhood" clusters of countries: dark-shaded "**Mus**" indicates a country that is characterized by a Muslim majority (countries mainly located in northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia) and unshaded "**Afr**" indicates a country located in non-Muslim (sub-Saharan) Africa.

CONTRIBUTORS

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